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GENERAL EDITOR

CHARLES H. HASKINS

Professor of History in Harvard University

A HISTORY OF ROME

By

TENNEY FRANK

Professor in The Johns Hopkins University



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PREFACE

This book is intended primarily for general readers who are interested in the political and cultural fortunes of the ancient republic which in so many respects did pioneer work in democratic government. With such readers in view I have aimed to tell a consecutive story rather than compile a reference book of paragraphed facts. However, I have also kept constantly in mind the needs of college classes, which, till very recently, have had to depend upon elementary books or upon histories emanating from Europe. The latter, though usually well written, do not seem to meet our needs. The older peoples of Europe are more interested than we in the imperialistic problems of Rome, in the government of widely scattered provinces, and in the survival of late Roman institutions which they have inherited. We are naturally more concerned with Rome's earlier attempts at developing an effective government while trying to preserve democratic institutions. Whereas modern European nations have experienced a devolution, as it were, from late Roman autocracy, our state, like the Roman Republic, plunged at once into experimenting with more or less clearly accepted theories of popular sovereignty. Since a book of this compass can consider only a fraction of the known facts, it has seemed advisable to select rather rigorously the parts that concern us most.

In treating the Ciceronian period I may seem to have disregarded this rule in favor of fulness of detail. My justification must be that only in Cicero's correspondence have we the material from which to picture accurately Rome's everyday political and social life. Even if some of the incidents sketched may seem to be of little objective importance, it is well in one chapter at least to gain an

intimate impression of how the Romans actually conducted themselves. Furthermore it is at this point that the reader is most apt to have some knowledge, from first-hand reading of Cicero, Caesar, and Vergil, of the facts and personalities involved.

My colleague, Professor Wilfred Pirt Mustard, has given me most generously of his time in a patient and helpful scrutiny of many of these chapters. Professor Allen C. Johnson has offered numerous excellent suggestions, Professor Ralph V. D. Magoffin has helped me prune the later chapters, and Professor C. H. Haskins, the general editor of this series, has pointed out many a sin of omission and commission throughout the manuscript. To all of them I am deeply grateful. The bibliography at the end, while intended primarily as a selected list of suitable readings, will also indicate the authors to whom I am most indebted. Finally I wish to thank the Johns Hopkins Press for permission to cull freely from my *Economic History of Rome* in writing chapter XXI.

T. F.

Baltimore, Md.

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A HISTORY OF ROME

CHAPTER I

EARLY INVASIONS OF ITALY

The early peoples of Italy. The hordes of Celts, Goths, Vandals, and Lombards that have in historical times overrun Italy provide examples of what the peninsula must have experienced during the many thousands of years before Rome was built. The superb climate and the luxuriant vegetation of a soil far richer than that of the eastern Mediterranean have always invited armies of migrants from the inclement North. And when in the course of time each invading horde has itself grown indolent under the softening influence of the Italian conditions, it in turn has had to give way to a more enterprising stock not yet enervated.

How long Italy has been settled it is impossible to tell. The caves of southern France, with their walls decorated with surprisingly artistic drawings, prove that soon after the last glacial period, when reindeer still roamed about, a race of magnificent build and notable intelligence inhabited southern Europe. This so-called Cro-Magnon race seems to have lived about twenty thousand years ago. These people may well have overrun Italy also, but the absence in Italy of limestone caves, which might have preserved such records, leaves us without information.

We know, however, that all of Italy was inhabited by savages long before the use of metals was known. In practically every district of the peninsula there have been discovered peculiar rounded depressions which prove, by the

fragments of tools and pottery found in them, that they served as floors of human habitations. The tools are of flint and rough stone, and the houses covering these round depressions were doubtless a kind of straw wigwam. These savages, to judge from skeletal remains, seem to have been a short, dark people not unlike the Berbers of to-day.

The Terramara invasion. About two thousand years before Christ, various Indo-European tribes began to push their way across the Alpine ranges into the Mediterranean countries. They were apparently a tall, well-built, fair-haired race closely related to the ancestors of the modern Celts, Germans, and Anglo-Saxons. In Greece these migrants were called Hellenes and became the basic element of the remarkable Greek people. The tribes that first entered the Po valley of Italy came gradually, and developed more slowly than the Hellenes, since they came into contact with nothing but barbaric folk in Italy, whereas the Hellenes had at once mingled along the Aegean coast with the most cultured peoples then in existence.

Before entering Italy, while dwelling near the numerous Swiss lakes, these migrating tribes had adopted the ingenious custom of finding safety from their enemies by building their huts on wooden piles driven into the water along the shallow margins of the lakes. Hence they are often called *lake-dwellers*, and their homes *pile-dwellings*. Coming over the Alpine passes they found in the Italian lakes places suited for such dwellings.


Here they pursued their habitual occupations of fishing, hunting, herding, and cultivating a few products of the soil. Fishing from the back door must have been a congenial as well as profitable occupation. Wild boar could be found in numbers in the foothills of the Alps nearby. Their hunting tools were still largely of flint, finely finished, but they had also learned to prize bronze when any happened to be brought their way. In fact, though they had no direct access to copper deposits, they had learned the arts of

smelting, molding, and working the metal—useful arts in reshaping instruments out of broken fragments. They had also domesticated the ox for food and for work, the pig, the dog, and the sheep. They used wool and flax for their clothing: and the work of spinning and weaving kept the women well occupied.

Of agriculture there are very few traces in the earliest pile settlements in Italy, but it was not long before the raising of millet, wheat, and flax became the mainstay of the rapidly increasing settlements in that rich new country. The development of agriculture was of course of supreme importance, for it soon suggested the desirability of private ownership of land, it promoted the organization of government for the unified protection of the crops and stores of grain against invaders, and it encouraged the invention of new implements of agriculture and the training of the oxen to help in the heavy work. This, in turn, caused the growth of a more heterogeneous society; private ownership soon divided the prudent and frugal from the shiftless, the need of advanced tools gave play to talents for practical industry and a primitive commerce, and the development of the social organization provided positions of authority for men who distinguished themselves by their prudence and ability to govern.

During the millennium that followed the appearance of the first lake-dwellers, new waves of the same stock kept coming on. The lakes could no longer provide space for their dwellings, and so they pushed on southward into the margins of the marshes that were still extensive in the Po valley, and finally even created places for their customary pile-settlements on dry land. This they did by surrounding a block of houses by a ditch into which they ran the water from some nearby river. It is from the numerous remains of these later settlements, now filled with *débris* about the regular rows of decaying poles, that the Italian archaeologists have given the name *terramara* or *terramarna* to such

TERRAMARA SETTLEMENTS



sites. The word means "fertile soil," and the term was first applied to them by the modern Italian peasants who have long made a practice of employing this débris for fertilizing their fields.

When the Terramara peoples had filled the lower plains of the Po, and had made their way into the upper districts, passing the Apennines, and finally overrunning a large part of Italy, they abandoned, of course, the habitations protected by water and constructed their villages in a more normal fashion. But even then they preserved their old custom of carefully plotting their village areas and making a regular pattern for their towns which had been forced upon them by the expense of cutting their canals and dikes. The Romans of Caesar's day still made their military camps on a plan which closely resembled that of the Terramara town of a thousand years before.

The Villanova settlements. A branch of these northern peoples had overrun that part of Italy which we now call Umbria and Tuscany. After the introduction of iron into Italy, more than a thousand years before Christ, this group grew into a strong people, and developed certain customs of workmanship that seem to distinguish them from the Terramara people. Many of their villages grew into strong cities, the principal one of which was the one now called Bologna. The cemetery of this town, at Villanova near Bologna, has given its name to this people. Their remains are distinguished particularly by a certain type of funeral urn found in their cemeteries. Many thousand examples of this so-called "Villanova urn" have been found in northern Italy. Their pottery and copper implements bear decorative designs that indicate contact with the Cretan civilization. Their iron weapons are skilfully made and their tools show that they were an industrious and prosperous agricultural people. Whether they represent a new wave of immigrants from the North that introduced the use of iron or whether they were a branch of the Terramara folk

which progressed along peculiar lines on Italian soil because of contact with commerce on the Tuscan and Adriatic coasts, is not wholly clear. It is generally conceded that these are the Umbrians of historical times, who, as their language implies, were cousins of the Latins and Samnites.

The Terramara and Villanova peoples certainly represent the largest groups of northern immigrants that during the second millennium before Christ took possession of practically all the good land of Italy. It is not likely that any large part of the native barbaric stock remained, as the native element in Greece seems to have done. The Italian barbarians, not being tillers of the soil, had cared little for the possession of land; and such barbarians—like the North American Indians for example—prefer to emigrate before land-seeking invaders rather than to fight or remain in subjection—as did the land-tilling South American Indians. The earlier Italian natives, therefore, were generally driven to the high mountains of Liguria or southern Italy and Sicily, and even over the seas. The monuments of Egypt, indeed, show pictures of such rude refugees who had taken service with the Pharaohs.

At the dawn of history, the Italian peoples derived from the northern immigrants held nearly all of Italy. The Latins were a relatively small group of these dwelling near the Tiber; the Sabine and Samnite tribes, who spoke a dialect so like Latin that it could very quickly be learned by the Latins, held central and southern Italy except for the southern-most end of the peninsula; and the Umbrians, as we have seen, held Tuscany and Umbria. The Po valley was also still in the hands of Italic tribes. The non-Indo-European native tribes were left in mass only in the Ligurian mountains above Genoa and in Calabria and Apulia.

In this group of immigrants who took possession of most of Italy we are particularly interested because they are the first Indo-Europeans with whom history has any acquaintance. This tall light race, though far from precocious and

seldom the originator of a new culture, has nevertheless shown a marked capacity for analytical thought and for orderly government, as well as a distinct ability to assimilate and appreciate high artistic ideals. Their capacities have to be sure been variously dulled or quickened by intermixture with other races. In Greece, for instance, they doubtless gained in artistic power and lost in political genius by freely mixing with the native Aegean peoples. In Italy, however, we may study them in their more normal development, since there the more thorough elimination of the native element seems to have left the immigrant stock for a long time fairly pure.

The Etruscans. Italy, however, by jutting deep down into the Mediterranean, also invited immigrants from over the sea. Two or three centuries before Rome was built, crowds of an eastern people, the Etruscans, began to come from Asia Minor by ship to settle the coast towns of the Umbrians north of Rome. Whence these people originally came, and who they were, no one knows. Egyptian monuments of the 13th century B.C. tell of the *Turuscha*, who are presumably these people, and who were then making sea-raids on the Egyptian coast. The religious rites of the Etruscans prove furthermore that they had at one time come in close contact with the Mesopotamian people. We may suppose then that after migrating to the Asia Minor coast from the interior they had taken to sea roving, and, when hard pressed from behind, had sailed in considerable groups to Italy where they took possession of several Umbrian towns. We still have about eight thousand inscriptions of theirs, chiefly brief epitaphs upon tombstones, but though the letters and words can be deciphered, being written in an adapted Greek alphabet, no one can understand the language itself, nor has any one found any other language to which it seems to be related. The Etruscans indeed are one of the strangest mysteries of history.

Within two centuries of their coming they had taken

possession of all of Tuscany, had crossed into the Po valley where they founded a large number of cities, and then turning south past Latium—which still for a while resisted invasion—they seized Campania, the most fertile plain of Italy. How immigrants coming in ships could do all this, it is difficult to explain. Had they merely sought land for colonization as the Italic immigrants had done, the feat would have been impossible. Their object and their methods, however, must have been totally different. Like the Normans who invaded Sicily in the middle ages, they came apparently as conquerors and overlords eager to organize, rule, and exploit the inhabitants already there, rather than to drive them out in order to get their soil. Hence we may suppose that relatively small bands of adventurers seized city after city, organized armies of the Umbrians to do their bidding, and levied taxes to support their princely courts. But though they succeeded in imposing their language on the people of Tuscany, it is not to be supposed that the Etruscans of Cicero's day were predominantly of the Oriental stock. Notwithstanding the fact that they spoke the Etruscan language, they must have been in the main of Umbrian stock with some Oriental admixture.

The Etruscans had an easy advantage over the quiet Italian farmers, for, having lived in Asia Minor where the current of all the latest ideas flowed, and having roved the seas, they had the latest weapons, were skilled in the best devices of military and political organization, and could with their ships keep in touch with the arts and crafts of the East.

When, therefore, in the eighth and seventh centuries there was a remarkable blossoming of Greek civilization in the East, the Etruscans very quickly brought the artistic products of this civilization to Tuscany. At a time when the Latin farmers were intent only on their crops, Etruscan princes at Caere, Tarquinii, and even the Latin town of Praeneste, which they had captured, were building magnifi-

cent temples for the decoration of which they brought in Greek artists. They also imported beautifully wrought gold and silver table-ware from Cyprus, Egypt, and Phoenicia, as well as the precious stones, jewelry, and ointment which Phoenician traders handled. Presently their own craftsmen learned to reproduce the terracotta statues, the exquisite pottery, and the intricate jewelry that were then appearing in Ionia and Greece. Their large tomb-chambers, which they cut into the solid rock in the form of dwelling-rooms, have preserved in many cases the best examples in existence of the seventh and sixth century art of Greece. Though their civilization shows but little originality, and did not survive very long, the Etruscans by acting as a distributing medium for the arts and crafts and ideas of more gifted peoples exercised a profound influence upon Italian history.

The Greek colonists in southern Italy. We must finally mention the numerous Greek colonies of southern Italy that were founded in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries. The trading folk of Euboea took possession of the bay of Naples with the colonies of Cumae and Dicaearchia before the Etruscans arrived there, and then, perhaps to guard the route through the Sicilian straits, planted colonies on both sides of the water. Dorians established themselves on several sites on the southern coast of Italy and in Sicily; of those Tarentum and Syracuse especially rose into prominence. Finally, Ionians driven from Phocaea by the Persians, settled Massilia (Marseilles), far up beyond Italy near the mouth of the Rhone. Most of these Greek colonies, settled by adventurers and traders, contributed relatively little to Greek literature or philosophy. But their service to Rome was worthy of note. They had some opportunity by their commerce to keep the home-loving Latins in touch with the outside world, they blocked the advances northward of the Carthaginian power, kept the Sicilian straits open, and, recognizing a kindred spirit in the Latins,

aided Rome at times of great peril from being overwhelmed by Etruscans and Carthaginians. Especially true is this of the Greeks nearest Rome in the cities of Cumae, Mar-seilles, and Syracuse.

Physical geography of Italy. Though historians have lost some of their former confidence in the doctrine that environment determines racial characteristics, geography still has a legitimate place in history. A glance at the map of Italy will show that the peninsula, over six hundred miles long, juts boldly down into the Mediterranean sea about half-way between Asia and Spain. Since this sea bordered all the civilized lands at a time when communication by water was easier than by land we may venture to suppose that Italy was favorably situated as the home of an imperial power. It is also to be noticed that the Alps formed a palisade that must have turned back many a migrating horde of Northerners and made Italy relatively easy for any fairly well-organized people to defend. In other words, Rome was seldom compelled to waste man-power in defense of Italy, and she did not constantly have to fear that in sending armies abroad she was exposing her vital center to attack.

Whether Italy should be considered favorably situated for commerce, it is difficult to say. The peninsula to be sure protrudes down into the routes of seafarers, and has two thousand miles of coast line. But it does not possess many natural harbors. The eastern shore has no good port, but it also has but little fertile land that would need shipping facilities. The fertile western coast is washed by a shallow sea. This was a great advantage in the early days when skippers stranded their flat-bottomed vessels while landing for trade, and in that day the Etruscans were a great trading people. But the lack of deep and easily protected harbors proved to be a disadvantage when larger vessels came into use and when pirates began to attack exposed ports. The best harbors were at Tarentum and in the bay of

Naples, and of those two places the Greeks with their good commercial sense early took possession. Possibly the Romans might have become a trading people like the Greeks had they possessed better harbors and less fertile lands to induce homekeeping. However, it would be hazardous to affirm or deny this.

That the soil of Italy was relatively good in comparison with that of Greece, Asia Minor, Syria and North Africa we know. To be sure the persistent chain of the Apennines runs the whole length of the peninsula, and covers more than half its width. But these hills are not very inhospitable. Somewhat like our Appalachians, they contain many broad and fertile valleys and at worst provided timber and pasture ground. They also attracted precipitation, stored water on their timbered slopes, supplied subsoil moisture and irrigating streams for the plains below. Italy was thus better watered than she might otherwise have been. And compared with other Mediterranean countries Italy has a large area of arable land. The western strip of rich lowland, though seldom over twenty-five miles wide, is several hundred miles long; and the extensive Po valley is composed of unmeasured depths of alluvium that has silted in from the mountains on three sides. With cereal and vegetable culture on the plains and in the valleys, and large herds of sheep and cattle on the mountain pastures, modern Italy is capable of supporting about 30,000,000 of her people, and that is a larger population than ancient Italy ever contained. Presumably this condition of the soil helps to explain the fact that the Romans prided themselves on being an agricultural people.

Summary. Such then was Italy and such were the peoples that merged together to make the stock destined to rule the Mediterranean world. In the conglomeration the predominant element was the Italic group: the Latins, Umbrians, Sabellians, and the Samnites. The thinly scattered group of Orientals soon lost itself in the whole, after plant-

ing the seeds of Aegean culture. The Greek colonies of the southern rim retained their identity longer, serving always as a means of transmission of Greek thought and art. But it was the Italic inheritance of prudence and sobriety, of patience and persistence, of integrity and clean living that gave its stamp to the Roman character of the Republic.

—Rome was the first city state which discovered a formula whereby a republic could expand beyond the confines of a city, unify other peoples in goodwill under its leadership, and thus give a free field for the peaceful extension of culture. There were many ingredients in that formula, but the most important one was a strong sense of justice and equity resulting in a code of laws which has educated every nation since then in the principles of government. Of this code Bryce has said: "They imparted to the law as it left their hands a spirit of honour, good faith and equitable firmness which modern systems have never surpassed and which is in some respects higher than that of our English Law."¹

The Greeks, to be sure, were a more original people, in fact they are probably the only Indo-Europeans that have distinguished themselves for originality in every form of art and thought. But the Romans, in temper more like the modern representatives of the Indo-European stock, performed an inestimable service at a time when Greece could no longer stem the almost overwhelming pressure of seething barbarian migrations. They unified the civilized world and made it possible for all the cultural acquisitions of other ages to pass into the possession of one extensive empire so that they could not be blotted out wholly when the crash came. Through their capacity to assimilate, the Romans saved for future ages practically all that was worthy of saving. The new Europe of the renaissance found at hand not only Roman law, Roman governmental ideas, Roman literature, and an architecture adapted out

¹ *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, p. 591.

of the Aegean for European use, but also Greek literature, philosophy, and art saved from destruction, and not least, the Christian religion which had come to Rome from Palestine and which the Romans had assimilated before the dark ages came.

In the following pages we shall especially give attention to the experiments of the government which accomplished these things. It was the only republic before our own that succeeded for a considerable period in maintaining liberty and potency. Its problems were to a large extent the very ones that we have had to solve. The Romans approached these problems with hardly any precedents to guide them, and from their failures and successes we can derive valid principles of government.

CHAPTER II

LATIUM BEFORE AND DURING ETRUSCAN OCCUPATION

The Latin plain. The backbone of the Italian peninsula is formed by a limestone ridge called the Apennines, which had risen out of the sea in the Tertiary period. The western shore of this area was shallow and soon began to fill in from the alluvium of the mountain ridge. To help the process of land-making a long series of volcanoes all through Tuscany, Latium, and Campania began to arise and eject lava and ashes. This process began at the north and progressed southward. Vesuvius on the bay of Naples is still active occasionally. The Tuscan plain filled in many millennia before historic times, but the Alban volcanoes, commanding the Latin plain, continued their eruptions till the last millennium before Christ. In fact Latium seems not to have been habitable until about a thousand years before our era: on the present surface, at least, few implements used by man have been found antedating the iron age, though Tuscany and the Apennine mountains behind reveal marks of human habitation of long ages before.

It is well to keep this in mind because it explains why the Latin soil remained rich and unexhausted longer than that of some other parts of Italy. The volcanic ash contained a good store of potassium and phosphates, which are, of course, very desirable for agriculture. After a period of jungle and timber growth which brought nitrogenous matter into this soil, it was ready to support a very dense population.

The plain of Latium is very small, bound in by the Apennines on the east, a spur of the same called the Volscian

mountains on the south, the sea on the west and the Tiber on the north. It is no larger than an average county in America, or the area of the present city of Chicago with its nearest suburbs. A good walker can cross it in either direction in a day. Before the Etruscans came, the Latins, or rather the Faliscans, a very closely related tribe, extended north of the Tiber for some distance. Indeed it is likely that the Latin tribe had once been an extensive group of Terramara peoples which had been pushed south across the Tiber into the forest country of Latium by the expansion of the Umbrians on the north.

The Latin villages. The Latins in occupying the new land settled, as early Europeans usually did, in villages on ridges which would give some natural defense and whose springs of water could be made reasonably secure. It is difficult for Americans to comprehend the meaning of such villages, for we have nothing like them. Most of our country was settled by farmers who received about 160 acres each from the government and built each his lonely house on his land. Our "villages," which grew up at the crossroads near post-stations here and there, are only settlements of middlemen who came in afterwards to provide articles needed by the farmers in exchange for the farmers' products. The early Italian villages arose in a different way. They were close-packed dwelling-places of all the farmers of the community. The settlers of Italy lived together because they felt the need of society, because, in the lack of a strong government to protect their possessions, it was dangerous to live alone, and because their plots of land consisted of only a few acres and were, therefore, within easy access of the village home. Without machinery all farming was necessarily intensive garden-culture, and under that system a family could not take care of many acres.

This manner of living naturally had its peculiar effects upon society. It provided an interesting life for the women

and children—preventing the dreary monotony of the isolated farm-house that makes it difficult in America “to keep the young men on the farm.” It also encouraged a simple type of democratic self-government. Every individual was thoroughly acquainted with every other, and undue power was not apt to fall to anyone. By intermarriage within the village, close feelings of kinship sprang up and natural “brotherhoods” were formed.

It was customary to group the population of the town into ten of these brotherhoods or *curiae*, for voting or military purposes. For the direction of the assemblies and their armies, these *curiae* every year elected at town meeting a magistrate, and the fathers of families acted as a senate of elders which gave advice to the magistrate.

Since even the Terramara folk practised agriculture, there is every reason to believe that the Latins had adopted the institution of private property in land long before they settled in Latium; but we may suppose that some woodland was if possible left undivided where every citizen could cut wood for his own use, and that some meadow land, less desirable for cultivation, was also left to village ownership where each citizen had a right to graze his proper proportion of sheep and cattle.

Such was the normal system in the primitive Latin towns before outside influences from the Etruscans created difficulties. There were a great many of these small communities within Latium, perhaps more than fifty, if we may accept a late tradition. The whole tribe of course acted in unison at times of invasion from the outside, but it had no strong central government that could impose laws or rules. The tribal unity was kept up chiefly by means of annual meetings held on top of the high Alban mountain where the chief god of the tribe, Jupiter, was supposed to dwell. Once every year the Latins sacrificed to him and partook with their god of a common meal. For a long time before the pressure from the Etruscan invaders be-

came dangerous the simple sturdy farmers lived thus in peace multiplying rapidly on that rich land. The soil was new and, after the timber had been cut, the most fertile in Italy. It seems clear also that these early settlers did not suffer from the want of humidity which now prevails there. At present the soil of Latium yields only scanty crops, not only because the soil is exhausted but also because the dry season comes on so early in June that wheat has not sufficient time to fill out. The deterioration of the climate is probably due to the cutting of the timber on the high mountains east and south of Latium. In the early days of Latium, however, a thick forest on the Apennines kept the winter snows longer than at present, and this kept the temperature somewhat cooler; and furthermore the forest-grown mountains had a deeper soil which held the last spring rains from running off quickly, and thus insured subsoil moisture for the crops on the plains somewhat longer into the summer than at present. The early Latins probably did not have the long dry season which now prevents gardening in the summer and which compels the modern peasants of Latium to drive their flocks to the mountains early in July. Under the conditions that prevailed then, Latium could support very many people; and we may suppose that the strength of the Latin tribe, despite the circumscribed area in which it dwelt, was due to the density of the population.

The primitive religion. These early peoples had a very simple religion. There were no temples as yet, and no images of any gods. They believed in good and evil spirits that should be worshiped or propitiated, but did not conceive of them as having human form. The god of the tribe by whom all members took their most sacred oaths was a spirit, represented by the light of heaven and by lightning. His name was Light-father, Jupiter. Him they worshiped on the Alban mount because that reached farthest into the sky, perhaps also because they knew that this had once

been a mountain of fire (a volcano). There was a spirit in sown crops called Saturnus, a wild spirit in the woods, injurious to cattle and men as well, called Mars, a spirit of gardens called Venus, and a mysterious spirit of the deep woods about Lake Nemi, called Diana. Then there were spirits in every spring deserving of offerings, a spirit called Blight (Robigus) that sometimes let the grain rust, a spirit called Terminus which protected boundary stones so that farmers should not move them to their own advantage, and a large number of helpful spirits of various functions called Lares. In short, the religion was simple *animism* with but few suggestions of anthropomorphism.

Simple though this worship was, it was also remarkably clean of baser superstitions like the magic and *tabu* which we find in the animism of American Indians, the South Sea Islanders, and even in the rites of ancient Greece. There were a few magical practices like the employment of "sympathetic magic" by which priests tried to get rain from heaven by pouring water over a stone while repeating charms; and there were also a few instances of *tabu*. But such things are extraordinarily rare in the recognized religion. Some scholars attribute this purity to the high-minded ordinances of some religious legislator like the legendary king "Numa," but it is more likely that the clean Indo-European customs which the ancestors of the Italian peoples had brought down from the North were for a long time left uncontaminated by the superstitions of a lower civilization. It has been noticed that Homer also, who represents the early unmixed Hellenic culture, has fewer references to such base beliefs than the later Greek authors. It was the Etruscans and the Greeks of Cumae who taught the Romans anthropomorphic notions of the gods, and it was the Etruscans with their gloomy view of life and their mysterious superstitions that brought in the *haruspices* who professed to foretell the future by inspecting the entrails of animals. Animism is, to be sure, polytheistic, but it has

spiritual value, and some beauty; and it is, under guidance of thoughtful men, capable of spiritual growth, as it was in Palestine. This is particularly true when the tribal deity is conceived of as a universal attribute like light. It was a great misfortune for the Latins that the Greeks and Etruscans brought in their picturesque stories before the Latins were advanced enough in thought to resist their deluding attractiveness.


These early folk held of course no clear tenet concerning the immortality of the soul, though they, like the Indo-European people generally, had long inferred that the spirit might hover about a dead body. They may have inferred this from diseases that spread near plague-stricken bodies, or perhaps from acts of vengeance that followed violent death. At any rate, they had concluded that it was prudent to avoid the dangers from such ghosts by burning the bodies of the dead. That is why Viking heroes, as well as Homeric warriors, were burned and not buried. The Terramara and Villanova peoples had continued this custom of cremating the dead, and in early Latium it was customary to burn at least the bodies of adults. But the rite was less generally observed after the Latins came into contact with the Etruscans, who regularly buried their dead.

The Latins seem to have preserved some slight trace of the old belief in ghosts that hung about, for they performed annual rites at the tomb of the dead, whether the corpse had been cremated or buried. It is possible, however, that these annual rites were early introduced by the Etruscans, and that we should not draw inferences from them regarding primitive Latin ideas.

The Etruscans at Rome. Rome was said by late tradition to have been founded in 753 B.C., and when in Cicero's day men measured epochs from the date of foundation (a.u.c.—*ab urbe condita*) that date was regularly assumed. The Romans, however, used the date only for convenience of reckoning, for they knew that no records had been pre-

served from the earliest period. No one claimed absolute accuracy for the date. We know now, from examination of graves in the Forum and on the hills of Rome, that there were several villages on the site of Rome as early as a thousand years before our era, and that there was, except for a growth and gradual unification of the villages, no vital change in the situation till about 600 B.C.

Then Etruscan adventurers, having already penetrated Italy as far south as Capua, and having gained possession



The four regions: I, Suburana; II, Palatina; III, Esquilina; IV, Collina. The chief gates: a, Collina; b, Viminalis; c, Esquilina; d, Caelimontana; e, Capena; f, Fontanalis. The chief buildings: 1, Temple of Jupiter; 2, Janus; 3, Quirinus; 4, Vesta; 5, Saturn; 6, Diana; 7, Circus Maximus; 8, Cloaca Maxima.

of Praeneste and the territory in southern Latium, which afforded a road to the sea-coast past Velitrae to Satricum, also seized possession of the Roman hills and turned them into a stronghold. The approximate date of this founding of Rome is known only by a combination of archaeological data. The cemetery of the Forum was in use at least till 600 B.C. as is proved by the remains there of Greek pottery,

the style of which can be approximately dated. We know that when the Etruscans founded a city they drew a sacred circle called a *pomerium* about the city and strictly forbade burial within that circle. Since the cemetery of the Forum was near the center of this area, the city wall of Etruscan Rome cannot be older than 600 B.C.

The new city did not receive its name from any of the very old villages on its site, but it was given a new Etruscan name, Roma, and the names of several of the traditional kings who ruled during the next century are also Etruscan, as for instance Romulus, Ancus, Numa, and Tarquinius. Since hardly any records were kept in this early time we can do no better than accept the statement of Livy who says that the stories of the early kings are largely untrustworthy in detail. But when we notice that medieval legends are apt to preserve a memory of striking events, we may well believe that the names of the seven traditional kings of Rome were not invented, and that the tale that the kings were finally driven out by a republican revolt is based upon facts.

The detailed stories of early Rome, brilliantly told by Livy in his first book, contain facts and myths inseparably interwoven, as Livy well knew. They relate the following events. Aeneas, escaping with other Trojans when their city was taken by the Greeks, brought them to Latium and, making peace with the Latins, passed on the Trojan civilization to the new race which at once founded a Latin kingdom at Alba Longa. (We know that this story was invented by the Greeks to explain the remarkable growth of Rome, and that the Romans later adopted it, accepting it as true because the story was so similar to the facts of the Etruscan immigration over the sea. Vergil's Aeneid later made a national hero of Aeneas.) Several hundred years later a priestess of Alba Longa bore Romulus and Remus the sons of Mars. By order of the king the children were exposed, but a she-wolf nourished them at the foot

of the Palatine hill. At this site Romulus later founded the city, and gave it laws and a constitution. He was carried to heaven alive and was worshiped as Quirinus. (Most of this is of course pure legend.)

Numa, according to tradition, was chosen the second king of Rome by the people. He preserved peace and organized the religious cults and priesthoods. (Historians to-day have noticed that the official calendar of holidays drawn up many centuries later by Julius Caesar distinguished, by large lettering, the names of gods and holidays which had come down from a very early calendar, a calendar obviously belonging to a primitive agricultural people. The Romans were right, therefore, when they held that an early legislator had organized the cults and made a calendar of sacred days. They may be right also in attributing this work to Numa.)

Tullus Hostilius, the third king, is described as a warlike and aggressive king who captured Alba Longa and incorporated it in Rome. (Again, there is some truth in this legend, though the name may possibly be an invention. We may feel certain, however, that one Latin city would never have attacked and destroyed another city belonging to the Latin tribe unless it had been driven to do so by a foreign king. Rome certainly broke up the league of the Latins and incorporated a large part of it in some such way as Livy's story implies. The deed can only be explained as instigated by some Etruscan king of Rome.)

Ancus Marcius, the fourth king, continued the subjection of the Latins, and, to invite traders to Rome, founded a harbor at Ostia, the mouth of the Tiber. (Once more the legend represents a fact. The Etruscan cities north of the Tiber took a vigorous part in commerce, and they must have tried to bring Rome into the same current. Excavations at Ostia have recently revealed some foundations that seem to date from the regal period.)

Tarquin the Elder, the fifth king, is represented as extend-

ing the possessions of Rome eastward. (This is likely, because the Roman king must have been eager to gain possession of the trading road that crossed the Tiber further east and compel the traders who traveled from Etruria to Campania to pass through Rome.)

Servius Tullius, the sixth king, is credited with building the first stone wall around the city, called the "Servian wall," and with the organization of the army under the "Servian constitution." (This is wholly credible. The great wall, parts of which are still standing, dates largely from about 360 B.C. and later, but it contains portions that are made out of a material which was popular at Rome in the sixth century B.C. We shall revert to the Servian constitution later.)

Tarquin the Proud, the last king, is represented by Livy as a great builder and conqueror and a lordly chief whose heavy taxes and acts of tyranny drove the Romans to revolt. The occasion for the revolt was offered when one of the Tarquins violated the fair Lucretia, a Roman matron of high station. Her husband, Collatinus, with the aid of his friends Brutus and Valerius, then organized the revolution, drove out the king and his family, and established a republic. (Many picturesque elements were later added to this story by dramatists who made chronicle plays of the tale, but there is no reason to believe that the kernel of so important a political incident would not have been treasured with great care.)

We may conclude, therefore, that though many fanciful tales are incorporated in the early legends, the course of events attending Rome's growth under the kings must have followed the general lines sketched by Livy's striking account.

Latium under the Etruscans. The rise of city-states. The arrival of the Etruscan princes in Rome and other Latin villages was a very important fact in the development of the Italic race. Even before they took possession

the threatened invasion of Latium caused great social changes in the tribe. The Etruscans had already pushed the Umbrians back on the Sabellian tribes which caused them



in turn—Sabines, Aequi, Volsci, and others—to press inward on Latium from the east. This together with the Etruscan raids forced the Latins of the small open villages to concentrate in various towns that could be protected; and this in turn tended to break the unity of the Latin League in favor of strong towns like Rome, Ardea, Velitrae, Aricia, Tibur and Praeneste. This seems to be the real cause of the growth of city-states in early Latium. Rome, for instance, was not under Etruscan dominion till about 600 B.C., but her state organization of the thirty

brotherhoods (*curiae*) from three separate villages had probably been formed on Latin ideas before ever the Etruscans captured the site and walled it in. And there can be little doubt that the other cities of the League which grew to prominence had also developed in the same way and assumed predominance over their surrounding land through the accretion of people from nearby villages that were less favorably situated. The Etruscan princes of course continued this process of centralization by fortifying the cities that they captured and building up small monarchies in each, so that the League practically fell into insignificance during the Etruscan occupation.

Princes and serfs. A second effect of the Etruscan invasion was the reduction of many landed districts practically to serfdom under the usurping princelings. We can see the signs of this state of affairs particularly below Velitrae. Here an extensive system of underground drainage canals has been discovered. These channels are cut a few feet below the surface through the solid tuff; usually they measure about $3 \times 1\frac{1}{2}$ feet, and extend in length from the sides of the Alban hills down several miles towards the sea. They were apparently made to carry off the rain waters and thus preserve the arable soil which alone supported the very dense population. The system is so extensive that we cannot suppose it to have been undertaken by hundreds of poor peasants without direction. When we find similar systems in Etruria, where we know that wealthy Etruscan landlords had the service of subjugated peoples, we must conclude that in Latium also these foreign landlords seized the lands, and compelled the peasants to acknowledge them as masters, pay them rent, and carry out their commands.

That the lords of Velitrae, Lanuvium, Satricum, and Ardea grew very wealthy on this exploitation of the Latin peasants we have learned from the excavations in those places. Several burial mounds have been opened where jewelry and table-ware have been found imported from

Phoenicia, Egypt, and Greece. The early temples of these Latin towns were, like those of Etruria, decorated by excellent Greek artists. In fact, there seems to have been a time when several independent lords, holding sway in various Latin cities, threatened to divide the little tribe up into small principalities as they had already divided the best part of the Umbrian nation north of the Tiber.

(*Rome as an Etruscan principality.* The princes of Rome, however, grew in power more rapidly than the others, and in time subjected to themselves not only the nearby Latin villages but also most of the other lords who had seized Latin towns. Before Tarquin was driven out he was the acknowledged ruler of nearly all of Latium. And to gain the support of the Latins he—or one of his predecessors—had taken charge of the tribal cult of the Alban Mount, had moved the very popular cult of Diana from Lake Nemi to Rome, and had begun to build a magnificent temple to Jupiter on the Capitoline, intending to make it the center of the Latin religion.

Let us follow the growth of Rome under this foreign régime. The city itself developed rapidly because it became the governmental seat of all of Latium instead of being merely the home of the peasants who cultivated the farms nearby. The influential and rich landlords naturally moved to the city where the king lived, and they required carpenters and builders and craftsmen of every kind to supply their needs. The growth of the population attracted traders with their wares, and traders encouraged the manufacturing of goods that could be exchanged for imports. Latium to be sure had few natural products to sell. It contained no mineral deposits. Nevertheless, being very rich in soil, it could in exchange for grain acquire copper from the north and cattle and hides from the interior, and use these articles for barter, and in addition it could offer certain goods produced by the skilled labor of its dense population.

For maritime trade Rome was not very well situated since it lay thirteen miles from the sea. The Tiber had too strong a current for the ships of that day. Ships cannot readily go up a river under sail, and merchant ships did not carry enough oarsmen to pull up a river against a stiff current. Indeed the most conveniently placed commercial towns of that early day were those that lay on easily protected plateaus three or four miles from the sea, just off some low sand-bar where the flat-bottomed trading vessels could beach while the trading-master brought his wares up to the market-place for barter. It is clear, therefore, that towns like Caere, Tarquinii, and Ardea, nearer the coast, had an advantage over Rome in attracting seagoing commerce.¹ To overcome Rome's disadvantage of distance, her princes had to make a trading port at the mouth of the Tiber whence the wares could be brought up to Rome by row-boats or pack-animals.

However, Rome possessed a great advantage in her command of the crossings of the Tiber, whereby she could compel all caravans passing by land from Etruria to Campania or Latium to bring their wares to Rome. By her possession of the high hills on both sides of the Tiber she could have and protect a bridge at that place, and her princes made that bridge the sole route for the north-south land trade by taking possession of Gabii through which the only other easy land route passed.

These princes also controlled the road to the best salt flats of the western coast—those near the mouth of the Tiber—and as all the tribes of the interior of central Italy must have their salt from those flats, the Roman monopoly in salt doubtless proved to be very profitable. The east and west road through Rome is still called the *Via Salaria*.

From the wealth of the Latin soil and the profits of indus-

¹ In the fifth century such towns met with heavy reverses because they had no harbors where they could protect their ships against the fleets of war vessels which by that time had been equipped by various cities of Sicily and Etruria.

try and trade, the Romans were able to improve and fortify the city. The marshes in the valley were drained by a closed sewer, and a large market-place—later called the Forum—was laid out there. A stone wall was built along the upper edges of the hills, enclosing an area that might hold three or four hundred thousand inhabitants, although it must not be supposed that Rome ever had that number of inhabitants in the early days. This extensive area had to be included within the walls in order to take in three separate villages. Besides, the hills lay in such a way that the architect in availing himself of natural escarpments could thus provide for the future at no added cost.

Several temples were also built, some for the gods of the tribe, some for gods of other villages who had to be brought along with the people whenever a town was captured. In fact, one reason why the Romans came to have so many gods is that the government often introduced those of conquered cities. By building these temples and placing statues of gods in them the Etruscan princes did much to change the religion of the Romans. No Roman had thought of Jupiter or Juno as a person. But when Greek or Etruscan artists were hired by the kings to make statues of these gods, they took their models from the statues of those Greek divinities that most resembled the Roman ones in their attributes. The image of Jupiter was made to resemble one of the Greek Zeus, while Juno was made to look like Hera, and the other deities were treated in a similar way. Thus it was largely the work of imported artists that taught the Romans how their gods ought to look. The new generation, which saw these images from childhood, completely forgot that gods were spirits. Anthropomorphism is a disease that spreads very quickly, as the prophets of the Old Testament learned to their sorrow.

The "Servian" army. The most momentous change introduced by the Etruscans was the organization of a strong army, on the basis of the so-called Servian constitution.

The wealthiest men, who could afford to provide both armor and horses, were chosen for the cavalry. Of these there were 1800. Next to these were chosen eighty centuries (8000) of men who were wealthy enough to provide heavy armor for service in the first line. These were called men of the first class. The second, third, and fourth classes provided twenty centuries each, the fifth class thirty, and from among the numerous poor who had no property only five centuries of artisans were taken. This system threw the heaviest army service on those who could best afford the time and the costs of the equipment, and who presumably had most at stake in a war. It has been calculated that since the first class of citizens of military age could provide as many as 9800 men Latium must then have had a population of at least 400,000. This is a very large number for an area of only about 400-600 square miles then in the control of Rome, but as we have seen the city had grown rapidly under Etruscan enterprise and the soil was being intensively cultivated.

The importance of this organization of the army is twofold. It taught the Romans the art of making an effective army, which they constantly improved in their days of independence, and it also introduced the principle of classifying the citizen-body according to wealth, a classification later used by the founders of the republic in creating their primary assembly for voting and law-making purposes. That assembly, based upon wealth, then gradually displaced the old-time assembly of brotherhoods. The conservative character of the republican government is in large measure due to this early adoption of the timocratic principle.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY REPUBLIC

The Revolution. The traditional date of the Revolution that ended Etruscan domination in Rome is 509 B.C., and this seems to be approximately correct. Since, however, many records of early Rome were destroyed in the Gallic fire in 387 B.C. and since no unified system of record-keeping was agreed upon for a century after that, we must always make an allowance for a few years in dating¹ events of the early republic.

The precise nature of the revolution it is not now possible to determine. The Romans could hardly have enjoyed being ruled by princes who spoke a language different from their own and worshiped foreign gods; the army service was exacting, and the Latins must have objected to being led by foreign princes to war against other Latins; we may assume also that the poor who lost their vote and especially those who had become serfs of foreign landlords were ready to revolt. The occasion for the revolt, according to legend, was an act of violence against a noble lady, Lucretia, which stirred several noblemen to form a conspiracy. These men went to the army, secured its help, and cleared the city of the foreign tyrants. The whole work, however, was not completed at one stroke. Etruscan princes still held some

¹ The discrepancy in the dates of early events was due to the fact that some later historians reckoned dates by the nails driven annually into the doorposts of the Capitoline temple, and others by the names of consuls who were elected annually. Since, however, opinions differed somewhat as to when the first nail of the temple was driven, and since political disturbances occasionally prevented the election of consuls, the later historians who tried to fit the two systems together did not always arrive at identical conclusions. We cannot cavil, therefore, if early Roman dates show slight discrepancies.

strongholds like Tusculum on the Alban hills, and there were also Latin cities which hesitated to accept the dominion of the Roman Republic. Hence Porsena, a powerful Etruscan king of Clusium, succeeded with the aid of some of the Latins in capturing Rome again, and we have the record of a law which he imposed forbidding Romans to use iron except for agriculture. It was not till about 496 B.C. that the decisive battle at Lake Regillus was fought, after which we hear no more of Etruscans in Latium or Rome.

The Republican government. The Comitia Centuriata. The formation of a new republican government at Rome was difficult. The powerful families in the city knew that a weak Latin league of the old kind would be powerless against future Etruscan invasions that seemed to be inevitable, nor did they have any faith in the rule of the brotherhoods (*curiae*) that had in the old days elected a praetor for each town every year by equal suffrage. They, therefore, wisely kept several ideas of the Etruscans that had made for a strong central government. They kept the army, in the first place, which was sure to be needed. Then they made the army organization the basis of the centuriate *comitia*, the voting and law-making assembly. It will be remembered that there were 193 hundreds or centuries in the army, divided into five classes according to wealth. Now to make up the "town-meeting" (*comitium*) for voting and legislative purposes all the citizens, both in and outside the army, were divided by the same system of classification into 5 classes or 193 groups. The military term "century" was kept for each voting unit, though of course every political unit must have exceeded a hundred citizens, and the five units of citizens without property doubtless ran into the thousands. Since the first class, consisting of the wealthier men, made up 98 "centuries," i.e. more than half of 193, though they must naturally have been a decided minority of the citizen body, and since each "century" had one vote, the legislation and elections of this centuriate assembly must

have had a conservative tendency. It is safe to say that poor men and radicals were seldom elected to office so long as the system held.)

Consuls. For magistrates it was decided to have two consuls holding office for one year, and these consuls were to possess very much more power than the old Latin magistrates had enjoyed, almost, in fact, as much as the Etruscan kings had had. They were to be commanders of the army with absolute power in the field, and to have judicial and executive power at home. But since their powers were so great they were given their office for only one year, and each consul was subordinated to the veto power of the other. As an additional conservative measure, it was stipulated that only patricians could hold this high office. The title of king was not wholly abolished, since the religious laws required that certain rites should be performed by a *rex*. But, fearing tyranny from a life-magistrate, they took all civil power from the *rex*, and he was made simply a religious officer of no political importance and called *rex sacrorum*. The real head of the religious cults was henceforth the *pontifex maximus*.)

The Senate. As the Etruscan kings had continued the old Latin custom of having an advisory body of elders, so the new constitution adopted the *senate* from the preceding régime. The consuls were allowed to form a body of 300 distinguished elders to serve in the senate for life. Since the consuls were patricians they generally chose men of that class at first, though not compelled to do so. This body was from the beginning given more power than it held during the regal period, so that it might serve as a check both on the legislative assembly (the *comitia centuriata*) and on the consuls. It not only discussed and shaped bills before the consuls proposed them to the assembly but it had the veto power over all measures passed by the assembly. It also gained a distinct ascendancy over the consuls very early because the members held office for life

whereas the consuls held it for a year only, and, again, the consuls generally came from the senate and returned to the senate after their year of office was over so that the power of "senatorial courtesy" generally bound the consuls' hands.

On the whole this constitution was a brilliant adaptation of native Latin customs of democracy to the requirements of a strong government needed at a time when foreign dangers were numerous. It combined the most effective elements of royal leadership and the liberal elements of democracy with a wisdom and foresight that was hardly to be expected of a people at so early a day. It at once reveals the Latin folk as possessing a genius for law-making and government building. Under the strain of foreign danger it proved presently to be somewhat too conservative to invite wholehearted enthusiasm on the part of the poorer classes; but the foundations were securely laid, and the necessary compromises could be effected without a new revolt entailing the shedding of blood.

Political and economic conditions. Regarding the political and economic conditions of Rome during the first years of the Republic we fortunately get an insight from a contemporaneous document of very great importance, the first treaty between Rome and Carthage, which is also the earliest commercial treaty of the West in existence. It was dated the first year of the Republic, 509, by Polybius, who apparently saw the original in the Capitoline temple and translated it into Greek. It reads as follows:

"There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:

(a) "Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond (west of) the Fair Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies. If any one of them be driven ashore there he shall not buy or take anything for himself save what is needful for the repair of

his ship and the service of the gods, and he shall depart within five days.

(b) "Romans landing for traffic in Libya or Sardinia shall strike no bargain save in the presence of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these, let the price be secured to the seller on the credit of the state.

(c) "If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall enjoy all rights enjoyed by others.

(a') "The Carthaginians shall do no injury to the people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, Tarracina, nor any other people of the Latins that are subject to Rome.

(b') "From those townships of Latium which are not subject to Rome they shall hold their hands; and if they take one they shall deliver it unharmed to the Romans.

(c') "They shall build no fort in Latium; and if they enter the district in arms, they shall not stay a night therein."

This document reveals several important facts:¹

(1) It shows (in a') that Rome under the kings had held sway over most of Latium, including all the seaport towns as far as Terracina, 60 miles southeast of Rome, and that Rome expected to continue that domination, disregarding the old Latin league. (2) It also shows (b') that there were some districts which had not acknowledged the new republic, presumably towns like Tusculum and perhaps Velitrae, which were still under independent Etruscan princes; and that Rome hoped to get possession of these also. (3) Finally, it implies that Rome under the Etruscans had had an active share in the maritime trade (a, b, c,) which the new republic might presumably continue, but which its leaders did not care very much to safeguard. They permitted Carthage to close several important seas to their shipping.

Reconstruction of the Latin League. The natural ambition of the Roman aristocrats to keep Rome the leader of

¹ Many scholars have doubted Polybius' dating, but there is no other period before 341 when Rome could have laid claim to sovereignty over Latium except during or immediately after the regal period.

the Latin tribe and the sovereign of all of Latium was doomed to disappointment. The Latin cities were glad enough to be rid of Etruscan oppressors, but they did not choose to fall into the position of vassals to one of their own number. This seems to be the reason why some of them aided the Etruscans at Lake Regillus. The Romans finally saw that, in order to have the goodwill of all the Latins in the continued struggle against the Etruscans, they must reestablish the old Latin league on a more liberal basis and give up all claim to sovereignty over their liberty-loving brother-cities in return for promises of aid against a common enemy. Therefore, two or three years after the battle of Lake Regillus, the Latins and Romans came to an agreement which they embodied in a treaty, the *foedus Cassianum*, a copy of which was still in existence in Cicero's day. It¹ read as follows: "Between the Romans and the combined Latin peoples there shall be peace forever. Neither shall attack nor incite foreign peoples against the other, nor permit the passage of an enemy through its territory. In case of invasion from without each shall use all its forces. The division of booty shall be equal, and wars shall be conducted under the independent auspices of both parties to the agreement. When private bargains are made between Romans and Latins, decisions shall be rendered within ten days in the forum of the city where the bargain is made. No alterations of these terms shall be made without the consent of both parties."

The treaty is a full recognition of the independence of the southern half of Latium, which presumably preferred to revert to the old pre-Etruscan democratic government of the League. The southern Latins were still an agricultural people chiefly and devoid of political ambitions. The treaty safeguards the territory of both parties, however, by providing for a full Latin army in case of invasion, and the clause dealing with contracts proves that the Latins and Romans

¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, VII, 95. The traditional date is 493 B.C.

still regarded themselves as brothers who might as individuals trade—and presumably marry—anywhere within the old tribe. Rome is by no word acknowledged as a superior: the Latins are to lead and control their own army. But experience soon proved that Rome would be leader to all practical purposes, for, being a unit, she could always act quickly and effectively, whereas the Latins, composed of several autonomous cities, required time to unite and reach decisions. This condition, through nobody's fault, finally led to bickerings which broke the League.

We still happen to have a list of the towns that formed the non-Roman half. The northern line,¹ nearest Rome, ran through Tibur, Tusculum, Aricia, Lanuvium, Lavinium, and it extended southeast through Ardea, Pometia and Cora. It would seem that some of the southern coast-towns, which the Etruscan Rome had held (Antium, Satricum, and Tarracina), remained outside, as did also the strongly fortified Praeneste and Velitrae. Perhaps the last named had already become a Volscian possession. It appears then that Rome had now to be satisfied with a dominion of no more than about 300 square miles.

The temporary decline of Rome. Rome began to decline in importance very soon. Being at enmity with the Etruscans beyond the river, she could not readily keep up commercial relations with them, while they in their commerce with Campania employed the sea-route rather than the Tiber-bridge held by a hostile state. She could not even invite the Latin trade to Rome since the Latin cities of Ardea, Antium, and Satricum were now independent of her and had their own harbors which served as ports of entry for the east and west roads that led to Aricia, Velitrae, Praeneste, and Tibur. The wealth that had flowed to Roman princes from Latin vassals was cut off, and with this diverted into other channels, and the lordly Etruscan princes gone, there was no incentive to building, manufac-

¹ See map, page 24.

turing and trading. The city came to a period of rest; seafarers ceased coming to a place which produced little and had no money with which to buy, the seaport town at Ostia fell into decay, and the industrial classes and small traders of Rome began to scatter to more promising cities, or, falling into debt and bondage, to create disturbances at home. In fact a century and a half of hard conditions passed before Rome regained the prestige she lost in the decade or two after the revolution. But it must be remembered that the new prosperity which came later depended upon native resources that flowered out of a land of free people. It was not the frail hothouse growth nourished by a superimposed tyranny.

Struggles with invaders. As it happened the Latins gained more from the renewal of the League than did the Romans, because it so happened that external dangers throughout the century came from the south and east instead of from the north where they had been most expected. The Etruscans in fact soon proved to be weakening, for they were just then beginning to suffer from Gallic invasions into the Po valley and from combined Samnite and Greek attacks in Campania. They had used their strength in exploiting their subjects and now were beginning to pay the price; besides, their adventurous lords were so bent on working for themselves that they failed to combine in time of danger for the common good. Hence the Tiber-boundary was seldom assailed after the battle of Lake Regillus. On the other hand the Latins soon had to endure a long series of attacks from Sabellian mountain tribes, Volscians and Aequians, who were being driven on by pressure due to the Celtic invasion of the Po valley and upper Picenum. Thus for a century Rome had constantly to waste her strength in the defense of southern Latium. The Latins about 500 B.C. had at first been strong enough to found colonies at Signia and Norba on the Volscian mountain that commanded the southern passes of Latium. The magnificent

old walls of polygonal masonry of these colonies still stand. But the Aequians swept up the Trerus valley and captured even Tusculum, while the Volsci forced the pass below Signia and Norba, taking towns as far north as Ardea. For many decades Rome and the Latins had to labor to beat these peoples back. Tusculum was, however, retaken in 480, Ardea in 442, Velitrae in 406, and finally Tarracina in 404. These places were resettled as joint colonies of the Romans and the Latins to possess the same rights with respect to Rome as any Latin city.

The struggle of classes at Rome. During these struggles with external foes the new government had to meet attacks upon the constitution from within. The common people (*plebs*) claimed that the constitution favored the nobility (*patricians*), and demanded reforms. It is now difficult to state exactly how the Latins and Romans came to be divided into two classes as sharply separated as the plebeians and patricians. Some historians have supposed that a racial difference lay at bottom, a difference between Etruscans and Latins, or Latins and Sabines, or perhaps Latins and the original race of Italy. But there is no evidence of this nor any reasonable argument in its favor.

The caste system had probably arisen gradually within Latium by the natural processes of selection which may be observed at work everywhere to-day. Even in the old democratic tribe, before the Etruscans came, some men must have gained distinction in the village councils by prudence and good sense and acquired the prestige that goes with wealth by their shrewdness and diligence in agriculture. The Etruscan kings must have selected the influential and wealthy farmers for their advisory senate, because they needed the good-will of the subject people in order to succeed. When Livy says that the king selected the senators from the most distinguished elders (*patres*) and that this group and their descendants formed the body later called *patricii*, he has, therefore, given an essential fact.

The families thus ennobled by political distinction had naturally begun to consider themselves superior to the rest; and since the wealthier and more influential continued to be added to the group by each new king, the patrician class grew to be fairly large and powerful. We have seen that the patricians were the dominating class in the revolution, and that after the revolution they laid down the rule that only patricians could hold a magistracy. The implications of this rule were very important. At Rome no important political business could be entered upon before the will of the gods was ascertained through auspices, and as these were taken by magistrates and religious officials who must be patricians, it is easy to see that this class could absolutely control political action in case disputes arose. Out of this custom grew the theory that the gods dealt only with patricians in state matters and that the plebeians somehow were an inferior class, also the theory that a plebeian might not marry into a patrician family for fear that the exclusive religious right might, by blood descent, pass to a plebeian. Thus distinctions that were at first small and accidental created customs and theories of large significance.

In the new republic though distinguished plebeians might be admitted to the senate they were not considered quite the equals of the patrician group and they were addressed as *conscripti*. Thus a caste system was stereotyped which seemed after a while to be dividing the state into two factions. There were many good and influential plebeians constantly coming into prominence who objected to being considered unfit for office and for intermarriage with patricians. To make matters worse the Etruscan régime and the republican revolution had created a large class of very poor people who lost all political rights under the new timocratic voting system. Having no property they had no vote, and no influence. Some of these had apparently been nothing but serfs under Etruscan princes; some were workingmen of the city who had lived from hand to mouth in days of pros-

perity and now were in destitute condition because industry had fallen into decay; some had been servants and clients of the kings and now had no one to serve since the king was gone; some were small farmers who began to fall into debt when commerce deserted Rome and their products found no market. In a primitive society like that of Rome debt laws are very severe, and imprisonment for debt—usual in England till Dickens' day—and even peonage and enslavement for non-payment of debt were frequent. Hence there was much distress among the poor, and they particularly attacked the aristocratic features of the constitution because they claimed that if they had full political rights in the assembly they could pass laws to remedy this condition.

Reform measures. Immediately after the founding of the Republic, the people secured the passage of the *lex Valeria de provocatione* which was always looked upon later as the first great step toward liberty. According to this law no Roman citizen could be put to death by a civil magistrate without being afforded the right of appealing his case to the popular assembly.

In 494, according to early tradition, the plebeians demanded some relief from what they considered inequitable arrests, imprisonment and court judgments, apparently in cases of debt. Getting no relief, they seceded to the Sacred Mount outside the walls when summoned to join the army. Here they threatened to settle and draw up a new constitution of their own. They refused to come back and join the army till the consuls and senate pledged themselves to pass a law giving the plebeians the right to elect two annual officers of their own class, called *tribuni plebis* (ward-leaders of the commons), who should have the power to intercede in behalf of individual plebeians in case of unjust arrest.

The nature of this relief-measure implies that in days past the people had had the privilege of appealing to the king for a rehearing of cases and that the new tribunes were to provide the kind of aid which they had lost with the disap-

pearance of the king. Presently the number of the tribunes was raised from two to five and finally to ten.

The tribunes could exercise their powers only within the city walls, and were not to interfere with military discipline outside. They were declared inviolable (*sacrosanct*), so that no one dared hinder them in the pursuit of their duties. The creation of the tribuneship seemed at first only to provide poor clients with free legal service, but as time went on it was discovered that the tribunes could and would extend their powers immoderately. For they later undertook to enter the senate and the legislative assembly and forbid speakers to put motions that displeased them, on the plea that this was only forbidding action detrimental to their clients. But this extension of power came at a later day.

The appointment of *tribuni* implies that Rome and her territory had already been divided into wards, "*tribus*;" the city comprised four of these, the country at first seventeen. We do not know when this was done but it may have been an invention of the early republic made to facilitate the taking of the census by districts. It is interesting that the plebeians when they went to the *comitium* to elect these new officers voted by wards, each ward having one vote. Since the wards were presumably of about equal size at first, this method was far more democratic than election by property classes since a poor plebeian counted for as much as a rich. But it must be remembered that the new officers represented the plebs alone, hence the patricians were excluded from this election.

The Publilian law of 471 defined the tribunes' position more clearly and empowered the *comitia tributa*, which elected the tribunes, to pass resolutions expressing the desires of the plebeians¹ which the consuls must present for

¹ It was in an attempt to get rid of the tribunate that Coriolanus involved himself in a quarrel with the plebeians and was banished. The play of Shakespeare on this character is largely taken from the account of Plutarch, which rests, however, almost wholly on oral tradition.

action to the senate and *comitia centuriata*. In 456 something was done to relieve the distress of the city poor by allotting the Aventine hill to them for homes, perhaps with garden lots. The ground had apparently belonged to the king in Etruscan times.

Before the middle of the century the plebeians called for a written code of laws, because the tribunes were constantly hindered from helping the poor by want of a fixed set of laws that might bind judges to consistent judgments. At Rome, as in all early states, old senators who had dealt with public matters all their lives were the only men who knew the sacred customs of the ancestors (*mos majorum*). From such men the judges learned the laws orally, and it was charged that they at times gave individual interpretations to them in the interests of their own class. The pressure for a public code was widespread, and the assembly voted that ten men (*decemviri*) be elected instead of two consuls to serve as executives for the next year and at the same time as a committee to draw up a code of laws. During that year ten tables were drawn up by the committee and accepted by the assembly. This was so satisfactory that decemvirs were elected again the next year, and it appears that there were even some plebeians among them. Two more tables were now drawn up, but a political quarrel arose when charges were made that the decemvirs were attempting to usurp power and continue in office illegally. Two consuls, Valerius and Horatius, were consequently elected for 449, who brought measures to reestablish the old constitution with certain slight modifications and compromises. According to these laws of Valerius and Horatius, the twelve tables were adopted and posted in the Forum; the magisterial power was definitely restored to the two patrician consuls, the election of ten annual plebeian tribunes was legalized, and finally a provision was made that the resolutions (*plebiscites*) of the tribal assembly should, under cer-

tain qualifications not now known,¹ have the full force of laws.

The liberalizing of the constitution continued rapidly when the plebs had this organ of expression thus fully developed. Constantly new resolutions were forced upon the attention of the senate and the centuriate assembly. In 447 the quaestors, the treasury officers, were made elective instead of appointive, though a generation passed before plebeians were made eligible to the office. In 445 the worst stigma on the plebeian class was removed when the *lex Canuleia* legalized marriage between plebeians and patricians. In the same year the plebs demanded admission to the consulship. They did not gain the point, but they forced a compromise whereby the executive office might year by year be turned over to an executive committee of six called "consular tribunes" to which board plebeians would be eligible. This makeshift, which shows the jealous conservatism of the patricians, was used about fifty times during the seventy-eight years that the compromise law lasted. But we do not find any plebeian even in this office till about the year 400 B.C.

In 443 the consular office was again somewhat weakened by transferring to two censors certain important civil duties formerly performed by the consuls. The censors now made up the list of senators, chose the *equites* who were to serve in the cavalry, assigned all citizens to their proper class in the army and the assembly, and let state contracts. The office in time came to be one of the most important and certainly the most dignified at Rome. The august religious

¹ Some authorities suppose that the tribal assembly was now opened to all the citizens so that its resolutions were actually expressions of a full "town-meeting" and needed only the approval of the senate as did bills that passed the centuriate assembly to become effective. Others suppose that it was still an assembly of plebeians only, and that its resolutions (plebiscites) were by the law of 449 made the first order of business for the regular lawmaking assembly, the *comitia centuriata*, to be accepted or rejected as that body saw fit. If this be true, as seems likely, the law of 449 elevated the tribal assembly only to the extent of compelling the real legislative assembly to take cognizance of and early action upon all plebiscites.

ceremonies connected with the office kept it for a long time in the hands of the patricians.

The duel with Veii. Near the end of the century Rome finally came to her last struggle with Veii after bickerings that had continued from the regal period. We include the story of it here since Rome's conquest of Veii had very important effects upon the constitution. Veii was as large as Rome, had a stronger situation, and commanded as much territory. Excavations on the site of the old city have recently disclosed heavy walls on the citadel, the foundations of the city's senate house, interesting remains of very old houses, and remarkable terracotta statues. These reveal the fact that Veii was a very wealthy and beautiful city. That a deadly rivalry should arise between Veii and Rome is not surprising. Even the Etruscan kings of Rome were unable to keep on friendly terms with Veii. The two cities came to blows over the salt-flats at the Tiber mouth, over the control of the river traffic and of the north and south trade routes, which had to cross the Tiber at Rome or at Fidenae six miles up the river. Since Rome controlled the traffic over her own bridge, the struggle often had to do with the control of Fidenae, a town that now favored one, now the other. Who started the last war we cannot say, but we know that the struggle flamed into terrible bitterness. Rome after a time gained the upper hand in the open campaign and succeeded in surrounding the lofty city. Veii refused to come to terms, but finally after a war of ten years (405-396) Camillus, the Roman dictator, stormed the town. A large part of the city was sacked and burned, and some of its surviving inhabitants were sold into slavery. But since the Veians were largely of Latin stock, many of its people could be adopted as Roman citizens. Some of the rich Veian territory was distributed in small lots to poor Roman settlers, and four new Roman wards (*tribus*) were laid out north of the river.

The direct result of this distribution was that a large body

of landless plebeians became landholders, a thing which not only strengthened the plebeian element in the centuriate assembly, and gave power to the plebeian assembly itself, but established the custom of dividing lands among the poor. After this enlargement of the plebeian influence in the city we may soon expect to see democracy winning its last battle against the patrician element.

Not all the vacated lands of Veii were thus given to poor Romans. The northern part was laid out in two Latin colonies, Nepete and Sutrium (383-2), which were to serve as colonial forts on the northern border. This was doubtless a part payment to the Latins who, according to the terms of the *foedus Cassianum*, must have aided Rome in the struggle. The planting of *Latin* colonies north of Rome is, however, surprising, for it shows that the Romans did not at that time expect to extend their city-state north of these colonies. Finally, since Veii had much rough land not very suitable for agriculture, some of this was left unassigned and rented out by the treasury, especially to cattle grazers. Since only rich men could afford to stock cattle ranches, such leases were apt to be taken up by senators of wealth. Presently this territory became a bone of contention. Plebeians claimed that the senate and the censors had withheld good lands in order to make profit by state contracts and that certain senators used their personal influence with the censors to procure profitable leases. Such were the charges of "war-profiteering" that presently led to the framing of a new set of laws.

Rome sacked by the Gauls, 387 B.C. The new class quarrel had, however, only begun, by the banishment of Camillus on the charge of profiting unduly from the war, when an invasion of Gauls threatened the life not only of Rome but of all Italy. The Gauls during the preceding century had gained possession of the whole Po valley and of a long strip of the Adriatic coast in Picenum. New hordes kept pouring down from central Europe, driven on presum-

ably by Germanic and Oriental hordes behind them. The Umbrians of the mountains, who held poor land, offered no obstacle; the Etruscans had no strong central government to organize any effective opposition against them. Had it not been for the Romans, Italy instead of Gaul would probably have become the land of the Celts. The advancing horde of Senones, who lived below the Rubicon, swept through Etruria, and at the River Allia near Rome defeated the quickly levied Roman army (probable date 387, Varro's date 390). They captured Rome with the exception of the Capitoline hill. This held out for months, the one fact which tended to discourage the none too constant Celts. Meanwhile Marseilles, at the mouth of the Rhone, with the friendliness that Greeks generally showed towards the Latin people, came to the rescue of the city, advanced ransom money and saved the remnant.

Fortunately for Rome, the Celts had, in their characteristic fear of the gods, spared most of Rome's temples where her records were kept, fortunately too, most of the Latin countrymen had escaped from danger into the cities further south and the city of Rome soon began to regain its old appearance and a rapidly increasing population. The Servian wall was soon rebuilt by the soldiers with magnificent stone taken from Fidenae's old walls and from Veian quarries.

The Licinian-Sextian reforms. By the time that Rome had sufficiently recovered from the Gallic invasion, the class hatred flamed up again. The plebeians had suffered their part in the Veian and Gallic wars and claimed equal recognition in the distribution of offices; and they had grown strong enough by the addition of four wards north of the Tiber to press their claims with renewed force. The question of debts also entered into the account. Thousands had lost their homes and crops in the Gallic invasion, and such complained that debtor-laws permitting imprisonment were too severe, and that leased public lands ought to be dis-

tributed to the poor. The struggle threatened to grow into a revolution. There were riots and postponements of elections, and the appointment of dictators. Finally, the tribunes of 367, Licinius and Sextius, after they had been re-elected several times in succession, were able to reach a compromise with the aristocracy through the aid of the military hero, Camillus. It was agreed that the consulship should be restored on the condition that one seat must be open to the plebeians. However, the judicial duties of the consuls were transferred to praetors and the supervision of public works was transferred to a board of officers called *curule aediles*. Patricians alone were to be eligible to these new offices. As for lands, here too a compromise was reached: there is no mention of disturbing old lease-holds, but henceforth not over five hundred *jugera* (about 300 acres) could be rented to any one man—with a possible maximum of 1,000 for fathers of two children—nor should any individual pasture more than 100 head of cattle or 500 head of sheep on public land. Thirdly, a moderate “moratorium” was declared for debtors. Interest already paid should be deducted from the principal, and the balance made payable in three annual instalments.

Thus practically the last disqualification was lifted from the plebeians—for they soon gained admittance to the praetorship and aedileship also—and the old class struggle between patricians and plebeians was almost ended. It was not long, however, before a new line of demarcation became visible. Naturally the plebeians who had now gained admittance to high offices did their utmost to emphasize the importance of political honors. A new patricio-plebeian nobility, therefore, arose of people who held curule offices and of their descendants. Such men before long combined to further the influence of the senate against the popular assembly, and we shall find that in the third century a new political contest arose between the common people and the recent nobility that based its preten-

sions not upon pride of birth but upon political distinction.

The middle of the fourth century B.C. marks the end of a period. The aristocratic constitution had slowly been modified to represent the views and permit the healthy participation of all classes of the citizen body, though it was still timocratic in nature. The state had survived the Latin demand for autonomy, the economic dwindling of Rome, the attacks of Etruscans, Aequi, Volsci and Sabines, and the capture of Rome by the Gauls. The new era opens with a more aggressive political and economic policy, which apparently was fathered chiefly by forceful plebeian leaders who had gained power through the democratic reforms.

Economic and social conditions. Before entering the new epoch inaugurated by the reforms of 367, we must glance back and form some picture of Rome and her people as the foreign traveler would have found them about the time of the decemviral legislation.

The population of the city had dwindled very much. Archaeologists find in the Latin and Roman remains of the fifth century very little evidence of home industries except those occupied in the production of the simplest wares made for home use. There is no manufacturing for export. They also find no foreign imports worthy of mention. Greek pottery, jewelry, wearing apparel, statuary, and architectural adornment—even Etruscan—practically disappear. The Greek, Carthaginian, and Etruscan traders who went up and down the Tyrrhenian sea seldom considered it worth while now to stop at Rome. The harbor at Ostia shows no signs of having been used between the regal period and the recolonization in the new democratic period of about 350.

The population settled back to a secluded life of "home economy" based mainly on intensive "hoe-culture" of the land in the immediate vicinity of Rome. Many of the nobles had fairly large farms worked by tenants, but they

themselves did not scorn to live on their farms and participate in the work. The story of Cincinnatus summoned from the plow to the high office of dictatorship represents the life of the times accurately. Cincinnatus indeed was noteworthy not so much because of his occupation as a farmer as because of his modest possessions.

The quality of their thinking must be judged from the fragments of the twelve tables that have survived, since we have no other written documents from which to draw conclusions. These tables are really a peculiar mixture of conceptions, some very progressive, others very conservative. The fragments from the civil law reveal advanced customs and farsighted thinking which prove that the Romans had profited from a contemplation of the vigorous commerce and industry of the preceding century as well as from the existence of old aristocratic families that needed advanced inheritance and property laws. It was only vigorous trade in the Forum that could beget at so early a day the clear conception of contract that accepted a mere agreement as a valid bargain;¹ and only the deep respect for private property that is begotten out of a long succession of estates from father to son in families of long pedigree could so early have created the liberal testamentary laws of these tables which permitted a father to leave property by legacy outside of his family.²

Here and there, however, even in the civil law the twelve tables show backwardness, as for instance in overdue respect for property. This fault is traceable partly to aristocratic tendencies which over-protect the creditor, but

¹ See table VI: "If a man enters a personal obligation or makes a purchase, as the tongue has spoken, so shall it be." Primitive laws usually do not recognize a bargain as valid until the actual exchange has been effected.

² Cf. the fifth table: "As a man bequeaths his personal property and his power of guardianship, so shall it be." Primitive codes, usually assuming that property rights belong to the community or family, seldom recognize free testamentary rights.

partly also to the lack of machinery in any and every early government. Though the state provided the judge to pronounce the penalty for debt, it did not yet provide officers to enforce his judgment. Hence the creditor was allowed so heavy a judgment that the debtor and his friends would be frightened into payment.¹ These are the intentions of laws that permit imprisonment and enslavement for unpaid debts.

In criminal law we again find the conservatism that is due to lack of executive machinery. Since the Latin peoples had for long had no central government, but had left jurisdiction in the villages chiefly to the patriarchs, prosecuting and police machinery were slow to develop. Hence in case of injury, the injured, though permitted to bring the culprit to the judge, received no aid from the state to enforce the judgment. To cover this deficiency, the twelve tables permitted *talio* (retaliation) on the part of the injured to aid him in compelling the culprit to pay the adjudged claims. Thus we have the rule of the twelve tables:² "If a man break the limb of another and does not satisfy the claim for injury, the injured may retaliate" ("an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth").

Finally we must notice that religious awe was still so effective that it could be trusted to take care of many offenses. Hence there are such laws as: "He who burns another's grain shall be under the curse of Ceres."³ Needless to say Rome would be ready to bring such crimes under civil jurisdiction as soon as religion proved insufficient

¹ See table III: "After a judgment for debt, there shall be thirty days of grace. Then the creditor may lay hands upon the debtor and bring him to court; if the debt is not then discharged, the creditor may lead the debtor away in chains . . . after three market days unless the debt is paid the debtor shall lose his civil rights or be sold beyond the Tiber." On this law see Radin, *Secare partes*, in *Am. Jour. Phil.* 1922.

² See table VIII: *Si membrum rupsit, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto. Manu fusive si os frigit libero, ccc, si servo, cl poenam subito.*

³ See table VIII, 8-10.

for the purpose. This rule is not so much a mark of failure to define the sphere of law as of a tendency on the part of the state to assume obligations only where necessary.

~~The~~ code then is far from exemplary in details or in legal conception. It reflects a religious community that likes to trust the ancestral customs of a village democracy as far as possible. Nevertheless it shows traces of much experience in industrial life and the effects of aristocratic conceptions of property, family, and inheritance. In points of jurisprudence it has many wise clauses, as for instance, the one that forbids class legislation, and another which permits the revision of the code or any part of it upon a majority vote of the *comitia centuriata*.

Religion. During this period Roman religion underwent no improvement. The Etruscans had taught the Roman children what the gods looked like by erecting Hellenic-looking terracotta statues of them. Jupiter, instead of being the spirit that pervaded life and dwelt in lightning, now became a reddish brown well-bearded terracotta creature that stood in the Capitoline temple between Juno and Minerva. Juno was an Italic spirit that the Etruscans adopted and figured in the shape of Hera. Hence she suddenly became Jupiter's wife. Minerva, the spirit of skill, the Etruscans shaped into the appearance of the Athenian Pallas. She, therefore, must needs be a daughter of Jupiter. This blithe family group standing stiffly in the Capitoline temple inherited much simple reverence which they did little to increase. The spirit of light beholding all men's deeds had been a god that was called upon to witness all important agreements, and thus had become a protector of truth and fidelity. This fact had once tended to give a deep moral significance to the worship of Jupiter. But anthropomorphism made further growth in that direction impossible, since Jupiter inherited the very mundane legends that were told of Zeus. Morality had to seek for aid else-

where than in religion. Etruscan methods of using religion also emphasized the lower tendencies of the cults. The Etruscans were skilled above all in the precise methods of eliciting practical benefits out of religion. The intricate science of augury from the flight of birds, from the sacred fowls, from lightning and from the precise condition of each of the forty parts of a calf's liver, when first introduced at Rome, invited skepticism, but was thoroughly acclimated during the hundred years of Etruscan domination. It was a science which tended to make religion nothing but the art of exploiting the gods.

However, the state itself organized the cults and placed the worship in the hands of state priests, and since religion had lost its ethical importance, this was an advantage. The individual at least then felt that the sacrifices were being duly performed, the mysterious gods were being properly appeased, and that he need not fret day by day. He had only to give tokens of remembrance and libations to the household and field gods, and give his votive tablet or simple offering in case of special incidents. The minor gods of his daily life remained much what they had been before.

After the departure of the Etruscans the habits imposed on the state by them were continued and new divinities were brought in from time to time. Sometimes these were gods of conquered cities like Veii, introduced partly to secure the advantage of their friendship, partly to satisfy the desires of the subjugated and incorporated inhabitants. Sometimes the Romans, reverting to their old-time animism, made gods out of abstractions, as when, after the compromise between the classes in 367, they erected a temple to Concordia, the spirit who had presumably reconciled the warring factions. An artist was called in to make an appropriate statue of her, and thus a new goddess was born. But the greatest source of the new accretions was the Sibylline literature that was brought to Rome from the Greek colony at Cumae, where it had developed in connection with Apollo's oracle. In

consulting these oracles the Romans found mention of important Greek gods whom they did not have. Hence at a time of famine, about 493 B.C., they decided to introduce the Greek goddess of grain, Demeter, whom they identified with Ceres. In the same manner Apollo was brought from Cumae in 433 to allay the ravages of a pestilence.

These cults of Cumae offered but little improvement over the Etruscan ones, for they introduced the crass *Graecus ritus*, which represented the figures of the twelve gods sitting at table to partake of the sacrificial banquet (*lectisternium*). This rite always seemed disagreeable to the Romans, but at times of great danger when prudence suggested the need of every possible precaution it also was resorted to.

Religious rites were generally conducted in an orderly fashion by the state officials. The *pontifex maximus* was usually a man greatly revered who had held all the highest offices of state. He could be trusted to preside over the festivals and conduct the sacrifices with dignity, prudence, and sobriety. The augurs, also, who had great power because of their right to declare legal or illegal practically any undertaking, were generally chosen by coöptation from among the most distinguished men of Rome. A board of ten responsible men controlled the imported cults and the consultation of the Sibylline books in order to prevent dangerous innovations and religious panics. Thus the confused religion imposed on Rome was at least kept as dignified and harmless as possible. The need for such administration in a state destined to absorb all kinds of races is patent. That, however, the state's management kept religion coldly impersonal and out of the sphere of moral conduct is also obvious.

The Roman family. One of the most striking institutions at Rome was the patriarchal family. No history of civilization is adequate which does not take full cognizance of it. In early Rome the father controlled the whole *familia*:

wife, sons, daughters, slaves and all the property. These were said to be in his hand (*manus*) by right of the *patria potestas*. He in fact had the authority over his household which sovereign states alone have now, the authority even of life and death. Not that he often exercised this power to the limit. The Roman *paterfamilias* was an affectionate father and a husband of a strict puritanic code, and his wife had a dignity and authority not known in Greece. Furthermore the Roman *paterfamilias* did not exert his *patria potestas* in serious matters without calling together a *consilium* of related *patres* to whom he submitted his decisions for full discussion. Yet the fact remains that well into the last days of the Republic the *familia* submitted to him for the decisions which later were considered to belong only to the civil authorities.

The elevation of the Roman *paterfamilias* to this dignity and authority was due to several causes. It is a well recognized fact that during long periods of folk-wanderings the civil authority of the large group is apt to atomize, as it were, and revert to clans and families. This is due to the fact that in the constant migrations the tribal government or chief is overburdened with the questions of military organization. As the central authority in social, civil, religious and criminal matters reverted to the *pater*, the individuals of the horde aggregated to the several authoritative heads, since everyone must know to which head he was most closely related, and the degree of his relationship. Thus family and clan relationship grew important.

Native instincts and temperament, inherited with other racial qualities, also enter into the making of a centralized family rule. It is very likely that the Latins like the Celts had inherited from their forefathers a stronger social instinct, which we sometimes term "loyalty" and especially "loyalty to kin" or "clannishness," than some other branches of the Indo-European race. It would seem, therefore, that both inherited temperament and the long centuries of migra-

tion from the northern home had something to do with making the patriarchal family so strong in early Rome.

Every Roman indicated his position in the family by the form of his name. He regularly bore the gentile name ending in *ius*, and if the *gens* (clan) was divided into several important branches, a family *cognomen* as well. His personal name, called the *praenomen*, was given first. Thus in the standard form of name, Marcus Tullius Cicero, we have the *praenomen*, *nomen* and *cognomen* in regular order. Every *gens* also had its separate protecting deity and separate rite, and could, in case a member died intestate and without relations, inherit such a man's property. Of course thousands of plebeians who had fallen into utter poverty lost all trace of their proper *gens*. Laboring men have more pressing duties than to look up pedigrees. But the plebeian families that had been distinguished enough to keep up their family traditions were as careful of gentile rites and pedigrees as were the patricians.

This strong patriarchal system accounts for many things in Roman history: for the ability of the old families to cling together and survive, which in turn protected the old Indo-European civilization and customs much longer in Rome than in Greece; for the custom of keeping the family estates intact so far as possible; to a great extent for the continued dignity of women in the Roman household, when Southern civilization in other countries generally gave them an inferior position; for the deference to the nobility which often overrode economic considerations at elections; and finally, because of these things, for a long continued respect for senatorial rule. It must not be thought that the *patria potestas* retained its old rigidity in Cicero's day. To be sure, laws had not been passed to abolish it: Romans usually let their customs progress and make dead letters of old laws without much legal disturbance. When, however, the central government grew strong at Rome and assumed normal civil and criminal jurisdiction over all citizens, the

fathers of families gradually gave up to the civil authorities their disagreeable responsibilities in difficult cases. After this, members of a man's family usually submitted their disputes to the courts of the state instead of to the *paterfamilias*. By Cicero's day very few women were passed into their husband's full *manus* at marriage, or if they were, it was under a contract that the husband's *potestas* should not be exercised. The girl's parents, for her sake as well as for their own, provided at marriage that her property and her liberty should be fully safeguarded. Women then managed their own property, and they even had the right to annul the marriage contract at will and without rendering an explanation. In theory, however, the patriarchal family continued to the end.

We have remarked that the patriarchal rule indicated only a temporary and necessary shifting of sovereignty while the state was weak, it did not imply harsh rule within the family. Nowhere in fact could one find more parental affection than in the Roman family. It did not manifest itself in a sentimental fashion, but it was deep and constant. The concern with which senators took their young sons into the senate to learn the great lessons of state, or placed them in the train of distinguished statesmen to acquire direct training for their high duties, or brought them along on far-off diplomatic journeys to all the provinces to learn the lessons of responsible government, or devoted personal care to their education, proves that Roman children did not have to dread the exercise of a father's extraordinary *potestas*. That it might entail bitter experience is true. There are cases recorded where a father had to face the duty of pronouncing the sentence of death upon a son who had proved a coward or traitor on the battlefield, and one belated instance of the exercise of that power is even reported in Cicero's day.

CHAPTER IV

ROME'S CONQUEST AND ORGANIZATION OF ITALY

Discontent in the Latin League. The capture of Rome by the Gauls in 387 B.C. had severely shattered Rome's prestige, and old enemies, especially the Volscians on the south, took the occasion to advance. When these were beaten back Latin colonies were planted at Satricum (385) and Setia (382). But some of the Latins also showed signs of dissatisfaction. The Veian and Gallic wars had of course cost them much, and Rome had profited more than the Latins from the outcome since these attacks had been made on her northern boundaries. To many of the Latin cities Rome with her efficient government must have seemed dangerous to their independence. Furthermore, differences of ideals and customs were growing up which strained the old bonds of sympathy. Rome was rapidly becoming democratic and adopting advanced reforms while the Latin cities were clinging to the old aristocratic ideas of landholding communities. Rome also, being the largest city and offering a more varied and interesting life, naturally attracted many Latins away from their home towns. Praeneste was an example of a strong Latin city which refused to take orders either from Rome or the League, and Rome had for a long time to allow it to go its own way. Rome was also attracting more attention from foreigners than were the small Latin towns. She signed a treaty of friendship with the Samnites in 354, and a new one with far distant Carthage in 348.

This last treaty seems to be due to a new democratic policy on the part of Rome. The reforms of 367 had admitted

vigorous plebeian blood into the government. Some of these men, like Marcius Rutilus and Publius Philo, desired to see Rome act with more vigor, and strong minded patricians like Valerius Corvus were ready to act with them. It is doubtless due to men such as these that the seaport town at Ostia was rebuilt to encourage foreign traders, and that copper coins were first minted at Rome in order to facilitate trade. It was in fact one of the disgraces of the old landholding régime that it had so neglected trade and industry as to let the harbor go to ruin and to refrain from having any coinage though the Greek cities of Sicily had had metal currency for two centuries. As we have said, the Carthaginian treaty was only one of many indications of a new policy at Rome.

These innovations, however, could but disturb the slow-moving Latins. In 358 the League, now almost shattered, was patched up and the old treaty signed again, a proof that special efforts were needed to keep it from breaking. It was renewed, however, on terms that eventually brought more trouble, for some of the lands that had been taken from the Volscians south of Latium were now given to Rome for her poor. Rome made two new wards out of this territory, the Pomptina and the Publilia; a severed section of the city, as it were, about forty miles away, was thus laid out on the side of the Volscian hills. Surely the Latins must have felt within a few years that they could not well keep their equality if Roman magistrates and Roman troops must march through Latium in going from one part of the city-state to the other.

Economic disturbances at Rome. The legislation of the period at Rome proves that this was also a time of financial uneasiness. Roman farms were not yielding as much as they should. The land had become densely populated in the days when the soil was still very rich. Now signs of exhaustion were coming to view rapidly. In fact the land was so new—the surface had been laid by the last eruptions of

the Alban Volcano—that only a thin coat of humus was found on top, and this was now not only being exhausted by intensive farming but was being washed away by surface erosion. And though the volcanic ash beneath is fairly fertile, the weak roots of cereals do not readily break it up. Latian soil will generally recover from exhaustion in time, but periods inevitably come when it must be given a long rest as pasture land. This approaching exhaustion was one cause of trouble both at Rome and among the Latin farmers.

Another special cause of distress at Rome at this time was, apparently, financial dislocations due to the beginning of coinage. We have seen from our own experience (in 1918-21) that when there is an unusual inflation of currency an era of buying, spending, borrowing, and speculation sets in, and when the excess has been used up, there is a sudden stringency. Then many who have been reckless find themselves in debt, with nothing at hand with which to pay their obligations. Failures and bankruptcy result. The Romans, never having had money before, made similar mistakes as soon as the government issued currency (about 350 B.C.), and the failures that resulted led to a strenuous cry for relief on the part of the poor. It was a new experience, and hence the popular leaders were at a loss what to do. They did at first the most obvious thing and cut the rate of interest in half, then they passed a law completely forbidding the taking of interest—both foolish measures aiming at the symptoms rather than at the evil. Finally, however, they learned from experience, appointed a commission to draw up a liberal bankruptcy law which enabled debtors to get on their feet again, and served as a warning to creditors not to lend recklessly; and then they ended by passing an excellent law putting a stop to imprisonment for debt. The experience proved well worth the price, when the simple old legislators learned so quickly how to draw the logical conclusion. In the future Rome carefully supervised her issues of currency, trying to issue the volume requisite

to meet financial needs. In another chapter we shall see how she kept devising new systems to meet new demands.

The First Samnite War. Such were the experiences which Rome and Latium were passing through when in 343 the people were asked to make a momentous decision. Down in Campania, more than a hundred miles south of Latium, Samnite tribes had long before this driven out the invading Etruscans and taken possession of a plain even more fertile than Latium. In touch with the Greeks at Naples and Cumae, they had quickly taken on many of the customs of cultured people, had built a flourishing city at Capua and had broken off quite completely from their kinsmen who still lived in the mountains. Now the Samnite mountaineers began to make raids into the Campanian fields, and the Capuans appealed to Rome for help against their rude kinsmen. We do not know what arguments Capua used nor what inducement moved Rome to send an army down to help the Capuans. Rome usually acted from prudential motives and may have thought it the part of wisdom to combine with them against the rude and unrestrained mountaineers before the latter grew too strong, or perhaps Capua's promise of an alliance may have sufficed,¹ if Rome already foresaw that she might some day need an ally in a contest with the Latins. Finally, we need not entirely exclude sentiment as a possible motive. We know from recent events that democracies are quick to respond to the appeal of a people threatened by unjust invasion. Old-fashioned nations may call such sentiment hypocrisy, and attribute the action to secret hopes of material benefits, but that is an inadequate view of human nature. The Roman democracy more than once was carried off its feet by an appeal to its altruistic sentiment.

The results of the brief war that followed (343-1) were the salvation of Capua, and a close alliance between Capua

¹ Livy explains Rome's act by saying that Capua offered to become Rome's subject if she would help. The objection to this explanation is that Capua seems not to have been subject to Rome until some time later.

and Rome, which later developed into a union whereby the Capuans became "half-citizens" of Rome.

One interesting incident of this war was that Capua coined considerable silver money for Rome to use in her southern campaign. The Campanian people were accustomed to the use of silver currency, and as Rome had none and needed not a little to buy supplies in Campania she contracted with Capua to make it. The same kind of silver currency was again issued for Rome's use during the second and third Samnite wars, though Rome still avoided issuing any silver at home. This arrangement shows how simple the economic system still was at Rome, and also how the Romans had come to dread the financial crises that seemed to follow new issues of money at home. Rome in fact coined no silver money of her own till the year 269 B.C.

The Latin War. No sooner was the First Samnite War at an end than the threatened break came with the Latins. In addition to the quarrels of the past decade, the Latins now found Rome involving them against their will in foreign enterprises, whereas the makers of the League had contemplated only united action in defensive wars. They thought that if Rome was thus to enter on an adventurous policy which was not only costly but also gave Rome great prestige abroad and threatened to hem in Latium completely, they ought to secure the right to participate in Rome's government. Hence they asked that Latins might become members of the Senate. This demand seems very reasonable and potentially productive of excellent results; it might indeed have led to representative government. But the Latins did not offer to give up their position in the League. They wanted complete "home-rule" as well as participation in Rome's government. That of course Rome was unwilling to grant, and war resulted. The Latins received aid from the Aurunci south of Latium and even from some of the northern Campanians, since these people were afraid of the strong Roman-Capuan alliance.

The Latins, however, did not act in complete accord, they also lacked an efficient central government and effective leadership. Their army was pushed back by the Romans to Sinuessa and was there defeated in 340 B.C. Rome continued the campaigns and sieges till Antium, Latium's best seaport, fell in 338, and Cales, which commanded the road to Campania, was taken in the same year.

The Publilian Law. In the midst of this war Publius Philo, one of the new plebeian consuls—indeed elected to the office three times—passed a law which made the tribal assembly of the plebeians a full lawmaking body of the state by reducing the veto power of the Senate to a mere formality (339 B.C.). This was daring in that it empowered a part of the state to legislate for the whole, a part indeed which must have been almost the whole, but nevertheless a part. It was illogical not only because it disregarded patrician citizens but also because it placed the formulation of bills in the hands of young tribunes instead of in the hands of the real magistrates, the consuls; and furthermore it removed the wholesome veto power of the deliberative body, the Senate. The law shows how strong the democratic party had become, how it distrusted legislation of a body based upon wealth as was the centuriate comitia, and how firmly it believed in popular sovereignty. We need not object seriously to the fact that the patricians had no vote in the assembly; before long they acquired it and they proved to be so few in proportion to the plebeians that their presence made no difference. The serious matter was that ambitious young tribunes presided over the tribal assembly and that their power could not be checked except by the veto exerted by one of their nine colleagues. The only reason why reckless legislation was not indulged in was that one of the ten could always be found to listen to the arguments of conservative men and employ his right of veto. Publius doubtless saw the dangers that we have indicated, but the old-fashioned timocratic assembly which should have re-


formed itself and thus saved itself real power probably proved unreasonably stubborn. The Romans in general believed in majority rule, and if they could not get it through the old legitimate machinery of government, they were willing to create new machinery with which to achieve it.

For two centuries we do not find any serious trouble because of the existence of two legislative bodies. They worked side by side as two systems work in several of our states where the "referendum" exists. The old (centuriate) assembly continued to be used freely as a legislative body, and the plebeian tribal comitia came to be a kind of safety valve, providing for popular referendum in serious cases. The danger of the system was revealed only in the Gracchan days.

The passage of the Publilian law shows that it was the democracy that was in the saddle during this period of rapid expansion. And this suggests that it was probably nervousness due to land exhaustion which had consciously or unconsciously impelled the populace to adventurous policies such as were not customary in periods when the Senate and its nobility had a controlling hand at Rome.

The Roman Federation displaces the Latin League. Yet we must hasten to say that in the settlement of the subjected Latin peoples and their allies, land-grabbing and narrow selfishness are not the dominant motives. The intricate federation now formed to take the place of the Latin League was remarkably liberal and prudent, or perhaps we should say, prudent in its liberality. The government did not, as all ancient nations had hitherto done, take all the best lands, loot the subjects, and sell them into slavery or impose heavy taxes upon them. They imposed no taxes at all, continuing to tax themselves only, and what lands they took they selected chiefly for their suitability for garrison colonies. The inhabitants were treated as though they were to be made full citizens of Rome as soon as they had been Romanized, if not at once.

This liberal behavior toward subject states was one of Rome's first contributions to civilization and marks a great forward step in the history of government. We need not



assume that this liberalism was based on sentiment or emotion. It was rather due to wise insight into human nature. The Romans somehow had learned that subjects can readily be ruled only by fair treatment. It was the example set by these great legislators that made Rome the first city-state

capable of building an enduring empire, and it is a pity that we do not know their names. We may suppose that Manlius Torquatus, three times consul, Valerius Corvus, four times consul, Publius Philo, and Furius Camillus, the grandson of the great dictator, had much to do with it. These men were at least the ones who were most frequently elected to the great offices of state during the period, and we assume that they were the most influential speakers in the unrecorded debates.

Let us now see what old Latin institutions were combined with the new ideas in the settlement of the conquered territory. The Latin League was abrogated, and Rome took the religious rites of the league under her own charge. The Latin people spoke the same language as the Romans and were in fact kinsmen. Hence (1) the nearest towns, like Tusculum, Aricia, and Lanuvium, were accorded full Roman citizenship and at the same time allowed to keep their own local governments. Eventually all cities in Italy were destined to become "municipia" of Roman citizens like these. (2) A probationary stage of half-citizenship—*civitas sine suffragio*—with the duties of Roman citizenship but without the privilege of a vote at Rome, was invented for citizens of towns less friendly, like the half-Volsclan Velitrae and the Auruncan towns of Fundi and Formiae. Their local governments remained intact. Later these towns were promoted to the first class. (3) Antium, on the seacoast, had a good harbor and her fleet had proved dangerous during the war. The fleet was taken, the beaks of the ships (*rostra*) nailed to the platform of the Forum, and three hundred Romans were settled at the town to take charge of the government in the interest of the state. When the natives had proved that they could be trusted they were admitted to full citizenship at Rome and full participation in the government of their own town. This citizen colony (or "maritime" colony) of 300 citizens became the regular model for all future seaport colonies. Besides these three classes of

citizens, Rome formed several classes of allies. (1) In the first place there were strong Latin cities like Tibur and Praeneste that preferred not to have Roman citizenship, being old cities proud of their own history. These were left independent and autonomous in theory, but by signing treaties of defensive alliance with Rome they of course recognized her leadership because the larger city would have more wars to fight, would assume hegemony, control policies, and make all future treaties. Thus such cities actually entered what we might call a protectorate, though nothing in the treaty indicated any difference between them and Rome. (2) A second class of allies was composed of those Latin colonies that had been founded by the Romans and Latins together before the abrogation of the League. These colonies Rome did not disturb; they retained their autonomy and the rights of trade and marriage (*commercium and conubium*) with Romans. They, therefore, were practically in the same position as Tibur and Praeneste. The more important of these old colonies were Norba, Signia, Sutrium, and Nepete. This class was destined to play a very important part in the Romanization of Italy, for by colonizing Romans and allies together in "Latin colonies" Rome henceforth shared all conquered land with her allies, thus gaining their good-will; and by mingling her people with theirs she made the colonies a means of getting acquainted, and learning each other's customs. Moreover by planting such colonies at strategic points she secured garrisons of reliable farmers who saved her the cost and the odium of keeping a standing army among the allies. Cales which commanded the road to Capua was the first new Latin colony founded on this principle. (3) Finally, with the various non-Latin peoples Rome signed everlasting defensive alliances on the same terms as with Praeneste (the *aequum foedus*). Later Capua, Naples and several Campanian towns entered the federation on these terms. In theory such allies were Rome's equals; in practice Rome was their

superior, since she was a unit, and they were not united. Throughout this very intricate federation Rome kept her leadership secure by a device which she had not used in the Latin League. She now made her alliance with each individual city and not with any group. The result of this was, that since no city could consistently form any outside alliances of the same nature, each came into close relations of commerce and kinship with Rome and with no other.¹

This federation was intricate and must have exercised the memories of senators in the discussion of international affairs. Indeed one reason why the plebeian assembly soon allowed the Senate to usurp administrative powers was that the governmental questions had now grown too complex for ordinary voters to handle. Their very intricacy is a mark of the unusual degree of patient sympathy with which the legislators tried to settle each case on its merits. The peoples affected differed in language, religion, custom, and locality, and no single system could have been suited to all. A flexible system whereby the closest of kin could be amalgamated with Rome at once and the rest in progressive steps in proportion to their adaptability to Roman customs was thus prudently devised, and with excellent results. A hundred years later when the federation had spread through Italy, Hannibal, who knew only how selfishly Carthage had exploited her subjects, expected Rome's allies to fly to him for liberation as soon as he entered Italy. To his great surprise he found that Rome's allies fought as bravely for the life of the federation as did her citizens. The wisdom of the fathers was then justified.

We must of course not suppose that Rome had the lofty ideal of governing subjects "for the good of the subjects." That, to be sure, was an idea later accepted by Cicero, and


¹ One strip of land, the Ager Falernus, above Cumae, was for some unknown reason divided up into small lots and given outright to Roman citizens without being organized into an independent municipality. This has rather suggestively been called "the American system" of land distribution. It was not often employed in later times.

the Roman democracy sometimes was moved to individual acts on that theory. But it is only in recent years that governments—and only a few of them—have actually adopted this theory as a definite policy. What Rome actually set out to do was to build for peace, order, and safety on her border, to protect her hardworked lowlands against the raids of less advanced tribes, and to raise up a series of friendly buffer states for her own good. In order to accomplish this effectively she knew that she must show these states the amount of sympathy and justice that would at the critical moment make them her friends, not the friends of her enemies.

It is often asked why Rome did not devise some kind of representative government such as was proposed to her by the Latins. There were several serious objections. The Romans could hardly be willing to give up their democratic assembly, where every man had a vote, for a representative senate composed of peoples many of whom were strange to Roman ways. No government cares to give up its rights and privileges to some one else. Furthermore the people had long fought against a senate for the privilege of direct participation in the government, and a representative senate made up from Latin delegates might possibly restore the aristocracy which they had struggled so hard to subdue. Thirdly, if Etruscans, Volscians, Oscans, and Greeks were to help rule the state in a representative body, Rome would quickly be outvoted by foreigners who cared nothing for her culture and religion, and from their bickerings in various tongues there could hardly have emerged anything but divided purposes. The representative principle might later have been introduced, and was again proposed, but Italy needed first to be permeated with one language and one culture before it could be considered practicable. For the present no better means could have been devised than the flexible federation just made. Had the descendants of these Romans carried out the spirit of their institutions a repre-

sentative republic might well have been created in the second century.

The Second Samnite War, 326-304. In 328 the Romans



settled a colony at Fregellae on the Liris river, a town from which they had driven the Volscians in the last war. Samnite tribes in the mountains behind claimed a prior right to the land and a quarrel arose. Furthermore the Greek city

of Naples joined Rome's alliance in 326 against the will of a large Samnite population in the city, and these Samnites appealed to their kinsmen in the mountains to help them keep the city out of the federation. Thus a very serious war broke out between Rome and the extensive tribe of the Samnites who held most of south-central Italy. At first the Romans made little headway because their unwieldy legion which resembled the Greek phalanx was not suited to warfare in the mountains and the mountaineers having no large cities to protect could keep up a guerilla warfare. The Romans, however, now adopted from the Samnites themselves a more flexible army system, breaking the legions into companies or *maniples* (handful) of 120 men each. In 321, they attempted to break through the Caudine pass in order to approach the enemy from the rear but they were defeated and the consul had to surrender his whole army in disgrace, signing a treaty of peace which surrendered the disputed Fregellae to the Samnites. The peace, however, did not last long. Rome presently began to secure her safety by making treaties of alliance with all the peoples surrounding the Samnites who had suffered from their raids, the Apulians and Lucanians on the south, the Frentani on the east, and some Sabellian tribes on the north. This may be the reason why the war broke out afresh in 315. Both sides were now organized for a determined struggle. Rome's army succeeded this time in forcing the Caudine pass and invading the valleys of the south. The Samnites boldly made a countermove by marching on Latium. At Tarra-cina they defeated Rome's army of defense, and marched on within twenty miles of Rome, so that Rome had to call back her southern army. Now setting out from Rome once more the consuls slowly drove the foe back into the mountains again, and to secure ease of communication the Senate, following a suggestion of Appius Claudius, had the Appian Way built from Rome to Capua.

The Samnites, however, having learned from Rome the

advantages of wise diplomacy, secured the aid of several Etruscan cities in the north. Rome now had to raise a new army to save her northern colonies. In 310-08 the Etruscans were forced to make peace, but it was not till 304 that the Romans were able to capture Bovianum, the central Samnite stronghold. Then peace was made. The only advantages that Rome gained from the war were the return of her colony at Fregellae, and some strips of territory on the borders of Samnium where garrison colonies ("Latin colonies") of Romans, Latins, and Campanians were planted.

Among these Latin colonies were Luceria, founded to keep together the friendly peoples of the south (315), Saticula (313) to hold the Caudine pass, Suessa (313) to support Cales on the Latin road, Interamna (312) to support Fregellae, Alba (303) and Carsioli (298), to command the road north of Samnium. To secure the ports south of Rome opening into Campania, in case the southern land-roads from Latium should ever be blocked again, citizen colonies like that of Antium were planted at Minturnae and Sinuessa in 296. No further settlements were made in Etruria at this time. The Etruscans were a peculiar people, so different from the Latins that Rome had little desire to mingle with them or to have them in her federation. She did not even make her usual defensive alliances "for all time" with the Etruscan cities which she overcame, but adopted the Etruscan form of treaty establishing "friendship" for a given term of years.

The Third Samnite War, 298-290. Within a few years the peace of Italy was once more broken by a Gallic invasion. A new horde of Gauls had crossed the Alps from central Europe and finding no lands among their brothers in the Po valley they decided to wrest them from Rome, as the Senones had so nearly done in 387. They invited the Etruscan and Italian tribes to share in the enterprise and at Sentinum in Umbria, the Roman general, Decius Mus, had to meet in 296 the Gallic forces augmented by bands of

Etruscans, Samnites, and Umbrians. The battle was desperately contested and was not decided till the consul, offering himself as a sacrifice to the gods, rode to the front at the head of his troops, and fighting valiantly led the attack till he was killed. The story of this battle reached even the Greeks and was described by Greek historians. A Roman dramatist Accius nearly two centuries later made a chronicle-play out of the Greek account. After the battle the Gauls retreated, and the Umbrians and Etruscans made peace, but the war continued in Samnium till the enemy surrendered unconditionally in 290. Samnium was made an autonomous ally but surrendered territory for a new garrison of allies (i.e. a Latin colony) at Venusia. The Sabines who had aided the Samnites were overrun and subdued by the vigorous general Curius Dentatus and the inhabitants were at first made "half-citizens." A generation later they became full citizens of Rome, being taken into the two new wards, the Quirina and the Velina. Thus the boundaries of Rome's city state were extended to the Adriatic sea, effectively cutting the south of Italy from the north.

The Northern boundary secured. Rome's federation had now spread so far that its buffer states came in contact with a score of other states and tribes, Etruscan, Umbrian, Gallic, and all the Greek city states along the southern sea-coast. The Romans were gradually learning that every new alliance simply added to the number of problems they must settle, for every new ally brought with it new personal quarrels. Modern states find that all the arts of diplomacy hardly suffice to keep them at peace with three or four neighbors: what must have been the difficulty of Rome in trying to adjust the disputes of this unwieldy federation with their scores of neighbors, many of whom were barbarians that preferred war to peace? As England with her far-flung empire is almost perpetually involved in some border dispute in some corner of the world, so now the Roman Senate was kept at its wit's end to adjust difficulties upon the boun-

daries. The Senate was probably beginning to realize that it would be well to find some good natural boundaries for the federation.

To this consummation events now quickly led. In 285 the Gauls broke loose again. The Senones, who had captured Rome in 387, led as usual, attacking Arretium, the Etruscan town, now an ally of Rome. The first army sent by Rome to the rescue was defeated, but a second, led by Curius Dentatus, succeeded better. Curius with characteristic thoroughness drove the dangerous Senones out of Italy beyond the Rubicon, appropriating the *Ager Gallicus in Piceno* as Roman public land. Colonies were gradually planted at Sena, Hadria, and Ariminum, to hold the coast. The rest of the land was left unsettled for the present, since Rome's population was too depleted by war to fill it up. However, another Gallic tribe, the Boii, then living at Bononia (modern Bologna) took up the quarrel, gathered contingents from several Etruscan cities and dashed southward. They were not stopped till they reached Lake Vadimon, fifty miles from Rome, where they were decisively defeated (284). The Gauls now had to sue for peace, and Rome took the occasion to reorganize all of Etruria and Umbria, which had not only showed themselves incapable of stopping Gallic raids, but even of holding their own people from partaking in such raids. Several cities were compelled to give up land for garrison colonies, and all were made to enter Rome's federation on more or less honorable terms. By 280 the federation had a natural boundary on the north, consisting of the Apennines north of Florence and of the Rubicon north of Ariminum.

War with Pyrrhus. On the south a series of dangerous disputes soon brought the federation to the sea. Most of the famous old Greek colonies of southern Italy (Magna Graecia) had by this time fallen into decay. Interested chiefly in commerce they had never built up strong armies to protect themselves from the Lucanians and Bruttians.

Hence when in trouble they had had to purchase the aid of Syracusan and Greek armies to save them. These helpers had, after the manner of "protectors," exploited them with little mercy. In addition, the recent decay of the Greek states at home had destroyed the profits of their commerce. In fact with Alexander's conquest the interests of the Greeks were turned eastward rather than westward. Tarentum still maintained some power by acting as *entrepôt* and manufacturing center, especially in the woolen trade of south Italy, and at times undertook—usually by means of mercenary armies hired in Epirus or Sparta—to play the part of protector to nearby Greek cities, not always to their advantage. Thurii, one of these Greek cities, tired of Tarentine protection, and comprehending the nature of Rome's strong federation in the north, sent envoys to Rome asking admission to her league and aid in defense against the Lucanians. Rome after much hesitation on the part of the Senate consented, and sent an army to her aid. The Tarentines took offense at the fact that a Greek city should turn from them to Rome for aid, and set out to punish Thurii, at the same time¹ sinking several Roman ships that appeared in their harbor contrary to the terms of an old treaty. In the war, which Rome declared in 281, Tarentum secured the aid of many Lucanians and Samnites and hired the services of Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, a skilful Greek general who claimed to be a descendant of Achilles, and an army of mountaineers trained in the best Macedonian tactics. In 280 Pyrrhus met the Romans at Heraclea. The Roman legions dashed on the solid phalanx seven times without success. Then Pyrrhus charged with his elephants which, impervious to spears and swords, served as "tanks" and tore gaps in the legions everywhere. The Thessalian cavalry dashed into

¹ There was an old treaty that Romans should not sail east of the Lacinian Cape. We do not know when it was made. Now, of course, that Rome had colonies on the Adriatic she must naturally have connections by sea. The Tarentines seem, however, to have been formally correct in their claim that the Roman ships had infringed upon the terms of a treaty.

the breach and completed the work. Pyrrhus now marched on Rome unobstructed, not expecting to take the walled city, but thinking that the Roman federation would break up and join a new alliance with him. Nothing happened, however, and when only forty miles from Rome he concluded that he had miscalculated. He withdrew to southern Samnium to fight it out. Again he defeated the Roman army, and now offered to come to terms if Rome would surrender the South to him. A large element of the Senate, which had objected to the adventurous expansionistic policy of the democratic leaders, advocated peace. But the blind old Appius Claudius called the Senate back to a firmer stand by his insistence that Rome had never treated with an enemy who was still on invaded territory. Cineas, the envoy, returned to Pyrrhus, it is said, with the report that the Senate was an assembly of kings. Pyrrhus, on the other hand, gained the high respect of the Romans by turning over to them a traitor who had promised to assassinate the Roman general. For this magnanimous act the Romans never tired of singing his praises, and one of the most vigorous passages of Rome's first great poet, Ennius, lauds his chivalrous conduct of the war.

Pyrrhus, unable to secure peace on favorable terms, now made the mistake of leaving the Roman question unsettled and turning his ambitions to Sicily where he had been invited to help the Greek cities against Carthage. His weakened army, however, could not make much permanent progress. Returning to Italy after three years to complete his contest with Rome he was defeated in 275 by the veteran Curius Dentatus at Beneventum. Rome then drove the Epirote garrisons out of Italy, and invited the Greek cities to join her federation on terms of "equality," which they did. By the terms of the alliance, Rome was to furnish the land army in case of a war, while the Greek cities promised their service in the form of naval contingents if they should be needed. Rome was now master of Italy.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW

Rome's currency. Rome met with no little difficulty in adapting her simple monetary scheme to the needs of her rapidly expanding empire. We have noticed that the Romans had no coinage at all until about 350 when the state had become almost a pure democracy, and then only bronze was coined at home. At first they issued bulky one-pound bronze pieces called *asses* (in the Oscan pound = 273 grams, about $\frac{4}{5}$ pound troy) and uncial fractions of the pound. At that time metal in Italy, being relatively scarce, bought more food than now. An average ox was considered worth 100 bronze *asses*, and a head of sheep 10 *asses*. A pound of silver was considered worth about 120 pounds of bronze, and a pound of gold about 15 pounds of silver. (At present the rate of gold to silver is about 20 to 1, and of silver to bronze about 75 to 1.) In the purchasing value of food we may count that the bronze *as* piece was normally worth about 50-75 cents in terms of prices prevailing in 1914. For her foreign purchases, however, Rome, as we have seen, had to have silver pieces coined at Capua. These pieces contained $7\frac{1}{2}$ grams of silver, and were practically duplicates of the Greek double-drachmas current about Naples. One of these pieces, at the ratio of 120:1, was worth a little over three bronze *asses*. About 312 B.C., i.e. in the middle of the second Samnite war, Rome reduced these silver pieces a trifle, apparently in order to facilitate their exchanging exactly with her bronze coins. At once Italy learned the truth of what we call "Gresham's Law," that cheap currency tends to drive out dear currency. Various Greek cities of Italy found that they had to reduce their

double-drachmas in accordance with Rome's coinage unless they wished to have their coinage displaced by Roman pieces.

At the beginning of the third century a very drastic change in the values of metals seriously affected Rome's system of coinage. Silver and gold were falling in value because Alexander the Great had brought great hoards of these precious metals from Asiatic temples and put them into circulation. Prices rose rapidly in Greece and gradually in Italy also. There was much complaint about the high cost of living; which means that silver and gold were abundant and therefore cheap. To make matters worse at Rome, copper and bronze rose enormously in value, partly because the Gauls and Etruscans were by their raids cutting off the source of supply in Etruria, partly because Rome was using up her stock in the war. Rome was then in the same predicament as Germany in the last war: copper had become almost a precious metal. As a result the bronze *asses* rose in intrinsic value while the silver double-drachmas fell in value. And in order to keep her bimetallism intact Rome had to reduce the size of the bronze *asses* year after year. About 300 B.C. she cut them to half a pound, and in the next twenty years continued to cut them till they weighed only two ounces, or one-sixth of a pound.

When Rome's serious wars were over, values began to go back to the old norm. Silver rose somewhat because no new hoards came into Italy from the east, and Rome's subjugation of Etruria and the return of peace very quickly restored the cheap price of copper. This readjustment quite wrecked Rome's coinage system, since the small two ounce pieces now had little value, and no one wished to return to the use of bulky one-pound *asses*. Rome, therefore, abandoned the whole system. She did this the more readily because the silver piece was really a Greek coin and unworthy of Rome's proud position as ruler of Italy. Accordingly in 269, the year after peace had been established in the South,

Rome devised a new system which, with but one serious change, survived for about 500 years, and she operated her own mint henceforth. A new bronze *as* was made weighing two *Roman* ounces; and since the ratio of 120:1 had now been restored as the relative values of silver and bronze, a piece of silver weighing only one-twelfth as much ($\frac{1}{6}$ of one ounce) was coined. It was, therefore, worth 10 of the new bronze *asses*, and was accordingly called the *denarius*.¹ This denarius weighs about four grams and is a trifle larger than our ten-cent piece. A smaller coin worth one-fourth the denarius (two and one-half *asses*) was struck for smaller change and was called the *semistertius* or *sestertius*. The denarius seems to us small for a standard coin, but metal was scarcer then than now and accordingly had a relatively larger purchasing value, perhaps three to five times as much as our currency in 1914. Gold was still so scarce in Italy that it would not have been practicable to introduce it into the currency system.

The new system was based upon convenient pieces coined at practically the recognized market value of the metals, and in order to gain at once a wide distribution of the coins Rome erected branch mints in several of the Latin colonies. So well was the system managed and such credit did it acquire that it soon became the generally accepted currency throughout Italy. A few of the Greek cities of the south continued to issue their own coins, but it was only a matter of years before they learned that their coins were not popular and their mints were closed.

Agriculture and cattle raising. During the fourth century we notice in the numerous reports of farmers, of debtor laws, and of colonization, the symptoms of land exhaustion. With the growth of Rome and of her trade, the timber on the surrounding mountains had to yield to the ax, and this did not benefit the farmer. The fact that Rome settled farmers in the Pomptine region below the Volscian moun-

¹ If silver : bronze :: 120:1, $\frac{1}{6}$ oz. silver = 10 x 2 oz. bronze.

tains during the fourth century on land that became a stagnant marsh before the second century shows what deforestation could accomplish. The soil was carried off the rocks when the forest was cut, and, blocking up the coastal plain of lower Latium, formed lagoons in which malarial mosquitoes bred. Further north the Sabine mountains were similarly laid bare and the spring rains ran off to the sea quickly, leaving no subsoil reservoir for summer herbage to draw upon.

The conquest of the Sabine and Aequian mountain country showed the Latin farmers a remedy, though a desperate one. By buying up large pastures in the hills for summer grazing they could turn their exhausted Latian farms into pasture grounds for the other three seasons and thus combine the two areas for productive cattle and sheep raising. This of course could not be done profitably on a small scale, as a shepherd would cost as much for a few sheep as for a hundred. Hence it was not long before men with capital and extensive estates got possession of a large part of Latium and the surrounding mountain pastures. Farming in small plots continued in Latium chiefly where irrigation was possible, but a large part of the peasantry scattered to the colonies. It has been estimated that about 60,000 colonists, mainly from Latian lands, were established in colonies during the first great period of expansion between 343 and 264. This fact involved almost a complete change in the economic and political situation at Rome.

The economic change was so great that Rome felt it to the end of her career, for because of it the Romans remained an agricultural people at a time when they were on the point of being forced into industry and commerce. In the fourth century, when Rome rebuilt Ostia and instituted her first coinage, it seemed for a time as if the state were about to encourage commerce. The industrial classes were definitely favored by the censor Appius Claudius when about 312 B.C. he built an aqueduct to their quarter of the city, and when

he gave them strong political power by letting them register in all the thirty-one *tribus* (wards) of the city instead of confining their votes to the four urban tribes. Later censors, to be sure, annulled this order, but the measure shows that the industrial class of the city was then an item to reckon with. However, the scattering of the poor Romans, both the peasants and the urban proletariat, into colonies, disposed of the classes that would naturally have supplied cheap labor to new industries. Since there was no longer any pressure for new work, none appeared. The situation reminds us of the decay of the American marine and of some of the New England industries when the opening up of the great plains on the Mississippi attracted the surplus labor of the East westward. At Rome this process continued for a long time, keeping the Italian people primarily an agricultural people when it would have been well for Italy to have had a much more varied economic system.

By expanding landward Rome severed herself from the outside influences that would have come from trade on the seas. Her contact with the outer world continued to be weak. There are very few traces in the architectural remains of this period that show any signs of contemporaneous Aegean influence. The Romans had long ago ceased to follow the progress of Greek art that had dominated Etruscan Rome in the sixth century, and they show little inclination to reestablish lost connections. Not till the Second Punic War did Roman architecture become aware of how far it had been outdistanced. In industrial art the story is the same. Praeneste, the inland hill-city only twenty miles away, developed in the third century a thriving industry in bronze and silver ware that produced very artistic pieces. It is hardly due to lack of skill that Roman crafts of the same period fell behind, since the two cities were of the same race. The explanation of Praeneste's new development probably lies in the fact that the city had limited its territorial bounds by a treaty of "equality" with Rome which

tied it for all time to the possession of some fifty square miles and compelled its surplus energies to find expression in industry. It might have been well for Rome had she to some measure been forced back upon her inventive skill in the same way. But as a result of Rome's expansionistic ventures, her citizens, always invited to settle new lands and to invest their excess capital in real property, became for all time farmers and real estate capitalists. Necessity, the mother of crafts as well as of arts, never forced them into apprenticeship in those occupations that develop the love for artificial beauty and train the instincts for commercial enterprise.

The government. We have seen how conservative the regular machinery of government remained, despite the admission of plebeians to all important offices of state. The regular centuriate assembly was still based on property in such a way that the first class together with the knights had 98 of the 193 votes while the proletariat was herded together in five centuries. Not only must the sympathies of this assembly have been conservative, but it received no bills even for approval or rejection except those which a majority of the Senate sent to it. The Senate was apt to remain conservative since its members were drawn by the censors chiefly from office-holders (consuls, praetors, and aediles) who had been elected to their offices by the centuriate comitia.

But we have also seen that, though this government refused to liberalize itself to any great extent, it had been forced to allow the growth of a plebeian assembly which voted by wards, an assembly which gave every plebeian, poor as well as rich, an equal vote in his *tribus*, and counted each *tribus* alike as having one vote. After 339 B.C. this assembly, presided over by young plebeian tribunes, had been able to make plebiscites that, with only the formal approval of the patricians of the Senate (*auctoritas patrum*), had the force of *leges* passed by the centuriate comitia. The

necessity of a formal approval seems at times to have acted as a deterrent so that the plebeians demanded its removal. In 288 they asked that the plebeian assembly (*comitia tributa*) be allowed to become an absolutely free legislative body, not because they cared to assume the full duties of legislation but because they believed thoroughly in the principle of popular sovereignty which seemed not to be safeguarded by the centuriate assembly. On being denied this demand—and others of which we now have no accurate record—they again declared a political strike and seceded. Their demand was acceded to by the Hortensian law of 287. It is probable that the patricians were now admitted to the *comitia tributa* so that the assembly henceforth contained all the citizens of Rome. Democracy of the primary kind was now in the saddle so far as lawmaking and the voting of war and peace were concerned. The centuriate assembly was still used as a voting body in the election of magistrates, and this, therefore, assured the continuance in power of rather conservative magistrates and Senate.

It is significant that the period of expansion was the period of democratic rule. This illustrates a principle which has long been recognized, namely, that, while democracies are generally peace-loving, they can readily be excited to enthusiasm for war. The popular imagination catches fire at dreams of empire and visions of glory which staid aristocracies often disregard. Furthermore, democratic assemblies often fail to count the cost or to take cognizance of old treaties and long established traditions and policies that hold in diplomacy. Readily inflamed by sympathy or aversion they fly to arms at a word or deed which, if analyzed calmly in senatorial debate, might have assumed less significance. We do not know enough of the causes to judge fully the motives leading to these expansionistic wars, but it is likely that had the old constitution been in force, Rome might have ventured less far afield. At any rate, it was not according to old tradition to leap to the aid of Thurii

against the Lucanians in 282. The war with Pyrrhus was brought on by a plebiscite, which is a clear indication that the Senate had not recommended it. And that plebiscite was passed only five years after popular sovereignty had been finally admitted by the Senate.

The power of the primary assembly, however, was destined soon to be weakened. In the first place, the poorer people were little by little being sent away to colonies, glad to accept allotments elsewhere, since the plantation and ranching system was pushing them out of the competition at home. The land-holding nobility of course remained at Rome, and their influence and importance increased in proportion to the diminishing of the group of small peasants and urban poor. To till their farms and tend their herds the nobility bought slaves, who of course had no vote, or they hired laborers or engaged tenants who were apt to be so dependent upon them that they voted as their patrons desired.

A second reason for the diminishing significance of democratic tendencies during the next hundred years lies in the fact that the problems of directing a very intricate federation involved such detailed knowledge of treaties and the minutiae of government that very few of the young tribunes dared suggest a policy. And when they remained silent, the burden of administration fell upon the consuls and the Senate. For these two reasons it is that the democracy was no sooner fully established by the Hortensian law of 287 than the directing power in all matters of great importance began to fall back into the hands of the nobility. The democracy had launched the state into the war with Pyrrhus, but it was the Senate that had to find the means of seeing it through and of settling the terms afterwards. As we shall see the same tendencies manifested themselves during the Punic wars.

The result of this trend was that for the next hundred years the constitution by common consent slowly changed

back towards the aristocratic form. Not only did the *comitia tributa* more and more surrender their influence, but even the centuriate assembly was less often called together in times of war to pass enabling acts and administrative measures. In war time, decisions had to be made quickly: at a crisis the consuls would consult the Senate, and if the Senate reached an agreement, they would frequently act on such advice without putting measures to a vote of either assembly. The Senate by common consent thus became a cabinet and quasi-legislative body, and though this change never was recognized by an explicitly formulated law, the new position of the Senate was seldom questioned during the next hundred years.

It is interesting to find that no regular party organizations arose to control elections at Rome. When consuls, praetors, aediles, questors, and tribunes were to be elected—and separate elections were held for the various offices—the candidates posted their names, as is still done in England. They were not nominated by party conventions nor promoted by party support as in America. To be sure, we know that in Cicero's day, radicals voted for Catiline on the strength of his campaign promises, while conservatives and property owners generally voted for Cicero because they thought he would prevent revolutionary legislation. But even in this case there was only an approach to modern party organization.

The chief reason for the absence of political parties at Rome is that elections changed only the executive and judicial magistrates and not the Senate or legislative assemblies. The legislative assemblies, consisting of the people voting by classes or by wards, remained unchanged. Elections could not affect them. Hence an election could hardly affect policies of state to any great extent. Catiline attracted party support largely because he proposed to override the assemblies by revolutionary methods. Ordinarily no one dared to make such threats. The elections, therefore, generally

centered about the personality of the consular candidate, as sometimes happens in America when the two parties have no clear-cut issue and the election offers no choice of policies.

Another reason why a party system failed to develop was that Rome continued to be an agricultural state. Its leaders were generally landholders who took no interest in manufacturing or commerce. Hence there never arose any exciting financial questions about tariff policies involving the pockets of consumers and producers alike. Furthermore no vital labor questions emerged, since the slaves who did the farm and household work had no vote, and there never was at Rome a large class of free labor in industries. Such division of interests as we have seen between rich and poor did become acute at times, but then the poor, instead of trying to affect the election of the magistrates, usually vented their anger in an effort to work through the referendum machinery of the tribunes and *comitia tributa*.

Development of Roman law. The Decemviral code of 450 was, as we have noticed, a hastily drawn up compromise between old customs and new ideas that did not properly distinguish between civil, criminal, and religious jurisprudence. It was too hastily formulated and with too little regard for any body of legal practice. By the Licinian-Sextian reforms of 367 the judicial powers were taken from the consuls and given to praetors. And now, with two men who devoted all the time of their term of office to the settlement of disputes, it was possible to build up a body of decisions, and to evolve principles of jurisprudence. The praetors, to be sure, were not necessarily chosen because of their distinction at law, but very important senators were then usually elected for this high office, sometimes even ex-consuls. Being members of the Senate they were men who knew the laws and treaties which were rapidly being evolved in great number. It was not long before legal principles began to be laid down by them in prudent Roman fashion.

Membership in the Senate at once had a very salutary

effect on the law. The praetors were made to feel constantly that civil law was a thing apart from religion, divine authority, and old custom. With all respect for these things they saw before their eyes that the organs of the sovereign people made the laws at their will. Hence they soon began to do away with such obsolete rules of the twelve tables as the one which left the penalty for some crimes to divine wrath. It was the business of the human state, not of gods, priests or family heads, to make laws, and the Roman praetors adopted this idea much more quickly than did for instance the ancient Hebrews or modern Teutonic peoples.

A second influence that worked constantly in the development of Roman civil law was the existence of a large landholding nobility of which the praetors were apt to be members, a nobility which kept itself intact for hundreds of years at Rome. This influence worked partly through economic channels, in that the families which continued for ages to hand down important estates from father to son grew to be careful of legal rights. But legal-mindedness was also a temperamental inheritance of the Roman nobility through families of relatively pure pedigree descended from the northern immigrants. It manifested itself especially in a deep respect for property rights that looked askance at revolutionary changes, socialistic schemes, and debt repudiations. In an account of Roman law we should also consider the effect of Rome's position in a relatively fertile plain surrounded by less civilized mountaineers who were likely to break down into the valleys to raid and plunder. A sense of law and order, and a dislike for brigandage develops in the lowlands much more quickly than in the mountains. The influence of this is particularly seen in an early "fetal law" that the Romans adopted, among their religious customs, a law which frowned upon wars of aggression and insisted that violence could not be used except for defense. In every war of the earlier day we find that the Senate refused—at least claimed that it refused—to

enter a war of aggression, and that even for defense it would not go to war until it had sent the fetial priest to the offending state to report the grievance and give thirty days of grace in which to make reparation. Of course we need not hold that the Senate could not find some plausible excuse for an attack if it really wanted one. But the very regulation discountenancing wars of aggression had a salutary effect. The theory underlying this action was that the gods took vengeance on the breakers of oaths, and fought unjust aggressors. But that theory might not have arisen unless the Romans had themselves usually been the sufferers from lawless raids. If holding property could have such an effect on intertribal questions, it must have exerted a strong influence on civil law as well.

This sense of justice, partly inherited in the race, and partly developed by the experiences of the Latin people by their position and wealth, early evolved an institution which did more than anything else to keep Roman law progressive. This was the court of the *praetor peregrinus*. The Romans had usually had some commerce with foreigners at their port, and they soon observed that injustices were done because different peoples did not have the same conceptions of what constituted a sale or purchase. A Roman for instance had a law which pronounced a bargain complete as soon as the words were spoken before witnesses. Some foreigners who came to the port had the custom that a bargain was not consummated until the complete exchange of the wares and the price had taken place. Suppose that the day after a bargain was struck, before the wares were exchanged, there was a violent change of price. *A* might insist on the bargain, while *B* might, according to his rules, refuse to carry it out. Such disputes with strangers were not infrequent, and often with no intent on anyone's part to deceive. In such cases the Romans thought it only equitable to let the *praetor peregrinus* (the judge of the court of strangers) hear both sides and instead of deciding every

case according to Roman law, which would naturally favor Romans, try to reach an equitable compromise based on the customs of both parties. This would naturally make strangers feel that their interests were cared for and it would invite them to return.

This court was instituted in 366, though there can be little doubt that even before that date, the practice of taking cognizance of the customs of strangers had been observed by the consuls and the arbitrators whom they were wont to appoint. The effect of this practice was that the Roman jurists learned a great deal about foreign customs and that the praetors, being members of the Senate, brought such knowledge into their proposals for new laws. The practice of giving strangers an equitable hearing was, therefore, very enlightening to the Romans. They began to assume that there were practices of other states which were based on good principles, that their own legislation, though the supreme law in the city, might be amended according to more general concepts, that somehow, indeed, *equity* and not native custom or desire was a universal principle to which law should conform. They began, therefore, to hunt for a general equitable formula to which to refer and by which to explain individual statutes. This was the great discovery of republican jurists, which, as we shall see, was later furthered by the adoption of Stoic ideas. It was the thing that constantly fitted Roman law for general application the world over. The idea that every law should be based upon a universally applicable principle of equity was Rome's discovery, and one of the greatest legacies of the ancient to the modern world.

Finally, the constitution of Rome allowed and encouraged praetors to keep legal practices progressive, which aided very much in the law's development. The praetors, inheriting a part of the consular powers, and being men of dignity, were allowed by custom to decide in some measure when obsolete laws should be disregarded and considered a dead

letter. Legislative popular assemblies are poor organs for the revision of laws. All of our states have hundreds of obsolete statutes, because the legislatures have neither time nor inclination to revise them year by year. The evil was even worse at Rome where the whole impatient populace had to be called together for legislative purposes. The praetors, therefore, gradually assumed the privilege of stating their version of the applicability of old statutes—if this was too radical to suit the people the assembly could of course pass a law on the matter. Each year when he went into office the praetor posted, if he wished, an edict embodying his interpretation of laws no longer applicable in their original intention. When, for instance, business enterprises grew and old laws of contract seemed to be inadequate on the subject of agencies, the praetor simply laid down the rule that the principal was bound by the act of his agent. When, again, the custom arose at Rome that women could hold property which was not subject to the control of their husbands, the praetor announced that there were certain methods of holding property in the wife's control which he would consider valid. In this way the law was kept liberal, progressive, and free from dry rot. Any abuse of power could quickly be corrected by legislation. The advantages were very great not only because the civil law was kept up-to-date despite the cumbersomeness of legislation but also because praetors were by their sympathies apt to search for general principles upon which to base their edicts. The danger, not always avoided, was that the praetor in his eagerness to escape the appearance of radical action often invented legal subtleties in order to make his new ruling seem to agree with old statutes. Thus, for instance, in the rules that freed the family from the *manus* of the father, where clear-cut laws might have done away with the *manus* entirely, the praetor pretended to recognize the *patria potestas* while he permitted its annulment by several forms of contracts and

agreements.¹ Thus it was that law was "judge-made" at Rome to a greater extent even than in America where every statute has to be passed upon by the court, and where court precedents and interpretations ultimately decide what force statutes actually have. Thus, too, Roman law, despite the difficulties involved in legislative revision of statutes, could progress with commendable speed.

The army. The legion was now no longer formed into a solid phalanx but into thirty mobile maniples of 120 men each. The legion was formed in three lines of maniples, each line several men deep. The men of the front line were heavily armored with helmets, breastplates, shields and greaves and each man carried two javelins to hurl and a sword for hand to hand contests. These arms they were compelled to supply at their own expense. This line of heavy armed men was deep enough to carry the attack with some momentum and to provide men for the place of those who fell. The second line was similarly armed, and acted as recruits in battle. The third line often consisted of veterans, more lightly armed, for support. Three hundred cavalry men went with each legion. This wing was not developed much during the Italian wars, since Italy was somewhat too mountainous for the use of horses. Indeed Rome suffered much from her deficiency in cavalry when Hannibal invaded Italy with his more mobile army.

After the stipendium had been introduced in the fourth century, it was no longer customary to place the wealthier men in the front line. All could now arm themselves. Hence recruits were first used as light armed infantry till trained, then placed in the front line, and later released from hard service by being moved to the second and third ranks successively.

¹ This is the reason why so many obsolete laws have actually survived in the Justinian code. Such survivals have deceived many modern readers into the belief that numerous early institutions still survived in actual force, when as a matter of fact they were disregarded in practice.

Discipline was very strict. Desertion, betrayal, or sleeping on watch entailed quick death. The camp at night was invariably fortified by wall and moat, each soldier having to do his assigned portion of fortifying at the moment of reaching the chosen spot. A regular plan was followed so that each soldier could step off his allotment of work without specific orders. Rewards and promotions for bravery were numerous, carefully awarded and highly prized, but a common soldier could not ordinarily rise from the ranks to a position higher than that of centurion (captain) of a manipule. The consuls of the year served as generals of the army, a policy which proved defective against such capable generals as Pyrrhus and Hannibal. But Rome did not believe in standing armies, and was afraid that if professional soldiers were kept militarism might endanger democracy. On the whole it could generally be assumed during the period of expansion that a consul had served as officer in several campaigns and had thus gained some experience or would at least take on his staff a capable adviser. Cicero for instance took with him to his province his brother who had served on Caesar's staff in Gaul. There was as yet no navy.

Rome's control of Italy. Italy was now a federation under Rome's leadership. The Roman citizens of the sovereign city who decided the foreign policy of the federation occupied perhaps not more than five per cent of the whole area. Rome had to be liberal in her policy or she would quickly have been crushed. The *Ager Romanus* extended about thirty miles south into Latium, some twenty miles north into Etruria, and through the Sabine country to the Adriatic—for in 268 the Sabines had been given citizenship. Besides this central group of citizens there were only small colonies of Roman citizens here and there. The rest of Italy consisted of Latin colonies, Latin allies, some cities of half-citizens, and a great number of non-Latin allies (*socii*).

These allies were not all treated alike. In the south, the Greek cities were the most favored, continuing in commerce so far as they had survived their past misfortunes and having their safety secured by Rome, although they were free from military duties except such as would be required on the seas. The Oscans of Campania had suffered in the Samnite war because of disloyalty in 312. At some time, we do not know when, they were deprived of independence and made "half-citizens" of Rome. The Sabellian tribes of the Apennines, the Marsi, Piceni, Vestini, etc., were still a rude mountain people, living in primitive villages as the Latins had several centuries before; and Rome, finding no organized cities here with which to sign treaties, accepted the tribal states into her federation. The Umbrians had, under the influence of the Etruscans, merged most of their villages into cities which now came individually and on good terms into the league. Etruria presented a difficult question. The people were so different from the Romans in language, religion, and customs that Rome had little desire to make full citizens of them. Indeed, not till the Social war of 89 B.C. was any large part incorporated in Roman territory. Yet this section had remained badly organized and always seemed unable or unwilling to stop Gallic raids. Rome, therefore, when she ended the Samnite wars, appropriated plots here and there in Etruria and, as opportunity offered, settled them with people she could trust. But Etruria did not prosper under Roman rule. Her princes had lived too much by exploiting subject peoples in a kind of feudal system which did not readily fit into the Roman system. The subject peoples could now revolt from their masters and find places in which to live in liberty. Moreover, their old industries no longer thrived since the Greeks had become the commercial peoples of the Mediterranean; their lands too were now exhausted and, being hilly, had eroded badly. Roman cattle raisers and agricultural folk of quieter habits seem gradually to have filtered in,

and the Etruscans—they never had been very numerous—merged with the new population so that by Cicero's day it is likely that their language had practically disappeared.

Throughout this heterogeneous group of Italian allies Rome's direct influence was exerted only by the control of the external policy. Rome had as yet made no effort to interfere in the laws, customs, religions or languages of the various peoples, or in their commerce. All of them had complete "home-rule." Yet through contact provided by the colonies and by common military service, Rome's language and customs were gradually beginning to permeate the whole.

CHAPTER VI

ROME AND CARTHAGE: THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Carthage. Carthage had been settled by Phoenicians of Tyre and Sidon not long after the time that King Solomon built the temple of Jerusalem with the aid of Tyrian craftsmen furnished by King Hiram; and when Phoenicia later suffered under Assyrian attacks Carthage became the ruler of the western Phoenician colonies, drawing a large part of the powerful men of Tyre and Sidon to this new home. The city grew rapidly in size and wealth, though it seems not to have created any literature or art of importance. In order to trade with the barbarian Libyans, its merchants planted trading posts all along the shores of north Africa, some 600 miles eastward to Cyrene, and a thousand miles westward to the Atlantic ocean. Carthage also took possession of western Sicily, keeping up an incessant quarrel with the Greek colonies of the eastern half, and presently of Sardinia and Corsica. Wherever the Carthaginians gained a foothold they tried to establish a monopoly of trade for themselves. We have seen how in the first treaty of Rome they excluded Romans wherever they had complete control. Only in Sicilian ports, where they could not control the eastern approaches, did they permit free trade, and their policy of exclusion they carried even further in the treaty that they made with Rome in 348. To the Romans of that day Carthaginian extension of the *mare clausum* mattered little, since Rome had as yet no commerce. But to Greek cities, like Marseilles and Syracuse, which depended much upon trade in the western Mediterranean this policy was annoying. Finally, they took possession of southern Spain, and in order to protect their trade in that region—especially in the tin which came from Britain—they announced that the


western sea belonged to them exclusively, and they made good their claims by sinking every vessel that came into those waters. That Marseilles kept up a perpetual war with them is not surprising.

The government of Carthage, however, was not wholly in the hands of the mercantile class. A large land-owning aristocracy arose in time which reduced the native Libyans to serfdom. And these landed proprietors often controlled the senate and elected the consuls (*suffetes*). These land-owners were not always friendly to the mercantile class which grew very wealthy on commerce and supported a large part of the city populace in commercial and industrial work. It happened, therefore, that the mercantile class, which needed a strong navy to enforce its policy of closed seas, had at times to appeal to the popular assembly and over-ride the senate in order to procure what it desired. Thus the state was at times a landlord aristocracy, rather peaceable and stable, at times a mercantile democracy which elevated a militaristic leader to power who would protect and extend the trade routes. And as the city was wealthy enough to supply the ships and hire mercenaries without disturbing the landlords and their serfs, these military rulers often had their way.

Sicily. In 278 Pyrrhus had gone to Sicily to help the Greek cities rid themselves of the Carthaginians. He almost succeeded at one time in accomplishing this task and had driven the enemy to the farthest cape. But the Carthaginians secured reinforcements from home, drove Pyrrhus out of the island and then quickly won back more than they had lost. Only Syracuse and Messana (modern Messina) were left independent. Syracuse, a beautiful Greek city, was governed by the brilliant tyrant, Hiero, who a few years before had seized the reins of government by a cold-blooded revolution. Messana was in the control of a set of Campanian mercenaries who called themselves Mamertines, Sons of Mars, and who, being Campanians, must have been

"half-citizens" of Rome. Twenty-five years before when their employer Agathocles died, instead of returning home to Capua, they had seized Messina, murdered or exiled the men of the city who dared oppose them, organized its forces, and by means of these had extended Messina's sway over some Syracusan as well as Carthaginian neighbors. In 268 Hiero had struck back and won no little glory by driving the invaders out of Syracusan territory.

Causes of the Punic War. During all these disturbances Rome had shown no concern over Sicilian affairs. In 265, however, a question touching her future arose. The Mamer-



tines realizing their weakness, and fearing more punishment, were considering the advisability of inviting the protection of some stronger power. One faction succeeded in procuring a decree in favor of calling in the Carthaginians; immediately, another faction, gaining control of the government, repudiated this decree, and sent an invitation to Rome asking for her protection. The Carthaginians accepted the call but moved slowly. The Romans fell into a serious

dispute over their invitation, the popular assembly favoring acceptance while the Senate favored refusal. The leaders of the assembly who favored acceptance were moved, we are told, by military reasons. They knew of course that if Carthage gained control of Messina, which lay only two miles from Italy across the Sicilian Straits, she would at the first opportunity close those straits to foreign ships as she had for centuries closed the straits of Gibraltar, and such a situation would now be impossible, for Rome must have communication by sea with her naval allies of southern Italy. This conviction was strengthened by the fact that Carthage had not long since shown undue eagerness to gain a foothold at the Italian ports of Tarentum and Regium. Their most persuasive arguments before the assembly were of course much simpler. They told the Roman populace that they had good hopes of profiting from the acceptance of Messina's invitation, but it is difficult to imagine what profits could have been promised unless perhaps it was suggested that henceforth Sicilian grain might be diverted to Rome and reduce the cost of living, now that Latian cereal culture was failing.

The Senate objected, says Polybius, on the score that the Mamertines were usurpers in Messina. In view of the fact that the Mamertines had committed their lawless coup about twenty-five years before, and that their government had been officially recognized by several Sicilian treaties made after that time, there is ground for doubting whether this argument was anything but a pretext. The Senate doubtless had more serious objections. They knew that the acceptance of Messina would probably result in a war with Carthage, a very strong power. They probably did not care to risk such a dangerous war for the sake of keeping the straits open since they cared not at all for commerce and had never been in favor of the entangling alliances with the Greek cities that were now possibly threatened. It must be remembered that the Senate had opposed the aiding

of Thurii which had led to the Pyrrhic war. Finally, if cheap Sicilian grain was mentioned as an inducement by the aggressive party, it is not likely that this argument would have appealed to the landlords of the Senate who were still engaged in agriculture.

The assembly, however, was now supreme, had in fact been so since 287, and the assembly followed the aggressive democratic leader Appius Claudius—probably the son of the old blind censor—as it had followed the aged censor in the Pyrrhic affair.

In 264 Appius was consul and he was voted the command of two legions, and sent to accept Messana's invitation. This force was hardly sufficient for a war with Carthage; it is, therefore, probable that the Senate still hoped to limit the consul's objective to Messana and conclude peace as soon as possible. Meanwhile, however, the Carthaginians had entered Messana and were patrolling the straits. When Appius arrived at the straits, the Mamertines got rid of the Punic general by a ruse, helped the Romans cross the straits past the Punic cruisers, and admitted them to the city. Appius soon attacked the besieging Carthaginians, who had also secured the aid of Hiero of Syracuse, and scattered the united Punic and Syracusan forces. Hiero was induced to become an ally of Rome, but the Carthaginian general, acting doubtless on firm orders from home, continued the struggle, which was destined to last for nearly a generation.

The War. For two years the Romans with their small army made little headway against the constantly reinforced troops of Carthage. Then, however, they captured the Carthaginian base of supplies at Agrigentum (Acragas), and, impatient of delays, committed the blunder of sacking that beautiful city and selling the citizens into slavery. This merely turned Sicilian sympathies against Rome and made progress difficult.

The war came to a stalemate, and Rome decided to build a navy so as to control the sea. The Greek cities of

the federation helped with this, and new Roman ships were built on the model of a Punic war vessel that had run ashore. The Romans, not accustomed to manoeuvres on the sea, adopted an old Greek device of supplying their vessels with swinging gang-planks and grappling hooks. When the Carthaginian navy met them off Mylae in 260, the Romans turned the battle into a hand to hand contest by means of these devices and won the battle with ease. Duilius, the consul who won this battle, proud of his victory, had a column erected at Rome decorated with some of the captured beaks. The inscription on this column—restored in the empire—may still be seen at Rome. It reads in part:

“He was the first consul to fight with ships on the sea and to build a war-fleet. With this fleet he defeated in battle on the high seas the entire navy of the Carthaginians under the command of the dictator Hannibal, and he captured one septereme, thirty quinqueremes and triremes with their crews, and sank thirteen vessels.”

The battle, however, was not decisive since Carthage had another fleet in reserve. But in 256 a second naval victory in which 330 Roman ships triumphed over 350 Carthaginian vessels ensured to the Romans a safe passage to Africa. There Atilius Regulus landed in order to bring the war into Carthaginian territory. After meeting with some success he was nevertheless defeated by a Spartan general who had been invited to organize the armies of Carthage. The story of how Regulus was sent to Rome to deliver the hard terms of peace, and of how he advocated further resistance although he knew this would involve his own death, was one of the favorite tales of Roman history. Whether or not every detail is true, it appears in one of the most stirring patriotic lyrics ever written, the fifth in the third book of Horace's odes,

Caelo tonantem credidimus Jovem.

To add to the disaster a large part of the Roman fleet was caught in a storm and destroyed. The African expedition

was an utter failure. The contest continued in Sicily where the Romans made very slow progress for want of a navy. So long as Carthage controlled the sea she could bring new mercenaries to her aid. By 249 Rome, using what seemed to be her last financial resources, built a new fleet, but this too was defeated and destroyed. All in all, Rome had now lost over 500 ships and each had borne an average of 120 marines besides 300 crew. The ancient world had never before heard of such heavy losses in war. In 247 Hamilcar of the military-mercantile family of Barcas took charge of the Punic forces and began a skilful series of attacks in Sicily that threatened to win the whole island. Rome's treasury was depleted and her citizens were being taxed to the limit of endurance. Rome, therefore, called for private contributions of jewelry and property in any form, and by these means secured enough money to build a new fleet on the best model. With this fleet Lutatius Catulus won a decisive victory off the island of Aegusa in 242 and cleared the sea. Hamilcar was effectively shut off, and Carthage, unable to raise another army because her subjects were at the point of revolting, sued for peace. The war had lasted twenty-four years.


By the terms of peace Carthage surrendered Sicily and agreed to pay an indemnity of 3,200 talents (over 3,000,000 dollars in gold) in ten years. The indemnity was but a small fraction of the cost but Rome was weary and glad enough to come off the victor. This war offers perhaps the first thorough demonstration in history of the fact that liberal government provides the most stable basis for empire. Carthage had better generals than Rome, for they were trained specialists brought up and kept year after year in military service, while Rome's consuls, civil magistrates elected annually by the people, seldom had a thorough military training, and no sooner gained the experience of a summer's campaign than they were displaced by new consuls. Carthage had better trained soldiers, for they were

standing armies of long experience, whereas Rome had no permanent army. Carthage had centuries of experience with navies and great amounts of ready wealth with which to equip them. The Romans had had no navy, not even any maritime trade that could provide experienced seamen. And her financial system was far from ready to stand the strain of heavy costs of equipment: it was only four years before this war that Rome had begun to coin silver money at Rome. Rome's one great advantage was that she had organized Italy on such liberal principles that her subject allies gave her never failing support both in the army and the navy, while Carthage, because of her old-fashioned exploitation of her subjects, had to rely upon disgruntled serfs and mercenaries. Carthage, to be sure, had held her armies together without an open break till the end, but the forces of dissolution could not have been thwarted much longer. Africa proved to be in a turmoil of revolution before the terms of peace were signed, and it took four years for Carthage to quell that rebellion. It is useless to discuss what might have been the result if Carthage had won the war and become the outstanding world power instead of Rome. In truth Carthage could never have become a world power. The independent peoples of Italy could never have been held together for even a generation under the Oriental theory of government by exploitation that Carthage represented.

A change of policy. It was unfortunate that at the end of the war Rome adopted the policy of Carthage for the administration of Sicily instead of extending her own liberal system there. Outside of Italy Rome now became an imperial democracy, and the date of her victory over Carthage is the beginning of her surrender to un-Roman ideas and Oriental policies of government. This date marks an epoch in Roman history. Rome found in Sicily a theory of government, which was new to her experience. It was the theory held in the East from time immemorial that the land

did not belong to the individuals who possessed it, but to the sovereign who, therefore, had the right to exact more than a fair tax for its use; he charged what might be called a *rent*. Alexander the Great had found this system in vogue in Persia and had adopted it, and after him the Hellenistic monarchs in Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt had used it. This system both Hiero, King of Syracuse, and Carthage had employed in Sicily. (1) Some of the land these sovereigns had expropriated outright, and had rented it out to whomsoever they pleased at a rental of about one third of the annual crops. (2) Most of the subject cities they had left undisturbed in the possession of the original holders, but, claiming ownership of the land, they had charged a tenth (a "tithe") of some products like wheat, and a fifth (a "double tithe") of garden products and fruit, accepting this tribute in kind, while on pasture land they had charged a cash tribute of a definite amount per head of sheep or cattle. (3) A few favored cities were left free to pay a tax or to be wholly immune.

This system was so profitable, the war had been so costly, and Sicilian grain—now that Latium was going out of cereal culture—was so badly needed at Rome, that the Senate fell into the temptation, adopted it outright, and later, after acquiring Syracuse in the Second Punic War, extended it over that part of the island also. The Romans called the system by the name of Hiero, not that Hiero had so far as we know employed it more extensively than Carthage, but because the Romans, having learned Greek better than Carthaginian, could more readily study the records of Hiero than those of Punic administrators. Of course they assigned the cities and districts of Sicily to the various classes according to the behavior of the several cities during the war: some of the Carthaginian cities naturally fell into the worst class, while several of the Greek cities that aided Rome in the war were lifted to the class of immune and free cities, becoming practically a part of the



Roman federation like Naples and other free Greek cities on the peninsula. The cities were finally grouped as follows:

I. Five free cities, independent and immune from taxes.

II. Three allied cities with obligations to furnish certain naval contingents.

III. About three-fourths of the Sicilian cities were made tithe-paying.

IV. About six cities lost their land to Rome and had to pay rent for it.

Sicily as a province. On the whole, however, Sicily benefited by being a Roman province. The incessant wars that had been fought between Carthage and the Greeks for three centuries were at an end. The danger of worse oppression that would have come if Carthage had gained complete control was over, and it was well for Sicily that Hiero's regulations (the "Lex Hieronica"), rather than those of Carthage, served as models for the Roman system. By these rules the Sicilian cities, which retained home-rule, could themselves take the annual census according to which the tithe of each individual was estimated, and if a dispute arose about the amount, the case must be tried in the city of the defendant; moreover the city could guard its citizens from injustice by undertaking the contract for collecting the tithes. Furthermore since the contracts had to be let in Sicily, not at Rome, the evils of the publican-system which later developed in eastern provinces were slow to find entrance in Sicily. Finally, the tax, so long as the rules were observed, was not heavy. The grain-tithe which was the principal tax amounted to about one million bushels of wheat annually levied on a population of about two million people. It was a misfortune that the system by requiring the relatively smallest tax on grain, overencouraged grain culture. It made Sicily "Rome's granary" in the second and first centuries B.C., and we now know that no land can stand an incessant production of cereals. Had the tax been heavier on grain and lighter on legumes and cattle

raising, the Sicilian soil might have improved rather than deteriorated. But no one could have been expected to know all the secrets of agriculture then. At any rate Sicilian soil was finally so exhausted that in the Empire its tithe of grain amounted to very little.

The necessity of governing a province of subjects outside of Italy opened up new constitutional problems at Rome. Since the island might at any time be invaded by Carthage, and since the new theory of subjection did not invite coöperation from the natives, a standing army had to be kept there, and with it a military officer. A judge was also needed for judging cases involving Roman citizens and for the appointment of arbitrators to settle disputes regarding the tithes. The two offices were somewhat dangerously combined in one. A praetor was sent annually with the powers of an oldtime consul to act as executive, general, and judge. Such an arrangement seemed to promise efficient government, but failed to take cognizance of the fact that while a strong magistrate may be held in check at home by public opinion, this force might fail to restrain an unscrupulous official ruling over provincials far from home. Rome, in fact, committed the same mistake there as has our own government in failing to constitute an adequate special court for the protection of natives against the decrees of military governors, who are at times sent to places like Haiti and Santo Domingo. The time came when Rome had to institute such a court to hear the complaints of provincials against their proconsuls and proprætors. The government of Sicily, however, became the pattern for the government of other over-sea acquisitions. Sicily was the first province of a long series destined to be formed.

Effects on Rome. The contact with the artistic Greeks of Syracuse during this long war brought a new era of culture to Rome. The Roman generals were apt to spend no little of their time during rainy seasons with the affable Hiero. This remarkable man must have enjoyed putting

his rude conquerors into embarrassing positions by showing them the treasures of Syracuse. In the theater of the city he could take them to plays of Euripides and Menander, in the temples he could show them some of the finest masterpieces of Praxiteles and Apelles, in the libraries he could turn to the Greek historians and read them tales of how the Romans had long ago come from Troy—a flattering legend which the Romans had not known before. All these things made a very deep impression. A year after the war, a Greek schoolmaster at Rome, Livius Andronicus, was asked to translate some of the Greek plays so that they might be produced at Roman festivals, and presently Hiero was invited to Rome to see how well the Romans had learned their lesson from his people. This was the first literary work in the Latin language. Livius naturally chose most of his themes from the Trojan cycle, since these reminded the auditors of the new legends they had learned about themselves in Sicily. A few years later (235) Naevius, who had served as an officer in Sicily during the war, wrote the story of Rome from Trojan times down through the great war, in the old-fashioned ballad meter of Rome. This “*Bellum Punicum*” was the first original literary production in Latin. The Sicilian war had awakened the Romans to consciousness of their power but also of their neglect of the arts. From now on they strove feverishly to catch up.

The effect of the war on Roman character was not wholly good. There is great danger in a democracy accustoming itself to ruling a weaker people, particularly if this experience comes before the nation is enough humanized by culture to counteract the poisons of insolence. There was danger that the government would acquire an overbearing attitude towards their subjects in Sicily and transfer this to their behavior toward Italian allies. They began before long to forget the liberal policies of 340, to blind their eyes to the fact that a democracy is not shaped to reign over subjects, and that imperial rule not based upon consent and good-will

requires an army which may in time turn to crush the people that created it.

Between two great wars, 241-218. Sardinia. It seems strange to us that in making the Punic treaty Rome neglected to demand the cession of Sardinia, which might at any time be made the base of operations of a Punic fleet in front of Rome's harbor. Soon, however, Rome had a chance to acquire possession of the island. Carthage had tried after the war to pay her mercenaries less than she had promised them. They mutinied and received the aid of the Libyan subject tribes in a vigorous attack upon Carthage. Even the Sardinian garrison revolted. For several years Carthage was very hard pressed. The Roman Senate, wishing at that time to reestablish good relations with Carthage, aided her by preventing Italians from engaging their services in the revolting army. The Senate also refused to accept the tempting offer of the rebellious garrison in Sardinia which asked Rome to assume a protectorate over the island. However, two years later when Carthage had done nothing to win back the island, the offer was renewed. Rome now, in unfriendly haste, without asking Carthage whether she had given up her prior claims, accepted the offer and took possession. Carthage protested that she still claimed the island, organized an expedition to recapture it, and did not desist till Rome fitted out her fleet for action and declared war. Carthage frightened, sued for peace, which she got only after an indemnity of 1,200 talents had been exacted. Most modern historians would agree with Rome's historian Livy that Rome acted unfairly, though it is a question whether modern nations would not have behaved in the same manner had the same temptation been thrown in their way. The act, however, destroyed all good feeling for Rome at Carthage, and did not a little to support the militaristic party of Carthage in keeping alive the spirit of revenge.

This party led by Hamilcar saw the need of finding an-

other province where the trading classes might recoup themselves for the loss of commerce in Sicily and Sardinia. Hamilcar, therefore, took an army to southern Spain and began a carefully planned conquest of the whole peninsula. He saw that the products of the rich country could readily be attracted from the trading posts held by Marseilles to the southern ports held by Carthage if political control was established, also that a strong army could be recruited in Spain with which not only to hold the peninsula and protect the trade, but to attack Rome if his hopes of a war of revenge were realized. Thus Carthage was turning into a land empire as well as a maritime and trading power.

The distribution of public lands. Meanwhile Rome had her own difficulties. The democratic party grew restive again. In 233 Gaius Flaminius, a man of democratic sympathies, suggested that the *ager Gallicus*, which had been taken half a century before, should be distributed to the poor citizens of Rome. It is likely that long military service in Sicily had reduced many small farmers to poverty. Farmers can not go soldiering for ten years and keep their farms in good condition; besides the wheat now coming from Sicily reduced the profits of such small farmers as were still trying to raise wheat. The senators opposed the measure because they wished to enjoy the profits of renting the public land cheaply—at least so the people thought. The senators, however, had some legitimate reasons for opposing the distribution. In the first place the treasury needed the revenue from the rent; then it might not be well to establish the precedent of giving lands to the populace who had failed to make a success of life; it would be difficult to follow such an example indefinitely. Perhaps also the Senate brought up the fact that land captured by the federal armies ought by right to be distributed as formerly to all the allies in Latin colonies.

Flaminius, however, carried his measure in the assembly, and most of the land was distributed by virgane allotments

—the very system that has usually been employed in American settlements of public land. It was a method that Rome had not employed for a century; and Polybius, who had his point of view colored by senatorial writers like Fabius, calls it “the first step in the corruption of the people.” Flaminius, a few years after, followed this measure by employing public funds to build a magnificent road from Rome to Ariminum up through the newly settled region. It still bears, in the sections remaining to-day, the name of *Via Flaminia*. Another democratic measure supported by Flaminius was the Claudian law (218 B.C.) forbidding senators to engage in foreign trade.¹ It would seem that Rome’s nobility was being attracted into commerce, an occupation which was considered beneath the dignity of great men at Rome, as well as likely to take their attention away from problems of state. This peculiar feeling never died at Rome: Julius Caesar in fact reënacted the law nearly two centuries later.

The Gallic War, 225-222. Soon after the distribution of the *ager Gallicus* there was another invasion of Gauls. The opponents of Flaminius claimed that the invasion was incited by the settlement of the *ager Gallicus*, but the true reason seems to have been the arrival of new migrants of Gauls in the Po valley from beyond the Alps. Rome and Italy were thoroughly frightened. A census was taken of the available forces in Italy that might be used for defense, an interesting census since it is our first reliable record of population in the peninsula. All told, the sum amounted to 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry; of these, 250,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry were Roman citizens² (including Capua’s “half-citizens”).

¹ The law actually forbade senators to own vessels that carried more than 300 amphorae = about 225 bushels.

² Of the others, Latin cities and colonies recorded 80,000 infantry, and 5,000 cavalry; Samnites, 70,000 and 7,000; central Sabellian tribes, 20,000 and 4,000; Southern tribes 80,000 and 19,000, Etruscans and Umbrians unfortunately are not given in detail.

In 225 the Romans met the invaders at Telamon in Etruria with a force of 150,000 men, an enormous army for that time, and defeated the Gauls. They followed the defeated hordes into the Po valley and for three years kept up the contest till most of the Gauls south of the river and the most troublesome Insubres near Milan were forced to submit. In 218 two Latin colonies were sent to the valley to colonize Cremona and Placentia on the river Po.

Illyrian pirates. During this period also the Romans first met the Greeks of the Aegean in an official capacity. On the Illyrian coast—now Albania—a pirate queen, Teuta by name, ruled over a tribe of lawless sea rovers. Now that Rome had colonies on the Adriatic and was protector of the Greek trading cities of southern Italy, it became her duty to see that seafaring was made safe in the Adriatic waters. To the envoys who came from Rome demanding respect for Italian commerce, Teuta retorted that she could not prevent her people from engaging in their customary occupation. When the envoys returned with an ultimatum from the Senate, she put them to death. Rome of course sent a fleet and broke up her power, bringing Corcyra (Corfu), Apollonia (near modern Valona), and Epidamnus, under Roman protection. Several Greek states sent hearty thanks to Rome and Corinth invited her to participate at the Isthmian games; but the king of Macedonia, Antigonus Doson, was offended at Rome's entry into politics across the Adriatic, for he had the ambition of extending his own protectorate over the whole of Greece. Macedonia's resentment was to show itself presently when Rome was being attacked by Hannibal.

Hamilcar in Spain. Meanwhile Hamilcar was continuing his conquest of Spain. This was of course none of Rome's affair, except in so far as Hamilcar was an avowed enemy of Rome and desired to have his revenge for his defeat in Sicily. His conquest, however, did very much concern Massilia (Marseilles), a long-standing ally of Rome, which for

obvious reasons had aided Rome in the first Punic war. Massilia was a trading state that not only commanded the routes of all Gaul but had planted commercial posts all along the Gallic and Spanish coast. Since she cared nothing whatsoever for empire her merchants found a friendly reception among all the barbarians of the West and North. Now, however, the Carthaginians were marching northward in Spain behind Massilia's seacoast towns and crosscutting her trading routes. It would be only a question of time before they not only diverted all the Spanish trade southward to New Carthage and Gades, their own ports, but also crossed the Pyrenees and cut off her route past Tolosa by which she got British tin. After that her navy, which had procured her a portion of open sea, would be of no more service.

The Romans, like the Massilians and most civilized peoples of that day, believed in the freedom of the seas. And it was doubtless the envoys of Massilia who reported to Rome every advance made by Hamilcar and his successors, Hasdrubal and Hannibal, and finally incited the Senate with fear that this empire-building was ultimately aimed at Rome. Rome at first gave little heed. In 226, doubtless for the purpose of helping Massilia save her northern posts, Emporiae and Rhodae, Rome asked Hasdrubal to sign a treaty promising that "the Carthaginians would not cross the Ebro river in arms," and this she followed up by entering into a defensive alliance with Saguntum, an Iberian city still independent, a hundred miles south of that river.

Modern students who draw inferences from political policies, like those that are implied in the Monroe Doctrine and African protectorates, are apt to assume that the Ebro-treaty may have been a definition of "spheres of influence," and that Rome, therefore, had no right to make any alliance south of the river. There is danger, however, in attributing modern doctrines to ancient statesmen. Rome had made probably a hundred treaties with other states but in none

of these do we observe any evidence that she claimed any influence beyond the definite limits of her alliances. "Spheres of influence" were foreign to Rome's precise dealings at this early date. Saguntum was an independent state and had a right to make whatever alliances she chose. Carthage would naturally be nettled at the alliance since it implied distrust of Carthage, and assured an open port to non-Punic trade in Spain which might in case of war afford an entrance to Roman arms in the rear of a Punic army, but no ancient authority ever implies that the alliance provided a *casus belli*.

In 221 Hasdrubal, Hamilcar's successor in Spain, was slain, and Hannibal, a worthy son of the doughty Hamilcar, was chosen by the army to take his place, a choice which was accepted by the home government. This young man had grown up in the army, had endeared himself to the soldiers by his democratic manners, his readiness to face with the soldiers the severest tests of endurance, his quick wit and excellent judgment, and his skill in all the arts of war. He combined promptness of decision and the simplicity of true self-confidence, with an air of bravado and a frank generosity of manner in a way that appeals to all soldiers. Whether or not the story is true which was told at Rome—spread perhaps by the envoys of Marseilles—that his father had led the boy to the altar and made him swear undying enmity to Rome, it was Hannibal who planned the war with Rome and set the trap to spring when he was ready.

In two years he secured all of central and eastern Spain up to the Ebro, except Saguntum. Then, having an army of thoroughly trained soldiers ready, he found, in a dispute between the Saguntines and some Spanish allies of his, a plausible excuse to attack Saguntum. He needed to capture this city before setting out against Rome, not only in order to close its port against Roman invasion in his rear and to obtain booty with which to provide the sinews of war, but for a more important reason. He must, if possible,

force Rome to make the declaration of war since he knew well that he could never induce Carthage to begin the contest, nor would Carthage support him if he set out on the expedition without permission from home. Carthage in fact was now in the hands of the landed nobility who entertained little sympathy for the Barcan commercial adventure in Spain, and still less for another costly war with Rome. He hoped, however, that if by attacking a Roman ally he could force Rome to declare war, his government, out of pride and through the flaming up of old hatred, would approve of his venture and vote him supplies. His conjecture was right, but his hopes for supplies were usually deceived. Carthage let Hannibal have his war but it did shamefully little during the next fifteen years to support him.

Hannibal accordingly attacked Saguntum in 219. Rome, however, was neither ready nor eager for another war. Both of the consuls were in the Adriatic settling the Illyrian war which had broken out again. Rome also had reason to suppose that Carthage did not want war and that if the challenge were met with calm deliberation Hannibal might be called off by his government. Months were accordingly spent in sending embassies to Hannibal and to Carthage, to no purpose. Rome did not fear an invasion. The Alps were thought to be impassable, and the Romans had reason to believe that Hannibal could not get a fleet from Carthage for such a venture. It, therefore, seemed to them only a question, in case of war, of their invading Carthage in order to force her to recall Hannibal and make the proper restitution. For this there appeared to be no hurry, and so negotiations were continued. When, however, Saguntum finally fell, after an eight months' siege, and Carthage refused reparation, Rome declared war.

The Plans of the Romans and of Hannibal. Rome's policy is disclosed by her first moves. She prepared the fleet and the main army for a quick thrust against Carthage.

She apparently had no intention of fighting seriously in Spain, probably had no desire for a new province so far away among barbarians. A mere handful of ten thousand men was sent to Spain to keep the army of Hannibal busy and away from home while the issue was settled in Africa.

Hannibal, on the other hand, knowing well that Carthage would not long resist a direct attack and that he would not be trusted to take the command at home, had planned a far bolder manoeuvre. He would carry the war into Italy, and he would march in by land over the Alps not only because it would take the Romans by surprise and because he could not hope that Carthage would give him control of a passage by sea, but mainly because in studying conditions he had learned that the Gauls of the Po valley, though recently subdued, were ready to rise in revolt and provide aid both for his foot and his horse.

His policy with respect to Rome is disclosed in his treaty with King Philip of Macedonia¹ signed in 215 when he was at the height of his successes. This reveals that he had neither the intention nor the hope of crushing Rome and making Italy a dependency of Carthage. Like Pyrrhus he supposed that Rome's allies would fall away to him as soon as he appeared and offered them "liberty." This was his greatest mistake, an error of judgment which all were apt to make in that day who concluded too hastily that Rome had treated her subjects with the harshness customary in ancient empires. Hannibal assumed that on his approach the Roman federation would fall to pieces and that Rome, when thus deserted, would accept humiliating terms and make peace. This revenge would quite suffice, and he doubtless meant to couple it with a recovery of Sicily and Sardinia, and such a weakening of Rome as would prevent her from interfering in the future in favor of an open-sea policy for Marseilles and the Greek traders. The Western Mediter-

¹ Polybius VII, 1. The treaty contemplated a strong state of Rome after the war.

ranean would henceforth be made a Punic *mare clausum* to please the mercantile-military faction for which the Barcan family had fought. Hannibal probably never hoped to win for Carthage a tributary empire in Italy. The Roman allies naturally would not join a Carthaginian alliance except on better terms than they had from Rome, and better terms could only mean absolute independence. Therefore, he could have promised the south Italian allies¹ only independence with a pledge that Carthage would observe and secure it. This, however, would bring Carthage no commercial advantages in Italy that she did not already possess, since Rome never closed the seas within her sphere of activity, and Carthaginian ships had always been free to trade at will in the Greek cities of Italy. Hannibal indeed never expected to make Carthage master of Italy and Rome. His war was one of revenge, of recovery, and of winning the commercial privileges that would come with the extension of the *mare clausum*.

¹ Polybius III, 77, 85; VII, 4; Livy, XXIII, 7. The Capuans stipulated that they were not to be called upon for military service or contributions and that no Punic officer should have control over any Campanian.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

Hannibal's Invasion. In the spring of 218 Hannibal, having heard that the Roman envoys had been rebuffed at Carthage and that Rome had declared war, set out for New Carthage on his march of a thousand miles. Envoys were sent to the Po valley to gain the support of the Gauls. Spain meanwhile was entrusted to his brother, with a strong force; for the peninsula must serve as Hannibal's recruiting ground if Carthage failed him. He entered Gaul with a veteran army of more than 50,000 foot and 9,000 horse and some two score elephants, all in as perfect training and condition as any ancient army had ever been. This was no mean force for the Romans to meet with their recruits just called from the fields and led by consuls trained in senatorial debate rather than in the arts of war.

Hannibal was crossing the Rhone when the consul Scipio sailed into Massilia bound for his task of diverting Hannibal in Spain. Here the Romans learned for the first time of Hannibal's movements. It is typical that Scipio obeyed senatorial orders and sent the army on to Spain. Quite alone, he hurried back to the Po valley to take charge of the northern borderguard with the hope of holding Hannibal in check till reënforcements and winter might come to his relief. Sempronius, the other consul, who was well on his way to Africa, was of course recalled and sent north at once.

Hannibal pushed on over the pathless Alps, his army suffering badly from the attacks of the mountain tribes, from cold, from lack of food and fodder, and the dangers of untracked and icy mountain passes. The trail was lost

and a road had to be cut through glacier and rock. Hannibal's "war correspondents," two Sicilian Greeks of facile pens, made lively accounts of their difficulties which are reproduced with due appreciation by Polybius and Livy. Hannibal's losses on the road were heavy, and he had to leave garrisons to keep the road open for the Spanish recruits which he expected. But he was later able to restore his foot and horse to nearly their original number by enrolling Gallic mercenaries and volunteers. The few elephants that survived the trip over the Alps perished in the following winter.

Scipio, on reaching the Po to face Hannibal, found the Gauls in rebellion. They had already prevented the settlement of Placentia by the Romans. In order to check their further defection, he boldly advanced towards the Taurini (modern Turin) with his inadequate northern guards, meeting Hannibal beyond the Ticinus river near modern Pavia. A cavalry skirmish, in which Scipio was wounded, proved to him that his raw army was no match for the finished troops of Hannibal.

The Defeat at Trebia, 218. Scipio retreated below the Po, taking his stand in a pass before Placentia.¹ Here many of his Gauls deserted, he saw that without them a battle in the open was impossible and he withdrew again, this time to high ground behind the Trebia, to await his colleague. Hannibal could not attack a Roman camp on a hill, depending largely as he did on cavalry; but when Sempronius came, eager for battle, Hannibal succeeded in drawing the Romans across the river into the open plain. Here by skilful use of hidden troops and outflanking horsemen, he quickly surrounded the Roman army. Of some 40,000 Romans that went into battle only 10,000 broke through in any semblance of order and escaped to the walls of Placentia.

In the spring Hannibal, leaving those in his rear as quite

¹ The first colony of Placentia was apparently 20 miles west of modern Piacenza.

negligible, marched on south, intent on striking boldly for central Italy. The new consul was Flaminius, the old democratic champion, who took charge of a reconstructed army and followed Hannibal's rearguard into Etruria. Flaminius had doubtless been chosen by the democratic element to show the Senate how their favorite could save Rome when aristocrats like Scipio and Sempronius had failed. He was committed to a policy of speed. Hannibal seems to have known this—his "intelligence" service was highly trained—and he drew Flaminius on by cruelly burning and devastating the country of Rome's allies. His purpose was to win a battle before Flaminius' colleague could come up with his army of recruits.

The defeat at Lake Trasimenus in 217. In the early spring of 217, Flaminius' army was lured into a trap on the edge of the Trasimene lake near Perugia, where a narrow plain bordering the lake was skirted by hills, behind which Hannibal had hidden his most mobile troops. It is a question whether the trick would have succeeded had the enemy not been aided by a low-lying mist that blinded the Romans in the valley while it left the hills clear for concerted action on the part of the enemy. The Romans were attacked along the whole line of march without a moment's notice, and in three hours of hopeless fighting they were thoroughly beaten. Flaminius fell with 15,000 of his army; an equal number were taken prisoners. Some 10,000 stragglers survived. Hannibal had lost only about 2,000 men, and these were chiefly Gauls. In the hand to hand contests of that day all depended on winning the first advantage by surrounding the opponent, the rest was butchery of the losing side.

Hannibal did not march upon Rome. He had of course no siege engines with which to ram its strong walls, and the great extent of Rome's area with its broad river flowing through made an attempt to storm the city into submission unwise. Besides, if Rome's allies outside the city proved loyal, he might readily be hemmed in by them. To risk

the attempt and fail would completely destroy his prestige. It seemed better tactics to raise a revolt among Rome's allies, and then force Rome to submission. By all the calculations that Hannibal could base on Punic experience, subject people ought to revolt when given a fair chance. So he sent broadcast his message: "I have come not to fight against you but to attack Rome in your behalf; if you will consider this you will be my friends. I have come to restore freedom to the Italians and to assist you to recover the cities and lands that you have one and all lost to Rome."¹

There was not a response. Hannibal turned upon Spoletium, a Latin colony, to give it an excuse to secede, and thus start a movement of revolt. But the colonists left their fields for him to ravage and manned the walls of their town, beating him off. He departed, marching east and south, ravaging and plundering to pay his troops and give an object lesson to what he considered stupid loyalty.

Fabius the Slow-goer, 217. Rome meanwhile was as near despair as Rome could be. Nothing seemed to stop the invader. Fifteen legions had been crushed with but small damage to the opponent. Hannibal too had escaped to the south of Italy, where he could presumably seize a port town, open up communications with Carthage, and so bring in supplies from home as well as from Gaul. Dictators had long ago fallen into disfavor with the democracy, but now the populace was not only ready to elect a dictator but to elect the most conservative of senators, Quintus Fabius Maximus, to this position. It was his duty to gather the fragments of defeated armies, to levy new recruits and to avoid a battle till these could be trained into a reliable army.

Meanwhile in view of Hannibal's command of the south a large fleet must be built in order to keep Punic transports from reaching Italy. Freedmen were gathered for service in the fleet, but much money was needed for its building as

¹ Polybius III, 77.

well as for providing the land-army with arms and armor. Loans and contributions had been relied upon in the first Punic war. Now, however, when Hannibal was plundering the length of Italy money suddenly disappeared into secret hoards. Not only did the treasury suffer but private business came to a stop for lack of currency.

At this point the state tried an interesting experiment in order to elicit the hidden metal and increase the circulation. Scarcity of copper had raised the price of it. The state accordingly struck a new issue of *asses* in one-ounce pieces, i.e. one-half of the former weight, and recognized their new market value by issuing a new silver denarius a trifle lighter than the old and equating it with sixteen *asses* instead of ten. In other words, they recognized a marked rise in the price of both metals and issued the silver and bronze at the ratio of 108:1, which was probably their relative market value. Needless to say, when these smaller pieces came into circulation, the larger coins of old issues came out of their hoards and were brought to the mint for reissue at a profit. Thus the state got money back into circulation, relieved the strain, and did something to meet the question of new prices. In order that the soldiers might feel that their pay would not suffer under the new arrangement, their monthly stipendium was calculated in denarii instead of in *asses*. And the courts doubtless settled all old contracts on the basis of denarii. It will be well to remember that after 217 B. C. the so-called denarius exchanged for sixteen *asses*, the sestertius for four, and that the bronze *as* weighed but one ounce. This is the last important change in Rome's currency until late in the Empire.

The Fabian policy. Fabius gathered his disconsolate army and followed Hannibal, bent on doing what he could to prevent depredations without risking battle. He could not afford to let the enemy have the honor of a third victory, after which Rome's allies could not reasonably be expected to resist Hannibal's blandishments. The enemy's

prestige must be dimmed by an interval of failure and the Roman troops must be hardened and accustomed to meeting the enemy in skirmishes. The strain upon Rome's patience was great, but Fabius Cunctator, "the slow-goer," as he was now called, held the reins doggedly. How difficult it was for him is shown by the fact that when in his absence Minucius, the "master of horse," *magister equitum*, gained a slight victory, the populace at once voted Minucius dictatorial powers also. It required one more disastrous lesson before the Romans learned that in an empire trained armies and trained generals were absolutely essential. Meanwhile Fabius saved the army that year to little purpose unless it be that he provided an object lesson in the years to come.

In the year 216 the impatient populace clamored for a change of policy. At the election of consuls there were five candidates from the old noble families and one candidate of humble station, Terentius Varro, a business man who had vigorously criticized Fabius as being a coward. He alone secured a majority on the first ballot. On the next ballot the conservatives combined to elect Aemilius Paullus. The historians of this period were aristocrats and, therefore, doubtless partial to the latter. At any rate they claim that when Paullus wished to continue the "Fabian" policy he was prevented by Varro, who insisted upon immediate battle. An early contest was just what Hannibal desired; for his Gauls were growing restless and his supplies were giving out. The consuls at this time held the supreme command by turns, each being in full charge every other day. Hence Paullus was helpless when Varro insisted upon offering battle.

Cannae. In the summer of 216 Hannibal was at Cannae in an open plain where he could use his cavalry to advantage. He also chose his position in such a way that the Roman army would have to face the sirocco, the strong southeast wind that can generally be counted on in the summer. The plain is sandy, so that this wind could become

very annoying. Varro knew no strategy but that of massing his troops deep and driving straight forward, and though he had 80,000 men, their value was far less when a great number was employed for weight and not for fighting. As they dashed forward Hannibal let his center yield in a curve so as to break the Roman phalanxes, then scattering the Roman wings with a brilliant cavalry dash, he shot out his own concealed wings to cover the right and left flanks of the Romans and sent his cavalry to shut in the rear. Varro's army was now one surrounded mass, a great part of which huddled in the center unable even to fight.

Polybius says what can scarcely be believed—indeed this author is not favorable to Varro—that 70,000 Romans perished that day. Hannibal apparently gave no quarter. Among the slain were Paullus, Minucius, Servilius and 80 men of senatorial rank. Scarcely 10,000 soldiers escaped. The story is told that a group of the young nobles who had escaped so despaired of Rome that they planned to take refuge in Greece or the East. Young Scipio, the hero of the war fourteen years later, came upon them and compelled them to take an oath that they would not desert Rome. Varro, who survived, gathered the remnants of the army within the walls of Canusium and reported to Rome. Rome acted with speed. Manning the walls with old men and marines, the Senate ordered the streets cleared, forbade all mourning and discussion of the disaster, and insisted that only the proper officials should enter the temples. Four new legions were formed by arming strong boys under seventeen. Slaves were asked to volunteer on promises of freedom. The state paid the price of their liberation to their masters. Thus 8,000 more men were secured. When Hannibal offered to release his prisoners upon the payment of ransom, the state refused to make such payment, arguing that Hannibal wished to establish a precedent which would weaken the morale of Rome's army as well as to acquire funds

But Hannibal did not march upon Rome as the Romans expected. He never had hoped to destroy Rome, and saw no need of risking his great prestige in a siege that might fail. He thought, however, that the fruit was now ripe for his picking, that the allies of Rome could hardly resist him now that he could threaten.

Some fruit indeed fell into his hands. Capua went over to him, though on such terms that the town was of little service to him. It stipulated that it was not to be called upon for any aid whatsoever. Capua, therefore, simply became a vulnerable spot that Hannibal had to protect. Other allies in Samnium and the south followed Capua's example, but usually on similar terms. Such additions did little to increase the Carthaginian resources, though they drew from Rome's. Unfortunately for Hannibal they decreased the territory which he could plunder in case of need, and every new addition required a garrison, besides hampering his movements. What he most wanted, a Greek city like Naples or Tarentum with a good harbor through which to communicate freely with Carthage, it seemed impossible to get. Naples resisted every attack, and Tarentum, though the lower city surrendered, kept its fort, which commanded the harbor, in Roman hands.

The next year, 215, brought two new disasters. Philip V, the ambitious king of Macedonia, when he had learned of the defeat at Lake Trasimene, had decided that the time had come to aid Hannibal and thus force Rome to withdraw from the Illyrian shore. His envoys to Hannibal, however, had been captured by the Romans and the attempt came to nought. After the reverses at Cannae he succeeded better. An alliance was made in which Philip promised to provide Hannibal with a fleet, and, if need be, an army. It seemed to Rome at this time that she might have to face a new Pyrrhus in addition to Hannibal. She saw that Philip must at all hazards be kept at a distance. A strong fleet, her third, was fitted out to patrol the Adriatic and

hold Philip back. In addition, envoys were sent to the Greek states that were known to be unfriendly to Philip, especially to Aetolia and King Attalus of Pergamum, that they might be encouraged to continue their struggle against the king. Thus began the First Macedonian War.

The news from Sicily was no more encouraging. Rome's faithful ally, King Hiero, died in 215, and his grandson, who succeeded him, a boy of fifteen, fell under the influence of courtiers in the pay of Hannibal. There was a revolution, the boy was killed, and Syracuse came into the hands of Hannibal's partisans. With the splendid harbor at Syracuse in her control, Carthage could have had Sicily back at once if she had acted with vigor. Fortunately for Rome, Carthage continued to do little and that inefficiently. Marcellus was sent to Sicily with a small army and began a protracted siege of Syracuse. The final calamity of a long series of disasters came in 212 when Hasdrubal, in Spain, gained reënforcements from home and defeated the two Scipios, who had not been able to get aid from their hard-pressed city. Spain also now seemed lost, and Hasdrubal might be expected to cross the Alps at any time unless a new army was sent out quickly to prevent him.

The situation during these years was indeed a test of Rome's powers of endurance. The two consuls were kept busy watching Hannibal with the main forces, an army was besieging Capua, another Syracuse, the Gallic frontiers must have two legions to keep back Gallic recruits, Etruria, Sardinia, Sicily and the loyal harbor towns of the south must have garrisons against Punic invaders, a new army must be raised for Spain, and three fleets must be manned, one on the Adriatic against Philip, one to patrol the African coast, and one to keep open the passage to Spain. Rome had long ago tried every new device for raising the necessary funds. The public lands were all mortgaged, taxes were increased time and again, a special graduated property tax was levied for the support of the fleet, and corporations

were formed of men who undertook to supply the Spanish army on bills payable after the war. To add to the distress unscrupulous war-profiteers tried to get the public contracts for the army and navy. We hear of one corporation which, after demanding that the state insure its ships and cargoes, collected insurance on unseaworthy hulks, and tried to escape condemnation by hiring thugs to break up the trial which followed.

But the worst period was over. After Cannae, the popular party showed little inclination to elect demagogical consuls. The Senate, under the guidance of men like Fabius, settled down to the slow but safe policy of tiring out the enemy. The various armies were broken up into mobile detachments, kept out of battles, and sent here and there to win back town by town. Hannibal, unable to be at all places at once, was reduced to the uncongenial task of garrisoning and defending a large number of places. In 212 Syracuse fell before Marcellus' attacks. In 211 Capua seemed also about to fall. Hannibal made a sudden dash against Rome in the hope of forcing the city to recall its army from Capua and thus raise the siege. But though he camped under the walls of Rome, he dared not attack the well garrisoned city, and soon withdrew to the south. Capua surrendered. The Romans, embittered and not a little barbarized by the long years of bloodshed, made a terrible object lesson of the city. The senators of Capua—not the old body but a newly formed senate of Hannibal's partisans—were executed, and the inhabitants dispersed among the Latin towns or sold into slavery. The land of Capua was made *ager publicus* to be rented out by the Roman censors for revenue.

The Battle of the Metaurus. Hannibal's hope now lay in help from his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, but the young Scipio had been sent there to engage Hasdrubal's attention. In 209 Scipio succeeded in surprising and capturing New Carthage, the Punic base of supplies in Spain, but in the

next year Hasdrubal somehow eluded his vigilance and escaped with a strong army over the Pyrenees, following Hannibal's route into Italy. Rome sent one consul, Livius, north to meet him, the other, Nero, to watch Hannibal. Hasdrubal's messenger, with important information regarding his proposed movements, fell into Nero's hands. Nero accordingly was able to adopt a daring stratagem that, had it failed, Roman prudence would hardly have condoned. Leaving behind him but a small force which Hannibal could readily have crushed, had he known the facts, Nero slipped away at night, and dashed northward with his best troops to join his colleague, Livius, 300 miles away. Combining their forces, these two generals attacked Hasdrubal on the Metaurus river and won a complete victory over him. Carthage tried to retrieve her fallen fortunes by abandoning Spain and sending Mago from Cadiz to Northern Italy by sea, in order to effect a landing and bring up Gallic and Ligurian mercenaries. But Mago met with little success and was defeated before he could reach Hannibal; meanwhile Spain was quite lost and Scipio quickly took complete control there.

Scipio Africanus and the end of the war. In 205 Scipio returned to Rome, and though little over 30 years of age, stood for the consulship on his record of Spanish successes and on a program for invading Africa. The senators were naturally dubious about trusting one so young to such a great task. Some of them may have pointed out that it was Scipio's fault that Hasdrubal had so nearly succeeded in becoming a determining factor in the war. Polybius, a personal friend of Scipio's son, may be charged with some partiality when he attributes the hesitation of the Senate to jealousy. Scipio, however, was elected and given a chance to see what he could do without involving the state's mortgaged resources in the venture. He was assigned to the province of Sicily—which carried with it a fleet and the nucleus of a good army—was given the privilege of calling

volunteers and making use of any volunteer contributions that the cities cared to offer, and finally of crossing into Africa if he chose. The venture appealed to many Italian cities which hoped once and for all to have the war carried elsewhere. So they severally offered arms and armor, ships, food, and money. Scipio remained a year in Sicily patiently gathering his forces and training them. Meanwhile to cut down expenses elsewhere, Rome came to terms with Philip in 205, giving him practically all that he asked, and "hailed down the flag" on the Illyrian shore.

In 204 Scipio landed in Africa. Carthage had no strong army of her own to put into the field against him, but received support from the Numidian king Syphax. In 203 these forces were completely shattered by Scipio, who gave the Numidian kingdom to his partizan, Masinissa, and through him secured a strong contingent of Numidian cavalry for his own army. Carthage sued for peace and Scipio offered terms, subject of course to the Senate's approval. Carthage was to cede Spain to Rome, pay by annual instalments an indemnity of 5000 talents (\$5,000,000), surrender her fleet, and furnish hostages till the treaty obligations should be fulfilled. The Senate accepted these terms, but before the fact became known, the Punic navy through some misunderstanding seized several Roman transports, and, when Scipio demanded reparation for the offense, Carthage, emboldened by the presence of Hannibal who had returned during the armistice, refused to come to terms. Hannibal supported the refusal, and the war was on again with Hannibal in charge of the Punic forces.

In 202 Hannibal and Scipio in the decisive battle of the war met at Zama west of Carthage. This time the Romans had a general who, like Hannibal, had grown up in the war, and, thanks to Masinissa, had the advantage in cavalry. Scipio in fact adopted the manoeuvres that Hannibal had employed at Cannae, the success of which he had every reason to remember from bitter personal experience. He held

his supporting maniples in the rear as usual during the first onset. But as soon as his cavalry had scattered the wings of the Punic army and returned to attack on Hannibal's rear he threw the third line maniples out around the two flanks of the army, thus surrounding him. The victory was complete, and Hannibal himself used all his authority in the Punic senate to advocate submission.

Scipio's terms were now very much more severe. The indemnity payable in fifty years was doubled, an amount, however, that Carthage could still readily pay, having so carefully hoarded its wealth despite Hannibal's needs. Numidia was given to Masinissa and declared independent of Carthage. But the hardest item in the terms was the stipulation that Carthage could carry on no wars outside of Africa, and must submit her disputes even in Africa to Rome's arbitration. Clearly Carthage was no longer a sovereign state. Indeed a few years later, Carthage, realizing the real significance of her position as a dependency and hoping to alleviate that position by winning Rome's goodwill, asked to become an ally (*socius*), and this of course was granted.

Results. The damage done to Italy in this war was beyond repair. For twelve years the hostile armies had driven each other over southern Italy burning and devastating, each doing everything in its power to damage the opponent. When the war was ended there was little left south of Beneventum. What with the dead, the slaves, the prisoners, and the emigrants who had sought refuge in Greece, whole districts lay without claimants, and the cities had been reduced to villages. After the war Rome saw the need of making the land productive again, but colonization and virgane assignments were out of the question since her own citizen body had been reduced by half, and the border colonies in the north and the seaports of the south must for political reasons receive first attention. What Rome did was the best that could be done in the circumstances: she

let Romans who had the means, the credit, or the courage, rent large farms and ranches under the rules of the Licinian law. This to be sure extended the area of the latifundia and of ranches and consequently the number of slaves, but there seemed to be no other way out. We shall see how this policy, when not limited or changed in time, led to very great evils.

The effects of the war on the constitution were quite as serious though not as apparent. No alteration was made in its form, the change came on gradually by acquiescence. The popular party had suffered in prestige so severely because of imprudent elections in the early stages of the war that it had learned to leave administration in the Senate's hands. Not only did the consuls employ the Senate as an advisory body but frequently, when in haste, they acted upon *senatus consulta* with reference to taxes and expenditures which the assemblies would have been called upon to vote had there been time. The Senate, therefore, assumed final administrative and even legislative powers that it was not allotted by the constitution.

Rome learned later that the Senate had a plausible excuse for saying that it possessed these powers, and that the people's tacit consent to its exercise of wide power was as good as a permissive statute, a position which we can only consider well taken. In respect to the executive office, however, the new habits contracted during the war were not permitted to continue unchecked. During the war consuls had in fact been repeatedly reëlected when the Romans saw that to contend with Hannibal consuls must have long experience. Both Fabius and Marcellus held the consulship five times and were usually given some promagistracy between their consulships, and the elder Scipios were continued as pro-consuls in Spain without interruption till their death in 212. But the Senate, while wisely permitting this state of affairs during the war, put an end to such practices as soon as the war was over. To permit one man to remain in power for

a series of years endangered the supremacy of the Senate.

On the whole one may say that despite its flaws the constitution owed much to its aristocratic qualities. Had Rome been an autocracy during the war, with all her discovered potentialities she would very soon have become an imperialistic state. On the other hand had not the democracy been checked and guarded by the Senate it would probably have been led to disaster by some Flaminius or Varro, or have exalted some military hero to the position of autocrat.

Rome's prestige in the federation. The war materially changed the nature of the Roman confederation, by elevating Rome into a position far above the allies. In fact we cannot hereafter consistently speak of a federation at all. During the war Rome had to assume the responsibility at every turn, and when Italy began to sink under the burden and various allies began to yield to the pressure of the enemy, Rome had to assume the position of judge and master. Capua was most severely punished, and twelve colonies which, while asserting their continued loyalty, affirmed that they had reached the end of their resources, had to be denied some of their treaty rights if only to prevent others from giving in. But since Rome was judge and executioner, she was necessarily master, and after the Punic war, while she generally observed the old treaties of the league, she continued at critical moments the custom that had to be adopted during the war of assuming full responsibility for the internal safety and good order of Italy. Accordingly she was henceforth considered the virtual ruler of Italy.

Of greatest moment, however, was the change, perhaps unconscious, in the spirit of the people. The struggle had revealed an unknown power of endurance, of loyalty, and of persistence in the temper of the people, as well as the apparent adequacy of the constitution to withstand the worst strains. The nation seemed to have stood as severe a test as could be applied. Had they not cause to grow self-confident? If Rome soon became impatient at the tedious

methods of older powers that merited her respect, if she began to command where she should have followed, if she presently betrayed a desire to impose her form of polity upon neighbors who failed to conduct their governments efficiently, if finally she ceased to revise her constitution to fit her growing needs, her perilous pride is but a very natural result of an overconfident faith in herself acquired during years of misfortune that hardly any other state could have survived.

Economic conditions. We need finally to glance about for a moment at the economic conditions of Rome. Of industry and commerce in this period we have little information. War-industries must of course have flourished. We hear of towns like Arretium, Tarquinii and Populonia that could provide large orders of arms quickly, and we hear of navies built with expedition. Commercial corporations also arose as we learn from the incident of the insurance "grafters," though we learn that Rome's harbor on the Tiber was not laid out till after the war. Some of this business may have continued after the war. It is, however, more probable that the capital thus accumulated was quickly employed in the excellent opportunities for investment in devastated lands. Here the returns were sure to be good, and furthermore land ownership was considered so much more respectable than commercial activity that the temptation would hardly be resisted. Parents who cared for the future of their children bought estates and became landlords if that was in any way possible. This is probably the reason why again during the following century we find hardly any records of trade or manufacture.

Religion. The period of the Punic War contained experiences that deeply affected the attitude of the people toward their religion. Contact with the Greeks in the First Punic War and extensive experience in political matters had begun to make the foremost Romans skeptical about their crude mythology. In that former war, for instance, the consul

Claudius had thrown the sacred fowl into the sea when they had not provided good auspices. In 217 Flaminius had completely ignored the auspices, and Marcellus, who came to be called "The Sword of Rome" for his courage and persistence, made it a custom to ride in his litter with blinds drawn so as to avoid having to take cognizance of evil omens. But this tendency was generally checked as the war continued. When death invades every household, and the victorious enemy is at the gate men have little patience with skeptical speculation. To quiet the fears of the superstitious, and to prove that no risks were being taken, the officials of the state now observed every possible rite with scrupulous care. After the defeats at the Trebia and at Trasimene Lake the pontifex carefully took note of every bad omen reported from any source and provided the time-honored expiations whether or not he took them seriously. The people must be reassured. After Cannae of course the superstitious terror broke out again. The populace naturally supposed that some god had been offended, and again the priests did all they could to show clearly that no rites were neglected. It was at this time that the priests made the Etruscan haruspex a familiar figure and that the Sibylline rite of having public banquets (*lectisternia*) with the images of the gods as guests became a common feature of the cult. But even this was not enough to pacify the populace, practically all of whom had lost near kinsmen in that one terrible battle. Etruscan and Greek soothsayers who had always strolled freely about Italy suddenly became popular. In anguish the distressed people resorted to every strange and mysterious cult that offered itself. Rome was inclined to allow freedom of worship, but here was a danger that might corrupt the whole people, and the Senate took firm measures. The praetor ordered everyone to bring to the Forum whatever books he had on religious charms or prophecy not recognized by the state, and to do so by a given day, and he forbade worship according to foreign

religious rites. This was an unusual interference on the part of the state in "liberty of conscience," and we can see that it might prove to be a dangerous precedent leading to religious persecutions. But Rome believed firmly in the sovereignty of the state, and was absolutely consistent in this action. The praetor's interference bore fruit at once. It removed a dangerous plague and brought the people back to their senses.

The state itself adopted one new cult for political reasons. The Sibylline oracles that had been brought to Rome long before contained references to *Cybele*, or *Magna Mater*, a mysterious Goddess of Phrygia, the land of ancient Troy. Wishing doubtless to encourage the people to think of themselves as descended from Troy, a thought that might arouse self-respect and hope during the long war, the priests found a Sibylline oracle which could be interpreted as an order to bring the Goddess from Phrygia to Rome. In 205 she was sent for and set up on the Palatine. To the disappointment of the Senate, however, the rites of worship were orgiastic and seemed dangerous in character. So foreign priests were imported to observe the rites for the state, and Romans were for the present forbidden to take part in them. The experience served as an object lesson. It was long before Rome brought in another unknown cult at the suggestion of the oracles. To give the people some harmless part in the worship which had to be duly observed, the Senate instituted annual games in *Cybele's* honor. These were called the *Megalensia* and were selected as the special season for the performance of comedies and tragedies. The result of the whole experience with religious innovations during the war was negative. Distress had temporarily made the people more careful of the old religious cults, but it had also forced the state officials for reasons of policy to introduce too many Etruscan and Greek rites which later seemed offensive and meaningless to the people. The result was that, although the priests

organized the cults with greater strictness, skepticism had more reason to criticize, and after the war the old contaminated religion meant less than ever. Before long observance of auguries came to be largely a matter of partizan politics, to be used by any party in power in hampering the election and legislation of its opponents.

Literature. Strange to say the period of the war was one of great literary activity, especially in the production of comedies. The state doubtless realized the special need of keeping the people wholesomely amused on holidays at a time when there were so many disasters. So the praetors and aediles were voted funds by the Senate to use in providing public games and plays. These officials would erect a temporary stage at the foot of the Capitoline hill and thousands of people would gather on the slopes above. A contract would be made with a manager of a troupe of actors to present the required number of plays and this manager would place his order with playwrights who were to have plays ready in time to be learned before a given holiday. Naevius, who wrote the *Bellum Punicum* and whose first play was presented in 235, and Livius Andronicus were thus engaged during the war. For hurried orders they usually translated Greek plays, but Naevius wrote not a few original plays on Greek models. Of his plays we have only fragments that happen to have been quoted by later authors and makers of dictionaries, but we have the names of over thirty comedies and some six tragedies. They include two chronicle plays, the "Romulus and Remus" and the "Clastidium," a pageant-play presenting the famous combat of Marcellus with the Gallic chief in the battle of 222 B.C.

Naevius unfortunately was very fond of satire, and had the courage to ridicule some of the dignitaries of Rome in his plays, especially Metellus who became consul in 206 by accident. Though Rome ordinarily believed in freedom of speech, censorship is apt to be strict in wartime. As a result Naevius was imprisoned through the influence of

Metellus (about 205), and when released by the tribune was sent into exile where he died very soon after the war.

Plautus (flourished 204-184) had become a prolific writer of plays before Naevius met his misfortune. Of his rollicking comedies, full of uproarious fun, we fortunately still have twenty. Shakespeare's "Comedy of Errors" is an adaptation of his *Menaechmi* and Molière's "Amphitryon" is made from his *Amphitruo*. The nature of his comedy can well be judged from these adaptations. It is rather astonishing now to think of such plays being produced at Rome at the time that the state was fighting for its very life.

The greatest poet of the period is Ennius (239-169) who served in the army for many years and who began to produce plays near the end of the war. His greatest successes on the stage were his adaptations of Greek tragedies which were produced during the first two decades of the new century when Rome entered so eagerly into a coalition which liberated the Greeks from Macedonian rule. Indeed the enthusiasm at Rome for this sentimental policy may have been due in no small measure to the success of Ennius in reproducing the best of Euripides and Sophocles on the Roman stage. However, the plays were much more than poetic translations. Ennius, though he used the old Greek myths that came so fresh to the Roman public, thoroughly nationalized the plays. Constantly in comparing the fragments (that is all we have) with the original we find new interpretations, new psychology, new solutions of the plots. Questions of ethics and morality for instance rest less upon fanciful quibbles and more on Roman ideas of social order in family and state. His greatest work, however, was a national epic in eighteen books called the *Annales*. It was really a series of Roman epics from the story of Aeneas to his own day, written in rather rough but nevertheless vigorous hexameters which reveal great poetic powers. This his-

torical epic it was that once and for all sketched the characters of the great Roman statesmen of the heroic age while the memory was still recent, men like Appius Claudius, Curius Dentatus, Decius Mus, Camillus, Fabius and Scipio. The book was read for centuries and did much not only in teaching the young a love for the high ideals of the heroic days, but also in setting a standard for later poets like Vergil. Again the original is lost, but we have some 600 lines of fragments that have been saved in the quotations of essayists like Cicero.

Finally we should mention the first prose history of Rome, which was written at the close of the century by Fabius Pictor, a senator and statesman related to Fabius Maximus. For the early part of his story he did the best he could with the priestly records, treaties and laws stored in temples, and with oral tradition. For more recent history he consulted the aged statesmen and his own memory and notes. Strange as it may seem, he wrote this history in Greek. He was eager that the cultured peoples of Greece who had a much older civilization should be able to read the story of Rome's remarkable rise. The work became the standard source-book of all careful historians, and seems to have deserved the high rank it held. To our regret only brief quotations from it have survived.


CHAPTER VIII

ROME AND GREECE

Philip V of Macedonia. Rome now needed a rest, and needed time to organize Spain and to come to terms with the Cisalpine Gauls for their part in the Hannibalic War. But before the treaty with Carthage had been signed, she received pleas for aid from the Greeks. Philip V of Macedonia, who had struck at Rome after the disaster at Cannae, and Antiochus III, the King of Syria, who called himself "The Great," had formed a bandits' alliance for the division between themselves of the lands of the Aegean; this they proceeded to put into operation and the sufferers called on Rome for aid. The situation in the East was, put in the briefest terms, as follows: The vast domains of Alexander's Empire had in great part fallen into three kingdoms, the Macedonian, the Seleucid Empire (which embraced Syria and inner Asia Minor), and the Ptolemaic kingdom (which consisted of Egypt and some of the Asia Minor coast). The kings of Macedonia had been sovereign throughout Greece immediately after Alexander's death, but had during the third century lost control of a large part of it. Philip V, however, was fighting hard to recover the old Macedonian sway over all Greece.

There were now several independent Greek states. The island of *Rhodes* was a respected republic whose people desired peace and liberty in the Aegean for the sake of their extensive trade. The Kingdom of *Pergamum*, ruled over by Attalus I, was a small but rich and compact state in Asia Minor. The Republic of *Athens* had been free for only a generation, had practically no resources or military power, but was influential through her writers and orators in shap-

ing public opinion among the Greeks. The *Achaean League* of twelve cities in the Peloponnese was independent and could fight effectively if properly led, but owing to its cumbersome federal government was difficult to stir into decisive activity. It was unfortunately forced to be subservient to the wishes of Philip because he had possession of



Corinth, the most important city of the peninsula. The *Aetolian League* was also a federal union. Its people were considered rather uncivilized though capable of furnishing a good fighting force.

In 203, while Rome was still engaged in the Punic War,

Philip and Antiochus made a secret agreement to divide between themselves, all of the possessions of the Ptolemies except those in Egypt. Antiochus seized Palestine, while Philip occupied Greek cities and islands on the Asia Minor border, some of which the Ptolemies had ruled, some of which were now actually free. Egypt, whose present king was but a boy, was wholly helpless and begged Rome for aid. Aetolia, angered at her loss of Thessaly, did likewise. Rhodes and Attalus, being already at war trying to block the plundering expeditions of Philip, sent envoys to Rome with the same plea as soon as Rome was free from the contest with Carthage. The Romans were utterly weary of fighting, and when the senators who favored giving aid to the Greeks put the proposal to the popular assembly it was voted down.

The arguments against the war included not only such practical considerations as an empty treasury and a weary nation, but a strong reluctance to abandon the old Roman tradition which had permitted no wars except those in self-defense or in defense of allies. With some of the Greek states Rome had signed temporary alliances of "friendship" during the First Macedonian War, but such alliances were not understood to entail mutual aid in time to come. It was clearly contrary to Rome's custom and to the fetial rules to enter upon wars unless attacked, or to interpret treaties of friendship as treaties of alliance.

On the other hand the arguments in favor of participation were many, though difficult to define. In the first place Philip was dangerous and unprincipled. He had, unprovoked, struck at Rome in 215 when she was "down," and he was now plundering helpless Greek republics for no cause whatever. Such a ruler is usually considered beyond the pale of international society, undeserving of the favor of customary treatment. If Philip went unpunished he would obviously take every favorable opportunity to attack Rome again. From the point of view of modern European

practice Rome was doubtless more than justified in helping to check him.

There were also sentimental reasons of great weight for undertaking the venture. The Romans of this generation had begun to learn Greek, had brought much of the best Greek literature to Rome, had produced many Greek plays at Rome, and many of the Roman nobles had acquired a great enthusiasm for everything Hellenic. Men like Scipio and Quinctius Flamininus so admired the Greeks that they wished to do all in their power to aid them in their distress. The wave of sentiment was somewhat comparable to the enthusiasm for France so widely prevalent during the first years of the recent great war. Some egoism may also have entered into this sentiment, for men like Scipio felt that Rome had been classed long enough as a nation of barbarians, and that she ought now to take her place in the world of cultured nations. Participation with states like Athens and Rhodes in a war for the liberation of the Greeks appealed to Scipio as a good policy, because of the international prestige it would bring Rome and the Romans.

We do not know what arguments were used to convince the people. We need not assume that they were all of a material kind. The Roman democratic assembly could doubtless rise to an idealistic appeal as other popular assemblies have in ancient and modern times. At any rate an embassy was sent to Athens to meet the delegates of Rhodes and Pergamum which were already in the war. Athens also joined, and the united delegates drew up a plan of co-operation which the Romans agreed to accept unless Philip at once gave up his evil gains. Philip refused, and Rome declared war. Antiochus had of course to be allowed to go his way for the present.

The Second Macedonian War, 200-196. The war was in itself not an important one but it is exceedingly interesting as a struggle of several allied powers against an aggressive monarchy, and still more interesting is the problem of inter-

national diplomacy which it raised when the allies tried to come to terms after the war was over.

In 200 Philip began by attacking Athens. Attalus led the Pergamene and the Rhodian forces against Philip but accomplished little. The Roman army of two legions struck eastward from Epirus but was checked in the mountains. During the second year of the war the Aetolian league joined the coalition and penetrated into Thessaly, but the other two forces were still held in check. In the third year Rome elected Flaminius consul though he was under the legal age for that high office. But his great enthusiasm for the cause of Greek liberty made him the logical candidate. He succeeded in bringing the Roman army through the mountain passes of Epirus and joining the Aetolians. This encouraged the Achaean league to join the coalition.

Philip now asked for terms of peace, and all the conferees met to put forward their demands. Rome asked for nothing, not even for the return of the Illyrian coast that she had been forced to surrender in 205. Flaminius claimed that Rome had gone into the war for the freedom of Greece and that that was all he would ask for. The other allies made numerous demands, and weeks were spent in oratory. Philip seeing that no progress could be made with so many conferees asked that Flaminius assume the responsibility for the allies. Then the important fact came out that since a Roman consul did not have full power to act for his state at a peace conference, and since the Senate alone had the power to lay down the terms for Rome, the whole peace conference would have to go to Rome whenever Rome took part in a coalition of this kind. The consequences of this provision in the Roman constitution proved to be of well-nigh unlimited importance in the shaping of Rome's external policy. It was as if the United States were to enter a League of Nations, and then compel every decision of the League to be referred to the American Senate because the Senate has been given the treaty-making power by the

American constitution. The results of such a situation are obvious. If the league submitted the Senate would in a short time practically control the league.

Such came to be the situation at Rome. Philip indeed did not at once accede to the Senate's demands, and the conference broke up, but a valuable fact had been learned. A war that had begun by a Greek coalition against Philip ended with Rome as the controlling power in the coalition. When operations opened again Rhodes took her forces home to win back her lost possessions in Lycia, the Achaeans sent their contingent to help Rhodes, Attalus withdrew because he had only naval forces. Flamininus, therefore, with the aid of some Aetolians and Epirotes, completed the war against Philip.

In the summer of 197 Flamininus attacked Philip at Cynoscephalae. Philip still employed the rigid Macedonian phalanx which stood sixteen men deep armed with long pikes, a formation that Alexander the Great had so successfully used. The mobile Roman legion now for the first time overwhelmed it by drawing it into rough ground where it could not act in a solid mass. The Romans had also learned at Zama how to use their rear maniples freely, to throw them severally into the weak spots or on the flanks of the enemy. The phalanx was broken and outflanked, and Flamininus gained an easy victory.

The Liberation of the Greeks. Now peace was made on the Senate's terms, and Philip was compelled to surrender all the Greeks outside of Macedonia to Flamininus, who promised to set them free and to organize governments for them. Flamininus, therefore, became the arbiter of all the liberated cities. This deeply offended the Aetolians who were still eager for an extension of their power into Thessaly, and they spread the report that Rome was planning to retain some forts and make herself master of Greece in Philip's stead.

Not heeding the criticism, Flamininus went about his

work, reanimating the old city governments that had been decaying during Macedonian rule. A few garrisons Flamininus temporarily held, for no one knew whether Antiochus would invade Greece as he was invading the Asiatic cities that had been liberated by the treaty. In Thessaly Flamininus organized new states on a plan which strongly resembles that of the modern "representative government." What he did was to unite several independent city-states of Thessalian districts into federations. Each of these federations had a primary assembly consisting of all the property-owning citizens of the district, and a kind of representative senate, consisting of delegates from the several cities, as well as an annual executive elected by the primary assembly. Since the senate was given control over legislation, this government contains the essentials of what we now call representative government. In creating it Flamininus combined the ideas of federal government already in use in Boeotia and Aetolia with aristocratic senatorial ideas from Rome. It deserves attention as a happy instance of political sagacity.

When his work was over and the danger from Antiochus seemed not yet pressing, Flamininus appeared at the Isthmian games, where crowds from the whole of Greece were assembled, and read this brief proclamation: "The Roman Senate and Titus Quinctius (Flamininus), proconsul and imperator, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians in war, declare the following peoples free, without garrison or tribute, in full enjoyment of their own laws: the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phthiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians and Perrhaebians." The joy of the Greeks was unbounded, as Polybius the Greek tells the story: "When the herald read the proclamation there was such an outburst of applause that it is difficult to convey it to the imagination. When at length the applause ceased no one paid any attention to the athletes, but all were talking to themselves or each other, and they seemed like a people bereft of their senses. Even after the games were

over, in the extravagance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in the face and call him their preserver; others were eager to touch his hand; most threw garlands upon him, until between them, they nearly crushed him to death. That the Romans and their leader, Flamininus, should have deliberately incurred unlimited expense and danger for the sole purpose of freeing Greece, this truly merited their admiration." And the Greeks went home and founded temples

To Zeus and Rome and Titus and Rome's Good Faith.

We are not told, but we may conjecture that they named their streets *Rome* and *Titus*—and after a year or two restored the old names.

Flamininus now withdrew his garrisons and sailed home with his army. The Greek city-states and leagues were free. It must be remembered, however, that their boundaries had been defined by a treaty guaranteed by the Roman Senate. Suppose any of these states undertook to change such boundaries, would it be Rome's province to safeguard the treaty?

War with Antiochus. Flamininus had left Greece against the advice of Scipio before a clear agreement had been reached with the other aggressor, Antiochus III, and he had left prematurely in order to convince the Greeks that the Romans were sincere in their professions that they had fought for the sake of saving liberty in Greece. Antiochus, however, had as a matter of fact just gained a diplomatic victory over Flamininus. The situation was as follows. In 197, when Philip had been hard pressed by Rome he had withdrawn his garrisons from the Greek cities in Asia Minor which he had taken from Ptolemy. By the treaty of peace he handed these to Rome who meant to give some back to Ptolemy and set others free. Antiochus

had in the meanwhile marched north and taken them on the pretext that they had formerly belonged to his ancestral kingdom. Flamininus ordered him to evacuate them at once. Antiochus, shrewd and well-trained in Oriental diplomacy, had foreseen that such an order would be forthcoming, and had prepared for it by sending a secret envoy to buy Ptolemy's title to these possessions. Now he produced his secret treaty with Ptolemy, and Flamininus found himself outwitted. The Roman could hardly claim to be Ptolemy's champion any longer. And there the matter might have rested had not Antiochus, elated at his success, proceeded to occupy the Thracian coast of the Balkan peninsula which Philip was surrendering.

In 193 Antiochus sent an embassy to Rome to try to have Rome recognize the status quo and sign a treaty of friendship. Rome was willing to acquiesce in the occupation of Asia Minor since Ptolemy was, but could not recognize the occupation of territory in Europe. The envoys had no instructions to cede anything and the question was unfortunately left open. The result was disastrous. Hannibal was now with Antiochus, having been banished from Carthage by the peace party (at Rome's request, it was rumored), and he was eager to have Antiochus pick a quarrel with Rome. To make matters worse the Aetolians, who had not been allowed by the Romans to occupy Thessaly, were making charges against Rome and sending envoys to Antiochus. Finally, Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, who had been forced by the treaty to give back to the Achaean league some territory of theirs that he had occupied, began to drill an army with a view to reoccupying it.

Nabis began hostilities by seizing the Achaean lands. Was it Rome's business to stand by the settlement in Greece? Some said she was responsible for it, since she had signed it; others said that she had only promised to free the Greeks but that the Greeks must now take care of themselves. The Aetolians thought they saw their opportunity to force An-

tiochus into the contest, bring him to Greece, and thus compel Rome to risk another war. If Rome were defeated, as seemed likely in a contest with the great King, the treaty of Flamininus would be shattered and Aetolia could occupy Thessaly. Aetolia accordingly seized several strongholds in Greece and invited Antiochus to take full command. Hannibal also urged Antiochus on with assurance that Carthage would come to his aid if he acted with speed. But the Carthaginian urged him strongly not to go by way of Greece but to invade Italy directly. Antiochus decided to strike at once. He thought it wise, however, to go to Greece and use the Aetolian aid which was ready, rather than wait for Punic aid which might fail. Besides, Rome had recently garrisoned all the southern ports of Italy against a possible invasion, and he might not be able to effect a landing. He, therefore, sailed to Greece with a hastily collected army (192 B.C.).

Rome now declared war and in the spring of 191 sent an army of 20,000 men to Greece. They found Antiochus entrenched at Thermopylae. In the struggle that followed Antiochus got little aid from the boastful Aetolians after all, and was quickly defeated. He therefore sailed for Asia Minor to gather a large army and to await the enemy behind the Hellespont. In 190 the Roman consul allotted to the great task was Lucius Scipio; he was given the aid of his brother, the famous Scipio Africanus, as proconsul. The Roman fleet, now aided by Rhodes and Pergamum, defeated the navy of Antiochus, and the King offered to make peace on the terms that Rome had offered in 193. Scipio, however, refused. In the interests of Rhodes and Pergamum he demanded that Antiochus withdraw to the territory he had held before 194, that is, south of the Taurus range, leaving the Anatolian peninsula completely. Antiochus, preferring to fight, drew up his line at Magnesia (190), where he was defeated. By the terms of peace, Antiochus acknowledged the Taurus range as the northern boundary of his

empire, gave up his fleet, and promised Rome a war indemnity of 10,000 talents payable in ten years. Unlike Carthage, he was able to keep his independence as a sovereign, but his great prestige in the East was gone. The Roman legions had shown that the Oriental magnificence of the Seleucid Kingdom was based on no abiding strength.

Again Rome had to act as arbiter in Greece as well as, for the first time, in Asia Minor. Rome set some of the Greek cities of Asia Minor free, gave some to Rhodes, and helped Pergamum subdue the vigorous Gauls—or Galatians as they were called—who had frequently proved lawless. They were now, though left autonomous, compelled to recognize the protectorate of Pergamum. The Aetolians were forced to surrender at discretion, and became an ally of Rome after the payment of an indemnity. The island of Cephallenia which had belonged to Aetolia was ceded to Rome.

Again the Roman armies went home, evacuating all the territory that they had occupied except one island which lay between Greece and Italy. It is apparent that the Senate was still acting on the policy of the philhellene nobles who believed in the Greeks, desired their freedom, and wished Rome to join the Greeks in temporary coalitions for the sake of protecting republics against militaristic monarchies. Rome of course had learned that such participation involved certain obligations in safeguarding the treaty stipulations which were made, but there is no indication that Rome had as yet assumed that it would ever be necessary for her to extend her power definitely beyond the Adriatic sea. There may have been men who knew that the Romans were unusually sensitive about treaty obligations, and that it would be very difficult for the Senate to sit patiently with arms folded if any of the two or three score of independent states now formed in the Aegean should attempt to change its boundaries. They may also have known enough of Greek history to realize that the Greeks were quick-tempered

and ready to quarrel, and that eternal peace could not be expected. But the Romans still judged the Greeks by their recently acquired knowledge of their remarkable literature and art. It was easy for men who had read Homer, Plato and Euripides to grow over-optimistic about the power of such a people to take care of themselves. We have no right to condemn the Senate for having erred on the side of sentimentality. In any case if the Romans had manifested distrust of the Greeks by establishing a protectorate at once, the results would certainly have been not a whit better.

CHAPTER IX

THE GROWTH OF AN EASTERN PROTECTORATE

A change of policy towards Greece. During the twenty years that followed the battle of Magnesia there was a gradual revulsion at Rome against the rule of the Senate and the strong aristocratic families that had won general confidence during the Punic wars. Those who remembered that the old constitution of 287 B.C. was based upon the idea of popular sovereignty could not but notice that the Senate had now in fact far outgrown its legal rights. It practically controlled the foreign policy. And even when the tribal assembly was called together to pass a legislative or administrative act, this was usually done by some tribune who acted at the behest of the Senate.

The change in Rome's foreign policy under the leadership of the philhellenes angered not a few of the more practical democrats of the type of Cato. They pointed out that Rome was spending blood and money for sentiment without material return. Rome had crossed the seas to fight for "friends" and got nothing but friendship for it and at times not even that. In the olden days, Rome had had a clear and definite bargain whenever she fought. In every case there had been a defensive alliance, "*societas*," which required that both parties in the alliance were equally obligated, the ally defended Rome as much as Rome defended the ally. Why, they asked, had this policy been given up? If Rome fought for Rhodes, why should not Rhodes be under obligation to send troops to help Rome in Spain and Gaul? They demanded that all the new alliances in Greece and Asia be put on the same footing as the *societas* of Italy, so that the alliances would be of some real service. We are

not to think that Cato was an imperialist or that he actually wanted to extend the empire any more than did the Scipios. In point of fact he would have preferred not to have crossed the Adriatic at all. He disliked the Greeks and was afraid of the new ideas that came from contact with them. His point was that if Rome must go into the East, she should go for practical purposes, but it was best of all to stay at home and leave the old civilization of Greece to take care of itself. If he were alive to-day he would have warned us against "entangling alliances abroad." He stood for "Rome First" and asked everyone to be a "hundred percent" Roman.

The men of this party also pointed out that expansion inevitably strengthened the Senate and the old aristocracy, for it was impossible for the assemblies to administer a large empire, especially with such loose treaties of friendship as were now being signed. Senators alone had the leisure and the knowledge of languages and history requisite for engaging in the intricate diplomacy of the east. This was another reason, they thought, why Rome ought either to sever all connections with the east, or, if that were now impossible, to draw her "friends" in the east into definite alliances of the old Italian type which the assemblies comprehended.

Finally the behavior of the senatorial generals was by no means pleasing to the people. Some had grown to be so enthusiastic over the Greeks and their culture that they offended the Romans. They learned Greek, brought home Greek books, works of art, Greek ideas and habits of life, and even Greek entertainers and cooks. There were more serious charges. Some of the officers, especially Manlius, who had raided Galatia, had taken much booty. Manlius in fact had attacked the now fairly hellenized Celts of Galatia in the same vicious manner as the Romans in their wars of revenge had struck at the Celts of the Po valley—and with more profit since these eastern Celts were wealthy.

The army came home laden with booty, and well-taught in eastern vices. Cato's charge that the decadence of Roman puritanism began with the return of Manlius' army was thereafter constantly repeated by the moralists of Rome. So Cato's party formulated the policy: Get out of Greece, or subject it to Roman rule and custom.

Domestic policies of Cato's party. This democratic revival at Rome made itself felt in domestic policies also. It did not yet manifest itself in an extensive program of restoring the idea of popular sovereignty. That was not an important party slogan until the Gracchi, following the lead of Cato, had to resort to extreme measures. Cato's party rather attempted to humiliate individual nobles who seemed to be growing too powerful and to introduce corrective measures little by little. In 193 Cato brought suit in court against Thermus, a partizan of Scipio's, for tyrannical behavior against the Gauls during his command in the north. Then he attacked Acilius Glabrio for lavish expenditures after the battle of Thermopylae, a battle in which Cato had fought as sub-officer under Glabrio. Fulvius and Manlius were next brought to trial for their alleged breach of the laws in plundering Ambracia and Galatia; and finally Cato had the courage to bring charges in the Senate against Lucius Scipio and the great Africanus. He insisted that Lucius had kept some of the booty for personal use, and demanded an examination of the records. Africanus, who saw that the attack was meant for him, knowing that proconsuls were given plenary powers during their term of office and were not legally bound to give an account of their finances, haughtily tore up the records. Cato, perceiving that Africanus had endangered his popularity by this act, now made the bold charge that Africanus had bribed Antiochus to liberate his son who had been taken captive. This went too far, and Africanus appealed to his past record, which undoubtedly was clean, and was discharged by the assembly. But Lucius was tried, and freed only on the inter-

cession of a democratic tribune. To accept release from such a source was a confession of defeat, and the great Scipios retired from public life. Cato had won. In 185 he was made censor with his friend Valerius Flaccus as colleague. He immediately dug up all the stringent sumptuary laws that had been passed during the Punic War, and on the basis of these removed from the Senate several of the influential nobles on petty charges of wearing jewelry or using silver plate on the table.¹

The democratic party was now able to put through several measures that pleased the people and that weakened the Senate. Freedmen, who were of course apt to be clients of the nobles and vote according to their wishes, were again confined to the four urban tribes. An end was made to founding "Latin colonies" because Roman citizens had to share these with allies, and furthermore poor citizens who accepted allotments in them had to give up their citizenship and accept the status of "Latins." Mutina, Parma, and Saturnia, though not maritime colonies, were settled as citizen colonies. According to the same selfish policy of pleasing the populace, allies were henceforth generally given only half as much of the booty as citizens, 12,000 Latins who had come to Rome and somehow made their way into the citizen rolls were compelled to return home, and the old system of promoting Italian cities to a more favorable political position came to an end. The last instance of raising "half-citizens" to full status occurred in the case of Fundi, Formiae, and Arpinum in 188, just before Cato became a powerful influence. It is very likely that if the democratic party had come into power a few years sooner than it did, Rome might not have had the services later of such men as Marius and Cicero, both of whom were born at Arpinum. Democracy is not necessarily a synonym of liberalism.

¹ Such laws had been passed during the war in order to attract gold and silver to the state treasury.

Cato. It must be said of Cato that he was absolutely honest, a puritan, and, though in a narrow sense, a thorough patriot. He was ready to risk all he was and had for the state. He did not cater to the populace for the sake of votes. He followed the policies which pleased the old-fashioned small farmers because he had grown up as one and felt as they did. The difficulty was that he had only the morality and statesmanship of a small farmer. On his farm he doubtless used an honest measure when he sold his wheat, and concealed no faults in his property when he traded horses, but he did nothing from sentiment. He worked hard, saved money, and bought out his neighbors when he could. To work, save and acquire were his ideals, business is business, his moving principle. He would have nations and governments act as he.

He himself taught his son reading, writing, some mathematics for home use, agriculture, military arts, athletic games, and Roman history. Indeed he wrote a history in simple language for his son's use when he did not find a good one available. The boy must be thoroughly imbued with the Roman spirit, if nothing else. For Greek literature, philosophy and art he had no use, though he secretly learned Greek for practical purposes. He wanted the Romans to continue to live as though they were peasants, cut off from the world. As censor, he interpreted his duty as "judge of morals" in the widest sense, examining into the wardrobes, bills of fare, and table-ware of individuals to see whether the old Roman ideals of simple living were being infringed. He even tried to continue into the new era the operation of certain war-time restrictions on the wearing of jewelry (the Oppian law) that had been passed when Rome needed to bring all the gold and silver into the treasury for coinage. In this, however, he failed.

Cato is often considered a typical old Roman. He was not so considered by later generations of his own people. They rather looked upon him as a well-meaning and honest

fanatic who carried the ideals of a preceding century into a later period. He came at a time when the aristocratic power needed to be broken, and so, because of his daring and his unquestioned honesty, he became a powerful man. But it was a great misfortune that the revolt was coupled by his temperament with such narrow culture, such a selfish policy with regard to Italy, and such crude ideas of international policies. Had a man like Tiberius or Gaius Gracchus taken the lead in the reform at this time instead of fifty years later, Italy would have been won to friendship instead of insulted, the Senate might have been led to a constructive agrarian program, and the advantages of Greek culture might have been welcomed instead of obstructed. When these men finally came to their work it was already too late to bring about the necessary reforms without a fight between the various factions that ultimately led to civil war.

Foreign Policies of Cato's Party. We must now see how the application of these nationalistic policies affected Rome's methods in dealing with international politics. Rome had checked Philip and Antiochus, had liberated the minor states, and defined their boundaries, and had departed leaving them to their own devices. Needless to say the Greek states, which had always teemed with revolutions, were not now able to settle down to everlasting peace. If Rome's settlements were not adhered to, what would happen?

A quarrel soon arose between Sparta and the Achaean league, because the latter had, in the Roman treaty of peace, been given some territory that Sparta had formerly seized. Both parties in fact broke their agreements, and both sent envoys to Rome to explain their action. The Senate refused to interfere. Two years later the league again exceeded its rights and again both sides sent envoys to Rome. Though it did not approve of the league's action, the Senate still hoped to keep out, and so the dispute continued. To make matters worse, King Philip of Macedon began to invade states outside the boundaries defined by the Senate, and

the sufferers naturally appealed to Rome. Philip may have heard that the democrats of Rome, now coming into power, disliked Greece. He probably thought that Cato would close his eyes to eastern affairs. But Cato, though neither imperialist enough to want provinces in the east, nor philhellenic enough to care for Greek liberty, was too much of a patriot to allow Roman treaties to be infringed. Hence a harsher tone presently becomes apparent in the responses sent to Greek envoys.

It was in 185, the year of Cato's censorship, that Rome sent three envoys to Greece to settle disputes, and they apparently had orders to let offenders understand that Rome's arrangements were not to be disregarded. The envoys ordered Philip to evacuate the territory he had taken, and he did so, sulkily, even burning some of the towns before withdrawing. From that time Philip began to prepare forces for a new war. The same envoys went to the Achaean league and asked for certain restitutions to Sparta. The Achaeans answered that they had not begun the quarrel, that they were a sovereign people and could not take orders from Roman envoys. They would later discuss the situation with the Senate. Claudius, one of the envoys, retorted that the League would do well to listen to the Senate's suggestions before it was compelled to obey its commands. Though we cannot wholly blame the Senate for growing impatient, we must agree that such language could only stir resentment among the peoples of Greece.

We need not follow the intricate disputes that continued through two decades. The Greek states and leagues grew more and more annoyed at the thought that they were bound to adhere to an old treaty, and consequently they were more and more ready to assert their right of doing as they pleased. The Senate on the other hand grew more and more weary of delegations and requests for interpretations of moot points in the treaty. Pro-Roman and anti-Roman parties began to arise in the Greek states, one flatter-

ing the Senate, the other antagonizing it. Usually the propertied classes desiring peace, the *status quo*, and intimate relations with Rome, were openly pro-Roman. The old democratic factions, by antipathy to these, took the opposite side. They had more to gain from revolutions and they felt instinctively that Rome would never favor anything but peace.

About 180, the Senate openly adopted the policy of taking sides in the politics of Greek states and supporting the pro-Roman factions, thinking that thus its wishes would be heeded without the necessity of armed interference. Such a policy, however, was not politically wise. It seemed to the anti-Roman factions but another proof that the states of Greece were not really free. Thus the Roman Senate, though it tried to be just in its decisions, only increased its unpopularity, partly through lack of sympathy, partly because the guidance of a strong power has always been and must always be offensive to weak nations.

The Third Macedonian War. In 179 Philip died and was succeeded by his son Perseus, a young man who was as unprincipled as he was imprudent. His only good quality was that he was patriotic and had set his heart on preventing Rome's interference in Greek affairs. He built up his army and made a series of strong alliances. He announced his friendship for the anti-Roman democrats of Greece and gave them welcome at his court. But he went too far when he began to draw northern tribes into a secret alliance with Macedonia, contrary to the treaty of Philip. The Senate countered him by asking several Greek states to break off relations with him. Perseus, now frightened, sent envoys to the Senate offering to submit on favorable terms. The Senate demanded submission without reservation, which of course he refused.

The war began in 171 B.C. The first three consuls sent to the front were inefficient generals, and, like the people who sent them, not sympathetic towards the Greeks. They

demanded contingents of several Greek states as though these states were *socii* like the Italian allies. Thus ill will was increased until several states actually provided Perseus with secret aid. It was not till 167, when Rome's army was efficiently led by Aemilius Paullus, that Perseus was finally defeated. He was taken prisoner and sent to Rome, his property confiscated, and his archives brought to Italy. Unfortunately for the Greeks, those archives proved that many leading men in Greece had secretly aided the King against Rome. As a result Rome compelled old states like Rhodes, Pergamum, and the Achaean league to surrender some of the men implicated as hostages, to give up their position of "friendship," and assume the status of *socii*.

By this act Rome made herself sovereign in Greece and in Asia Minor over all the territory that the treaties of 196 and 189 covered. Rome did not, as a matter of fact, intend to govern this territory, nor to exact any tribute from it, nor even to ask its inhabitants for military aid except at very critical moments. She did intend, however, to put an end to bickerings and make it easier for herself to keep the peace without having to resort to constant embassies and armed intervention. It was Cato who was still so averse to having any dealings across the Adriatic that he insisted that the Macedonians must govern themselves. "We cannot rule these people, we must set them free to rule themselves," he said, and his policy was adopted.

The Macedonian Republics. Aemilius Paullus with a committee of ten was given the task of making a constitution for Macedonia. The form of government which he produced is exceedingly interesting. In order to prevent united action against Rome he cut the kingdom into four republics. To protect them from invasions of barbarians, he gave the northern one permission to have an army; the other three were disarmed. The four states were severed socially and commercially from each other to prevent the growth of a Macedonian union, that is, marriage between

citizens of the different states was made illegal, and citizens of one state could not hold property in another.

The political organization of these republics is especially interesting since it was based upon that which Flaminius devised for Thessaly after the Second Macedonian War. In each republic magistrates were elected by a primary assembly consisting of all the people who had certain property qualifications; but the administration and legislation were in the hands of a representative senate made up of senators from the several cities, and this senate was presided over and controlled by the magistrate. Thus these Macedonian republics seem to have been true territorial states of a very modern type, administered by a representative government. It is a great pity that these governments were overthrown within twenty years by a disastrous revolution. They might well have handed on the idea of representative government to the modern world, had they survived long enough to leave a distinct record of achievement.

Aemilius Paullus unfortunately marred his record of good generalship and liberality by invading Epirus and sweeping away a large part of its population into slavery because it had attacked the Roman armies in Perseus' favor. It is said that 150,000 captives were sold for this deed. Apparently a Roman general of the best type could still commit deeds of pagan cruelty.

Again Rome withdrew from the East, but this time it was clearly understood that the Greek states had lost their sovereignty. No province was made and no tribute was exacted. Greece and Asia Minor were not reduced to the position of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. Rather these states were placed in the position of such Greek cities in southern Italy as Naples and Regium. They were to be left strictly alone so long as they kept the peace and observed their treaties, and that was all.

It must be admitted that Cato's party had on the whole been moderate. For when others, who like him distrusted

the Greeks, wished to punish Rhodes because many of her distinguished men had given encouragement to Perseus, he objected. In the Senate he made a vigorous speech, a part of which we still have, and it does him credit. He urged, fairly, that such Rhodians had only done the natural thing in fearing Rome's growing strength and therefore favoring Rome's opponent, that sympathy was not a feeling that could be forced, and that at most a whole state could not be held responsible for the enmity of individual citizens. The Senate's greatest mistake was in taking as hostages a great many prominent Greeks whose loyalty to Rome had been impugned by the documents taken in the war. The ill feeling engendered by this act led later to a new outbreak.

Rome, however, was not to have peace in the East. The disputes and factional strife continued, and embassies came to Rome as before. Had the Senate pursued a consistent policy, serious trouble might have been avoided, but the Senate was of many minds, and its policies shifted with the alternating success of the various parties. Cato was frequently the dominating force, but not always. He was so blunt and so harsh in his criticism that the Senate often rebelled against his proposals. There were of course other political questions to settle as well as those of Greece, and the Senate's blunt methods in disposing of the Gauls and Spaniards tended to habituate the statesmen to deal harshly with the Greeks as well.

Northern Italy was pacified with some severity during the fifty years after Zama. In Cisalpine Gaul, Rome punished the Insubres about Milan, and the Boii about Bononia harshly enough. The Cenomani, south of Verona, fared better because of their loyalty to Rome during the Punic War. But what with local outbreaks and new invasions of Celtic hordes from beyond the Alps, standing armies had to be kept in the Po valley. Indeed Polybius informs us that in his day there were not many Celts left except in the foothills. Colonies were replanted at Cremona and Pla-

centia, and new colonies sent to Bologna, Mutina and Parma below the Po, and to Aquileia at the head of the Adriatic. Though the rest of Transpadane Gaul was not parcelled out, emigrants from all over Italy went up into the region and found homes. Indeed this valley was settled during the century by a sound Italian stock, and it was the descendants of such settlers who played an important part in Rome's literature and politics in the days of Caesar and Augustus. Two of Rome's greatest poets, Catullus and Vergil, at that time came from there.

The Ligurian mountains also had to be cleared or pacified for the sake of Cisalpine Gaul, the Arno valley, and the coast road to the new province in Spain. After many attacks that yielded little except triumphs for ambitious consuls, the Senate decided upon vigorous measures. Two tribes of Ligurians living near the coast were conquered and transplanted to the lands in southern Samnium (north of Beneventum) that had been confiscated in the last Samnite war. There we find their descendants living and apparently prospering as Roman citizens in the days of Trajan.

Spain had been "subdued" by Scipio in 206 after it was abandoned by Hasdrubal. That is to say, Rome took possession of the Punic forts at that time. In point of fact, only a few of the many warlike Spanish tribes had come in contact with Scipio. Rome of course conceived it her legitimate duty to establish her rule over the whole peninsula, and after the war her proconsuls set about the task of winning the tribes to allegiance by diplomacy and an exhibition of force. Progress was slow. The tribes preferred liberty, and some of the proconsuls were too ambitious, some too harsh. Cato during his year in Spain gained a reputation for fair dealing and progressed favorably. Some of his successors, however, proved to be more interested in winning booty than in establishing peace. Tiberius Gracchus the elder was famed for his kindness and justice. Thus good administration alternated with bad. In fact Spain was not

entirely brought under Roman rule till Augustus completed the task. In the second century B.C. the province was a training school for devious diplomacy, overbearing domination, and "triumph hunting." It proved what later history has repeatedly demonstrated that an aristocratic clique like the Roman Senate does not provide the best administration for barbaric provinces. The administrators are too far removed in culture from such subjects to understand them, and they are too ready to condone each other's abuses of power.

In *Carthage*, as was to be expected from the treaty of 201, the hatred of Rome lived on. For a long time, however, the landlord nobility, which had returned to power because of Hannibal's failure, remained at the helm and kept on good terms with Rome. For thirty years Carthage prospered without incurring any serious difficulties. The indemnity she had paid had indeed been small for so rich a state, and her trade is said to have grown to the old proportions in a short time. But Masinissa finally caused trouble by laying claims, false ones it seems, to a part of Libya, south of Carthage. According to the treaty of 201 Carthage could not resist with arms but must submit to Rome's arbitration. To Rome she accordingly referred the case, and at Rome Cato's party now happened to be in power. Polybius assures us that Rome pronounced an unjust verdict against Carthage, probably through fear that she was growing dangerously strong. Scipio Nasica, always an opponent of Cato, favored Carthage, holding that it could only be an advantage to Rome to have a strong rival. As time went on, nevertheless, other disputes arose and Carthage was generally subjected to humiliation, on the sole ground that she was growing to be a menace, if we are to believe Polybius. Apparently Cato openly adopted the dangerous view that any powerful state should be humbled before it became too dangerous; and he managed somehow to end every

speech he made in the Senate with the brutal sentence *Carthago delenda est*.

In 151 the Senate was offered the pretext it desired, for the war party of Carthage then came into power and voted to resist Masinissa by arms without Rome's permission. Cato's party now had its way, war was declared, and in 149 a strong army landed in Africa. Carthage in terror offered unconditional surrender. The consul, disarming the Carthaginians and exacting hostages from them, pronounced Rome's sentence: it was that they must surrender their city to Rome and build their new home at least ten miles from the sea. This they naturally refused to do. They closed their gates, turned all their forces into making arms, and defended the city for two years.

The disagreeable task of completing the harsh orders of a Catonian Senate—Cato himself died in 149—fell to a Scipio. In 147 the young son of Aemilius Paullus, adopted into the Scipionic family and therefore called Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, was elected to the consulship before the legal age because of his military skill, and was sent to storm Carthage and destroy it. The task was not easy, for the inhabitants barricaded the streets and in their desperation fought for every foot of ground. In 146, however, the citadel was taken and what remained of the town was burned. Polybius, the Greek historian, stood by the consul's side and heard him none too cheerfully prophesy a similar doom for Rome.

Scipio Nasica who had opposed Cato effectually was heard to remark with scorn at the Senate's merciless policy that there were now no longer any nations which Rome need either fear or blush before. The territory of Carthage was made into a province called Africa, seven cities like Utica that had been friendly to Rome were made autonomous allies free from tribute, the native Libyans became Roman tributaries, while the land that had belonged to Carthaginian citizens became Roman public land to be sold or rented out

as the censors saw fit. A large part was sold to Roman investors to pay the costs of the war.¹

We now return to *Greece*. The Macedonian republics created by Aemilius Paullus fared only moderately well: the people were accustomed to autocratic kings and needed time to learn the arts of democratic government. Parties of course arose; the propertied classes, having a predominating influence in the new government, were well satisfied and formed a group friendly to Rome, but the populace which had previously enjoyed the favors and bounties of Perseus began to form an anti-Roman party.

After some twenty years of democratic government a pretender, by the name of Andriscus, who falsely claimed to be the son of Perseus, escaped from prison and appeared in Thrace not far from Macedonia. The people there thought they recognized him as Perseus' son and flocked to his standard. In 149, he invaded Macedonia, appealing to the populace for support. Since only one of the four republics had an army, his success was easy. Then Rome sent Metellus with an army to drive him out. This was speedily done, and the experiment in self-government ended. In 147, Macedonia was declared a tribute-paying Roman province with a resident Roman governor.

Metellus was now sent down to Greece to settle the affairs of the *Achaean league* which were in utter confusion. The Catonian policy, declared twenty years before, of treating the Achaean league like a *socius* that must adhere to the original treaty stipulation, did not bring peace. The patri-

¹ Some historians assume that the destruction of Carthage was due to the business and commercial classes at Rome who desired to destroy a rival. Polybius who lived at the time and discusses causes says nothing about economic reasons. He lays the whole blame upon the Senate's fear of the growing political power of Carthage. He is doubtless right. Roman policy was not commercial at this time. After Carthage was destroyed Utica was allowed to inherit the African commerce. Rome might readily have planted a seaport colony in Africa to give Roman commerce an entrance. That she let African traders inherit the trade of even her own new province, shows clearly that the driving force in this cruel act was not economic.

otic party had, to be sure, lost most of its leaders when these were taken to Rome as hostages. But the taking of hostages was itself a harsh act which kept resentment alive; and though Polybius, who was one of them, lived on intimate terms at Rome with the Scipios and exerted his influence for their return, the Scipionic party was now too weak to accomplish anything in their behalf. When finally, after seventeen years of exile, they returned, they only strengthened the anti-Roman party in Achaea.

This party now came into power, and was led by Diaeus, a hot-headed patriot who mistook Rome's conciliatory tactics of recent years for a sign of weakness, and convinced himself that since Rome was engaged in wars with Carthage and Macedonia he could reestablish the independence of Achaea. Diaeus, therefore, asserted the old claim of Achaean dominance in Sparta and had twenty-four pro-Romans of Sparta condemned to death.

Rome retorted by sending envoys to Corinth, the capital of the Achaean league, declaring free from the league such cities as the league had acquired by Rome's aid. The people of Corinth mobbed the Roman envoys, an act of the kind that Rome seldom forgave. Diaeus declared war on Sparta; in turn Rome declared war on the league, and ordered the army in Macedonia to take Corinth. Mummius, now consul, defeated the Achaeans, took Corinth and razed the splendid old city to the ground (146 B.C.). This cruel act was explained as due to resentment at the attack upon Rome's envoys, and as an object lesson to allies that refused to abide by the terms of their alliance. Greece was not made a province nor was tribute imposed, but the cities of the Peloponnese were reorganized on aristocratic principles, and individually made into *socii* of Rome. The leagues were allowed to continue only for religious and social purposes. Rome had no more trouble with the Greeks. A hundred years later, when the memory of the "liberation of

the Greeks" had had sufficient time to fade away, Achaea also became a province.

This experiment of Rome in protecting weaker republics, extending over a period of fifty years, is one of the most interesting in the history of politics. The blame for the failure must be laid at the door partly of Rome, partly of Greece, but must after all be mainly attributed to the great difficulty of the task. As for the Greeks, they had never been known to have a strong political sense. Their individualism, their love of personal liberty, their originality, and their highly developed artistic sense had always made them impatient of strong and well ordered government. The Greek states had never been able to combine effectively, nor had they been able to compromise their party-disputes peaceably so as to keep them from flaming up into revolutions. The modern historian does not attribute the end of Greek productivity to Rome's intervention, for the great period in Greece had come to an end long before Rome entered the country. The real cause of Greece's decline we do not now know. It may be that constant warfare and revolutions had wasted away the most talented stock, or that political disorder disrupted society so that men could not produce effectively, or that the emergence of the lower classes in the fifth and fourth century democracies had in time overwhelmed the best blood and mixed it with so much of the Aegean stock that the Greek race had now changed into something less fine. If Greece had outlived her greatness, it was on the whole beneficial that a state like Rome, with enduring political capacity, established peace in Greece and saved it from eastern monarchs and northern barbarians until her great culture could permeate Rome and thus be saved for future generations.

Rome of course had meant well at first. It was a very fine display of political idealism that stirred the Senate in the days of Flaminius and Scipio Africanus, and the memory of their generous deed had a wholesome influence time

and again in softening Rome's practical policies. A grave difficulty, however, lay in the fact that Greeks and Romans differed so widely in temperament that they could never quite do each other justice. When they became acquainted, the Romans insisted that the Greeks were impractical and dishonest. The Greeks attributed too much of their own political strategy to the Romans and called them calculating when they merely lacked insight. The Greeks did find the Romans blunt, uncultured, legalistic and unimaginative. One of the most serious obstacles to success in the experiment lay in the fact that Rome was a republic whose policies were bound to change from year to year because of the annual change of consuls. Republics will always swing like a pendulum from one policy to another, reacting to the influences that predominate at election time. Idealistic sentiment may at any moment give way to practical demands when the time comes to reckon up the costs of past administrations. That is one reason why republics should be satisfied to govern themselves and be very slow to make promises to others. They seldom have the power to keep promises in the spirit in which they were given. We have only to think of the difference in modern states between the spirit of 1917 and of 1920 to comprehend what happened in Rome's relation to Greece between 200 and 146 B.C.

CHAPTER X

ROMAN SOCIETY IN THE DAYS OF CATO

Through these years of marvelous expansion when the dread monarchs of Alexander's empire bowed before Rome's sturdy soldiers, the plain-living Roman senators found themselves suddenly lifted to unusual heights of responsibility and dignity. There is a characteristic story of how Popilius, a senator, was sent to order the magnificent Antiochus to desist from attacking Egypt, and how, when the King refused to answer, the senator drew a circle about the King with his staff, saying: "Give me your answer before you step outside this circle." To such consciousness of power had these despised "barbarians" of the west been exalted. But if we observe them in their daily life at Rome and examine their mode of life we shall find them still a peculiarly simple farmer folk. It is more than likely that Popilius lived in an ugly little house of five or six rooms, a structure of sun-dried bricks with no floor but packed sand, without heat except from the kitchen hearth-fire, without bath, without decorations. As Horace says, the people lived in huts, palaces were built only for the gods.

The Roman house. The plan of the Roman house in general use at the time under consideration was very simple. The central atrium was open to the sky in the middle to let in light and let out smoke; the rest was roofed. Surrounding this and leading into it were the four or five rooms, which had no windows outward but received their light from the doors opening into the atrium. In the rear was the *tablinum*, where the master had his office and kept his accounts. The chief reasons for the shape of the Roman house were two. Ancient towns were walled and therefore space inside the walls was costly. Hence houses needed

to be packed closely together, and to be built in the center of city blocks leaving the street fronts for shops and booths. Dwelling houses, therefore, seldom had a visible exterior. They opened toward an inner atrium rather than toward outside porches. The second reason was the lack of window glass in the early days. Since windows could not be let into the exterior walls, light and air must come in under the shelter of the atrium-portico so that rain would not enter.

Temples. But the gods, as Horace says, had palaces. The temples possessed some grandeur though not much beauty, because unfortunately there is no beautiful stone within hundreds of miles of Rome. The native rock about Rome consists of tuff and lava, volcanic rock of the ugliest drab brown and gray. For temple walls it was used in blocks and also broken up and used in concrete. But its effects were so unpleasant that it had to be coated with stucco. It was not till the end of the Republic that the Romans could afford to import slabs of marble and granite with which to cover the walls. Nor in the earlier days was there any fine stone available for columns, cornices, and statues, such as Athens had near at hand. Pillars were stuccoed, and the pediments and roof adornments were made of terracotta, tastily molded. But, of course, real beauty and dignity could hardly be attained in such materials.

Public buildings. Various consuls, especially democratic ones, had also begun to decorate the city with buildings for the use and pleasure of the people. Before the Punic war Flaminius had built a circus where races might be held. A public hall or basilica was erected in the Forum by Cato during his censorship in 185, a second was ordered by the censors of 179 and a third in 170. These were spacious halls in the Forum built of stone to serve as court houses and places to contain business booths, especially in inclement weather. It is very likely that these so-called *basilicas*, "royal palaces," were modeled on buildings observed in Macedonia, for Cato as well as the other builders of these

structures had taken an active part in the wars against Macedonia and had had an opportunity to make observations there. It is to be noted that the early Christian basilica adopted the form of these public buildings.

The first stone bridge was contracted for in 179. About the same time the censors began to have the streets paved with lava-blocks. This very hard stone was at first quarried about forty miles from the city. In 144 the splendid aqueduct called the aqua Marcia was built to bring pure cold water to the city from the Sabine mountains, a distance of about forty miles. The two previous aqueducts had been underground affairs and had served only the lower section of the city. The Marcia ran on high arches over the six miles of low ground outside the city and could therefore serve even the top of the Capitoline hill.¹ It still bears witness to the marvelous efficiency and the care for the public health of the Romans, for some of the fine arches are standing to-day.

Permanent theaters were not yet built. In fact the comedies of Plautus and Terence, based on Greek models, seemed to the Roman censors somewhat too free in their sophisticated morals. They felt towards them as the English Puritans toward the Restoration drama brought in by the court of King Charles. They let them continue for the sake of amusing the populace on holidays, but did not quite wish to lend them open approval by building permanent theaters for them.

Social life. The austere conservatives of the day, men like Cato, complained bitterly of the decay of old customs and the introduction of Greek manners at Rome, but when we examine their complaints we are reminded of the vials of wrath that the Pilgrim fathers were wont to pour over

¹ The principle that water seeks its level was known and was applied at times. But since iron was very expensive, it was found more economical to keep the water at a fair level on arches than to use iron or make cement flues underground that would be capable of holding the weight of a flume nearly seven miles in length.

foibles which now seem innocent enough. Despite some innovations there was apparently not much crime. A divorce occurred so rarely that a single instance shocked society for weeks. The day of judgment seemed at hand if a nobleman's son lost some property at gambling. A censor like Cato could still bring disgrace upon a senator for setting a few pieces of silver plate upon the table. It must be said that a city which, with a population of perhaps three or four hundred thousand, could fare as well as Rome did without any police, was hardly corrupt to the core.

Family life was, to be sure, growing somewhat freer, and society recognized instinctively that as the government gained in capacity the authority of the father must yield. Hence the old rite of *confarreatio* which established the *patria potestas* had gradually to give way to a new rite which was less strict and which allowed a woman the privilege of holding property and freeing herself by divorce. This did not mean, as Cato thought, that family life was corrupt. It simply was an indication that the government of the state had progressed beyond a primitive stage. Nor was the *lex Voconia*, passed in 169, forbidding a woman to inherit property, intended as a reaction against the new liberty within the family. It was only a link in the chain of laws that were somewhat conservatively meant to keep family estates together, for it permitted a son or adopted son a free hand in the division of the inheritance in order that the whole estate of a family might be held within the family. Daughters could still procure the shares intended for them by private arrangement.

Greek and Roman literature. New ideas were being rapidly introduced into Roman literature. Ennius had issued several books of "Saturae," which might be called miscellaneous essays in prose and verse, and he had not hesitated to discuss philosophy and to question the myths. His son-in-law, the tragic poet Pacuvius, also liked to introduce radical and skeptical ideas in his plays.

Polybius, one of the Achean hostages brought to Rome in 166, was not only a historian but well versed in the Stoic philosophy, and he became influential in directing Greek reading in the circle of the younger Scipio. This Scipio in fact was the center of a group of important nobles who read and studied Stoic philosophy. He invited Panaetius, the leading philosopher of that school, to come from Greece and to live with him while he lectured in Rome. Stoicism was a philosophy which suited the puritanism and austere life of the natural Roman and began at once to affect the life and the legal thinking of Rome.

In literature, drama still held the foremost place, since the Romans had not yet been trained to become a nation of readers. Ennius' tragedies continued to be produced after his death, and Pacuvius, a man of scarcely less power, added to the store of tragedies. A good half dozen writers of clever comedies supplied the fun required at Roman festivals. We have the names of over a hundred comedies produced in this half century, but nothing has survived except six plays by Terence. These were perhaps the best in point of literary merit, but were apparently less original than many of the others.

In prose, Roman histories were growing to be popular. The story of Rome was so full of marvelous happenings that fiction could hardly be more exciting, and they were now being written in Latin. Cato himself wrote one in seven books, in which, as we might expect, he abused his noble opponents roundly and by name, talked incessantly about what he had done, and quoted liberally from his own speeches. Orations also came to be written out and circulated at this time. The battles of the Senate and Forum had grown to be more and more exciting owing to the importance of the political questions involved. Crowds would come to listen when Cato hurled his thunderbolts, and written copies of his speeches were in demand for the enjoyment of rereading. Cato alone published about 150 of

them. It was an education in politics as well as in style to read these. Cato's style was indeed far from polished. He claimed to scorn stylistic finish. "Know your subject and your phrases will take care of themselves," was his motto. But his wits were keen, his vocabulary precise, and his homely illustrations, drawn from everyday life, remarkably apt. Cato's speeches were as good as a radical weekly and came out almost as regularly.

The Roman economic system continued to be based chiefly on agriculture. Capital was, to be sure, going somewhat into public contracting, but there was still very little manufacturing or commerce at Rome or nearby. Tools and implements, household ware and clothing had of course to be made, and when we consider that such ware was now generally turned out in individual small shops, not in factories, we may assume quite a large population of handicraftsmen. Rome, however, made nothing for export. Cato in his farmer's manual *De Re Rustica*, written for his son, has a paragraph on where to buy tools, implements and clothes. Here we discover that Campania rather than Rome supplied the best iron and bronze ware. It was the Greek population of the bay of Naples and the Capuans driven from their farms in 211 who kept up the crafts in Campania. In fact, the iron industry was even deserting Etruria with the influx of Roman settlers, and the ore that was mined at Elba, which used to supply Etruscan industry, was now being shipped south to the Neapolitan bay to be worked into implements. The Romans had always liked farming and disliked shop life, and they continued to do so.

The situation in *commerce* was similar. The Roman republic continued to do nothing to encourage trade. Ostia, the seaport, was falling into decay again because shippers would not come there. They could not get return cargoes at Rome and Ostia. They, therefore, began to use Puteoli on the bay of Naples as their chief Italian port of call, though this was 140 miles from Rome, but there at least

there was something to buy. Goods bound for Rome had to go the rest of the way by coasting vessels or by the *via Appia* on muleback. So little did the Roman Senate care to encourage Romans at trade that though it controlled the whole Mediterranean by treaty compacts, not one clause is found in any treaty or law which accords any preference to a Roman merchant or trader. These treaties all insisted upon open ports for Rome and her allies alike, and since several of the allies were trading states, they not only benefited, but benefited to such an extent that they retained their old position as the foremost traders in the Mediterranean. When in fear that Antiochus might invade Italy at the beginning of the second century, Rome had planted citizen colonies at most of the southern ports, there were in each case 300 farmers who received land; they were to act as garrisons and to be the controlling political influence at each port town so that the enemy could be kept out. It was, however, the native Greeks of these places who continued to conduct the industries and trade under Roman protection.

That at Puteoli, which had the deepest and safest harbor in Italy, and which, as we have seen, became for a long time Rome's chief port, Rome placed only 300 landholders, is indeed most surprising. Greeks and Campanians controlled the trade there as elsewhere. The thousands of traders and business men who spread from Italy east and west—those, for instance, found in Asia by Mithradates, those recorded on inscriptions at Delos, which Rome had declared a free port in 167, those mentioned in the Verrine orations as engaged in commerce in Spain and Sicily—are almost all South Italians: Greeks, Lucanians, and Campanians. This explains why Rome did not care enough for her trade to establish a Roman seaport in the place of Carthage, but let the allied Punic city of Utica profit from the trade of Rome's province, why the Roman Republic did not keep Ostia in serviceable condition, or pass a single law in the

nature of a protective tariff, or make a single treaty giving preferential rights to her own citizens.¹

This scorn for trade and industry, concomitant with a devotion to landed property, which has everywhere manifested itself in the societies where an ancient aristocracy is strong, simplified the government's problems to a great extent. It did not have to trouble itself about tariff schedules, protection versus free-trade, and the struggle between capital and labor, questions that occupy so much of the energy of modern governments. Traders, bankers, and manufacturers were quite below the horizon of the senator's notice. His concern was with imperial problems, the peace on a score of borders, and delicate relations with a hundred different allies and subjects.

The Equites and Public Contracts. There was, however, a class of business men closely connected with the politics of the state, the class that took state contracts, and was, therefore in a way a part of the civil service. After the Second Punic War, especially after the debts had been paid, when the Spanish mines began to bring good returns, when the leased public lands yielded rents, Sicily provided a good tribute, and war indemnities came from Philip and Antiochus, there was a surplus in the treasury that could be used for public works. The censors now let expensive contracts. The Aemilian way was built from Ariminum to Placentia, the Cassian way was run up from Rome to the Po valley through Etruria, a large part of Rome was paved, several basilicas, temples, porticoes and bridges were built. Since Rome's administration changed so frequently, a permanent bureau of public works could not be organized; the censors, therefore, let these undertakings out to contractors. Since few men, however, had capital enough to undertake large contracts, the contractors were allowed to form corporations and gather capital by issuing what we might call shares

¹ The tax collectors had tariff privileges, but they were of course in the service of the state.

and stocks (a thing which Roman law did not yet permit for purposes of private business). When the work had been completed the state would pay the contract price, the profits would be distributed among the stockholders and the company dissolved. The Catonian period was a very prosperous one for such companies, and Romans who had any free capital were encouraged to invest in their shares. Polybius assures us that all Romans of any account were apt to invest in this way. Since the business was on the public account, it was considered above the plane of private business, and the organizers of the companies were looked upon as a substantial class, worthy of honor.

Later these companies were tempted to engage in the menial business of provincial tax-collecting and this brought them into bad repute. But for the present the Sicilian tithe was collected by natives, while the Spanish, African, and Macedonian tributes were fixed amounts sent in by their own governments. In Cato's day the companies, uncontaminated by foreign business, had a good reputation. The contracts which they took were let by the censors who were drawn from Rome's best statesmen removed from political influence, and since the work was done at Rome or nearby where every citizen could watch it, the work was honestly done. The companies that built the bridges of the Aemilian and Flaminian roads, that laid the pavement of the Appian way, and erected the masonry of the Marcian aqueduct, deserved the highest respect and received it. We can still judge the excellence of their works by considerable remains. They should not be made to share in the condemnation of the knights' companies which a century later fouled their hands with unclean politics in order to control the exploitation of provincial tithes in the east.

Latifundia. The capital, however, that went into these companies was after all but one or two percent of Rome's total wealth. It was investment in land that always and everywhere attracted Romans first. Agriculture was un-

fortunately tending towards the accumulation of large estates, partly because it is so apt to tend that way. In all countries shrewd farmers who know the best methods are apt to progress and accumulate several farms, then by saving on "overhead expenses" they increase their profits at the expense of small holders. This tendency is particularly apparent when land begins to be exhausted and special skill, new methods of rotating and fertilizing, and the introduction of new crops require the investment of some capital. Accumulation was further favored at Rome by the customs of inheritance which owed their origin to the Roman pride in family. Romans, to be sure, had no law of primogeniture such as that which has kept estates together in some modern states, but they seldom divided up a property by will. To procure its passing on intact they usually stated only what fraction of its value each child should have, and this permitted one to buy out the shares of the others in the final settlement and thus keep the estate intact. Thus estates frequently passed intact or enlarged from generation to generation. Such a growth of large farms naturally implies the diminution of small ones.

But the most serious difficulty in Italy arose as a legacy of the Punic War. The vast places then laid waste, as we have observed before, had been rented in large blocks to any who could or would take them. Poor men, however, could hardly invest far from home in this way. Most of the tracts needed development or they were so far from a market and labor was so scarce that there was no use in attempting to raise vegetables or grain upon them. The obvious thing was to buy cattle and a few slaves to tend them. Slaves could be bought in the Greek market-place, as they came in from the east or were being sold off by the Greeks whose finances were in a bad way. As time went on these leaseholders quietly took possession of other unoccupied lots. This was contrary to the Licinian law, which specified 300 jugera as the maximum allotment of any one

person, but since the land was unoccupied and Romans believed in "developing resources," no one objected for the present. Needless to say, the leaseholders were frequently senators who were accustomed to land owning, derived their incomes from it, and could not invest in trade if they wished. Thus the Senate, which now administered Italy, became interested in protecting the system. The land question, therefore, became a political question.

The misfortune that resulted can readily be imagined. When Italy's population recovered from the wars, the new generation found its opportunities gone. The land was already occupied, and being farmed and grazed in the least expensive way. Some hardy young men broke into the system, and small-farming continued to some extent. But most men drifted elsewhere. Some went to the city to see what could be had in public contracts—only to come to grief at times when no contracts were let. We hear of much suffering at Rome during the century. Others sought opportunities abroad. Not a few migrated to Cisalpine Gaul and found land there, though they had to neglect their citizenship to do so. Hence it is that the citizen-census shows such bad returns during this century. During the first forty years after the Second Punic war there was a very slow increase in population, but during the next thirty years there is a decrease. And this is true despite the fact that there were few serious battles, and that slaves were constantly being freed, and becoming citizens. This was not a healthy condition. Italy was not now supporting the hardy old Italian stock, its work was falling into the hands of slaves.

Agriculture. The methods of agriculture were on the whole intelligent. Cato's handbook *De Re Rustica* has survived so that we can still appraise them. A good farmer like Cato studied the physical properties of the soil to find out what crop it was best fitted for, and he studied market needs in order to raise the most profitable products. He

knew the value of rotating crops, and urged especially the use of leguminous plants in rotation so as to enrich the soil, though of course he did not know that their value lay in fixing nitrogen about the roots. He also recognized the advantage of plowing under a green crop of beans, and the value of wood ashes and of stable manure. He did not make the mistake of trying to cling to methods of "household economy," for he realized that there were things that others could raise and make more cheaply than he. He, therefore, specialized on the few crops that were most profitable with a view to selling the product at the best market. What he could not raise to advantage, he bought. In other words, he was very like a modern capitalistic farmer.

Though he had a large estate he did not of course farm it with much labor-saving machinery. The tools were still largely hand-implements. Cato was in fact not practicing real "extensive farming" but rather "intensive farming" on a large scale. The reasons for this are that the use of slave labor discourages the invention of labor-saving machinery because it is so cheap, and also that very much of the land of the Italian peninsula is too stony and rough to permit the employment of bulky machinery.

One advantage of the plantation system was that with careful supervision by intelligent men the land was more productively cultivated than by ignorant peasants, another was that crops and, therefore, food supplies were more diversified. It was good for the Romans to get away from their monotonous fare of cereals. Beef, pork and mutton, and many new kinds of fruit appeared on the tables of the well-to-do, though the poor, to be sure, who had to live on wages reduced by slave competition, could not afford such things. But we must hasten to say that, whatever advantages lay in the system, they did not outweigh the danger inherent in the ever-increasing mass of slaves who were driving out a hardier race.

Slavery. Slavery had always existed in Italy, but before the Punic War there were relatively few slaves at or near Rome. People had been too poor to buy them in the market, and Rome had seldom enslaved captives in the early Republic because the wars had been with closely related tribes. As a result of their scarcity slaves had been treated with remarkable kindness at Rome. If a farmer had a slave who was a Latin or a Samnite, and worked with him daily, he could hardly be cruel to him. The slave ate with his master and mistress and took part in the family worship. Hence the Romans had early adopted the custom of manumitting such slaves as a reward for a few years of good service and of making them full citizens at manumission.

In the Catonian period, however, the situation began to change. At that time many slaves were Punic and Syrian captives who had to be guarded and even chained. Some landlords who lived at Rome far away from their farms never saw their slave gangs and, therefore, had no personal sentiment with regard to them. The slaves were watched by trusted slave overseers whose one duty was to get as much profitable work out of those under them as possible. Cruel treatment came to be of daily occurrence. Furthermore the standard textbook on plantation farming with slave gangs was a Carthaginian book by Mago, a book that went into details concerning how to treat slaves. Punic practice had not been gentle in such things and these rules went far to aggravate the evils latent in the system.

In the city, however, where slaves came into contact with their master and mistress, old customs were generally continued, slaves were treated kindly, and the custom of manumitting was practiced very freely,—too freely in fact for the good of Rome's civilization. For, however worthy these people may have been—and many Greek and Syrian slaves were more clever than their masters,—they could hardly as citizens have the same respect for Roman institu-

tions and sound traditions as the more austere tempered citizens of Italic stock. One of the most serious factors in the oncoming change in Rome's morals and manners was this rapid introduction of new stocks from below due to Rome's over-generous gift of citizenship to so many slaves.

CHAPTER XI

THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION

The Roman constitution of the middle of the second century B.C. was very highly praised by Polybius, who was a Greek statesman with a profound knowledge of politics. What he particularly admired in it was its apparent union of strong executive power (in the consuls) with aristocratic and democratic elements represented by the administrative Senate and the primary legislative assembly. He thought that the diverse elements in the state checked and balanced each other very wholesomely in the Roman form of government. It is interesting to note that the sixth book of Polybius, which contains this analysis, had some influence, chiefly through French publicists of the 18th century, in the shaping of the Constitution of the United States, especially in stressing the theory of "checks and balances" between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. The modern scholar feels that Polybius overstated the importance of the mutual interdependence of the several departments. Polybius did not know that the larger part of the Senate's powers had been acquired by gradual usurpation during the wars and that these might any day be challenged; and he overestimated the virtues of anti-democratic elements because he had grown up in Greece where primary assemblies frequently played havoc with governments.

It is somewhat difficult even now to describe the constitution of 150 B.C., for it was not written and codified like ours but was rather, like England's, a product of laws and gradually assumed practices adopted for emergencies or forced by one element of the state upon the rest by sheer weight of influence. As in England, precedents tacitly established at times of stress were likely in time to be considered

as authoritative as practices recognized by law, but we also know that such precedents are more readily attacked and disavowed than are openly adopted statutes. The Gracchi, for instance, found it far easier to annul such of the Senate's powers as had been assumed through a long series of precedents than those that had been recognized by legal enactment.

In discussing this constitution we shall describe it as Polybius observed it, assuming for the present the validity of customary practice long established. We shall also examine it with reference to the five actual branches of government, 1) the electoral, 2) the executive, 3) the legislative, 4) the judicial, and 5) the administrative, rather than as Roman authors usually did, under the heads of consuls, senate, and people, or as is more usual in America with reference to executive, legislative and judicial offices.

The Electorate. In Rome as in America the people were considered sovereign. While in America this sovereignty is exerted *directly* in the *election* of officials to do the people's business, but *indirectly* through their representatives in *legislation*, the people at Rome exerted their will directly in primary assemblies both in *electing* and in *legislating*, except in so far as they had acquiesced for some time in the Senate's assumption of partial legislative rights. At present we are interested only in the *electorate*. All male citizens of military age could take part in elections. They voted in groups according to wards by show of hands, until in 139 B.C. when the secret written ballot was introduced. A separate election was held for each of the important officers: censors (only every fifth year), consuls, praetors, aediles, quaestors, and tribunes. In the election of tribunes, quaestors, and aediles the people voted by wards (*tribus*) in the *comitia tributa*, all votes of a ward having equal value, while a majority of the wards determined the election. The classification of the voters in the centuriate assembly which elected censors, consuls and praetors was

more intricate. Here the electors of every ward were again subdivided according to wealth into five classes, and the classes were subdivided by age into juniors and seniors. The centuriate assembly had been somewhat democratized in the third century so that it was no longer absolutely controlled by the first class. Indeed the five separate classes now had an equal number of votes. But the assembly still bore a conservative aspect. In the first place the upper "classes," while naturally containing fewer individuals than the lower, had the same number of votes, and secondly, the "classes" of the *seniores* (voters of forty-six years and over) had the same voting value as "classes" of *juniors*, though mortality statistics inform us that such classes could not have had more than about half as many voters. Thus we see that a premium was still placed upon wealth and age, and we comprehend why this assembly continued in general to favor conservative candidates and why it was so difficult for *novi homines* to gain high political distinction. It seems strange to us that while the populace so feared the aristocratic tendencies of the centuriate assembly as to object to its activity in a legislative capacity it never seriously tried to stop its activity in electing higher magistrates.

The Executives at Rome were the two consuls, elected for a year, by the centuriate assembly. They were commanders-in-chief of the army and, by a custom from which Rome suffered severely in various wars, they took personal command in the field even when quite devoid of military experience. As chief executives they were responsible for the preservation of order and for the proper execution of the laws, and, according to the conservative theory which was sometimes questioned by the liberals, they could at all times of great danger assume dictatorial powers by means of an order from the Senate. While they were not granted a direct veto power in legislation, they had some influence in law-making since they alone could summon the Senate and the centuriate comitia. At the time under dis-

cussion, however, all their powers were greatly limited by the Senate, since that body, consisting of ex-magistrates holding their seats for life, insisted upon being consulted by the executives in all matters of importance. After their term of office they were each, by an accepted custom, allotted a province where, being both civil and military magistrates, they governed with almost unrestricted powers for a year.

The legislative power lay at this time theoretically in the primary assemblies (both *centuriata* and *tributa*). In point of fact the tribunes were so apt to hamper the conservative centuriate assembly that it was seldom called together except for elections. In order to expedite legislation it had become customary for the Senate to invite the tribunes into the Senate for the discussion of necessary measures, and when a bill satisfactory to all parties had been agreed upon to let the tribunes present it to the tribal assembly.

It must not be thought, however, that even this assembly was summoned except when absolutely necessary. The people were too busy and widely scattered for constant attendance at the *comitium*. Two expeditionary devices for the passing of ordinary administrative measures and for the improvement of the civil and criminal code had emerged. In the first place the Senate was tacitly permitted during the wars, when emergency measures were constantly called for, to order new levies of troops, to raise money, to assign armies to points of danger, to look after the budget, in short, to pass practically all measures that had to do simply with administration. Most of these acquired functions the Senate was still permitted to exercise till the day of the Gracchan revolution. In the second place, ordinary reforms of the civil and criminal law were made by the praetors who presided over the courts. In fact Roman law was "judge-made" to a larger extent even than in America. There is only this difference; while in America the inter-

pretation of laws is usually based upon the decisions of courts in particular cases, that of Roman laws was largely based upon the general edicts of praetors who were allowed to issue a formal statement during their term of office as to what legal customs should be considered antiquated and what new practices should be adopted by the courts.

By these two devices the assemblies were saved the trouble of constantly meeting to discuss matters of which they had no understanding. In the days of Cato the assemblies were in general called together in legislative session only to vote on questions of war and peace, on actual constitutional reforms, on the grant of citizenship and on appeals in capital cases.

The judicial functions were performed in large measure by the praetors' courts. In 149, Piso passed a law establishing the scope of each court so that the praetors could specialize—a good innovation (which is being more and more introduced in modern states), since the praetors held office for but a year and did not have time to master a large field. Separate special courts were soon created to take care of indictments for provincial misgovernment, for treason, for embezzlement, for murder, etc. The praetors at this time drew their jurors from the body of senators, a procedure which made for intelligent judgments in most cases, but which worked badly in cases of provincial maladministration, since the accused would necessarily be one of their number. As we have seen, the court was largely responsible for the progress of the law.

Owing to the fact that the theory of popular government was always strong, political cases—especially of impeachment of magistrates—continued to be brought by the tribunes before the assembly. This was a privilege that the people did not care to delegate to the courts when the good name of Rome was at stake. Furthermore, by an old custom the people were slow to give up the right of hearing appeals of citizens in cases of life and death. In


such cases the assemblies interfered with the judiciary. Finally, the Senate, as we shall see, invaded the field of the courts in matters that touched upon questions of senatorial administration.

The fifth function of government is that of *administration*. This is usually delegated by a sovereign legislative body to the ministry or the "king in council," though in America it is shared by the president (with his cabinet) and Congress. At Rome, the Senate, formerly acting as the king's council or the consul's cabinet, had acquired most of this work, though of course the popular assembly frequently asserted its sovereign right to perform administrative tasks. Gracchus for instance learned to use the assembly for the passage of administrative bills, quite disregarding the Senate. However, during the great wars, as we have noted, and long thereafter, the Senate carried on the administration of the great empire in so far as definite tasks had not been assigned to censors, aediles, and pro-magistrates. All senators had been magistrates and had had much practical experience. They could, therefore, be trusted to undertake this work. They made some mistakes, and through "senatorial courtesy" committed wrongs in favor of their own members to the detriment of innocent subjects. But so do all administrative bodies. At Rome there was certainly no body that could have done this work more wisely or generously.

The Senate's usurpation of judicial and executive functions—destined to lead to disastrous quarrels—came about in this way. During the Punic Wars and after, the senators assumed that throughout Italy they had the right to examine into facts relating to alleged breaches of law and order. Then they assumed that the right to examine implied the right to pronounce judgment. Thus they began to appoint special judicial commissions with plenary powers, and the consuls, being of their number, executed the orders of such commissions. Thus they tried certain cases of

alleged treason. Again, they felt that if they could try and condemn, and order the consuls to execute their judgments, they could also empower the consul to assume full dictatorial powers at time of danger in order to safeguard the state. Such an order was called a *senatus consultum ultimum*. An instance of its employment was Cicero's commission from the Senate in the days of Catiline "to see that the state suffered no harm." This practice was first seriously questioned by the Gracchi.

The interrelations of functions in the Roman constitution may, though inadequately, be pictured in diagram as follows:



It will appear from this diagram that the electorate, theoretically sovereign, was at the basis of the system. It elected the praetors of the courts and the executive magistrates; it constituted the legislative assemblies, and indirectly (through the election of the magistrates) determined the personnel of the Senate. The arrow-head lines indicate the overlapping of functions. So, for instance, although the praetors' courts performed most of the functions of the judicial department, the assemblies always retained and the Senate acquired certain judicial powers. Similarly, although the assemblies were the chief legislative bodies, nevertheless the presiding executives had a strong hand in shaping legislation, and the Senate took to itself a large share, not only in framing bills for the assemblies but also in issuing quasi-legislative *consulta* in the field of administra-

tion recognized as belonging to the Senate. Finally, the assemblies (especially in the Gracchan days) invaded the administrative field, which was ordinarily controlled by the Senate with the aid of the executives.

It would be quite misleading to assume that the Romans had intentionally shaped their constitution with a view to attaining those "checks and balances" which Polybius so much admired. The fact is that whenever the Senate was strong it insensibly tended to usurp powers in every department of state, while on the other hand powerful democratic leaders now and then tried to check the Senate and enlarge the functions of the tribal assembly led by the tribunes. The overlapping of functions was, therefore, a resultant of survivals and compromises rather than of consistent design.

Nor should the diagram be permitted to lead to the supposition that the Romans thought of their constitution as shaped to perform five distinct functions of government. They were only hazily and occasionally aware of the distribution of these functions. Indeed they usually thought out and framed constitutional measures with reference to the rights and privileges of (1) the magistrates, (2) the Senate, and (3) the populace. Their constitution can be schematized according to functions only because the instincts of Romans for a logical division were at times more accurate than their actual formulation.

The stability of the constitution and the governmental good sense of the Romans are attested by the almost unparalleled fact that Rome lived for four centuries without civil war or violent revolution. The weakest point logically is indicated by the dotted line. This broken line indicates that the Senate was not responsible to the electorate since its members had reached their seats in the Senate by virtue of elective magistracies and not by direct election to the Senate, and since they held their seats for life. Since now the Senate had acquired vast powers of administration

in the state it is clear that the electorate, which considered itself sovereign, might some day challenge the position of this more than semi-independent body.

Rome and the provinces. The Roman empire now consisted of Rome—the *ager Romanus* of the thirty-five *tribus* in central Italy—Latin cities and colonies, allies in Italy, numerous allied states in Greece and in Asia, and finally several provinces which contained subjects of various grades. The provinces were Sicily (acquired in 241), Sardinia and Corsica (236), Hither and Farther Spain (organized in 197), Cisalpine Gaul (practically, if not officially), Macedonia (established in 146), and Africa (146). Conditions varied greatly in the different provinces.

The government of *Sicily* was placed in the hands of propraetors. A Roman praetor after his term at Rome had his magistracy prolonged for a year so that he might serve as governor in a province. During the second century the Senate usually sent excellent men to this province and the government was then generally good. Unfortunately the Punic landlord system based upon slave-culture of a harsh type was continued under Roman rule, and the emphasis laid upon cereal culture by the tithe-system over-induced intensive farming which in turn increased the evils of slavery as well as of soil-exhaustion. The first serious revolt of slaves which the Roman government had to meet was in this province where there were as yet very few Roman landholders. It broke out in 134, led by a Syrian religious mystic who gathered 200,000 slaves to his banner before he was defeated by Rupilius in 132.

Sardinia and Corsica were mountainous islands inhabited chiefly by an old remnant of the pre-Indo-European race. Carthage had held only trading posts on their coasts at which bartering with the natives was carried on. Rome of course was never satisfied to hold provinces in this easy manner. The Senate cared nothing for the trade, and conceived it to be a duty to establish organized governments

in these islands so that the manhood of the province could be depended upon to take their share in the allied contingents of Rome's army. The second century, therefore, provided many instances of unedifying expeditions into the interior to pacify villages of natives that had no use for civilization.

In *Spain* the same conditions held. Only the south and the east were to any extent organized when Rome took the province. In order to organize the whole, the Senate divided Spain into two provinces in 197 B.C., and set about the long task of pacification. After many more or less successful efforts with arms, the elder Gracchus, adopting conciliatory tactics, came to an understanding with most of the tribes, and fixed upon a tribute of half a tithe on annual products as Rome's share. But many Spanish tribes were averse to peace, and objected to tribute. Revolts were frequent, and several Roman praetors, either from lack of sympathy with barbaric customs, or from venality and a desire for military conquests, accepted such revolts as opportunities for strong reprisals. This condition of affairs led finally in 149 to a general revolt of many tribes under Viriathus, a Lusitanian shepherd. The war dragged on needlessly because the Senate, long underestimating its importance, sent inferior men to the field. A constitutional peculiarity which Americans are in a position to appreciate also caused some difficulty. Repeatedly when a consul in the field made a treaty of peace with a Spanish tribe, the Senate at Rome, which claimed the right to pass on all treaties, would be induced by the political enemies of the consul to reject or revise it. Thus the Spaniards naturally came to the conclusion that Roman generals were not to be trusted. They thought the consuls when in trouble made peace with the intention of rejecting the terms as soon as reinforcements arrived. One typical incident among many became famous in later history. In 137 the consul Hostilius Mancinus was badly defeated by the Numantines and saved

his army only by signing a treaty giving Numantia its independence. The Senate insisted that no consul had a right to make such or any treaty. They rejected it, and handed over Mancinus to the Numantines, who, however, were too proud to receive him. Then the war broke out anew. This disgraceful situation continued until Scipio Aemilianus was sent out in 134 with permission to remain till he could end the war. This he did with expedition. Numantia fell in 133, and the Lusitanian revolt was at an end. During and after this war many Roman soldiers settled in Spain when their military service was over, and through them, even though no colonies were as yet sent, a large part of Spain was gradually Romanized. Latin had come to be the accepted language in a large part of the peninsula in Augustus' day.

Of the organization of *Cisalpine Gaul* we are not informed. The Senate seems to have allowed the quiet infiltration of Italians to take care of the problems there. Italians gradually occupied a large part of the country and organized local governments in the regular Italian fashion. We do not hear that a tribute was exacted in Cisalpine Gaul.

Macedonia was made a province after the invasion of Andriscus had been suppressed in 147. The proconsul kept an army for the protection of the northern frontier where various mountain tribes provided opportunities for governors ambitious to gain the "honor" of a triumph. The tribute here was fixed for each community, being estimated at about half of what the former royal tax had been. But Rome also drew revenue from the old royal mines which the state had taken over as public property. The public corporations worked these by contract, receiving 50 percent of the ore in return for the working of the mines.

The situation in *Africa* we have reviewed above. Such were the conditions in the provinces. The subjects were being given the advantages of peace, even when they pre-

ferred not to have them; on the whole the exactions of the state were but little more than what was required to finance the provincial governments. In general the governors, though unsympathetic with the temperament of the barbaric races they governed, were, during the second century, fairly efficient. But the temptations which the great power of the proconsulship offered, insufficiently checked because of the distance from any supervision, were many, and gradually led to the creation of evil precedents. Governors were flattered and banqueted, and the custom was established that they and their staff should be royally provided for by the provincial communities. What this led to we shall see later. Piso's new court, created in 149 for the protection of misruled provincials, was established in good intention, but it was costly for provincials to plead at Rome; and since this court, like the rest, drew its jury from the body of senators, who were likely to be personal friends of the governors, a fair trial was not assured by it. This is the reason why Gracchus removed the senators from the jury panel in 123. We shall see to what results this led.

The second century B.C. was a period of dangerous political experiments and of rapid changes in social customs and religious beliefs. That the core of Roman political society was still sound is apparent to those who will read the observations made by the Greek historian, Polybius. We may quote some passages from chapters 53-7 of his sixth book: ¹

"Whenever an illustrious Roman dies, in the course of his funeral, the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum to the Rostra, as a raised platform there is called, and sometimes is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely, is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son, if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers

¹ Schuckburgh's translation.

a speech concerning the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed by him in his lifetime. . . . After the burial and all the usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a wooden canopy or shrine. This likeness consists of a mask made to represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and color. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies, they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga with purple stripes; if a censor, whole purple; if he had also celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga embroidered with gold. . . . There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For can we conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were living and breathing? Or what could be a more glorious spectacle?

Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, after having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die; and the renown of those who have done good service to their country becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of the ceremony is that it inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare, in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest, some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to death, in defiance of every custom

and law, because they rated the interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with their nearest and dearest.

Again the Roman customs and principles regarding money transactions are better than those of the Carthaginians. In the view of the latter nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain; with the former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes and to make profit by improper means. For they regard wealth obtained from unlawful transactions to be as much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from the most unquestioned source is commendation. A proof of the fact is this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but among the Romans the penalty for it is death. With such a radical difference, therefore, between the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples, it is natural that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be different also.

Greek statesmen, if entrusted with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many seals, and twice as many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep faith: whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies, men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again, in other nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands out of the public purse, and is entirely pure in such matters: but among the Romans it is a rare thing to detect a man in the act of committing such a crime."

CHAPTER XII

THE GRACCHAN REFORMS

The public lands. The land question was coming more and more to the front. The populace of the city was rapidly growing, recruited from among the destitute farmers who were being driven to the wall by capitalistic farmers employing slaves. The poor people knew that the state owned much land which was rented by landlords at low prices, and that some of this land was even held by "squatters" whose right of possession rested only on the fact that they had occupied the land when no one had cared to enforce the Licinian restrictions. They remembered that Flaminius had less than a century before caused the distribution of public lands in northern Italy, and they knew that if a bill were once proposed they might be strong enough to carry a land-law through the assembly, because many of them were still registered and could vote in their ancestral country *tribus*. However, the assemblies could only vote on bills put to them by a presiding officer, and the Senate had been able for a century, by means of the veto of a friendly tribune, to compel the reference of all proposed bills to the Senate. Therefore, a very radical measure which threatened to reduce the possessions of individual senators seemed to have little opportunity of being put to a vote.

The senators had plausible arguments on their side. They could say that the treasury needed the money provided by the rents, that the assembly had acquiesced in the old land policy, thereby encouraging the landholders to spend money in improvements, that the land had been worthless when occupied, and was now worth having only because of the improvements made by the holders. Finally there

were many who, like old Fabius, thought it a poor social policy to reward sloth, as they called it, by giving new lands at public cost to those who had once failed as farmers, and drifted listlessly to the city.

A few thoughtful nobles like Scipio Aemilianus, his scholarly friend Laelius, the pontifex Mucius Scaevola, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who considered the question impartially from a social and political viewpoint, favored distribution; and most of these urged the Senate to yield and not permit a bitter factional fight to arise. These men regretted the increase of the number of slaves which resulted in a decrease in Rome's most reliable stock, the hard working, frugal and strong farmer; and they urged the Senate to consider the propriety of increasing the number of farmers for military purposes, because this was an argument which the Senate could understand. But large social ideals doubtless lay at the bottom of their radical arguments. All of these men were acquainted with the Stoic doctrines of the brotherhood of man, and they discussed such doctrines with the Greek philosophers Panaetius and Polybius who were now at Rome. The Gracchi indeed had a Stoic philosopher, Blossius of Cumae, as tutor, provided for their care by their mother Cornelia. These Greek friends of theirs doubtless told them how a Stoic philosopher had a century before induced king Cleomenes of Sparta to institute a general division of all lands to the citizens of Sparta. Such socialistic ideas were in the air, and were bringing thoughtful Romans to consider whether their old ideas of the sacredness of property rights had not been carried too far.

The proposal of Tiberius Gracchus. Tiberius Gracchus became tribune in 133, and asked the Senate to support a bill drawing in all public lands held contrary to the Licinian laws and permitting the redistribution of these in small lots to the poor. He proposed to reimburse the landlords for improvements made. The Senate refused. He then

stated that he would rely on the constitutional right of the assembly, acquired in 287 B.C., to vote on the measure without the Senate's approval. Many senators who felt that constitutions were made as much by precedent as by legislation felt that it was revolutionary to disregard present custom in favor of a very old and obsolete law. So it was, but legal authorities to-day usually agree with Gracchus that the sovereign people must have the right to brush aside precedents as well as laws that obstruct the sovereign will. The sovereign alone is ultimate judge of what is constitutional. Indeed the twelve tables of 300 years before had admitted that the legislative assembly that made the laws could not be obstructed even by the code of the twelve tables themselves.

Gracchus accordingly disregarded the Senate and brought his bill to the tribal assembly. Octavius, a tribune friendly to the Senate, vetoed it. Then Gracchus, to everyone's surprise, proposed a bill that Octavius be deposed from office. This introduction of the theory of "recall," now familiar in some of our states, was also revolutionary according to the senators. How can a magistrate, they asked, do his duty fearlessly if he is to be "recalled" at every whim of the voters? Indeed the Romans had always held that magistrates must be unimpeachable during their term of office so that they might have courage to act with conviction. But the bill was passed, and it must be said that so far as the principle applied to tribunes, Gracchus' legal instincts were right. The tribunes had not originally been meant to have magisterial power, but only the right to aid individuals in distress. For that reason alone their number had been increased to ten so that they could act in various parts of the city simultaneously. When they had assumed the right to veto legislative acts they had practically destroyed their own power, because one out of the ten could generally be found to favor the Senate and obstruct the popular will. Hence the only logical course was to reduce the board of ten

to one, either actually, or virtually, by letting the people decide which tribune to follow. Only so could the sovereign will effect its desires.


It has been objected that Gracchus should first have passed a bill legalizing the recall, and then applied it. That would have been more orderly, but the Romans frequently changed their laws by establishing their precedents directly, letting the law be inferred from the act. It may be admitted, therefore, that his act while revolutionary was logical, and consistent with the sound theory that the assembly was sovereign, and must not be blocked by illogical accretions of customs.

Thus Octavius was removed and Gracchus' bill was passed. It was in the main a reënactment of the Licinian law limiting leases of public land to 500 jugera per person, with additions of half the amount for each of two sons. It seems that the holdings that did not transgress the legal limits were to be recognized as the holder's property, but the clause indemnifying holders for improvements on lands illegally held was now apparently withdrawn. The law also created a land commission of three men with power to draw in illegal possessions and to assign these to new settlers in small lots of about thirty *jugera*.

As it happened the news arrived just then that the king of Pergamum, Attalus III, had died, and, by a peculiar whim which it is difficult to explain, had left his kingdom to Rome. Since Gracchus needed funds for the execution of his land law and foresaw difficulty in getting any from the Senate, he proposed a bill to the tribal assembly to take over and administer the legacy of Attalus. This again was a drastic interference in senatorial administration which could be justified only on strictly legal though certainly not on practical grounds. The assembly was not fitted for administrative work in foreign lands. But this bill also passed. Thus equipped, the commission of which Gracchus was a member went to work, and made good progress. Since

the next census reveals after many years of dwindling, an increase of almost 80,000 citizens, that is, of nearly twenty-five per cent, it is likely that the land allotment had to about this extent increased the roll of property-holding Romans. That was a result apparently worth achieving.

The death of Tiberius Gracchus. As the Senate continued its obstructionary tactics, Gracchus saw the need of having himself reelected for the next term, a thing which was forbidden by the law which created the tribunate. Again he held that the people were sovereign, and that their will was final on such questions. The Senate was in an uproar, crying that Gracchus was subverting all the safeguards of the constitution. It must be said that Gracchus was carrying his constitutional changes to imprudent lengths, and that the Senate did right in objecting. Rejecting the legislative power of the Senate had been necessary when the Senate claimed an absolute veto; reducing the tribune's power to obstruct the assembly was only logical; but to invade the field of administration set apart for the Senate was unwise, and to extend the tribune's term indefinitely, legally possible though it might be, was to open the door to despotism. Many senators desired the Senate to declare this treason and to pass a *senatus consultum ultimum* empowering the consul to arm the authorities and stop the election. When the Senate could not agree, a great number dashed to the Forum to obstruct the election on their own responsibility. They were followed by hordes of clients who had doubtless lost their positions and property by the land-laws. A riot was on, and Tiberius and many of his followers were killed. This was practically the first bloodshed in Rome's long record of political struggles. The peaceful record of the past had been almost matchless in political history. But this day established a precedent which was to be followed more than once, and for which the senators of a later day were to pay a heavy price. The Senate at once chose men of their own party as members



of the land commission, and thus its work was retarded. But it did not dare to question the legality of the plebiscite. Finally, the Senate, making use of the judicial power which it had assumed without legal enactment during the Punic wars, appointed a judicial commission to try the "revolutionary" followers of Tiberius Gracchus. This commission condemned many on the charge of treason and had them executed.

The Asiatic province. The Senate also acted quickly to reassert its right of administration in foreign affairs by taking charge of the legacy of Attalus, and making the kingdom over into a province which was called *Asia*. The Senate conformed to the desires of Attalus by giving autonomy and immunity from tribute to the Greek cities of the kingdom. The royal estates were large and these the censors were ordered to rent out for what they would bring; the country districts settled by oriental peasants of mixed stock were ordered to pay their tribute to Rome as they had in the past to the king. But the Senate, with characteristic dislike of extending Rome's rule over troublesome tribes, lopped off eastern Phrygia, giving it to Mithradates of Pontus, gave Lycaonia to the king of Cappadocia, and set the Pamphylian and Pisidian tribes free to misrule themselves. Mysia, Lydia, and Caria were retained as a part of the province. Unfortunately this arrangement did not endure for long. In the first place a pretender to the throne, Aristonicus, claimed the succession and had to be driven out. Some of the Greek cities supported him, and were accordingly subdued and brought into the tributary list. And later Gaius Gracchus, claiming that the assembly and not the Senate now controlled administration, annulled the Senate's disposals and made arrangements which would bring a larger tribute to Rome. We shall have to examine his regulations presently. Here we are merely concerned with the establishment in 133 of the first of Rome's provinces beyond the Aegean sea.

The class struggle continues. The struggle at home continued fitfully. In 129, after Scipio Aemilianus had tried to bring about a compromise by admitting the consuls to the land commission to represent the viewpoint of the Senate, he was found dead in his bed. There is no proof that he had been assassinated, but the optimates, as the senatorial party called themselves, spread the charge that he was, and ill will between the classes was intensified. Now the Gracchan party began to urge the gift of citizenship to all Italians, doubtless a suggestion from Tiberius Gracchus' program. Not only did considerations of justice and wisdom argue for this measure, but it was also meant to win the allies over to the support of the land laws, which indeed they were inclined to fear because the allies had also done their share in settling public lands illegally. The optimates answered this proposal by a cruel law expelling all aliens from Rome. It must be admitted that the democratic assembly was apt to be liberal only in questions concerning their own advantage. Accordingly, when in 125 a popular consul, Flaccus, proposed the bill granting the franchise to the Allies it was defeated, and one Latin colony, Fregellae, which had the courage to rise up in armed revolt to favor it, was attacked and destroyed as a rebel.

Gaius Gracchus. Gaius Gracchus, the brother of Tiberius, stood for the tribunate in 124 when he was 30 years of age. He had had the same liberal education in Greek history, philosophy, and literature as his brother, had received a much wider preliminary training in politics by his participation in and observation of his brother's work, and was a brilliant orator, by far the most effective speaker of his day. Naturally emotional, he had through his bitter experiences acquired a deep hatred for the obstinate senators who had caused his brother's death. In the fragments of his speeches we find a strain of vindictiveness against which his mother, older and steadier of vision, warned

him. It is not a sin that we need criticize unless it affected his judgment, for the Romans expected a man of spirit not to forgive those who had murdered a brother. It affected the essentials of his program but little. His important proposals were made not from motives of revenge, but in order to correct the evils of Roman society and of the Roman constitution. He was one of the clearest-visioned and one of the most original of the world's great reformers. The failure of his reforms is due mainly to his being cut off when the work was only half done. At his death his constitution stood as a building half-erected that no one would complete. The walls left thus were useless and only added to the general wreckage.

Plutarch and Appian, who more than two centuries later gave the only account of his work that has survived, did not take the pains to arrange his acts in chronological order. We are, therefore, unable to estimate the value of some acts whose worth depends very much on what precisely went before and after. The following order attempts to be chronological, but is in part conjectural.

The plebiscites of Gaius Gracchus. One of the first measures introduced by Gaius was intended to destroy the usurped executive and judicial power of the Senate, by which it had terrorized the friends of Tiberius after his death. This measure reasserted the citizens' right of appeal to the assembly in case of capital sentence, and thus forbade senatorial judicial commissions. On the basis of it, Popilius, the consul who had proposed the special court in 132, was outlawed. Gaius also very early passed a corn law (*lex frumentaria*) ordering the state to sell grain at a very low price to all poor citizens. This measure was criticized as being mere bribery of the populace for votes, and of course it led to pauperization on a ruinous scale. It may be that Gracchus passed this plebiscite for the purpose of keeping poor voters in the city for his elections and assembly meetings, since Tiberius had found that poor peasants had

to stay on their farms and work for their daily bread even on important assembly days. But it may also be that he was taking care of sufferers until his colonization schemes and his large plans for public work should be well enough along to take care of the poor by better methods. Recent experience has proved that the most conservative states will pass corn laws at times of great danger in order to keep the populace contented during the period of strain; but it is crude statesmanship to continue such lavishness for partisan reasons when the strain is over. Furthermore, the idea of state charity had been much talked of, especially in Greece, where in the third century society was dwindling in productive capacity. And if Gracchus had been directed to such humanitarian ideas by his philosophic tutor, the temptation to apply them at Rome was great, for the granaries at Rome were full of Sicilian wheat which belonged to the people. Why should the people go hungry when they had only to vote to open their own storehouses? At any rate Gaius knew well that if he could pass all his measures there would soon be few indigents left at Rome to need state charity. The destructive results of this law must be laid at the door of those who obstructed the final reforms, and then continued to bribe the disappointed populace by lowering the price still further. Gracchus also restored his brother's land-law to efficiency by removing the consul from the commission and giving it full power to judge questions of ownership. Thus the work of distribution was set in motion again. The opposition of the allies was neutralized by a promise that he would presently endeavor to secure them a better status.

Meanwhile he kept the assembly at hand while he passed several administrative measures. Granaries were needed, and it was especially important that roads be laid out and paved. Communication must be made easy between the newly settled lands and their respective markets if the settlers were to prosper. And in all these bills the assembly

disregarded the censors whose business it had been to propose public works, and the Senate which claimed the right to control the budget. The assembly placed in charge of such work various commissions and boards directed by Gaius Gracchus himself, and Plutarch gives a picture of the tribune as a kind of business director of the whole corporation, drawing the plans, placing orders for materials, letting contracts, and supervising the work.

The tithes of Asia. In order to increase the state revenues to pay for such work he examined the sources of income and found that under the senatorial administration just put into effect there the new province of Asia did not yield what it ought. He therefore had the assembly reject the Senate's arrangement and make a new one. Eastern Phrygia was retaken from Mithradates on the charge that the gift had been induced by the king's bribes to some senators, a charge for which we have no convincing proof. The Asiatic tribute was also imposed upon several free cities. We do not know how this disregard of the terms of the legacy was made to seem justifiable. But the greatest change was the introduction of the contract system of tithe-gathering in place of the Attalid system of fixed community contributions. The public companies at Rome were asked to bid for the collection, deposit the cash for the whole contract at Rome and then collect from the communities one-tenth of the annual produce of each farmer. This is the Gracchan law which has been most severely criticized. It was not long before the companies began to collect more than was due them, and to lend money at usurious rates of interest to the communities which did not command the ready cash. The "publicans," i.e., the tax gatherers, came to be looked upon, and rightly so, as the leeches of the province. There is no charge in ancient authors, however, that Gracchus had foreseen this evil and had intended to betray the provincials to unscrupulous Roman business men. His concern for allies and provincials seems to have

been sincere. The law was a mistake, but Gaius would probably have been the first to correct the mistake as soon as the evils appeared, if he had lived to observe them.

At first sight the new device seemed good to Rome and provincials alike. The communities found it difficult to pay even a small cash tribute in years of drought, which were frequent in Asia. In their climate it would seem an act of mercy to require a percentage of the crop rather than a fixed sum, which was difficult to find in lean years. And Rome would benefit since the companies would bid in cash, so that the treasury would know what to count upon. To foresee the evils of extortion was not easy. The companies had carried many public contracts during his life time and even under his supervision, and they had done excellent work honestly. Why should they not be trusted with work abroad? And if any abuses should arise it would be the proconsul's business to complain, and guard the interests of the communities. The real evils arose in a later day when the system spread all over the East. Then the companies grew so powerful that they became a strong political influence which proconsuls feared to oppose. Gaius could neither have desired nor foreseen this. His law was meant to aid the communities and Rome alike, and it was devised on the basis of the faith that he had gained in the public corporations through his dealings with them. The Senate's chief objection to his measure was based not on a desire to aid the provincials but on the fact that the law extended political recognition to a class of wealthy people generally disregarded by the nobility, and that, though an administrative measure, it was submitted not to the Senate but to the assembly.

The second term of Caius Gracchus. His program was not complete, and he stood for reëlection, a right that had been accorded tribunes by law since the death of Tiberius. He won, but with him among his colleagues was at least one enemy, M. Livius Drusus. There now appear two laws

which were meant to correct senatorial abuses. The Senate had hitherto assigned the provinces annually to consuls and praetors, choosing the most important ones for the consuls. Gracchus observed that the Senate was apt to choose a province of no importance for consuls of the popular party. He, therefore, passed a law ordering the Senate to designate the consular provinces before elections. The choice would then be less likely to be decided according to party lines. The second law ordered the jury-men of all the courts to be drawn from the official list of the *equites* and not from the roll of Senators. The *equites* were 1800 men of the wealthier class who were chosen by the censor as worthy of a horse at public expense for service in the cavalry and for the officers' corps. The institution was a survival of the day when wealthy men were chosen for the cavalry because of the cost of equipment; they did not necessarily serve so now, but the distinction had been kept in order to reward men of property who engaged in public contracts. Gracchus' choice of these men for jury service pleased them, for it recognized them as a quasi-nobility capable of service hitherto thought proper only for senators. As men who were skilled in business they were doubtless capable jury-men, especially in civil cases. The particular reason for selecting them, however, was to remove senators from the provincial cases, where they had shown partiality towards proconsuls. Rome was soon to learn that the knights would do little better than the senators in this troublesome court, though this fact could hardly have been foreseen as yet. The difficulty turned out to be that the knights, who frequently engaged in the tax contracts after the Gracchan days, had to be held in check by proconsuls, and they found in this court a method of striking at such proconsuls as were inclined to be severe with extortionate tax gatherers. The law, therefore, rescued Rome from one evil merely to subject her to another evil, which in the end was no better. For the present, however, men observed only that this law

took patronage and influence from the Senate and elevated the knights to a distinct class in the state.

Colonies. The next measure is one of the best illustrations of the reformer's breadth of sympathy and keenness of vision. He proposed three colonies of an entirely new order. One was to be planted on the site of Carthage, though it had been cursed and a rebuilding forbidden. The land-lots were to be unusually large, not only because Romans must have extra inducements to go so far, but also because capitalistic farming alone could succeed in a land that required irrigation, as Africa did. Another colony was sent to Tarentum with a view to providing a good market for the farmers settled in southern Italy by Tiberius Gracchus, and to reviving the commerce of this old trading city; and finally a third colony was placed at Scylaceum, where the ancient portage-road over the "isthmus" of Italy had started when Greek commerce was at its best. Traders were still afraid of "Scylla and Charybdis," it would seem.

Here were schemes of economic developments that would increase the resources of the empire. The Senate had never cared for such things. Its opposition was unusually bitter, perhaps because of the paternalistic nature of the proposal; but it may also be that it saw a chance to strike the tribune by defeating measures that could not greatly interest the urban voters. The measures passed indeed, but the Senate took the occasion to outbid Gracchus for popular favor and belittle his scheme by inducing Livius Drusus to propose the planting of twelve land colonies for the poor in Italy. This trick succeeded, though the Senate had no intention of carrying out the promise.

Before Gracchus departed to plant his colonies he proposed to fulfill his promises to the Italians. The bill promised full citizenship to all Latins (including the thirty "Latin" colonies), and Latin rights to all other Italians. This was in the spirit of the great statesmen of the fourth century. In all justice, and for Rome's own best interests, it should

have carried. The people of the thirty-five wards no more represented the interests of all Italy than the "rotten boroughs" represented England before 1832. But as those boroughs opposed the Reform Act of that year, so the people at Rome opposed Gracchus. Their leaders told them that they would not be able to pass the land and grain laws that they chose if they extended the franchise to the Italians, their one-time enemy. An historian has recently said that a democracy has never been known to give away any of its power until compelled to do so. It was Italy's duty to rise now and demand citizenship. Gracchus had been too optimistic in expecting the assembly to be as liberal in giving as it had been in receiving.

Not only was this measure defeated, but Gracchus himself lost favor with his voters and failed of reelection. The closing scene was pitiful. In 121, after Gaius' second tribunate, the Senate proposed to overthrow the colony at Carthage. The people were in the *comitium* about to vote on the measure. Gracchus apparently made the tactical mistake of calling the masses away from the tribune's harangue to hear him in defense of his colony. This was illegal and his opponents made the most of the charge. In the rioting that ensued a supporter of the Senate was killed. The Senate, believing or assuming that the populace was in open rebellion, passed the *senatus consultum ultimum*, which, in their view, gave the consul dictatorial powers. The consul's messenger called upon Gracchus to surrender, but Gracchus refused to recognize the legality of the *senatus consultum*. The consul then sent his bodyguard and a troop of Cretans to charge the crowd. They gave no quarter and Gracchus committed suicide in despair. It is said that two hundred and sixty men fell in the charge, and many others were condemned to death by the senatorial commission appointed to adjudge those guilty of "rebellion."

Results of the Gracchan endeavors. Gracchus' work was not all undone, though it was left at the point where little

benefit and much harm came out of it. The very year in which Gracchus died his allotments were made saleable, which was probably a good step. Inalienable leaseholds are not attractive and they will always be abandoned when they prove unprofitable. Perhaps Gracchus had wished only to hold the settlers on their lots over their first discouragements, just as American homestead laws usually have tried to do. In 118, further distribution was forbidden and the commission abolished. Finally in 111 the lots were declared full private property and rent-free. The old encroachment by great landowners doubtless began as soon as that bill was passed. Yet in the meanwhile much land had been settled and many poor people had been removed from Rome. What had been accomplished in respect to lands was wholly an advantage.

The attack upon the Senate's usurpation of judicial and executive power failed, however. Gracchus himself died by authority of a *senatus consultum ultimum*, and to prove their constitutional right in the matter the senators submitted the consul Opimius to trial before the assembly and proved to the assembly's satisfaction that the Senate had acted legally. The assembly acquitted Opimius and recalled Popilius, thereby annulling the Gracchan law of appeal. It was on this precedent that Cicero relied when during the Catilinarian conspiracy sixty years later he recognized the legality of a *senatus consultum ultimum*.

To estimate the work of Gracchus we must consider his whole plan, and not the fragment which came out of the wreck. Gracchus was familiar with Greek constitutions and seems to have been influenced by the example of Pericles and his skilful use of the Greek primary assembly. In so far we have perhaps the first practical constitution-planning based on comparative politics. But Gracchus was by no means an imitator, he intended to build a consistent Roman constitution on a sound Roman citizenry. He clung to the idea that the electorate was the legal sovereign. He ap-

parently saw that this must be responsible for all the organs of government. The constitution as he found it was quite consistent with respect to elective, executive, legislative, and judicial functions except for undue interference here and there by the Senate. The great inconsistency lay in the fact that a powerful Senate seemed to administer the affairs of a large part of the state without being directly accountable to the sovereign people, that it obstructed the sovereign will in legislation, and had begun to interfere with judicial and executive matters. This is why Gracchus struck at the Senate. He would lop off all the Senate's independent functions except a partial administration of Italy and the provinces, and in this latter field it was to take its orders from the assembly. There were henceforth to be no last decrees, no senatorial judicial commissions, no obstruction of legislation, and no exertion of personal influence in courts. Logically he was entirely correct. But was not the Senate right in saying that the mob neither had the experience nor the wisdom to legislate, to administer provinces, and to decide when martial law was needed? We must agree that as things stood the senatorial claim was correct. But Gracchus had not intended that the Roman mob of thirty-five wards should continue to rule the world. He drew up a bill that was to make the whole Italian people the sovereign, and that would doubtless constitute a body on which the government could safely rest—if one more step were taken.

In order to secure an effective expression of the will of a people so widely scattered, it would have been necessary either to have balloting made possible at many centers, or to adopt the representative system of government. Now, we are not informed how Gracchus expected all of Italy to take part in legislating and electing: he died before his Italian law could be passed. But it would be unfair to the ingenuity of this man to suppose that he did not have an adequate scheme in mind, especially as the methods of representative government were then well known at Rome.

The father of the Gracchi was an intimate acquaintance of Aemilius Paullus, who had instituted the government of the Macedonian republics on representative lines; and the Greek scholars, Polybius and Blossius, could have told the young reformer how the principle was applied in the Greek leagues. It is only just to assume that he would have taken the obvious last step to complete his constitutional reforms in such a way as to make his democracy consistent and practicable. That last step might well have saved Rome.

The Senate, however, can hardly be blamed for attempting to save itself and the hegemony of Rome. Rome had organized Italy and the world, why should not Rome be able to rule them? Why confess inability and summon Italy to the task? But if Rome should rule, obviously the assembly was unfit. It could not discuss measures, could not govern provinces, could not even be trusted to judge when martial law was needed. If we grant the Senate's first narrow premises, its argument is valid. Since Gracchus failed to enlarge the sovereign body and create an efficient governmental agency out of it, there was only one thing for the Senate to do at present and that was to insist upon advisory rights over all functions of government. It was the fatal misfortune of Rome that Italy and the populace did not have the wisdom and courage to aid Gracchus to the logical end of his remarkable program. When we see how our own constitution has not been able to transform itself in any essential detail by legal amendments, while every essential part of its machinery has been forced to change by custom, we realize how near the impossible was Gracchus' task, and we are less inclined to blame the people for their lack of liberality and the Senate for its stubborn reliance on its own record. Unfortunately the Senate learned only pride from its victory; but the struggle had formulated the issue so clearly that the class war was sure to return. When it did it was the selfish military ruler who took advantage of the contest and overwhelmed both the contestants.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SENATE, THE KNIGHTS, AND MARIUS

For many years after the death of Gracchus, all classes seemed to be stunned by what had occurred. It was a shocking discovery that Rome, hitherto capable of applying cool reason before the clash of passion, had now acted like any Oriental mob. Factional enmity ran high, but fear of extreme measures that would lead to a new outbreak of bloody riots kept both parties ready to compromise. The land-laws were modified as we have seen, the Senate did not try to annul the rest that had been done, and the tribunes for the present let the Senate reassert its supremacy in administration. The Senate knew, however, that its claims to leadership had been challenged with precedents that would not be forgotten. So long as the Republic remained there was hardly a measure of importance which was not discussed from the point of view of the question raised by Gracchus: was the people sovereign, or had the aristocratic Senate won a dominating position in the government?

Narbonese Gaul. During the years of peace that followed 121 Rome gradually built up a province in southern Gaul to serve as a gateway to Spain by land. In this affair both parties were on the whole fairly well agreed. As early as 153 Rome had aided Marseilles—in return for many past favors—to subdue the troublesome barbarians who lived in the mountains on her rear, and had been a fellow-signatory of a treaty that established Massiliot sovereignty there and restricted wine-raising in favor of Massiliot commerce. In 125 Rome had again gone to the aid of Marseilles, this time against raids of the Allobroges and Arverni, and the work of pacification authorized by the Senate

had continued during the career of Gaius, and doubtless with his approval. Marseilles and Rome acted together with the understanding that Rome should have a strip of the conquered territory north of Marseilles for a road to Spain. Marseilles did not care for a land empire, and desired only peace for trade. A Roman province would shut her in, but would thereby also keep her protected, and the Roman road would be a clear advantage to her traders. The Senate was interested in securing a safe military route to the Spanish province, while Gracchus had large enough views to appreciate its argument, as well as, perhaps, to see that Roman commerce, in which he had more faith than the Senate, might soon find some benefit from the building of the road. In 121 Domitius and in 120 Fabius defeated the Allobroges and Arverni. They took very little of the territory won, but they set free the Gallic tribes in the rear of the Arverni, and accepted a treaty of friendship with the Aedui. The war won respect among the Gallic tribes for Rome and her friend Marseilles. The Narbonese province was laid out along the coast, the Domitian road built and paved as far as the Rhone, Tolosa was made a frontier post, and in 118 the Roman colony of Narbo was settled. This colony was founded on the Gracchan idea that Rome should take her part in the commerce of the Mediterranean, and it was settled by a commission under Licinius Crassus, a knight who represented the new business interests in the popular faction. Its foundation, therefore, is a sure index of a growing influence of business interests in the state, and of a readier acquiescence in their program by the Senate than was shown by that body in regard to Carthage.

The Jugurthine War. Troubles with Jugurtha in Numidia, however, stirred up party strife to a dangerous pitch again. Masinissa's son had died in 118, and foolishly left his kingdom to three heirs, two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal, and an illegitimate nephew, Jugurtha. Jugurtha was an energetic barbarian, ambitious, popular, a very skilful

leader of men, but none too scrupulous. He had led a troop of Numidian horse at Numantia, and Scipio Aemilianus and the many influential young Romans there had learned to like him for his dashing courage. He now thought that he might rely on the friendship of such men and win himself the kingdom of Numidia. The history of this war is very dramatically told by Sallust, a friend of Julius Caesar, but since Sallust chose the topic because it gave him an opportunity to criticize senatorial government and justify popular administration of provinces—a topic of keen interest in his day—we feel that we must tone down the chiaroscuro of his picture. The war stirred up an intense discussion, bitter tirades of senators and tribunes, which of course were published. Such speeches, which Sallust freely used, were as reliable for historical purposes as are bitterly partisan speeches and editorials to-day. Many things were uttered in the heat of passion, based on circulating rumors, that a more practical and impartial historian would have hesitated to repeat. The facts seem to be as follows: Jugurtha and Hiempsal first fell to quarreling. Hiempsal was killed, probably at Jugurtha's orders. Adherbal thought so, and took up the quarrel. When beaten he fled to Rome. The Senate had no interest in the kingdom, but feeling that peace ought to be established in its protectorate it sent a commission to arbitrate. This commission divided the kingdom between Jugurtha and Adherbal. Again war broke out, Jugurtha drove his cousin to Cirta (Constantine) and besieged him there (113). Again Rome sent a commission to work for peace; but the commission was put off by promises. Sallust says it was bribed. This was certainly charged by the tribunes at Rome. Whether the charge is true is quite a different question. Naturally the Senate did not wish to intervene with arms in an autonomous kingdom; furthermore, it was now worried by a threatened invasion of the Cimbri in the north and did not wish to send forces to Africa; finally, the Senate knew that Jugurtha was a

strong ruler of the kind that a barbarous people like the Numidians needed. The discussion must have sounded like some recent disputes about the proposed recognition of vigorous presidents in Mexico who have seized the power by force of arms. In 112 Cirta fell, Adherbal was killed, the city sacked, and many Roman traders from the province of Africa were killed in the mêlée. Now the Senate had to act with vigor, especially as Roman tribunes began to discuss the affair as an object lesson in senatorial administration. An army was sent in 111 under Calpurnius Bestia. But his army was small, since the Senate had to keep the Cimbri in mind. Calpurnius in fact seems to have had orders to do only what was necessary to save the reputation of Rome, and make peace as soon as possible. This he did. But the tribunes claimed that the Senate was disgracing Rome in making any peace with Jugurtha. Memmius, one of them, took the matter up in the assembly, and charged that the leaders of the Senate must have been bribed. He proposed and passed a bill that Jugurtha be called to Rome under safe-conduct to testify in an examination into charges of bribery. Jugurtha came and the assembly set about its amusing trial of the Senate over the head of a barbarian prince. When he was ordered to speak, another tribune interposed his veto. Thus balked, the enemies of Jugurtha prompted Massiva, a cousin of Jugurtha, then at Rome, to claim the throne of Numidia. Jugurtha did not hesitate to have the new pretender assassinated. Now, of course, the Senate had to act. It ordered Jugurtha out of Italy, and declared war on him. In 110 the consul Albinus was sent over, and having little military skill he was defeated by Jugurtha's excellently trained cavalry. The assembly was again in an uproar and, acting under the Mamilian plebiscite, instituted a special court to try the guilty. The last two consuls who had commanded in Africa, Calpurnius and Albinus, were "found guilty" on the charge of accepting bribes and outlawed. Caecilius Metellus, a better

general, took command in 109. He brought two men of military skill with him, Marius, a vigorous democrat, and Rutilius Rufus. With an army trained by these men he advanced cautiously and gained several minor successes, but Jugurtha, taking advantage of his mobile cavalry and the desert, dragged out the contest in guerilla warfare. The populace of Rome asserted that neither efficiency nor honesty was to be found in any of the nobles, and when Marius arrived from Africa just before the election and presented himself as a candidate, promising that he would finish the war in one year, he was elected despite the opposition of the Senate. Indeed, the assembly made bold to hark back to a Gracchan precedent, took the administration of the war in their own hands, and disregarding the right of the Senate to draw the lots simply appointed Marius to the office.

Marius as consul. This strange man had as yet done nothing remarkable to attract attention. The son of a land-owner and knight of Arpinum, he had quit agriculture and engaged in active business with the public contractors. When a young man in the army he had proved to be a good cavalry officer at Numantia. He was not afraid of work and study, and he liked to see things done thoroughly. In fact his success lay largely in his ability to work hard and accomplish his work well in the two or three excellent opportunities that chance offered. It lay hardly at all in brilliant mental endowment or in the comprehension of statesmanship. As tribune in 119 he had showed his friendship for the populace in some ballot reforms, but obeyed his business sense rather than a temptation to demagoguery when he opposed an extension of corn-doles. An indifferent praetor in 115, he became proprætor of Further Spain in 114, where he gained some more military experience in suppressing brigandage. A very fine sense of propriety he did not have or he would not have canvassed for the consulship by attacking Metellus upon whose generosity he had

depended. His moral backbone was never quite dependable when position was at stake.

The volunteer system. In 107 he took over the command which the people had voted him, and was expected to make the usual levy of troops to strengthen the army. What he did was not a little surprising. He did not care for the usual forced levy, but called for volunteers, and enrolled all who seemed physically fit. Hitherto every young citizen of property at Rome had had to take his turn, and though the practice of excluding the unpropertied had not firmly been adhered to, it had been assumed that all citizens should share the burden of army service and that those who had property were logically the defenders of the state. Marius' reason for calling for volunteers may have been that drafting brought many unwilling men into the line, and that with the spread of latifundia and slave-farming, it was more and more difficult to recruit an army of the old type. In fact, with an army already in Africa and many troops needed in the north, he might have to waste time by waiting for the machinery of the draft to get in order.

His change was momentous, however, in a city-state like Rome, where the central government might readily be crushed by an army of volunteers who presumably had little interest in property or in the state's welfare. Henceforth soldiers would obviously fight for what was promised by the general, not for their homes and their state, and being largely disaffected proletariat their loyalty would be attached to the giver of the promises rather than to the state. Marius was the first Roman consul who rewarded soldiers with land. Apparently his plea for volunteers had embodied some promise of more than the soldier's stipend. Rome may not have read the meaning of this change, and Marius probably did not see the entire implication, but this "reform" of the army it was that made militarism possible at Rome.

The end of the Jugurthine war. Marius quickly brought

this new army of volunteers into good condition, and being skilled in military tactics soon out-maneuvered Jugurtha, who fled to his friend King Bocchus of Mauretania. Marius sent his young quaestor Sulla to Bocchus to demand the surrender of Jugurtha. This the clever young nobleman by threats and promises succeeded in accomplishing, and Marius was able to return in triumph to show that his campaign promises had been kept. Sulla, who thought his own part in the final success had been underestimated, suppressed his grudge for a later day. Numidia was disposed of by the Senate in the old conservative fashion. Bocchus received a part as reward for his surrender of Jugurtha. The main part was given to a cousin of Jugurtha to rule and a portion near the Roman province of Africa was annexed to the province.

The Cimbri and Teutones. Marius was reëlected consul, contrary to law, and sent to the North by the assembly to retrieve the very disgraceful losses that senatorial commanders had sustained at the hands of invading barbarians. We must go back a few years to pick up the threads of the story. It was in 113 that the Romans first heard of the Cimbri, one more of those terrible hordes that came from the prolific north in search of a southern home. They were apparently a Teutonic tribe from the Baltic region. Coming down by way of Noricum (modern Austria), they attempted to enter the Po valley from the east. Here the Roman army went to meet them, and, though defeated, it had given such good account of itself that the Cimbri turned back. Two years later the Cimbri entered Gaul, trying without success to compel the Celtic tribes to make a place for them. Later in 109 they sent a request to Rome for lands in the province or in Italy and were of course refused, whereupon they attacked the small force of the Roman consul on the Rhone and defeated him. Again they felt it wise to turn back. In 107 they returned strengthened by the Teutones and the Tigurini. Tolosa was taken, and Cas-

sus Longinus, marching to its rescue, was caught in an ambush and badly defeated. The Narbonese province was overrun. The next consul, Servilius, thoroughly hated by the populace for his attempt at restoring the court panels to the senators, cleared the province and retook Tolosa, but when in 105 he was asked to work with the succeeding consul, the popular leader Manlius, political quarrels disrupted the good army of 80,000 men, which fell a prey to the enemy in a disgraceful battle at Orange (Arausio).

Marius had now returned from Numidia and was hurried to the front. The enemy had again turned back, this time to try their fortune in Spain. Marius was, therefore, given time to build up a good army. He now undertook some new changes of the army, inviting mercenary auxiliaries of horse, bowmen and slingers from the client princes, and especially from Liguria, Crete and the Balearic islands. Such contingents henceforth constituted a regular part of a Roman army. With this aid in light-armed forces he could solidify the Roman and Italian legion, which, consisting largely of volunteers, seemed perhaps less dependable than before. The maniple was indeed retained, but five maniples were massed together in a solid cohort of 600 and ten of these now constituted a legion. Marius thought it wise not to follow the enemy into Spain, but to await their return. The time was spent in drilling and in cutting a new channel for commerce at the mouth of the Rhone, a work not only of service in supplying his army from home and in keeping his men fit but also in the vigorous trade of Rome and Marseilles now growing up in this province. Marius saw these things with the eyes of an experienced man of business.

The enemy did not return till late in 103, when Marius had been reëlected to his fourth consulship. Even the Senate was now willing to break the law in order to escape responsibility in a case of such great danger. On their return the hordes divided, the Cimbri preferring to go back

through Switzerland to try the northeast entrance to Italy. The Teutones and Ambrones attempted the direct road past Marius. He struck them at Aquae Sextiae, above Marseilles, and destroyed them completely. In a battle of such a nature there was no thought of surrender. The barbarians had their women and children with them and they did not ask for terms that would probably betray these to slavery. Marius, who was now consul for the fifth term, returned to the Po to help Catulus, who had failed to prevent the invasion of the Cimbri. In 101 the two generals met there at Vercellae, not far from Turin, and defeated this mass as decisively as the Teutones had been; 120,000 were slain, and 60,000 were taken prisoners and sold as slaves, chiefly as farm slaves on Italian latifundia. We are not surprised to hear that these slaves were the backbone of Spartacus' slave-army twenty-five years later. Henceforth Rome did not again for 500 years have to stop "folkwandering" masses in Italy. Julius Caesar transferred the frontier of the empire to the Rhine when he met Ariovistus in 58.

Capitalists in politics.—Before the wars in Africa and the North were at an end the Romans found that the new political group created by the Gracchan legislation was growing very influential. In the olden day "new" men of wealth and influence had sooner or later made their way into the Senate. Now that Gracchus had given equestrian capitalists certain distinctive offices, privileges and insignia, they were apt to form a group apart and gradually to develop an *esprit de corps* for their group, which promised to create a permanent third party. And furthermore the profits of the Asiatic tax gathering and of the banking and merchandising enterprises connected therewith promised to increase the group rapidly. The bitter factional struggles of Rome that led up to the "Social" or "Marsian" war were due largely to the antagonism between the Senate and the knights, both of which tried constantly to win the favor

of the people, who of course controlled the electoral and law-making assemblies.

One of the first results of capitalistic power was a demand for the suppression of piracy on the high seas for the sake of safeguarding commerce. The commercial states of Rhodes and Pergamum had till recently policed the eastern seas effectively. But now Pergamum belonged to Rome, and Rhodes, though she still possessed a fleet, saw no need of spending her treasures in policing the seas that had come to be so largely Roman. Furthermore, Rome had made the mistake of giving independence to the southern parts of the Pergamene kingdom, the inhabitants of which were wholly unaccustomed to autonomy. In consequence many of the people of Cilicia and Pamphylia took to brigandage and sea-roving; and since the Roman Senate cared too little for commerce to appropriate money for navies, the nuisance soon grew to vast proportions. The pirates profited especially in capturing passengers whom they sold as slaves, and presently in raiding coast towns of the east for human booty. They even organized kidnapping expeditions which raided the inner principalities of Asia Minor. Finally, in 103, a year when the knights were especially powerful in the government of Rome, the Senate was induced to take action. Antonius, a praetor, was sent out with a fleet—a large part of which was requisitioned from the Greek naval allies—to clear the seas. This he soon succeeded in doing, and, to make the work permanent, he took formal possession of the Cilician coast, where most of the offenders lived, and organized it into a new province. Unfortunately Rome could not then afford to send out a standing army to clear and police the mountainous region in the province, so that Pompey had to do the work over many years after.

The slave war in Sicily. Indirectly this attempt at doing one's duty led to serious trouble in the province of Sicily. It happened that many of the persons captured and sold as

slaves by the pirates had been bought by the Greek plantation owners of Sicily to make up for losses sustained in a recent slave-uprising. The Roman governor was ordered by the Senate in 104 to investigate the claims to freedom which were being made by very many slaves, and to liberate those that could establish their claims. When the slave population presently heard that more than 800 had been set free, there was intense excitement. All demanded a hearing. The proconsul, seeing the danger he had invited, postponed the inquiry, but it was now too late. The slaves everywhere broke away from their masters and gathered into bands to fight for freedom. Many thousands collected in central Sicily and elected Tryphon king, another group in eastern Sicily chose Athenion. Tryphon's army attacked and defeated the proconsul's hastily gathered legion, and with a force which soon grew to 40,000 marched back and forth releasing slaves, plundering and burning. Lucullus, the governor of 103, defeated the horde, but failed to storm the rebel stronghold at Triocala. For this he was later tried at Rome on the preposterous charge of having accepted bribes, and banished. Servilius, the governor of 102, succeeded no better, probably because Rome did not then dare withdraw troops from the North for his support. In 101 finally the new governor Aquilius defeated the slaves, but it required two more years to restore peace completely. Sicily was then a sad spectacle. Unfortunately, the experience of the Greek landlords with large slave-worked plantations in Sicily was not taken to heart by the Roman farmers in Italy. It was only a generation later that a similar uprising had to be faced in Italy with similar results.

Knights versus Senate.—The emergence of the equestrian capitalists as a powerful political group had an even more marked effect on home politics. Indeed it changed completely the nature of the factional struggle. Gracchus had used the knights in strengthening the popular party in his battle with the Senate. Now the knights frequently as-

sumed the offensive against the Senate, and the populace, which held the votes, were enticed now by the one side now by the other to participate in a struggle which was fought over their heads. The contest centered chiefly about the jury panels at first. The knights had soon discovered that when their agents, employed in the taxgathering in Asia, were being kept in check by the Roman governor, that great official might be rendered harmless by threats of prosecution before a jury of knights. And the enmity between senators and knights was such that representatives of both sides at times were guilty of instituting court proceedings on very flimsy charges. We know too well from experience how in modern city elections candidates are apt to be charged with surprising misdemeanors just before election day. The senators wished particularly to wrench this weapon from the hands of the knights. Accordingly, in 106, Servilius Caepio proposed a bill to the assembly admitting senators to the jury panels. In order to secure the popular vote, he and his friends claimed that the measure was in reality democratic, that the true friends of the people were after all the Senate, and that the knights had grown to be a power in the state that threatened to override the constitution and set up a venal political dictatorship. This argument succeeded and the law was passed. Unfortunately for his cause, Servilius Caepio soon after committed a bad blunder, thereby causing a revulsion of popular feeling against his law. As we have seen, he stubbornly refused while proconsul in Gaul to aid his superior, the popular consul Manlius, when the latter was attacked by the Cimbri, in consequence of which the Roman forces were disgracefully defeated. In the next year, 104, the knights seized the opportunity when all of Rome was excited with grief and rage, and had Servilius removed from his command and from the Senate; then, employing the services of the demagogue Glaucia, they had Servilius' law annulled and restored the jury panels to themselves again.

The revolution of Glaucia and Saturninus. This struggle brought Glaucia and an equally unscrupulous tribune, Saturninus, into prominence, and the two conceived the idea of using the coalition of knights and people in an effort to control the government as Gaius Gracchus had done. They held the knights by their antipathy for the Senate, they proposed to strengthen their hold upon the populace by lavish corn laws, and to ingratiate themselves with Marius—now in the north—and his veterans by giving the bonuses which Marius had suggested that he intended to secure for his volunteers after the war. Accordingly, in 103, they offered a plebiscite reducing the price of state-grain from the moderate Gracchan figure of twenty-five cents the bushel to the merely nominal price of about four cents, and a second plebiscite setting aside certain African lands for distribution—presumably to the soldiers who had served under Marius in Numidia. Senators—who had some scruples about the state of the treasury—opposed the laws vigorously. They issued a decree that the Senate considered the bills contrary to the interests of the state, and they found tribunes to issue a veto. But Saturninus, reviving the Gracchan theory that the assembly represented the sovereign will of Rome, put the measures to a vote and had them passed. Rome was again a pure democracy for at least two years.

In 101 Marius returned to Rome a great popular hero after the final defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones. He was elected consul for the sixth time despite all constitutional prohibitions against reëlection to that high office. There was no excuse in military exigencies for this reëlection, and his friends asserted that he tried to avoid it. The reason why he did not absolutely refuse lay perhaps in his desire to see that his soldiers should have their promised reward—a consequence of his method of levying volunteers. He was, however, no leader of men in political contests, nor was he a man of statesmanlike vision. Unaccustomed to dealing with men except by military means, cumbersome of speech,

slow of thought, untrained in political maneuvering, he was soon outwitted by the politicians who had remained at home learning the game of the Forum while he was defending Rome's frontiers. Glaucia and Saturninus, offering to carry out his program, employed their visible influence with the popular hero for their own ends.

In the legislation of the year 100 Saturninus played the leading rôle because he was tribune and could summon the popular assembly, but it is likely that Glaucia, the praetor, was the moving spirit. Several measures were illegally combined, it seems, in an omnibus bill (*lex satura*). One was a *lex de majestate*, which affirmed the complete sovereignty of the populace, its purpose being to destroy the claim of the Senate that that body had a right to declare plebiscites void on technical grounds, as it had done in 103. Other bills appropriated lands in Gaul for distribution to veterans and also authorized the founding of colonies. Finally there was a clause—which seems to have been used now for the first time—condemning any and every senator or magistrate who refused to take an oath that he would support the law. This clause struck at the very basis of liberal government, and even Marius refused at first to take the oath, advising the Senate also to refuse. But the democratic coalition was too well organized to break. When the appointed day came Marius yielded and all others with him except Metellus, who won undying fame by choosing exile. The senators accused Marius of having merely pretended to refuse in order to entice his enemy Metellus into an attitude that would cause his exile. It is, however, more likely that Marius had miscalculated his own influence with his party, and that when he found his obstruction of no avail he weakly yielded in order to save the little power that was left him.

The crisis in the contest came finally at election time. Saturninus ran for the tribuneship again and was elected. Glaucia stood for the consulship. The equites now being

frightened by the revolutionary tactics of the men were inclined to vote for Memmius, a more moderate democrat. At the voting the partisans of the two candidates fell to rioting, and Memmius was found dead in the Forum. This was too much. The Senate gathered hastily and passed the dread *senatus consultum ultimum*, which declared martial law and gave the consuls dictatorial powers. Marius hesitated, for he knew that he was practically being called upon to issue orders to execute his former associates. His soldier's instinct, however, convinced him that the time had come for executive intervention if the government was to be respected. Hundreds of citizens were summoned—since Rome had no regular police—to accept arms from the public armory and to surround the lawless elements supporting the two demagogues in the Forum. Saturninus and Glaucia were driven to the Capitol and then induced by Marius to take refuge in the senate house, where the consul hoped to keep them till order could be restored. But his commands were no longer obeyed. The armed deputies stormed the senate-house, a procedure in which even senators and knights were said to have participated, and Glaucia, Saturninus, and several followers were slain outright. The Senate gave its sanction to the act by rewarding a slave with citizenship on proof that he had given the death blow to Saturninus. Marius ended his term of office as best he could, and then set out for the East to take a long vacation, disliked by the populace for having deserted his party, despised by the Senate for his vacillation and political incapacity.

For ten years there was peace at home and abroad while the Senate proceeded to strengthen its position in the government. The conservative consuls of 98 secured the approval of a law forbidding the proposal of "omnibus bills"—the favorite device of demagogues forming "blocs"—and also reaffirmed the old rule that all bills must be posted three market days before being voted upon. This was the

lex Caecilia-Didia, which later tribunes so often disregarded. The consuls of 95, L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola, undertook to check the usurpation of citizenship on the part of Italians. Their law, the famous *lex Licinia-Mucia*, instituted a special court to discover aliens who had illegally entered their names on the citizen-rolls, and to send them to their respective communities. It is very likely that this was meant in part to weaken the unruly element in the assemblies. The effects of the law were far-reaching, for the banished culprits returned home to lead the agitation for universal Italian suffrage. That same year leading senators made use of the recently passed democratic *lex de majestate* to punish Norbanus, who had been instrumental in having the jury panels returned to the knights in 104. The knights two years later retorted by trumping up false charges of misgovernment against Rutilius Rufus, who, as *legatus* of Scaevola, in Asia, had done his utmost to secure justice for the provincials against the oppression of the taxgatherers. The jury of capitalists in this instance cast a straight party vote and banished one of the noblest Romans of the day. Thus it was that the knights and senators proceeded by their own petty quarrels to disrupt the union which the disasters of the year 100 had so fortunately created for them.

The legislation of Drusus. In 91 M. Livius Drusus, a tribune, and son of the Drusus who broke the power of Gaius Gracchus, finally attempted, by making use of the unpopularity of the capitalistic courts, to restore the jury panels to the senators. He knew, of course, that the contest over his bill would be vehement. He therefore undertook to win the voting populace by sops in the form of corn laws and colonial distributions, and to weaken the capitalists' opposition by providing that 300 knights should be admitted outright into the Senate. This last measure, he claimed, would still give the knights half of the seats on the juries. The compromise, however, pleased few.

The Senate thought it possible to carry the judicial law without making concessions; the knights were shrewd enough to see that the chosen 300 would soon unite their fortunes with the nobles and that after a few years the equestrian order would practically stand unrepresented in the courts. Consequently an effective group in the Senate and a large group of the knights—represented as it happened by the consul Philippus—raised such opposition to the bill that it could not be put to a vote for many months. They were able to impress the populace by reiterating the charge (which proved true) that Drusus had secretly promised the Italians his hearty support in their contest for citizenship. In fact Philippus read a copy of an alleged oath taken, he said, by many secret clubs of Italians who bound themselves to support all measures of Drusus even by revolutionary means.

Drusus, now near the end of his year of office, offered more inducements for popular votes. Among the rest he promised to inflate and cheapen money by issuing an abundance of fiat currency in the form of silver-washed coins with which to meet the expenses of the corn laws. It is very likely that Rome's currency was too rigid and that it needed some expansion, but aside from the fact that in foreign trade all coins were weighed and, therefore, useless unless honest, Rome had no convenient way of redeeming fiat money since there was no citizen tax. It was an ill-considered experiment, and was tried only once again during the Republic.

By the aid of such popular measures Drusus at last secured a favorable vote from the assembly, but he had by then included in his bill so much that was distasteful to the Senate as well as to the capitalists that the Senate found it safe to declare his law illegal on technical grounds and it did not go into effect.

Drusus, nothing daunted, introduced his bill for the enfranchisement of all Italians, as he had promised that he

would do. It is very doubtful whether this excellent measure could have passed had it been brought to a vote. The people of Rome had discovered their power and were hardly willing to share it with a mass of people that might outvote them in such measures as corn laws. The Roman knights had no desire to share their control of the courts and their privileges in tax-gathering corporations with Italian capitalists. The senatorial families formed a close and small body that could under the present system usually secure the high offices of state for their own members. They were not inclined to invite the nobility of the Italian municipalities to participate in these offices. And yet the argument for enfranchisement was so reasonable that many senators supported Drusus in this instance. They knew that while the Italian allies were now providing more than half of Rome's armies they secured none of the high offices of state, had no share in determining Rome's policies and obtained very little of the public land that accrued to the state from conquests. They knew also that Roman generals and officials frequently abused and bullied allied soldiers and civilians who of course had no right of appeal to the popular assembly, and that in court proceedings between Romans and allies, the cases were tried by Roman judges. Finally, since the days when Fregellae had been suppressed for her revolt, the feeling of discontent had grown intense throughout Italy, and some senators were prudent enough to see that a civil war might result unless justice were done. However, before the bill could be introduced, Drusus was slain by an unknown assassin, and no one ventured to continue his work.

CHAPTER XIV

THE "SOCIAL" AND CIVIL WARS

The Social War, 90-89 B. C. The news of Drusus' death spread consternation through Italy. The allies thought their last opportunity of acquiring citizenship by peaceful methods gone. The clubs formed throughout Italy for the moral support of Drusus began to discuss revolutionary means, and not a few collected arms and began to drill in secret. The Senate hearing rumors of this activity sent out officials to various towns to pacify the people. One of these, Servilius, assigned to the district of Picenum, so enraged the people of Asculum by his tactlessness that they murdered him, and with him all the Romans in the city. The news of this event was followed by a general revolt and Rome faced her first great revolution.

Not all of Italy took up arms, however. The Sabines, Aequians, and Campanians were citizens and therefore remained loyal to Rome. The Latin colonies contained numerous citizens because of the old provision whereby magistrates of such colonies were *ipso facto* enfranchised. Hence the colonies also remained loyal. Most of the Greek cities also, from Naples to Tarentum, had benefited so freely by Rome's commercial treaties that they remained friendly. The tribes that revolted were the eight which used Oscan and Sabellic dialects: the Marsi, Paeligni, Marucini, Frentani, Samnites, and Lucanians, and the remnants of the Vestini and Picentes that had not been incorporated into the Roman state. It is to be noticed that the Etruscans, who were of a different race, and the Umbrians, who spoke a different Italic dialect, did not join in the first

revolt. Linguistic barriers even then determined the boundaries of national sympathies.

The new state formed by the allies was called Italia, and Corfinium, renamed Italicum, was made its capital. The state adopted the conservative Roman system of having two executive consuls, twelve praetors, and a senate of 500 members, but there resemblance ends. Because of its situation, a city-state, like that of Rome, was not feasible in Italia. A territorial state in which the eight tribes constituted a federation was necessitated by the inherent conditions. And although our information is meager,¹ we must suppose that the government did not rest in a primary assembly, for such an arrangement would have thrown control into the hands of the people who lived at and near the capital. It would seem that the 500 senators were somehow representatives of the several tribes and that they not only made the laws but also chose the magistrates. In other words, Italia seems to have made generous use of the principle of representative government as it had been worked out by Flaminius and Paullus in Thessaly and Macedonia during the preceding century.

Q. Pompeidius Silo, a Marsian, and C. Papius Mutilus, a Samnite, were chosen consuls. Both were skilful generals, having served in the allied forces of Rome's armies. Many of the praetors had also commanded forces under Roman consuls. In the spring of 90 B.C., the Italians, who had gathered more than a hundred thousand good men, advanced westward in two main divisions, Pompeidius directly toward Rome in order to cut off Etruria and Umbria, Papius into Campania to cut off southern Italy. A part of the Northern division defeated the Roman consul, P. Rutilius Lupus, who fell in battle. Marius, however, who commanded a separate Roman division prevented the

¹ Our sources for this important period are fragmentary. The evidence for the conclusion adopted here are discussed in *Classical Philology*, 1919, P. 547

advancing enemy from reaching the Latian plain. In the South, Papius, opposed by the Roman consul, L. Julius Caesar, reached his first objective, cutting through Campania and taking Nola, and Salernum on the sea. Such Roman disasters brought the Senate to reason, and the consul, Julius Caesar, who realized that both North and South might be forced to join the enemy if completely cut off from Rome, proposed and carried a bill (the *lex Julia*, 90 B. C.) granting citizenship to the allies that were still loyal to Rome and to those who would at once lay down their arms. This was the turning point of the war, for many cities at once accepted the offer.

In 89, accordingly, success was on the side of Rome. Cn. Pompeius Strabo, the father of Pompey the Great, was assigned to the north-central army, and soon carried the war into the enemy's country, capturing Asculum and invading the land of the Marsi. It was while serving in this army as a boy of eighteen that Cicero first met the young Pompey. It was there that he learned to revere a youth of much higher military rank than his own with a deference that unfortunately clung to him by mere habit long after Pompey ceased to deserve it.

In the South, after the death of Rome's second consul, Sulla was assigned the chief command, and succeeded during the year not only in clearing most of Campania, but in defeating Papius and invading Samnium. And now the Senate in order to end the war quickly—Mithradates was invading Rome's province in Asia—offered, through the *lex Plautia-Papiria*, citizenship to all allies within Italy who would register before a Roman praetor within sixty days. This measure brought organized opposition to a speedy close, and the consul Pompeius wisely introduced a supplementary law which gave citizenship to the Latin colonies of Cisalpine Gaul, and Latin rights to all the other inhabitants of that region. This was perhaps the occasion

on which Vergil's father, then living in Cremona, became a Roman citizen.

The Sulpician riots. The Italians who registered—many neglected to do so—were now the equals of Romans in the army and in the courts and that was what they had most desired, but, as they soon discovered, their vote did not possess full value for the reason that the new municipalities were distributed in only eight instead of in the thirty-five wards. This wily assignment, we may believe, was invented by the Senate to prevent ambitious politicians from playing up to the new voters, for there were rumors even during the war that certain generals of democratic leanings, like Marius, had been lenient toward the enemy with the intention of winning their friendship for political use. As the sequel shows, this minimizing of the vote not only disgusted the allies and drove some of them to continue in rebellion, but it gave the democratic politicians of Rome a program on which to appeal for armed support in the civil wars that followed.

The war had put the senatorial party, the party of action and "patriotism," in the saddle. For the year 88 Sulla and Pompeius Rufus, two stanch aristocrats, were elected consuls without difficulty. Sulla was especially desired because of his military successes, since Mithradates, who had encouraged Rome's rebels, was now on the point of invading Rome's province of Asia. By apparent good fortune, Sulla, when the lots were drawn, found that he was assigned to the task of meeting Mithradates.

Then an unseemly factional fight broke out at Rome. Sulpicius Rufus, a tribune who had hitherto been loyal to the Senate, an orator of remarkable power, proposed a bill to distribute the new citizens and also the freedmen over all the thirty-five wards, thus giving them the normal citizen-franchise. There is no reason for supposing that he was not wholly sincere in trying to right a wrong, though one must admit that it would have been better had he

waited. In any case, Sulpicius was not a man of sufficient wisdom and self-control to direct so dangerous a program. The city and all of Italy flared up in intense excitement. It is difficult to see how Sulpicius expected to win for his bill the votes of eighteen tribes necessary to a majority. He might reasonably count on twelve, that is the four urban wards which freedmen could readily control, and the eight in which the new citizens already voted. Perhaps some rural tribes like the Quirina, Velina, and Aniensis were reckoned on because of their early Sabine connections. But he made no progress till he entered into an agreement with Marius, who was still popular enough with veterans to count for something on election day. Marius did not have the gift of growing old gracefully. The numerous slights heaped upon him by senators for more than ten years had made him bitter and vengeful. He felt that since he had repeatedly saved Rome, he should have been given the command in the East. He could not endure to see this position go to the man he most disliked. Accordingly he offered to throw his influence in favor of the new bill if Sulpicius would add a clause appointing him instead of Sulla to the command in the East. The proposal was revolutionary; for though the assembly had more than once tried and deposed generals selected by senatorial lot, and had even forestalled the regular allotment once in favor of Marius, it had never before set aside a regularly chosen and appointed consul without charges and for political reasons, and selected another in his stead. Amidst great confusion in which thousands of freedmen acted as election thugs the *leges Sulpiciae* passed. We need particularly to notice the emergence of the freedmen class here, for their participation marks an epoch in Roman politics. These ex-slaves, mostly of Oriental stock, were now very numerous at Rome. They were not of the same temper as the people who had for hundreds of years built up the Roman constitution. They belonged to races which had never been able

to create self-governing republics at home, and they never learned the art of self government in the West. As their number increased at Rome, the state approached the need of autocracy.

Sulla's coup d'état. Sulla answered the illegal attack of Sulpicius by an act equally revolutionary. He marched upon Rome, took possession of the government by force, and drove Sulpicius and Marius out. The Senate at his request had the two men with ten others outlawed. Marius escaped to Africa as by a miracle, but Sulpicius met his death at the hands of a slave. That Sulla could thus induce his army to enter and take possession of Rome, which had never before been occupied by Roman arms, was largely due to the fact that Roman armies were now to a great extent made up of volunteers from the urban "breadline" class, and these men were in no small measure of freedmen stock. Historical tradition concerned them very little. As for Sulla, his instinct that it was a consul's duty to suppress revolution by constituted authority was not incorrect. But the very ease with which he could use the disheveled army as an instrument in his own hands, without applying constitutional remedies, tempted him to adopt inexcusable shortcuts. By this act he demonstrated the fact, not realized before, that in the city-state of Rome, where the life of the government resided within the walls of one city, any unscrupulous general who commanded an army loyal to himself alone could at will make himself the autocrat of Rome. Strange to say it was an aristocratic leader, supposedly devoted to even-tempered government, who first exposed this dangerous fact. Henceforth demagogues were destined to make use of the discovery, a discovery which eventually pointed the way to Caesar's dictatorship and the Empire.

Sulla did not indeed assume dictatorial powers at this time. He proposed the repeal of the Sulpician laws, and the people obeyed him perforce. He then proposed a law

which forbade tribunes to introduce bills before the assembly unless approved by the Senate, and the Romans were so over-awed that they passed even this death warrant upon popular sovereignty. But when he recommended his candidates for the consulship, the people tiring of dictation rejected them, electing instead L. Cornelius Cinna, an open radical, and Cn. Octavius, an irresolute partisan of the Senate. Sulla saw that his party must fall as soon as he and his army departed for the east, but there was still in him enough respect for old Roman tradition to decide him in favor of the appointed task. Desperate reports were already arriving of the terrible devastation Mithradates was spreading in Asia, and Sulla hurried off by way of Brundisium.

The return of Marius. No sooner had Sulla sailed than Cinna reintroduced Sulpicius' law equalizing the vote of freedmen and Italians with that of the old citizens by distributing their registration over all the wards. Cinna also called upon the freedmen to man the Forum. The Senate, now emboldened by the example of Sulla, armed friendly bands and drove Cinna from the city as a rebel. It may be that he had expected and desired such action for it advertised him to all Italy as the champion of the new citizens. In 87 he with Marius, who had now returned, summoned all Italians to their support. Large bands, especially of Samnites, responded and all the old hatreds of the Social War flared up again. While Cinna besieged Rome, Marius stormed Ostia, the seaport of Rome, cutting off all grain supplies. The city was forced to surrender for lack of food. Marius, grown brutal in a life of warfare, bitter through many years of neglect, and now crazed by a year's life as a hunted outlaw, organized a band of slaves and with these he took his revenge like a raving madman. He had but to point his finger at the nobles he hated, and the assassins struck them down. The great orator, M. Antonius, respected by all Romans, Q. Catulus,

with whom Marius had triumphed over the Cimbri, and the consul, Octavius, were only the most distinguished of the hundreds that fell in that brutal massacre. The senators who survived were compelled to annul Sulla's laws and declare Sulla a public enemy. Cinna and Marius nominated themselves consuls for the next year (86). Marius was thus in his seventy-first year made consul for the seventh time. Fortunately for Rome he fell ill a few days after entering upon his office and ended his tragic career. Cinna, however, continued as consul to govern Rome till he died two years later.

Sulla's war with Mithradates. We must now follow Sulla eastward in his attempt to chastise Mithradates. If the reader will turn to a map of Hellenistic Asia Minor he will find there a confusing conglomeration of states and principalities which had once been the property of the Persian Empire. The peoples were of all races. Greek cities lined the Aegean and Black Seas. The Roman province of Asia held hybrid peoples that were partly Indo-European Phrygians, partly descendants of Semitic, Persian, Turanian and older stocks. Behind the Roman province lay Galatia, an enclave of Celts; further back was Pontus on the Black Sea, the independent state ruled by Mithradates, and south of this Cappadocia, a kingdom "protected" by Rome. The people of these states also seem to have been highly hybridized of Persian, Hittite, Armenian and other stocks. East of all these lay Armenia inhabited in the main by the ancestors of the modern Armenians. Mithradates is said at one time to have ruled over peoples speaking twenty-one different languages.

This remarkable king, commonly called "the Great," came to the throne of Pontus in 120 B. C. at the age of twelve. Brilliant and audacious, though not always prudent, inordinately ambitious, cruel and generous by turns, he reveals in exaggerated form the qualities common to many of the Oriental autocrats. When once firmly estab-

lished on his throne he began his career by extending his kingdom to the confines of Armenia and then invading southern Russia where the Scythian grain-raising peasants were thriving under the influence of the old Greek colonies that bordered the Crimea (the Tauric Chersonesus). This land provided him with mercenaries as well as with grain. Bearing a grudge against Rome, which had first given his father the region of Phrygia and then (at the advice of Gaius Gracchus) taken it back again, he decided to enlarge his state westward. In 93 Rome had to resist his attempt to take Cappadocia, and again in 90 his invasion of Bithynia as well as Cappadocia. But in 88 when Rome had suffered severely in the Social war he seized the opportunity (offered by the aggression of the Bithynian king) to carry out his designs. Re-taking Bithynia and running through Galatia he dashed upon the Roman province of Asia, where many of the natives hailed him as a liberator from rapacious taxgatherers, and that winter in a general massacre, carefully planned, he had all Romans and Italians to the number of 80,000 slain in one day. It is not to be supposed that many Romans had actually migrated to Asia. In point of fact most of the slain were South-Italian and Campanian Greeks who had long conducted the shipping, trading, and banking between the East and the West and who, because of their extensive training in such matters and their knowledge of several languages, had acted as publicans and traders for the Roman taxgathering firms. Most of them were Roman "citizens" only potentially, in virtue of the Julian law of two years before. But the massacre was a fearful stain upon the good name of Rome who had so signally failed to protect her province. And Sulla was then barely out of Italy on his way eastward.

Meanwhile even Athens, frightened it seems by the fall of Delos nearby, declared in favor of Mithradates, and the latter sent his general, Archelaus, to Greece with a large army to establish a Pontic protectorate, if possible

as far as the Adriatic sea. Sulla accordingly had to clear Greece of enemies before he could proceed to Asia. Athens was besieged, but taken only in 86 after several months of hard labor. The people suffered not a little from looting, but Sulla had enough respect for letters to save the city for the sake of its past and to restore its independence. Sulla next met Archelaus at Chaeronea, defeated an army five times the size of his own, and presently overcame a new army sent by Mithradates to the aid of the first. Meanwhile Mithradates was being directly attacked in Asia by the Roman army which the Marians had sent against him when they revoked Sulla's command. Mithradates now offered reasonable terms of peace to Sulla, but the latter, fearing treachery on the king's part, marched to Asia to see that the settlement was made secure. There, in a personal interview, the king surrendered his conquests in Asia, offered an indemnity of 3000 talents, gave up his fleet and agreed to confine himself to his own kingdom henceforth. Sulla now demanded an enormous indemnity of 20,000 talents from the Asiatic cities for their supposed participation in the raids of the king, and called upon the Marian forces to desert their general and swear allegiance to himself, which they quickly did. Finally in 84, leaving a legate with two legions in charge of the province, he set out for Rome to punish the Marian party, sate his own desire for vengeance, and reëstablish senatorial government.

Sulla's return and Civil War. At Rome the consuls, Cinna and Carbo, were preparing forces against the inevitable, for Sulla had taught Rome that in the future party-strife would be settled by the sword. They seemed about to succeed. The new citizens hated Sulla, and believing that their future status depended upon the success of the Marians they enlisted freely. Even when Sulla gave his word that he would not again raise the question of votes, and the Senate, probably advised by Sulla, formally recognized the Marian distribution of voters, the new citizens

suspected Sulla of treachery. Many of the senators and capitalists who had temporized with the democrats also feared Sulla's return and for policy's sake supported the Marian party. They had made peace with the present government, and had been allowed to retain their offices and their property. Sulla, known to be vengeful and headstrong, might not only declare himself the government but might also punish them as apostates. Such were the fears that in 85 and 84 promised to cement the forces of Italy into successful opposition to Sulla. Had the democratic party possessed a single good general it might well have won, and its success would surely have been less disastrous than Sulla's victory.

While Sulla was completing his work in the East, the Senate, in order to prevent a war if possible, wrote him urging a peaceful compromise; but Sulla answered haughtily that he and his army would impose their own terms at their own convenience. Meanwhile Cinna had been slain in a riot, and the democratic party began to fall asunder. The new consuls, men of old families, a Scipio and a Junius, but opponents of Sulla, proved to be men of little force and influence. Sulla, soon after landing in Italy, defeated the forces of the one and won over the army of the other by bribes, threats, and shrewd devices. Several commanders of detachments, among them Pompey, then twenty-two years of age, went over to Sulla and volunteered their services. The "fox" flattered them generously. Young as he was Pompey received the title of "the Great" which with characteristic lack of any sense of humor he accepted and fondled to the end of a stormy life. Marching northward, Sulla defeated the Marians not far from Rome, and locked up the remnants in Praeneste, but not before his influential friends in the city had been murdered. Then he entered Rome in arms and seized the reins of government.

Italy, however, was not yet pacified. Strong forces of

the new citizens were still in arms, especially in Etruria and Samnium. Sulla marched through Etruria, attacking the stupidly conducted detachments of Marians with no show of mercy. The Samnites thus had time to recover, and in default of a Roman general, gathered—to the number of 80,000—under the standard of a native leader, Pontius. In a hopeless last raid upon the hated city the band dashed northward. Sulla barely had time to anticipate them. The battle was fought all day and till midnight outside the Colline gate. Sulla won, but with a heavy loss of men: 50,000, it is said, fell on each side, and Sulla ordered his prisoners slain besides. The Samnite people were now an insignificant remnant. Sulla declared himself dictator and began his work by posting rewards for the death of those who had opposed him. On these lists of proscribed it is said that there appeared the names of 4700 persons, of whom very many were of the equestrian rank and not a few senators. Most of them perished at the hands of slaves and freedmen, slain for the sake of the blood money offered for their murder.

In the ten years of intermittent civil wars at least half a million able-bodied Romans and Italians had perished. If we may trust the census figures, that was about one-third of all who could bear arms.

Revolutionary tendencies. This decade of civil wars began the death struggle that ended democracy in the ancient world. What had happened to the Romans that they had lost their capacity for self-control? For centuries they had progressed from one political crisis to another with calm deliberation, they had composed their differences in a spirit of fair accommodation, they had always turned to reason before resorting to the sword. It would be difficult to find in the history of any state a similar record of bloodless revolutions. With the civil war this spirit of compromise seems to have vanished and the sword was drawn at every provocation. Nations might profit from

the lesson if it were possible to define the causes of this change in Rome. Unfortunately there is no science that can infallibly diagnose the diseases of governments and of social groups. At best we can only point out the concomitant evils that seem to have been operative.

Among the most important of these must be placed the undue expansion of Rome. The part of the state which was selfgoverning was hardly one percent of the whole. This ruling element at the center was growing imperious and lordly, forgetful of the old habits of equitable procedure. It was discovering also that subject peoples could be exploited financially both directly and indirectly. Members of the nobility began to make provincial commands lucrative, the commercial classes gained wealth in public financing and in private ventures in the provinces, and the poor expected cheap bread out of the provincial revenues. Rome was turning into a parasitic state, for unfortunately a democracy is of all governments the least capable of keeping an even hand in the administration of subject peoples: every element in a democracy has the power to demand and get its share of the profits of dominion. At Rome it was primarily the existence of a large subject empire that brought economic considerations into politics, teaching the people to vote with a view to the pocket book, and to think of more effective means when the vote did not suffice.

It was also the existence of a vast empire which necessitated the keeping of large armies, and the armies, as we have seen, were obviously tools ready at hand for the use of unscrupulous politicians.

The change in the moral tone at Rome, another important factor, is more difficult to trace and estimate. Greek philosophy had been read assiduously for a century, and that philosophy had after Aristotle's day become rather skeptical and negative. The Romans found in many of the popular books elaborate arguments against the finality of the claims of right and justice. Men like Sulla probably

disclaimed the validity of all rules of duty and frankly followed their own desires and the dictates of expediency.

The steady accumulation of family fortunes had also a deleterious effect. At any rate it is apparent that in many aristocratic families the young, brought up in luxury, able to satisfy their every whim, had never been taught to check their desires and to learn self-control. In the political arena such men grow up to be selfish, imperious, and impatient of the restraints of laws and constitutional forms.

Not least in importance in the catalogue of altering factors is the gradual change of race at Rome. The old stock of Italy had suffered fearfully in the Punic wars, in the expansionistic campaigns East and West, and in the Social war. Roman citizens had also followed the course of conquest, going into the Gracchan colonies or into provincial ventures of their own accord, when the plantation system had made life precarious at home. As we have noted, their places were taken by hordes of slaves who bred up a new race of freedmen and consequently of citizens. Could these men, mostly of excitable eastern races, become true citizens of a Roman republic? However keen of mind and shrewd of wit they were, their experience as slaves had taught them lessons of individual craftiness rather than of political wisdom. Of Rome's constitution, the *mos majorum*, they knew little and cared less. Those dominating traditions—that an autocrat should never establish a throne in Rome, that men willingly die for liberty, that Rome never acknowledged defeat—were to them meaningless. Whether they might have been Romanized in time, we cannot tell; we know as yet too little about the persistence of racial traits to speculate profitably, but it is very likely that there was a vital and ineradicable temperamental difference between the versatile, choleric, superstitious, mystical and servile Asiatic and the slow minded, composed, rationalistic and liberty-loving Roman, and that the *mos majorum* created by centuries of Romans could neither be comprehended

nor respected by the new stock which was taking the place of the old. It is not an accident that the civil war began with a demand that the freedmen be given the full franchise in all the wards. After Sulla's constitution was adopted future freedmen were again for a while confined to the four wards, but the masses that had been unloosed by Sulpicius and Cinna could not later be herded back, and the descendants of these men were henceforth in no way distinguishable from the sons of Roman citizens. In a word, it would seem that the worst disease of the Republic was the disease that devastated the race which had built the Republic and that made place for peoples who were by temperament incapable of republican government.

Sulla's Constitution. Sulla had himself elected dictator by the centuriate assembly in 82, a new office explicitly giving him the power of rewriting the constitution. His work on that constitution reveals a brilliant mind incapacitated for sane statesmanship by reactionary prejudices; but his first proposals show that at least he did not intend to make himself a permanent autocrat. The purpose of his legislation was to establish a consistently conservative Republic, to place the legislative power in the Senate and centuriate assembly where it had been two centuries before, and to reduce the tribunate and the *comitia tributa* to the insignificant positions these held at the very beginning, nearly four centuries earlier.

The *Senate* was increased to the number of 600, the right of selection was taken away from the censors, and admission to the body made automatic by election to the quaestorship. The Senate was given the power of passing or rejecting all bills before they were proposed to the centuriate comitia. Jury duty was taken from the equites and given over entirely to members of the Senate.

The *magistrates* were in the future to be quaestors (20) aediles (4), praetors (8), and consuls (2), and candidates were to be eligible to these offices only in the order named,

according to the old *lex annalis* which had recently been disregarded. Consuls could not stand for reëlection within ten years. New courts were organized for the trial of special classes of cases. There were now six of these *quaestiones perpetuae* besides the regular urban and peregrine courts. To these courts the praetors of the year were assigned by lot. Tribunes lost all power of initiative in legislating and vetoing, and were forbidden to hold any office after the tribuneship. Sulla desired to keep men of ambition out of that office for fear that they might try to resuscitate the *comitia tributa*.

The *centuriate assembly*, organized on the basis of wealth, was brought back to life and made the regular legislative body, but since this body was presided over by consuls it would seldom be called upon to act except on measures approved by the Senate. The *comitia tributa* was employed only for the election of plebeian magistracies.

This constitution was more consistent than any that Rome ever had before or after, but it was hopelessly out of date. A people that has once accepted the doctrine of popular sovereignty will not submit to oligarchic rule except by compulsion. And in humiliating both the equestrian order and the people it evoked opposition that was bound to force a day of reckoning. The constitution was doomed from the first. A few of its better points, however, were long left intact; the regulation of provincial commands, the several courts, and the composition of the Senate.

Sulla's harsh treatment of Italy was even less wise than his legislation. Though he did not remove the "new citizens" from their place in the 35 tribes, he took the franchise completely away from many cities in Etruria and Samnium which had opposed him. Not only this, but he confiscated the land of many of such cities and gave it to his soldiers. This unprecedented act of cruelty disturbed the whole economic machinery of Italy, for it displaced good producers by impatient adventurers, and created a disaffected horde

of homeless peasants ready to revolt at any call. We shall soon find that Catiline later drew abundant recruits both from the dispossessed and from the ranks of the unsuccessful colonists of Sulla's army.

The province of Asia on the other hand received some compensation for his cruel exactions of 84. He changed the taxing system by fixing the sum due from each community and permitting the communities to pay these sums directly without the costly intervention of extortionate Roman corporations.

In 79 his plan was complete and had been accepted; then to the surprise of Rome he resigned his dictatorship and retired to private life near Naples. Probably some remnant of respect for the Rome of which he had read in history was the cause of this unexpected act of self-denial. However, he did not wholly refrain from expressing his opinion to his obedient servants in positions of power at Rome; he knew well that his old veterans, whose possessions had come from him, would heed any call to support his expressed will, and that the 10,000 slaves of proscribed citizens whom he had liberated understood that their liberty depended upon the respect in which their patron's acts were held. He had enough deeply interested protectors to be able to enjoy the rest of his life in safety. However, his days were numbered. Apoplexy brought on by a fit of passion removed him amid many sighs of relief in 78 when at the age of sixty. On his monument was written the inscription which he had himself composed. It breathes the true spirit of the petty politician: "No friend has ever done me a kindness and no enemy a wrong without being fully repaid."

It is a relief to turn from Sulla to three young men of sounder character, destined to become famous, all of whom shaped their careers largely by the attitude they now in early youth adopted towards Sulla and his acts. These are Pompey and Cicero, both twenty-two when Sulla

returned from the East, and Julius Caesar, who was about four years younger. Pompey reached a position of eminence first by gathering an army of soldiers who had served under his father and with these entering the service of the victor. The latter, finding him an exceedingly efficient soldier, employed him in the work of clearing Italy, then sent him to subdue the Marian forces who were recruiting in Sicily and in Africa. In both places the youth proved himself skilful and clean-handed though needlessly severe. In 80 Sulla permitted him to triumph, though he had held no office of state, and was but twenty-five years of age. That had never before occurred. It was already evident that Pompey was a man to be reckoned with.

Cicero was a young man of different temper. While Pompey was commanding legions, Cicero was preparing for a public career in the Forum, reading philosophy, and at spare moments writing poetry. The Civil wars and Sulla's proscriptions sickened him with a disgust for bloodshed that forever after was apt to lame his will at times of great crises. While Sulla was still in power in the year 80, he was the first to offer his services in court for the defense of a young man, Roscius, who was threatened with death at the hands of Sulla's unscrupulous favorites. The speech, still extant, was as brilliant as it was daring, and it established his fame. The young orator won his case, but found it necessary to leave Rome until after Sulla had died.

Caesar also, though younger, attracted the attention of Sulla, and his displeasure. This young politician was suspected by the aristocratic party because he was related to Marius and had chosen to emphasize his connections with the democratic party by taking as wife the daughter of Cinna. Sulla, thinking the young man worth saving for his own party, bade him divorce Cornelia, which however Caesar refused to do. It was only by the insistent intervention of powerful friends that his name was kept off the proscription lists. But Sulla continued to watch the

young man who, he said, "had many a Marius in him," and Caesar wisely withdrew to take a position in the army campaigning in Asia. Of these three men who grew up in the days of Sulla's great power, Pompey profited most from the master's favors while repudiating his methods; Cicero, disgusted by the dictator's cruelty and disregard for law and justice, shaped his whole career into a protest against all that Sulla represented; while Caesar, most imperilled by the "old fox," was the one who eventually adopted for himself the example of Sulla and finally imposed autocracy upon Rome.

CHAPTER XV

FROM SULLA TO CATILINE

Sulla had hardly died when Aemilius Lepidus, the consul of 78, proposed to annul all his laws. The other consul, Catulus, a staunch supporter of the Senate, successfully opposed this measure, but Lepidus was determined, and during the next year attempted to carry the revolt by force. He had the nucleus of a proconsular army, he readily found many willing volunteers in Etruria among the peasants who had been dispossessed by Sulla; the knights, reduced though they were in numbers and shattered in influence and resources by Sulla, lent what support they could, and not a few of the nobility who had been kept from office by Sulla's inner clique were ready to welcome a change. Aside from these partisan and personal motives, there were many who felt that Sulla's constitution was dangerously reactionary and should for the good of Rome be annulled at once. Lepidus actually marched his army on Rome, but Catulus had the aid of Pompey's practical generalship and defeated the rebel forces. Lepidus fled to Sardinia, where he soon died; but a large number of his partisans took refuge in Spain, where Sertorius, a former officer of Marius, had already gathered a large force of exiled Marians, and with the aid of the natives, whose friendship he had quickly won, had brought most of Spain under his control.

The next great problem for the Senate was in fact the winning back of Spain. For this task Metellus had been chosen by Sulla, but he had failed to make any progress. Pompey desired the command, but it was considered unconstitutional to give the *imperium* over a province to one who had never held a magistracy. Some indeed feared that Pompey had learned too many dangerous lessons in his

associations with Sulla, and would be likely to return from a successful war to demand the dictatorship as Sulla had done. The success of Sertorius, however, was such that the Senate yielded, and breaking all precedents made the young man "proconsul" of Spain. His task was by no means easy, for Sertorius was not only an excellent soldier, but he was exceedingly popular with the natives. It was not till Sertorius was murdered by a rival officer, Perperna, in 72, that Pompey was able to win a decisive battle.

Spartacus. Meanwhile a frightful insurrection had broken out among the slaves near Naples. All of southern Italy had extensive ranches and plantations which were worked by slaves, and the region of Capua had many industries, especially iron and bronze works, where brawny slaves were employed. For the heavy work on farms and factories, war prisoners from the barbarian countries were used, since they were too clumsy for household duties. Caesar happens to remark to his army in Gaul, for instance, that the Cimbri and Teutones taken captive by Marius were especially implicated in this revolt. The leader was, however, a Thracian bandit, Spartacus, who had been captured by the Roman army and who was now being trained in a gladiatorial school at Capua. He escaped with many of his associates (in 73), fortified himself in the crater of Vesuvius—which was not then active—and summoned all slaves to his aid. When he had a sufficiently large band he marched southward, gathering in others till he had a force of 100,000 men. The Romans were slow to comprehend the extent of the mischief, and sent insufficient forces against him. Both the consuls of 72 were defeated. Then in 71 the Senate sent Licinius Crassus, who had had military experience under Sulla. With six legions he followed Spartacus to Lucania, where he decisively defeated the horde in a desperate battle. Some five thousand escaped. These attempted to make their way back to their northern homes,

but they fell in with Pompey, who was then returning from Spain, and were cut to pieces.

The end of the Sullan Constitution. In the autumn of 71 Pompey and Crassus, both returning home with victorious armies, announced themselves as candidates for the consulship, and in doing so disregarded the *lex annalis* of Sulla despite the fact that both had been protégés of Sulla. Pompey, now 35, had held no office of state, while Crassus was praetor, and therefore legally two years from the consulship. The two men furthermore were bitter personal enemies. The government opposed both strongly but dared not carry opposition to extremities, for Sullan pupils with armies were much dreaded. Neither man, however, cared to employ force. Pompey at any rate, though he had no definite political platform and no knowledge of or respect for tradition, believed in legal forms and desired to win a good name. The two were brought together by mutual friends, and advised to canvass on a platform most likely to win a majority of the votes. Platforms mattered but little to either; they had, to be sure, been counted as Sullans, but if the Sullan constitution had grown to be unpopular it seemed wise to announce themselves as anti-Sullans, and so they did. The people desired a return of that liberty of speech and power of initiating legislation which would follow upon a return of full powers to the tribunes. They also wished to have censors once more, if only to purge the Senate of obese-minded reactionaries. Besides, many new citizens now living at Rome had never been officially listed in the centuries of the *comitia centuriata*. Their status was uncertain and could best be established by censors. The knights were also recovering from their terrific treatment and asking for their old Gracchan privileges. And in this they were actually supported by several senators who learned to their sorrow that senatorial jury panels voted according to their bias so often that provincial governors felt safe in robbing the subjects they were supposed

to protect. At this very time amazing reports were reaching Rome of how Verres, the *propraetor* of Sicily, was extorting large sums illegally under the item of military supplies, of how he was buying grain for the city granaries at prices fixed far lower than those he received from the treasury, and how he even compelled provincials to sell him works of art at nominal prices by overawing them with hints of prosecution.

Pompey and Crassus announced that they would restore in the main the democratic institutions, and on this program they were elected. When they set to work to carry out their promises they were aided not a little by Cicero, who undertook the prosecution of Verres, and in his speeches exposed the crimes of provincial rule that were made possible by the partisanship of the senatorial courts. Caesar also took an active part in supporting Pompey. In a series of laws passed in the year 70 the tribunes were restored to their former powers, the tribunician assembly was freed from the interference of Senate and consuls, the juries were reformed and constituted out of three classes: senators, knights, and *tribuni aerarii* (local officials of the wards who possessed a knight's census without the rank). Thus the government was restored to the cumbersome machinery of checks and balances with which the Gracchi had left it. What a lost opportunity! Sulla had at least cut away inconsistencies and, reactionary though he was, he had left a machine that could work. By him the weight of responsibility had at least been squarely placed on the oligarchic element, and if it failed men knew where the blame lay. But Pompey knew nothing about laws and constitutions; he had simply given the people by way of a bargain what they had asked for, and they were hardly intelligent enough to ask for anything but what they had once possessed. One can imagine a liberal and intelligent statesman combining the two assemblies into one, reducing the ten tribunes to one, raising the age qualification by some ten years, and

finally instituting some device for a written ballot throughout Italy so that all electors could reasonably participate. But Pompey, who had lived since early youth in army service, was incapable of such reforms and, it is to be feared, the other politicians preferred an intricate machinery which they best knew how to manipulate. Caesar must have been clever enough to see a better way, but Caesar was exceedingly ambitious, and if he had not yet studied out all the possibilities he at least learned soon how to use all the checks of this device to the disadvantage of his opponents, and how to employ the reconstituted tribunate for the securing of a military command which after Sulla's example might sooner or later vault him into the autocrat's saddle.

The Great Mithradatic war. Meanwhile war was again raging in Asia. In 75 the king of Bithynia, Nicomedes III, died and, like Attalus of Pergamum and Ptolemy of Cyrene, left his kingdom by will to the Roman people. What moved him to do this, it is difficult to say. He probably realized that Mithradates would attempt to seize it as he had done once before, and that Rome alone was strong enough to prevent that. And if he had any sincere regard for his people he doubtless considered the fact that Roman occupation had as a rule brought a cessation of wars and stable government. Mithradates did, in point of fact, invade Bithynia at once, and he did so with no little hope of success, for he had carefully trained a magnificent army of 120,000 men and had built a new fleet. To strengthen his position he sent envoys to Spain to make a pact with Sertorius with a view to common action. He offered Sertorius ships and money, while Sertorius—like any modern diplomat signing "secret treaties"—offered Mithradates several cities and tribes in Asia that were not his to give. In 74 Rome sent both consuls to Asia with strong forces. Mithradates defeated one, Aurelius Cotta, but when he advanced on Cyzicus he was besieged by the other, L. Licinius Lucullus, and forced to retreat. Lucullus followed him

slowly and persistently for two years, beating off one detachment after the other, till the king, utterly destitute, had to flee into Armenia.

Lucullus now turned back to Asia in order to rectify the financial abuses he found there. The distress caused by Sulla's inexcusable extortion of 20,000 talents by way of "indemnity" had led, in the intervening fourteen years, to general bankruptcy. The communities had had to borrow that money, of course, and since money was not easily obtained by cities exposed to Mithradates' whims, the interest rate had generally been very high. The usurers who had lent were largely the bankers of Greek cities on the coast, Syrians, and South Italian Greeks. But the Roman tax-gathering corporations had also contributed some, so that Sulla must have enjoyed the discomfiture of these companies when he soon after deprived them of the tax-contracts. Lucullus found that the debts had now mounted to 120,000 talents. Like all Romans, Lucullus believed in the sacred rights of property, nevertheless he had conscience enough to comprehend that a Roman province must be protected from choking to death. He, therefore, declared the interest rates exorbitant, disallowed two-thirds of the debts, and decreed that the residue was payable in four annual instalments without further interest. His drastic solution worked like magic, and we are told that the communities were free of debt in four years. But Lucullus was not now as popular with the Roman bankers as he was with the people in Asia. The equestrian corporations at Rome set about to have him recalled, and there can be little doubt that one of the strong factors in the success of Pompey over the Senate in 70 was this bitter determination of the knights to rid themselves of Lucullus and to weaken the Senate which kept him in command.

In 69 Lucullus returned to the contest, for Mithradates had won the aid of Tigranes of Armenia and raised another army. Lucullus won a battle at Tigranocerta without, how-

ever, being able to force any concessions. In fact he seems to have made unreasonable demands. Again in 68 he defeated the two kings at Artaxata, but his soldiers would not follow up success. They thought that he avoided reasonable terms in order to extend his command, and in this attitude they were encouraged by secret emissaries sent out by his enemies in Rome. In 67, while Lucullus delayed in Mesopotamia, two of his lieutenants, who were holding Pontus, were defeated, so that the one thing hitherto definitely won was lost again. Because of the disaffection in his own army Lucullus dared not pursue the king further. The news of this situation was enough to decide his enemies at Rome to act. Pompey's coalition was now in power, and Lucullus was recalled. It was as well. The inordinate love of power and "gloria," a vice found in too many Romans, had turned his head. He might have had fair terms in 72, had he not wished to "extend the empire of Rome" and win a magnificent triumph. As it was, Rome owed him little gratitude in the end. He had sent hordes of Oriental captives home who were bought for the personal household service of rich nabobs. The children of these captives became the future citizens of the imperial city. These are the people also who first brought the eastern mystery religions and a multitude of vices westward. As for Lucullus, since the general's share of booty was always a generous percentage, he was able to live in elegance and luxurious ease for the rest of his days. And yet it is significant rather of modern interests than of Lucullus' conduct that his fame is to most readers associated with the expression "Lucullan banquets" rather than with the saving and organization of a province.

Pompey and the Pirates. Pompey, who was generally favored by the business men as Lucullus' successor, was now engaged in clearing the sea of pirates. During the "social" and civil wars the Eastern buccaneers had grown well-nigh invincible upon all the seas. Sertorius and Mithradates had encouraged them because they served to obstruct

Rome's communications. We have some evidence also that not a few of the Italians that were dispossessed by Sulla's brutal colonization of soldiers took to brigandage upon the seas. Such for instance were the "Roman citizens" that Verres was accused by Cicero of executing illegally. It was only red-tape and conservatism that kept the Senate so long from wiping out the disgrace. The conservative nobles hesitated to give to one man even temporarily complete command over all seas, and in consequence over the coastal areas covered by a dozen other commands; and they hesitated all the more because Pompey, who had deserted them, was the logical candidate for such a position. But the tribunate was now restored and the tribune Gabinius acted without consulting the Senate. Pompey was voted the command, quickly gathered a fleet of 200 ships, and, beginning at the western end of the Mediterranean, swept the sea clean till he had all the pirates in his net at the eastern end. There he made an end of their fleet in one battle, and with striking generosity settled the captives in small rural colonies. It is one of these pirate-farmers that Vergil in his *Georgics* later describes at work in his model flower-garden near Tarentum.

Pompey in the East. While Pompey was busy at this task another tribune, Manilius, working in the interest of Pompey and the capitalists, proposed that Pompey be given charge of the war against Mithradates with full command over the East for an indefinite term, and with full power to make whatever terms he saw fit with all states and nations concerned. Cicero was the chief spokesman in favor of the bill, and his speech (*Pro Lege Manilia*) gives a clear notion of the political and economic factors involved. The Senate opposed this also, partly because it gave extraordinary powers to one man, partly because the Senate felt that it alone should control foreign affairs, as it had in the days of the great wars. The populace, on the other hand, were tired of the long war and desired to see it finished;

they also desired to honor Pompey, who had restored tribunician legislation, and they wished to establish another precedent in support of the theory of popular sovereignty by passing the measure in the tribal assembly. The capitalists were, however, most intimately concerned, for Pompey was in a position to open several new provinces, and might be induced to introduce in them the old contract system of tax-gathering which had formerly proved so lucrative to the equestrian corporations. Here consequently is a striking instance of business interests laboring with might and main in favor of territorial expansion. It is perhaps the first clear instance of it in Roman history. The command was given to Pompey by a popular vote.

In point of fact, Pompey's military task was not difficult, for his enemy's courage and prestige had already suffered severely. As soon as he was notified that the Manilian law had passed, Pompey sent his fleet to block all the Pontic harbors, marched against Mithradates and defeated him. Mithradates escaped beyond the Caucasus to the Greco-Scythian settlements about the sea of Azov (*Palus Maeotis*), planning to raise new forces there with which to invade Italy. Pompey accepted the submission of Tigranes of Armenia, and confirmed him on his throne, but deprived him of Syria, of which he had recently taken possession.

In 64 and 63 Pompey organized Syria as a new Roman province. Palestine, which had formerly belonged to Syria, but had become practically independent under the Maccabees, happened then to be suffering from an armed dispute between two priest-kings. Pompey, desiring to include Palestine in the province, took advantage of the civil war, espoused the cause of Hyrcanus, who seemed favorable to his interests, and after a siege of three months took Jerusalem, where he enthroned his supporter. The nation was incorporated as an autonomous but tribute-paying kingdom under the protection of the province of Syria. The city was treated with much consideration, but the people did

not soon forget that Pompey, despite vigorous protests, entered the "holy of holies," where none but priests were ever allowed to go. It was because they remembered this insult that the Jews later aided Caesar in his war with Pompey.

While in Palestine Pompey received the news that Mithradates, failing to raise an army of invasion in the far North, had committed suicide. Pompey now devoted a year to the complete reorganization of Asia. Bithynia and Pontus became a province, "Asia" remained as it was, Cilicia was enlarged. Thus Rome now had four provinces in the East: Asia, Bithynia, Cilicia and Syria. Galatia, Cappadocia, and various small temple-states were made into buffer client-kingdoms. Armenia was reorganized as a friendly kingdom, and Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates, was permitted to reign in the Crimea. Pompey also organized the internal affairs of these provinces, going so far as to found thirty-nine new cities which were to act as centers of local government in rural districts. When he returned home he could boast that Rome's public revenue had almost been doubled. It is a pleasure to add that though the knights' companies were given a share in the tax-gathering, Pompey's settlement retained many of the features of Sulla's reforms. The supervising power of proconsuls was increased and the wilful looting by publicans was permitted far less than it had been by the Gracchan settlement of "Asia."

It will be seen that Pompey did little to change Rome's *laissez faire* policy in provincial administration. He "Romanized" no more than had his predecessors. Indeed it may rather be said that he continued Alexander's policy of Hellenizing, for when in the rural districts he founded cities in order to facilitate administration he thereby formed centers of Greek culture, since Greek was the language of intercourse and trade in that region. In such towns schools, theaters, and libraries sprang up, but no one for a moment

considered imposing the Latin language upon them, the Romans least of all. Even the proconsuls sent to the East translated into Greek such public decrees as they issued.

With the local governments Pompey interfered not at all unless called upon to do so. The towns, and there were some five hundred in Asia alone, were generally democratic, the town meeting being the law-making body—not a curia of a hundred city fathers as in Italian municipalities. Except when he was asked to frame a new charter he allowed this democratic system to stand. When, however, he founded or refounded a town he was apt to adopt the more oligarchic Italian plan, for like all Romans of position he instinctively believed in the steadying influence of property and in the superior wisdom of those who had property. In general, then, Pompey disturbed existing customs as little as possible. The towns continued to manage their own affairs and the native courts to settle disputes as before without reference to Roman law. All that the Roman governor was called upon to do was to see that law and order prevailed, that the tithes due Rome did not fall into arrears, that the frontiers were protected, and that such Roman citizens as happened to be in the province should in case of dispute have access to his presence for an interpretation according to the principles of Roman law.

Radicalism in the democratic party. While Pompey was adding vast domains to Rome's empire, the city passed through a crisis that might readily have ended in another devastating civil war but for the vigilance of Cicero. The principles involved were of no great importance, but the incident deserves study as an illustration of how a nation may behave when it has lost self-confidence, when its morale is gone, when conscious of having blundered it stands in dread of committing new blunders, and when every man begins nervously to provide for himself against an impending crash. Catiline's program of reform need not be taken too seriously. It was not based upon a careful study of

social conditions, but rather upon the immediate desires of a few unscrupulous politicians. Behind Catiline, pushing him into reckless activity, were ambitious individuals like Caesar and Crassus. But not even these men represented genuinely popular needs, for their behavior emerged from individual desires which were symptoms of a deeper disease. The disease that had struck Rome was a parasitism due to overmuch conquest. The ruling classes wanted to rule what they had won, the capitalistic classes wanted to exploit it for gain, the populace wanted their old privilege of drawing free grain from it. Politics meant to all of them the control of the power to satisfy these wants. Since Sulla had cut off free grain when he cut off the tribunate the populace felt instinctively that it must keep every possible Sulla at a distance. Since he had destroyed the right to exploit provincials, the equites felt that they must in the future beware of senatorial domination. Finally, since the populace had given Pompey the distinction that a senator might have had, the Senate continued to distrust popular sovereignty. The particular fear which unnerved all parties now was that Pompey would return a dictator in the same way as Sulla had. The senators feared him as a political dictator who might feel called upon to reward the populace by weakening the Senate; ambitious leaders of the populace, like Caesar and Crassus, were apprehensive that Pompey would fill so large a part in the state as to make them quite superfluous. In those days the ghosts of Sulla and Marius rose to shatter the nerves of Rome's leaders. It became evident that the memory of political crimes might exert a more baneful power than even the criminal had exercised in his lifetime.

During the years 66-64 there was constant excitement at political headquarters. The supporters of the Senate felt that their theory of government had been dealt very dangerous blows by the passage of the Gabinian and Manilian laws. Men like Catulus, the Luculli, and Hortensius be-

stirred themselves at elections and assemblies to retain what power was left. The equestrian class were still inclined to continue their coalition with the populace in view of the fact that Pompey, their champion, seemed disposed to remain a democratic leader. But they were from time to time offended at the populist proposals which the democratic champions were willing to offer. The constant election promises of cheap grain, of bankruptcy laws, of colonization on public lands, rather disgusted men of property. It was not at all clear that Pompey could remain in control of the party. He was hardly demagogue enough for that. Consequently many of the knights began to make overtures to the senatorial party. The populace which made up the voting strength of the democratic party was an uncertain quantity. The new citizens of the outlying regions of Italy were still inclined to favor the popular party because it was the Marian group that had favored their enfranchisement. But by instinct they were more conservative than the city populace. Peasant farmers are not usually in accord with the urban proletariat on economic questions. Furthermore, the Sullan soldiers that had been planted in colonies here and there provided a rural vote which was decidedly anti-democratic, since they had reason to fear that victory on the part of Marian leaders might lead to a law restoring their lands to the original owners. It was questionable therefore what results a full vote of all citizens might have had.

What increased uncertainty on this score was the fact that the Italian voters found it so difficult to reach Rome. Men living two or three hundred miles away who could hardly afford the time might be summoned by party leaders ten or twelve times a year to attend the assembly because some important bill was offered. If they took a week off to make the journey on horseback they might arrive in time to find that some tribune or augur had interceded to postpone action, that another week might be con-

sumed in the struggle over technicalities, and even then perhaps no vote would be taken. After a few such experiences the more distant voters lost all interest in the franchise. And so, except when bills touching their immediate interests were concerned, they generally left politics to those in or near Rome. And these were, under the effects of the corn laws, precisely the least fitted to decide such questions. It is true that Sulla had confined freedmen voters to the four urban tribes, but his law seems not to have applied *ex post facto*. In other words, the horde of urban freedmen that had been spread over the thirty-five tribes by the legislation of Sulpicius and Cinna remained scattered, and it is likely that their sons were now in control of many of the rural tribes also.

L. Sergius Catiline was a patrician of small means who had learned all the worst political tricks that Sulla could teach. He had not hesitated to use his influence with Sulla to profit financially from proscriptions and even to urge the posting of names of men he disliked. After Pompey's political shift elevated the democrats to power he preferred to canvass for office as a democrat. In 66 he returned from the propraetorship in Africa to stand for the consulship, but was haled to court on the charge of extortion before he could enter his name. As it happened two popular demagogues were elected, but the vigilant Senate succeeded in having both convicted of corrupt election practices and their own men, Aurelius and Manlius, elected in their place. Sallust, who has given the history of these days, informs us that a group of fiery democrats led by Catiline planned to reinstate the two men by having Aurelius and Manlius murdered and that they failed only because of an accident, but this so-called "first conspiracy" is now doubted on evidence provided by one of Cicero's speeches.

In 65 Crassus, while censor, raised new party questions by proposing that Rome take possession of Egypt as a province. There were Romans who had come from Egypt as-

serting that Ptolemy Auletes, the reigning king, was not the legal heir, that in fact the former king had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome in a will which had been suppressed. The Senate, which had long seen that Rome's empire was overlarge, opposed the measure. Indeed Crassus seems to have urged the project only at Caesar's request, and Caesar seems to have planned it in order to establish himself in a strong military position in Egypt, where he might become independent of Pompey. Such were the forces at work in those days of intense apprehension of the future. The bill was successfully blocked by Catulus, but it served the purpose of revealing where some of the party leaders stood.

Cicero consul. In 64 Catiline stood for the consulship again, supported by both Caesar and Crassus, and his program was very radical. It is not to be supposed that these two men really desired cancellation of debts, which Catiline promised if elected. But Pompey seemed then on the point of returning home, and they desired to hold the government firmly in democratic hands when he arrived and if possible secure strong commands for themselves. Neither was eligible for the consulship, so the best course was to support a man who would play into their hands. Election promises need of course not be kept. Another candidate was Cicero, but he was a "new man" and the senatorial families usually threw their influence against such men, since they did not desire their own exclusive group enlarged. But as the canvass became more exciting Catiline lost his judgment and grew more and more lavish with promises to the lower classes, even hinting at armed revolution. The result was disastrous to his cause; the Senate and knights used all their influence to aid Cicero, who was elected. Unfortunately he had to endure as colleague a worthless patrician, Antonius, who had favored Catiline.

The year was a stormy one, for Caesar and Crassus, despite the defeat of Catiline, attempted to solidify their position against Pompey's return. And Cicero had the dis-

advantage in such contests of refusing to employ low tricks. He could, however, speak as no Roman ever spoke before or after, and speak he did against every demagogic proposal with such eloquence that the people actually refused at Cicero's advice the gifts of land which Caesar and Crassus offered them. The bill in question was introduced by Rullus, a tribune, in the interest of Caesar. It provided for the distribution of all public lands that Rome owned in Italy, and for the purchase of as much more as might be needed by appropriating for the purpose all the booty Pompey was bringing home as well as the vast properties that Pompey had acquired for the state by the confiscation of the royal estates and domains of Pontus, Bithynia, Syria and elsewhere. It placed in the hands of a commission of ten to be elected by the tribes the vast powers of determining ownership of lands to be used, of selling, buying and distributing available lands at will, and of organizing whatever military forces might be necessary to carry out the seizures. The last clause, as Cicero pointed out, looked very much as though someone intended to invade Egypt. What a magnificent opportunity the populace had to feather nests for themselves and the landowners to dispose of properties on a rising market! The bill was subversive of all reasonable economic, social and governmental principles, and Cicero found himself in the difficult position of having to face the people and persuade them not to vote themselves into luxury at the expense of the state. The government could hardly remain financially sound if the budget made by the Senate was to be disregarded and the people were to vote themselves bonuses from the treasury at every whim. The colonization might do some good in draining off the city idle, but what social benefit could derive from driving off those who were renting and working state lands and putting ne'er-do-wells in their place? The evicted renters would only drift to the city and make a new idle group to be disposed of by the next demagogue. Finally what con-

ception of property rights, of civil law and the dignity of the courts could a man have who proposed to allow a commission to disturb all titles to property throughout Italy? These things Cicero of course touched upon, but he knew too well that sound arguments would not finally block the bill. What he knew would count, he emphasized: that Caesar (he did not mention his name) was merely working for his own interest, and that when he got his power over an army and Egypt he would probably be less enthusiastic about the rest; that Pompey would not endure seeing the fruits of his labor thus scattered without an accounting, and finally that allotments in the wilds of Italy would only remove the recipients from an easy livelihood in the city with its grain distributions, games, and congenial life. He knew that only such arguments would tell, and he used all the arts of his brilliant fluency in drawing for their dull imaginations a gruesome picture of the possible consequences of Rullus' bill. The effect of his four speeches was such that the bill was withdrawn.

Caesar was foiled, and he suffered not a little in prestige. To recover his hold upon the populace he planned to have himself made *pontifex maximus*, an office of great dignity and one that carried with it much political influence. A bill was accordingly proposed that the pontifex should, as before Sulla's day, be elected by the people.¹ This naturally carried, and Caesar had no difficulty in winning the election. Then he proposed a new measure with the intention of keeping himself before the people as their champion against the usurpations of the Senate. He demanded that one Rabirius be tried for the murder of Saturninus, the demagogue of 37 years before. The purpose of the trial was simply to get the courts thus indirectly to declare illegal the passage of the *senatus consultum ultimum* by the

¹ For this election seventeen of the tribes were designated by lot, on the theory that the divine will could play its part in the employment of the lot. Caesar was, of course, aware of the fact that he could win control over seventeen wards with less effort and expense than over thirty-five.

Senate. It will be remembered that Tiberius Gracchus had passed a law forbidding the Senate to declare martial law in this fashion, and when nevertheless the Senate did so, after his death, Gaius Gracchus had again passed such a law. The Senate, however, had asserted its right to do so in the case of Gaius, and the fickle people had exonerated by vote the consul Opimius who obeyed the decree. Later, during the riots of Saturninus, Marius had accepted such a *senatus consultum* and acted upon it. Its regularity was, therefore, a credo of the Senate. Caesar, to win popularity, wished now to prove it illegal and it is also probable that he foresaw riots coming at the next election when Catiline was to be a candidate and that he intended by a popular decision to prevent the Senate's armed interference. He did not dare bring Rabirius before the regular court of senators and knights which would probably acquit him, so he had an old court resurrected from whose decision an appeal could and probably would be taken to the people. It was a very shrewd move and it worked. Rabirius did appeal, and Cicero again had to argue the case in the Senate's interest. He used all the powers of his wit to laugh the case down and all his gifts of persuasion to stir the crowd to pity, but the Senate's executive powers were unpopular and he seemed on the point of failing. Then some clever senator dug up an antiquarian device as archaic as the court procedure that had been evoked by Caesar; he raised from the fort of the Janiculan hill the old flag which formerly served as a signal that an enemy was approaching. That ended business for the day. Caesar at least had a lively sense of humor and confessed defeat by withdrawing his suit. Before the year was over the Senate once more passed a *consultum ultimum* and, thanks to the failure of Caesar in the case of Rabirius, it had a right to say that precedent was in its favor.

Now the elections were approaching and electioneering devices were carried to the extreme. Cicero had a law

passed against corrupt practices (*de Ambitu*) to prevent such insidious forms of bribery as distributing free seats at games and banqueting ward leaders, but this had little effect. Catiline grew ever more lavish with promises for the repudiation of debts, counting on the fact that in a large agricultural state, very many property owners are apt to be in debt to some extent. Manlius, a lieutenant of his, was busy gathering in the rural vote in Etruria by repeating such promises. Caesar and Crassus still supported him, though less warmly than before. They still believed they could manage him better than any of the other candidates. Sulpicius Rufus was also a candidate, but though he was the greatest jurist of his day, one of those who contributed most to Roman law, he had little real support. He would not stoop to canvass, and the better element found it prudent to throw all their votes to two mediocre but safe nobles, Silenus and Murena, in order to defeat Catiline. Again Catiline failed.

The conspiracy of Catiline. Catiline gave way to rage, overwhelmed as he was with debts heaped up through lavish expenses at the polls. He gathered his intimate friends, omitting Caesar and Crassus, who would of course not go to extremes, and planned to seize the reins of government by force. Manlius returned to Etruria and secretly gathered a band of discontents into the hills behind Florence, both Sullan colonists who had failed at farming and Marians who had been evicted by Sulla. Cicero, who was informed of these things by detectives in the service of the government, called a meeting of the Senate on October 21 and stated his belief that there would be an outbreak on the 28th. The Senate was not wholly convinced, but passed the *senatus consultum ultimum* giving the government dictatorial powers. The 28th, therefore, passed quietly, but a week later Catiline matured his plans. Cicero was to be killed, fires were to be set at various places in the city and in the confusion Catiline and his forces were to seize the

reins of government. Cicero, learning of this, called the Senate together on the eighth of November and Catiline of course appeared. The consul was in a difficult predicament. He had no written proof to show to skeptics; his former prophecy had not come true, since he had exposed the facts; he could not arrest Catiline and try him on verbal evidence brought by detectives. He must force Catiline into an overt act. He decided to face Catiline before the Senate with a blunt revelation of what he knew without revealing the fact that he had no usable evidence. We may read his terrific arraignment in the first Catilinarian oration. It was in substance a "bluff," but it succeeded. Catiline, completely unnerved, fled from the city and joined Manlius' rebel force, thereby committing himself openly. So far all was well, the state's forces would see to Catiline and the forces in open rebellion, but Cicero knew that Catiline had able lieutenants in the city who would probably carry out the original plan of revolt in the city when the rebel army approached. He therefore waited and again kept the conspirators under close watch. Finally, on December third, he secured the necessary evidence: the conspirators had tampered with Gallic envoys then at Rome and had committed their signatures to treasonable letters. On the 5th of December Cicero opened these letters in the Senate and asked the Senate what should be done with the culprits. The interest in the case was intense, for every senator there knew that the democratic party would, if it returned to power, declare a senatorial vote of the death penalty unconstitutional and would punish those responsible for disregarding the old right of *provocatio* if the conspirators were executed.

Silenus, the consul elect, at once proposed that the prisoners be executed, and the older senators agreed one by one until Caesar spoke. He did not question the evidence, nor minimize the crime; he even acquiesced in the Senate's right to try the prisoners. He only questioned the con-

stitutionality of a death sentence in view of the Porcian and Sempronian laws. Caesar's motion was that the culprits should be imprisoned for life and their property confiscated. The speech, summarized by Sallust, suave and dignified though it was, created a sensation. It was a notice from the leader of the opposition that the consul was likely to be held responsible for that day's action. Senators began to waver and modify their statements, several made their way to the presiding officer urging caution. It was then that Cicero arose and delivered the dispassionate fourth Catilinarian urging the Senate not to be frightened by innuendoes, assuring them that the consul knew what he was doing and that whatever the decision he would assume full responsibility for putting the question. Reassured by this speech the Senate proceeded with the discussion, and Cato reintroduced Silenus' motion calling for the death penalty. Cicero put that motion and it carried by a decisive vote. The culprits were hung in prison that very day.

A full treatment of the legality of the procedure would require a survey of Roman constitutional history, a treatment of the question of its advisability would require a deep study of Roman society. On strictly legal considerations Cicero had the right to use all the machinery of martial law to save the state. In view of the fact that the people had decided in favor of Opimius in 121, had failed to challenge the act of Marius in 100, and had acquiesced when Carbo had asked for the "last decree" in 83, the Senate's interpretation of its rights was correct and would continue to be so until the people effectively spoke on the issue again. Cicero was also on firm ground when he asked the Senate to vote on the measure, since the Senate's judicial powers were of old considered as a concomitant of their powers to pass the last decree. Martial law implies a court under the presidency of the executive that proceeds over and above civil courts, and by ancient practice the consul's court was the Senate or a judicial commission empowered by the Sen-

ate. Cicero, however, generously refused to treat this as a trial. He assumed full responsibility as acting under the powers given the consul by the "last decree," and he let the Senate feel that he considered their vote merely a vote of advice.

On the second question, that of advisability, we must again decide for Cicero. Had Caesar's motion passed, the rebels would have felt that the government was repudiated and cowed; they would have proceeded with vigor, knowing that if they won the culprits would at once be freed by the assembly. The execution shattered the rebels, many fell away at once, and Catiline at the end had a very small army. Firm action here certainly saved the lives of thousands, and probably was the chief factor in saving the government. Cicero might of course have brought the culprits before a regular praetor's court *de vi* or *de majestate*. But these courts were compelled to permit the convicted felon to choose exile instead of the death penalty, and presumably these rebels would not have remained in exile when the rebellion came on. They would merely have joined Catiline and strengthened his army. Cicero, therefore, though he was severely punished a few years later, and has been harshly criticized by many modern writers, would seem to have acted with prudence, with a full knowledge of the principles involved, and with striking courage.

On hearing of the death of his friends Catiline tried to withdraw towards Gaul, for his army began to dwindle. His rear was, however, already blocked. In January he faced the army that Cicero had sent against him. Only the most determined remained with him and the greater part of these fell on the field. Catiline was found dead in the front ranks of the fallen.

Sentimental litterateurs have been prone to picture Catiline as a brave champion of the oppressed who was crushed by a government which put property rights over humane considerations. We happen to have in Sallust's "Catiline"

authentic statements from both Catiline and Manlius giving their most important grievances. That of Manlius (chapter 33) appeals to us as a heartfelt cry for relief in behalf of unfortunates when it speaks of those who have lost their liberty as well as their property. But it would be incorrect to suppose that the people in Etruria who gathered about Manlius represented normal Italians suffering from the normal course of judicial decisions of average praetorian courts. They suffered rather from the effects of the Marian and Sullan revolutions, and war wounds usually go too deep for any remedies that governments find available. The Marian possessors had not only been evicted by Sulla, but they had also been reduced from citizenship to the "Latin" status, and the Sullan soldiers who got the lands of the Marians had in large measure assumed debts in order to equip their farms or had proved to be incompetent farmers. Distress was therefore great in Etruria, but through no fault of the restored government. To reopen the question of ownership would have been to invite another civil war. And to declare a repudiation of debts in Etruria would have brought on a general financial crisis that would have increased poverty everywhere.

Catiline's letter (addressed to Catulus on his departure) reveals on the other hand not even a wholesome sympathy for the unfortunate. It is merely filled with personal venom evoked by his failure to acquire a lucrative office for himself. Nothing could betray the depravity of the man better than the unconscious revelation of his own statement: "Enraged by insults and injuries heaped upon me, since I have been denied the rewards of my labors and failed to obtain an office of dignity, I have as is my wont espoused the cause of the unfortunate, not because I could not pay my debts out of my own property . . . but because I saw unworthy men honored by high office and found myself severed from the world by unfounded suspicions."

In other words, he became a "reformer" because a *novus homo* obtained offices at the elections that he, a patrician, could not attain. One can only conclude that there was still much sound judgment in the citizen body which had repudiated Catiline's glittering promises.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FIRST "TRIUMVIRATE"

Petty politics. The next year was one of waiting for Pompey's dreaded return. Near the end of the year Pompey landed in Italy and nothing happened. In fact he disbanded the army at once to allay all fears. In the autumn of 61 he celebrated his triumph. Huge "floats" displayed his booty, and inscribed banners proclaimed his deeds stating that he had subdued fourteen nations, captured a thousand forts, 900 towns, and 800 ships, that he brought back 20,000 talents to the treasury and had increased the annual revenue by 35 million sesterces. The day after the triumph the period of his decline began; for he was now to engage in political battles with men who easily outgeneraled him. He at once asked the Senate to accept his reports, confirm his dispositions and settlements in Asia, and give his sorely tried veterans a "bonus" in the form of land. The Senate, remembering Pompey's apostasy in 70, and egged on by Lucullus, decided to make him wait a while. He seemed less formidable now that he had disbanded his army. Cicero, who hoped to keep the two upper orders on good terms (his *concordia ordinum*, which he mentions so frequently) and who wished also to rescue the great Pompey for his coalition, was on the point of reconciling Pompey and the Senate, when Crassus, acting for himself and Caesar—now *propraetor* in Spain—played the political game so skilfully that the *concordia* broke up in petty quarrels, and Pompey was left in lone splendor without party or friends. Crassus first urged the equestrian companies to demand from the Senate a large reimbursement on the ground of having suffered heavy losses in their tax collections owing to crop failures. Such requests were regular,

but Crassus asked for an impossible sum, knowing that the Senate felt strong enough to refuse. This, despite Cicero's urgent efforts at settlement, led to an open quarrel. Meanwhile Crassus urged the knights to stand their ground, hinting that Caesar on his return would satisfy them. So the *concordia* broke. Crassus was capable of even pettier tricks. To illustrate, when Pompey had entered the Senate for the first time after his return expecting an ovation, Crassus surprised everyone by rising to make a speech in which, completely ignoring Pompey, he lauded Cicero's administration to the skies. Cicero, falling into the trap, arose and disregarding Pompey, discoursed at length about himself. Pompey left the house in disgust, and the incipient intimacy between Pompey and Cicero chilled into unfriendly suspicions. Such were the little incidents that kept parties crumbling under Crassus' skilful management until Caesar should return and find everything ready for his management.

During his year in Spain Caesar had not distinguished himself for devotion to his duty as governor. He sought occasion for wars on tribes still not subdued. Probably he was most interested in gaining experience at warfare; possibly he also counted on restoring his depleted estate by selling booty. At least he came back a wealthier man. On his journey through lower Gaul to Spain he made some observations that set his fecund imagination to conceiving of great possibilities for his own future. He returned in 60 just in time for the elections, entered the canvass for the consulship, and won with ease. The equites had suspected him during the conspiracy of Catiline, but the suggestions of Crassus, who was always intimate with them, had won over many. At any rate, they refused to vote for candidates that bore the approval of the Senate. The populace admired the reckless courage of the young patrician, who was always ready to be impudent to the Senate. With such support his election was easy.

Caesar's political coalition. To secure what he desired

next, an important command such as Pompey had held, might be more difficult. Carrying laws required overcoming the combined strength of antagonists united in their opposition, whereas winning the election had meant only overcoming opponents that were pulling apart. He, therefore, made overtures to the most powerful men, urging them to combine in unified action. He promised the knights the remission of the contract money which they had asked for in vain. Crassus was of course their spokesman. To Pompey he promised the soldiers' bonuses, though in the form of a general colonial law which would also attract the good-will of the populace; and he promised him also the validation of his acts and decrees. Caesar also approached Cicero with tentative offers, promising him that if he got his support, he would act regularly through the Senate and propose nothing offensive to Cicero. Crassus and Pompey accepted the offers. Cicero did not. He knew too well that any secret agreement between such powerful men was subversive of liberty, and that he would soon be maneuvered into some delicate position where he would lose his independence, or where, if he tried to obstruct, he would be exposed and dropped with his honor and influence destroyed. So the secret arrangement that has been called "the first triumvirate" was made without Cicero. Crassus and Pompey, who since Sullan days had hated each other, agreed for policy's sake to make the best of each other's presence. Needless to say, Caesar, who knew how to work with both, led them the more easily for their hostility to each other.

Caesar's consulship. On January first 59 B. C. Caesar entered upon his office with Bibulus as colleague, a stubborn but slow-minded conservative. His secret promises and his own plans entailed a large program of legislation for the year. By using the support of Pompey and Crassus and by striving hard to regain the friendship of Cicero, who was always ready to be reasonable, he hoped to be able to em-

ploy constitutional forms, and have his proposals adopted by the Senate before they were offered to the assembly. As a preliminary measure he ordered minutes of the Senate and assembly kept and published. Hitherto only completed business had gone into the records. Since the Senate's sessions were closed to the public no one had learned anything about proposals that were lost or about the nature of the debate. The senators indeed were not elected representatives of the people and saw no reason why their words should be amenable to general scrutiny. Caesar's order angered them not a little, for they felt that every word spoken would now be revealed and that Caesar's intention was merely to compel them to favor populist measures.

Caesar's first reform bill was a revised version of the Rullan agrarian law, so drawn as to make it possible for the commission to give preference to Pompey's soldiers in assigning lands. It was still unsound economically in that it perpetuated the practice of evicting desirable tenants for the benefit of the undeserving, and the dangerous custom of paying soldiers in the form of bonuses instead of adequate stipends, but the powers of the commissioners were reasonably limited, and the bill contained no vague possibilities of a large command for Caesar. The Senate, however, would not hear of it, and Bibulus used all of a consul's power to obstruct its passage. Caesar could not even get a vote on the measure in the Senate, though Pompey and Crassus came out openly in its support. Caesar then declared that he would accept in full the democratic interpretation of the constitution, disregard the Senate, and act entirely through the popular assembly. When the bill was proposed to the assembly, the Senate secured the services of a tribune to veto it, and threatened that if the veto were disregarded the Senate would pass the "last decree" and call upon the government to suppress revolution by force. Caesar answered by summoning Pompey to speak. The great general rose solemnly and declared that he was ready

to meet force with force. This terrifying utterance could only mean that Pompey would summon his veterans and that civil war would result. The Senate was cowed. When Bibulus and his tribune pronounced their vetoes, Caesar ordered them off to prison, and the vote was taken. Most of the senatorial leaders read in this procedure the death warrant of the Republic and withdrew from Rome. Cicero, who had labored in vain for a peaceful compromise, also withdrew. And the "triumvirs" continued to enact the rest of their program, while Bibulus went assiduously through the futile form of pronouncing each bill in turn invalid. It was less than ten years after this event that Caesar crossed the Rubicon on the pretext of defending the rights of the tribune's veto.

Now in quick succession the assembly complied with Caesar's requests to confirm Pompey's acts in Asia, and to make a remission to the equestrian companies of a third of their contract sum of two years ago. Never before had such administrative measures been passed by any body but the Senate. Then also Caesar found an opportunity to get his reward in the form of a desirable province. Metellus Celer, the proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul, had died in February. Here was a province of great value to a man like Caesar, who knew its possibilities, and he asked the assembly to assign him to this position and for a term of five years. The request seemed exceedingly modest, for it had been expected that Caesar would rather covet a position in the famous East, which was filled with rich cities that might be exploited. Cisalpine Gaul was largely settled by peaceful Italian farmers who could not possibly be governed in a lucrative fashion. But Caesar had passed through Further Gaul with observant eyes. He knew that it would offer vast military opportunities, since Aeduan envoys had informed him that the Helvetii were preparing to migrate westwards and that Ariovistus, the German, was bringing hordes of his countrymen into Gaul. The Senate, glad

enough to see Caesar concerned in such border problems among barbarians, added Transalpine Gaul to his assignment with an additional legion in case the frontier should need protection. They may have reasoned that they would retain some hold upon his action if he accepted a part of the province from them.

Later in the spring Caesar brought in a new agrarian bill which proposed to distribute the fertile public land of Campania to about twenty thousand colonists, the recipients to be families that had at least three children. It is likely that the commission had found less land for sale than it had expected, most of the available lands having been used in satisfying Pompey's soldiers. The new measure was especially opposed by those who concerned themselves for the income due the treasury, but it is not impossible that Caesar preferred to see the government in financial straits. The bill of course was quickly adopted by the people.

Having paid his political debts and having won the province he desired, Caesar laid plans for the future, and that his plans were extensive appears from the fact that like any eastern autocrat he arranged a series of family alliances on a political basis. His own charming daughter Julia he betrothed to Pompey. Having two years before divorced his wife with the explanation that "Caesar's wife must be above suspicion," he now married Calpurnia, the daughter of Piso, who had been selected as his successor in the consulship. This may be called the beginning of "dynastic marriages" at Rome. It must be admitted that both marriages were what novelists are wont to call "happy."

But there was one more important disposition to make. Caesar did not feel entirely safe in leaving Cato and Cicero behind him at Rome. Cato was irrepressible and implacable and might some day take advantage of some accident to become popular. Caesar decided to have him sent on a mission abroad that would keep him busy for a time. Cicero

was broken in spirit and less likely to lead a revolt, but Cicero was still deeply imbued with a strange boyhood respect for Pompey, and never ceased to hope that he might some day rescue his one-time hero from his present associations. And since Pompey was rather emotional, and fitfully sensitive to appeals to his sense of honor, there was danger that Cicero might succeed.

There was an easy remedy if Caesar would stoop to apply it. He knew that the populace would willingly exile Cicero by way of an example for having acted upon the hated "last decree" three years before. There was a bitter enemy of Cicero's at Rome, a desperate politician by the name of Clodius, who hated Cicero because the orator had furnished damaging evidence against him in a recent trial. Clodius desired to become a democratic leader, and aspired to the tribuneship for that purpose. It was an open secret that his first act as tribune would be to get his revenge upon Cicero. The one obstacle in his path was that, as a patrician, Clodius would first have to induce the curiate assembly to permit his adoption into some plebeian family, and this Caesar, fearing the reckless behavior of the man, had as *pontifex maximus* so far prevented. One day, however, after Cicero had expressed himself openly and bitterly against the "triumvirs," Caesar lost his patience and helped Clodius at the rites of adoption. This move of Caesar's was calculated to stop further criticism, but he again made overtures to Cicero, offering him a place on his staff. Cicero refused to sell his freedom. Caesar then allowed Clodius to stand for the tribuneship, and thinking that the orator was now sufficiently cowed he made a new offer. Cicero again declined. Then Clodius was permitted to work his will. Such were Caesar's methods.

In all of Caesar's acts during the consulship, there is evidence of remarkable power over the populace, of an unusual cleverness in the manipulation of men and parties, of endless courage, and brilliant political tactics, but except

for one law there appears very little promise of the splendid statesmanship that he revealed in his later years. The one exception was a law for the improvement of provincial government, a measure that was worthy of the best traditions of Republican Rome. Of this *lex Julia repetundarum*, we have only some scraps left, but these at least disclose its persistent thoroughness. With its more than one hundred sub-heads the law aimed to protect citizens, subjects, and allies alike from all the possible abuses practised by Roman promagistrates. It greatly circumscribed the dues that could be collected for army supplies, and penalized the governor's acceptance of gifts. It defined the governor's duties precisely, forbidding him to conduct diplomatic business with foreign states, to wage war, or cross the borders of his province without specific orders. It commanded the governor also to keep and deposit three copies of his official record for public inspection, two in provincial cities and one at Rome. Here one finds that scientific and legal tendency that Rome later came to look for in Caesar. What a brilliant plan of government he might have laid down during his consulship while he was wasting his time in settling political scores! As it was he departed to his province hated and dreaded by all lovers of republican institutions, proceeding at once to break several clauses of his own provincial code.

Before Caesar departed, however, the hot-headed Clodius became tribune and carried some demagogic measures which were generally supposed to have received Caesar's assent if not hearty approval. Clubs (*collegia*), originally formed as burial-aid societies, social workingmen's clubs and the like, which had been abolished by law in 64 because they had come to be used and abused by politicians, were again authorized. Clodius knew how to use them to advantage, as the sequel shows. A few casks of wine sent to each "lodge" with his compliments a week or two before election were effective in bringing out the desired vote. Clodius

also had the effrontery to offer and pass a bill providing that the grain hitherto distributed at a low price should henceforth be absolutely free. This measure alone is said to have cost the state 20 per cent of its income. Caesar cannot quite escape the suspicion of having been willing to see the treasury empty. At any rate, when he crossed the Rubicon later it advantaged him not a little that the Senate was in hard financial straits.

Cicero banished. The month of March 58 was now well on and Caesar was needed in his province; for, as he knew, the Helvetians were due to start on the 28th. But Cicero was still at large and refused to be silenced by a bribe. So Caesar gave Clodius the right of way. The tribune offered a bill outlawing "anyone who had put to death a Roman citizen without trial." The law, as everyone knew, referred to Cicero. It was of no use for senators to urge that Cicero's act in executing the conspirators was wholly constitutional. The Senate's interpretation of the law was simply not accepted by the populace, and Caesar when asked answered that he held the same views now as in 63. Cicero appealed to Pompey, who had before given his pledge that he should not suffer for the deed of 63. But Pompey suddenly found that his power was completely gone, forfeited by his coalition with Caesar. There was nothing for Cicero to do but leave the city he had saved. When he had left, a new plebiscite declared the banishment to be legally in operation; Cicero's property was confiscated and the Clodian mob set to work and wrecked the exile's house on the Palatine. Caesar's position now seemed safe, and he departed at once for his province.

Caesar in Gaul. While Caesar was hurrying his last arrangements at Rome the Helvetians were packing their baggage and preparing to migrate into western Gaul. To avoid the danger of being cut up by the Gauls while defiling through the narrow pass between the Rhone and the Jura mountains they planned to cross the Rhone at Geneva and

traverse the first thirty miles of the journey inside the Roman province. Caesar knew all this, and he also knew that Rome was not in the habit of permitting armies to use her provinces as short-cuts in their invasions. He probably could have stopped the movement by a brief order. Instead he kept silent and ordered his four legions to the point of danger. When finally the decree banishing Cicero had been passed he also set out himself, traversing about 700 miles in eight days, a strenuous ride for one who had spent the past year in the Forum. When the Helvetii attempted to cross in the face of his army he of course obstructed the fords, and secured at the same time a much desired pretext for pursuing the tribes, which had thus committed an overt act of war. Again he could probably have seized the pass and prevented the exit of the enemy, but he waited till they had passed into Gaul, and were devastating the fields of the Aedui, who had long before been recognized as "friends" of Rome. Now on the basis of a *senatus consultum* of two years before he had the right to "protect the Aedui, the friends and brothers of Rome." In his "Commentaries" he adds the reasonable consideration that a migration of such a horde to Aquitania would inevitably endanger the safety of the far distant regions of Narbonese Gaul and of the Spanish province. He accordingly followed the migrants well into Gaul, drew them into a battle in a position of his own choosing, and thoroughly defeated them. He sent the remnants back home, lest the Germans should fill the vacated country and become a menace to the province. Thus Caesar had brought himself into Gaul, where he desired to be.

Certain Aeduan chiefs now appealed to him to aid them and the Sequani against Ariovistus and his Germans, who a few years before had crossed the Rhine at the invitation of the Sequani. Caesar listened attentively to the story which he already knew well. In fact, while he was consul the year before the Senate had received a deputation from

Ariovistus and had recognized him as "friend." Caesar now responded to the Aeduans—it was an unofficial appeal presented by men who did not represent the ruling party in the tribe—that he would heed their request. He is again careful in his *Commentaries* to inform the Romans that he based this action on the *senatus consultum* authorizing the provincial governor to protect the Aedui. He therefore sent envoys to Ariovistus requesting an interview. The latter refused to recognize the Romans as having any jurisdiction in the region. A battle took place, not far from Strasbourg, the Germans were hopelessly defeated and many prisoners were taken and sold as slaves. Only a small remnant escaped across the Rhine.

Caesar did not return to the province, but quartered his soldiers for the winter in the territory of the Sequani. He had of course a right to do this, since he had, by driving out Ariovistus, established Roman sovereignty over the region thus won. But this act seemed to be proof that Caesar intended to remain in Gaul permanently, for if he had come simply to aid the Aedui there was no point in staying. That at least was the conclusion drawn by the Belgae, and that was no doubt the conclusion which Caesar hoped that they would draw. The Belgae accordingly banded together during the winter to drive him out, and when the Remi (*cf.* modern Rheims) in fear—since they were nearest Caesar—refused to act with the rest and allied themselves with Caesar, they were attacked by the Belgae, so that Caesar had at hand a legitimate excuse upon which to advance. Outmaneuvering the enemy by sending a force of Aedui to their rear, he crossed the Aisne and compelled the tribal forces to scatter in defense each of its own territory. Then, in a daring summer's campaign, he made his way toward the English channel, subduing successively the Suessiones (modern Soissons), the Bellovaci (Beauvais), the Ambiani (Amiens), the Nervii, a strong tribe north of the Ardennes which claimed Germanic descent, the Atuatucae, reported to be de-

scendants of the Cimbri, and the Atrebates (Artois). As a result of this astonishing campaign most of the tribes of Gaul and Aquitania, which had not yet been even threatened, sent envoys offering to submit to Caesar's dictation. Thus in a well planned advance, every step of which he could plausibly explain to Rome, he had brought the whole of Gaul to acknowledge Rome's sovereignty within two years. By taking this course boldly through the north along the Rhine he had been able to save years of work and much bloodshed. Of course the task was not yet complete—as he well knew—but in working to the rear of Gaul and inviting submission without a direct attack upon the central tribes he had gained the great strategical advantage of being able to treat any future uprising as a rebellion against a requested protectorate.

There can be little hesitation in saying that this conquest of Gaul was one of the most brilliantly planned and executed military exploits in Roman history, also that in its consequences to Rome and later history it was one of the most important. Since Roman territorial expansion practically came to an end with the death of Caesar it is not likely that Gaul would have been Romanized had it not been done at this time. The shifting of the frontier from the Alps to the Rhine and the possession of a province of many million Occidentals of a very hardy race that was amenable to Rome's civilizing influences, and available for army service, for commerce, and even for reinvigorating the stock of Italy, were advantages the significance of which becomes fully apparent only when one has read the story of Rome's struggle to survive during the centuries of the Empire.

Did Caesar see the importance of his act? Had he indeed planned it at all, and if so with what aim in view? One may scrutinize his *Commentaries* in vain for a direct answer to such questions, for the account, wholly unlike the score of apologetic military books written by generals

after the "Great War," is a model of objectivity and self-repression. Yet it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Caesar had a plan from the beginning. His choice of Gaul proves at once that he appreciated the West at a time when Romans generally had their eyes towards the famous peoples of the East. His permitting the Helvetii to escape at first, his intervention in the affairs of Ariovistus, his placing his first winter quarters so far to the north as to excite the Belgae, all indicate that he intended to subdue Gaul and that it was a well-conceived plan that he followed in taking the bold course near the Rhine to the rear of Gaul. It is also significant that he proclaimed himself a champion and friend of the Gauls, and that the *corpus vile* which served his purpose in striking terror into the barbarians was chiefly a group of Germanic tribes. Thus he was able to spare the people whom he intended to incorporate in the province. There is no record in the campaigns of the first two years that any Gallic captives were sold into slavery, if indeed Caesar's statement is true that the Atuatuci were of Cimbric descent. Caesar then seems to have chosen Gaul for a definite purpose, and to have planned with care the course he followed. If this be true we must also add that Caesar's campaign was a clear instance of deliberate imperialism, perhaps the first undoubted instance of the kind in the history of the Roman Republic. Whether it was justified from a modern point of view, need not be asked. More appropriate is the question whether Roman public opinion approved of such a course. Caesar himself, if one examines his *Commentaries* closely, reveals the fact that he took great pains to explain every advance as legally defensible. In every case he appears to prove that he was either on the defensive or was acting in accordance with some *senatus consultum*. It may, however, be doubted whether he took this ground to satisfy his own conscience, or even the average moral sense of the Roman of his day. He was perhaps conforming in part to an idea which had

formerly expressed itself vitally in Rome's fetial rules. We may, however, suppose that what weighed most with him was a desire not to contravene too openly the regulations he had laid down in his *lex repetundarum*, and, secondly, not to awaken any unnecessary suspicions in the Senate that he was making a needless war for the sake of his own aggrandizement. The latter was particularly needful, for the Senate could hardly forget that he had one day invited Pompey to bring an armed force into the Forum to aid in passing his laws. It had had sufficient warning that day that an armed force in Caesar's hands was dangerous to liberty. Caesar knew well that if the Senate grew too apprehensive of him it would make overtures to Pompey and possibly break up the "triumvirate." And Pompey was also an experienced soldier.

It has been urged that Caesar's conquest of Gaul was in reality a carefully planned military drill whereby an unscrupulous politician trained an army deliberately for the overthrow of his government. Such a view is not quite just to Caesar, though it might be fair to consider the campaign at its inception as incidental to his own ambition. Caesar was not always moved by a single impulse. He was a man of such vast endowment that he did not at once become aware of all his capabilities. In his youth, hindered by party connections from opening a normal career of responsible activity in the government, he was tempted by his mental and social gifts into a superficial life of pleasure, which indeed developed his knowledge of human nature, but otherwise retarded his moral growth. When he was able to enter politics he was far behind such men as Pompey and Cicero, and in order to overtake his predecessors he fell into the temptation of using his engaging gifts in unscrupulous ventures and proposals. The moral tone was low in politics, and most of his competitors were turning political power to material use. Crassus, who had played the game with the resources of "backstairs politics" and a full pocketbook,

was an unwholesome mentor who warned him that under present conditions he alone was safe who had the wherewithal to command an army. In such times men become individualists perforce. There can be little doubt that Caesar procured himself the command in Gaul, not for the benefit that would accrue to Rome through acquiring the province, but for the power Caesar would attain by holding and skilfully using an efficient army within striking distance of Rome. But it also seems to be true that Gaul was a training school for Caesar, that it was there he learned to know himself, his powers of penetrating understanding, his sure perceptions, his sound judgments and his swift intelligence, and it was there too that he had time and leisure to brood over questions of government, and the importance of the great state of which he was coming to be a responsible leader. To the careful student it is quite clear that after Caesar had acquired an army with which he might make himself master of Rome, his first thought came to be his duty to Rome, at least in so far as this did not seriously incommode him. When his first term was ending he remained in Gaul because he saw that his presence was required longer, and when finally his work was done he made serious, if not wholly sufficient, efforts to prevent the civil war which was likely to lift him to the position of dictator. The Gallic war was the turning point in his years of self-education.

During Caesar's absence Rome was in constant turmoil because of factional fights. The old leaders of the Senate refused to take any interest in a government that had practically cut the Senate out of the constitution. Pompey was still in name the "Great Man" whom all were supposed to consult but, being slow of wit and speech, ignorant of civil procedure, unacquainted with people except as obedient soldiers, unsympathetic in personal contacts, and pompous, he could only stumble about helplessly. The people broke up into factions. Some, comprehending that Caesar was

the power in the government, would do nothing till a messenger had posted to Gaul and brought back Caesar's decision. Clodius, who kept the workingmen's and freedmen's clubs in good humor with casks of wine, packed assemblies and elections with them to vote down any measure in which senators seemed interested. Milo to counter him formed clubs of his own which he wined and dined in order to have them offset the voters controlled by Clodius. There was some spilling of blood at the polls on the question of Cicero's return. Pompey in fact, sore of conscience at his betrayal of an overloyal friend, asked Caesar's permission to recall the orator, and Caesar, extracting a pledge from Cicero's brother that the orator should not offend again, gave his consent. Clodius exerted himself to the utmost with the aid of his bludgeoning ward heelers, to prevent Cicero's return, but saner voters from all of Italy came in and saved the day. Cicero was recalled, but the precedent of riots in the *comitium* only darkened the future prospect.

Another and more serious split occurred over the Egyptian affair. The worthless king had been driven off by his subjects and had come to Rome to ask military aid with which to be restored to the throne. He is said to have paid heavily in advance to Pompey and Caesar, presumably for the expenses to be incurred. Now was obviously the time to take possession of Egypt as a province, as Caesar had proposed in 65. But no one wanted more provinces. The important question was the choice of the general who should compel Egypt to take back her king. Pompey could not understand why all of Rome did not point him out as the obvious choice. The reasons were that Caesar preferred not to see Pompey established in such a strong position, and that Crassus who did not love Pompey set his agents at work to prevent it. This provided a year of quarreling in which the triumvirate nearly broke, for it

estranged Pompey from Caesar and brought him to the point of seeking consolation among senators.

Cicero was now back, and, counting on a possible break between the two and on his own apparent recovery of influence, made bold one day in the spring of 56 to announce in the Senate that he would on a certain day propose the repeal of Caesar's last colonial law. All these things were of course reported post-haste to Caesar, who was down in Cisalpine Gaul between campaigns keeping an ear at the telephone as it were. Realizing that a crisis was near, he summoned Pompey and Crassus and most of the influential men of the state—omitting Cicero—to a conference at Lucca. There he pacified the warring elements and bargained for a renewed alliance. He had in his two years in Gaul procured a formal submission of all the tribes, but actual pacification, to be permanent, would require more than the two remaining years of his term. Hence he was ready to extend the old compact: he was to have an additional term of five years, Pompey and Crassus were to have a joint consulship in 55 and thereafter provincial terms as long as his own. Pompey chose Spain as his portion, and Crassus chose Syria, with the understanding that he might have a large army with which to gain military glory in taking Mesopotamia from the Parthians. Finally Pompey was to close the mouth of Cicero by reminding him that his brother would be held to his pledge. Pompey informed Cicero of what was expected of him. The orator took the blow as he must, refrained from making his threatened proposal, and for good measure supported Caesar's request for an extension of the proconsulship. But he was a broken man, and except for a very rare appearance in the Forum he devoted most of his energies from now till Caesar's death to writing in retirement.

The consulship of Pompey and Crassus was famous for little except the continued increase of rioting and open bribery at the elections. They accomplished the one thing

necessary to all three by passing the Trebonian law which meted out the offices agreed upon. In 54 Pompey was to leave for Spain, but found some excuse to put his command under two able lieutenants while he "postponed" his departure. Crassus sailed for the East at once and the same year crossed the Euphrates. Then after retreating to winter-quarters he set out toward Mesopotamia again in 53 with seven legions. His Arabian guides led him into the desert and informed the Parthians where to find him. There the fleetfooted Parthian cavalry played with his heavy legions for days. His son, who had been with Caesar in Gaul, fell in battle. Crassus was enticed into an interview and treacherously killed. Very few Romans escaped from this disgraceful venture; ten thousand were taken prisoners, 20,000 dead were scattered on the road of retreat from Carrhae.

Caesar meanwhile was continuing his campaigns in Gaul. He devoted the summer of 56 to subjugating the Veneti of Brittany and clearing the forested coast as far north as Calais. A rapidly improvised fleet under the command of Decimus Brutus did remarkable service here, an illustration of the versatility of Caesar's engineers and soldiers. In 55 he hastily constructed a bridge over the Rhine in ten days to demonstrate to the Germans that a broad and deep river was no barrier to his army if he should have occasion to contend with them. Then, crossing over, he gave them an object lesson in Roman warfare, recrossed and cut down the bridge. Similarly he made a hurried demonstration in Britain whence he had found that Gauls were apt to draw recruits. These were romantic exploits that appealed to all Romans, and on receiving the reports of them the Senate—then quite docile—voted a thanksgiving of twenty days. In 54, the year of Crassus' departure for the East, Caesar again invaded Britain since Gaul seemed to remain quiet. This time he exacted tribute from the tribes as far as the Thames and beyond. During the winter he quartered

his several legions apart because of the difficulty of getting food. The Nervii and Eburones rose in revolt and very nearly succeeded in surprising the scattered forces. Caesar suffered heavy losses and had to spend much of the next summer in putting down the rebellion.

By the year 52 Caesar had completely demonstrated to all the tribes what the *pax Romana* would mean. While it implied autonomy within the tribe, unless the tribe was stubbornly hostile, it clearly meant also the surrender of freedom of movement, of raiding and warfare of every kind, the surrender of the privilege of subduing and living upon the labor of neighboring tribes, and it meant in particular the payment of an annual tribute to Rome. It was in order to teach the Gauls these facts that Caesar had remained even during the years when Gaul seemed wholly pacified. The lesson was by no means pleasant, and the time finally came in 52 when dissatisfaction found a voice in many quarters especially in the south and center where the natives had not yet directly suffered in battle. Vercingetorix, a nobleman of the great tribe of the Arverni (Auvergne), led the revolt. The Gauls boldly burned their towns in an effort to starve out the enemy and kept up a successful warfare for months. Finally since Caesar would not be trapped Vercingetorix took possession of the strong town of Alesia with 80,000 men and when Caesar with his ten legions besieged him there he called upon all forces outside to surround Caesar in turn. The outer army is said to have had over 250,000 men. The steadiness of the Roman soldier, the loyalty of his men to Caesar, the resourcefulness of Caesar's officers were abundantly proved in this double battle. The outer army was scattered and Vercingetorix surrendered. The eighth and ninth summer's work completed the task of reducing the most refractory rebels. Caesar remained, however, to await the end of his term of office, occupied then as we shall see in a bitter controversy with Pompey and the Senate.

At Rome meanwhile the government was drifting into anarchy. Each of the triumvirs used influence, money and appointive offices freely at all elections in order to have as many personal henchmen in high office as possible and the Senate did no less, the ruffian ward-clubs of Clodius and Milo providing the strong arms and the votes, Milo usually in favor of the Senate, Clodius for the triumvirs or for his own candidates. Pompey continued to postpone his departure to Spain. He had so long enjoyed the position of "first man," *princeps*, in the state that even now when real influence was slipping from his hand, he preferred the shadow of a principate at Rome—and his flatterers made it appear real enough—to honest work in a province. He seems to have had before his eyes the example of the great Scipio who for a decade after the Punic war had walked the streets of Rome its uncrowned king. In fact Cicero was during these days writing his *De Republica* in which he strikingly pictured the beneficent rôle that an unofficial *princeps* or *rector* like Scipio could play in stabilizing a volatile democracy. Perhaps Cicero had in mind the work that Pompey might accomplish in that position. It is quite likely that Pompey talked these things over with Cicero, and that his conception of his position was in his own eyes dignified by the picture.

Pompey was certainly drawing away from Caesar whose reputation was increasing with each startling report from the North. Crassus was now gone so that the two who were left had only each other to suspect. Besides, Julia, who had been a devoted wife, and had exerted a strong influence over her husband, died in 54, and Pompey not so long after married Cornelia, the daughter of a leading senator. The suspicions of Caesar were seriously awakened at the end of 53 when Pompey did nothing to stem the election riots which broke up every attempt to elect the consuls for 52, and finally entered into an arrangement approved by the Senate that he should be made sole consul

with powers to put down the rioting. Indeed the lawlessness had gone so far that Milo and Clodius had met in a protracted battle on the Appian Way and fought till Clodius was slain. Pompey enjoyed the dignified office of "sole consul" and he did much good work in bringing back law and order, but, carried away by his new honor and by the suggestions of senators who saw an opportunity of breaking Caesar's power by means of Pompey, he was led to propose or permit the proposal of several measures inconsistent with his past promises to Caesar. Thus came the break which resulted only two years later in civil war.

CHAPTER XVII

THE CIVIL WAR

The dispute between Caesar and Pompey. The fatal quarrel between Pompey and Caesar arose out of a long series of disagreements. On the renewal of the triumvirate in 55 Caesar had been given a legal extension of his command for five years, that is formally till March, 49. The understanding was implicit, however, that he would necessarily hold the office till January, 48, since his successor would naturally be an ex-consul who would be released from office in Rome in December, not in March. Since Caesar would, like all promagistrates, remain till his successor arrived, the date of succession could only be in January of 48. No one at the time considered any other possibility. Furthermore Pompey had promised Caesar that he would at a suitable moment propose a law exempting Caesar from having to canvass for the consulship in person, so that he might step directly into a new consulship on his return. This was illegal, but after all a small breach in comparison with the illegalities both had committed in 59. To Caesar this promise was exceedingly important, for if he entered the city to canvass in 49 he would thereby become a private citizen and amenable to the courts; and Cato had served notice that he would at the first possible moment hale Caesar to court for treason. Pompey indeed kept his promise, and had Caesar exempted by a plebiscite.

However, when Pompey became sole consul in 52 and became reconciled with the Senate, he and his new friends began to devise schemes for reducing Caesar to the position of a private citizen before the date of his probable consulship, and they could do this the better because Caesar was now so occupied with Vercingetorix that he had no time to

watch every political move at Rome. Pompey's party found a plausible way out. Urging that proconsulships were being used to pay political debts, they proposed to check the evil by selecting for promagistracies only such persons as had held a magistracy fully five years before. The real purpose of this measure was, of course, to make it possible to find some former consul for Caesar's place the very day his official term was ended, and thus bring Caesar back to private life for nine months. It would of course also deprive Caesar in 48 of a new proconsulship for five years even if he got as far as the consulship in 48. Caesar's friends in the city did not see the bearing of this bill in time to stop its passage. Pompey then passed a bill forbidding canvassing for the consulship *in absentia*. When asked how this conformed with his promises to Caesar in the previous bill of exemption, he evasively said that in his view a specific exemption was probably valid despite a general prohibition passed later.

Caesar, now on his guard, saw that the only legal means he had of preventing disaster to himself was to employ the services of some tribune to veto the appointment of a successor before the day of his return, and by this method the vital question was postponed till late in the year 50. Meanwhile he offered through his representatives to resign office if Pompey did the same, a proposal to which the Senate dared not listen. Pompey was no match for Caesar in a contest at the polls. His prestige lay entirely in his supposed superiority as a soldier. Though he had no great army at present he had recalled from Caesar's army a legion formerly lent him, to which the Senate had added another from Gaul on the plea that Parthian invasions into Syria required troops. And he also had strong legions in Spain that might conceivably attack Caesar from the rear.

In November the dispute came to a head. The Senate on the consul's motion voted a preliminary bill that a successor should be sent to Gaul before March 1. A tribune in the pay of Caesar pointed out that this might mean civil

war and immediately proposed that both Pompey and Caesar should lay down their commands simultaneously. The frightened Senate by a large majority adopted the motion—this of course was not binding, since a *senatus consultum* could hardly override the plebiscites that had bestowed the commands. However it showed that Pompey's supporters were yielding. The consul accordingly on his own initiative pretentiously handed the sword to Pompey, commissioning him to defend the state. This seems to have been merely a gesture without legal authority, but it impressed the people who supposed the act significant; and Pompey, seeing that he must act at once or lose, accepted the command and ordered a levy of troops throughout Italy. There is also archaeological evidence that masons were set to work to strengthen the weak points of Rome's fortifications at this time.

On the first of January, 49, when the new consuls took office, the question must come up for final settlement as all knew. After hearing a new proposal from Caesar that he would yield all but two legions if he might stand for the consulship *in absentia* the Senate voted that Caesar must retire from office on July first or be declared a public enemy. Mark Antony, then tribune, acting in Caesar's behalf, promptly vetoed the measure. For days the friends of peace tried to break the deadlock by urging each or both to yield. Cicero very nearly succeeded in persuading Pompey to advocate a compromise, but the conservative senators overrode his counsel and on the seventh the Senate passed the "last decree" which disregarded the tribune's veto and threw the government into the hands of the military power. The tribunes departed that night and reached Ariminum in three days. Caesar had already set out from Ravenna the evening before with his own legion, crossed the Rubicon, and now he met the tribunes on Italian soil.

There would be little point in attempting to apportion

the guilt in this quarrel. Both Caesar and Pompey were concerned chiefly about themselves, willing to risk the blood of innocents for personal advantage. And when men like Cicero hesitated to take sides we can only be grateful that there were still Romans who felt disgust at the heedless egoism of both contestants. Pompey has perhaps won more sympathy from historians, but that is probably because the blame on his side was shared by the Senate. His two agreements with Caesar in 60 and in 56 to override the constitution for the sake of mutual benefits made him as culpable as Caesar. Nor does it wash away his guilt that he suddenly became sensitive to the claims of the constitution when finally he had secured his own future before Caesar could do the same. It must also be added that, considering the pledges made him by Pompey in 56, Caesar's offers in 50 and 49 were so reasonable that one must exonerate him from the charge of maneuvering for a war and a dictatorship. He intended to keep alive and in a position of great power for the rest of his life, and he was willing to shed other men's blood for that, but there is no proof that when he took up the quarrel he aimed at anything more.

Caesar's victories. Pompey had hoped to hold Rome and to decide the conflict in Italy, but Caesar, though he had but one legion with him, dashed forward at once, knowing that Italy blamed the Senate for the war and that if he came rapidly enough he would be able to pick up most of the recruits being levied for Pompey. When Pompey saw what was happening he marched his two legions southward: having been with Caesar recently they were not wholly reliable. Most of the Senate went with him. He barely had time to embark from Brundisium for Greece before Caesar came up.

Caesar, however, could not well follow Pompey eastward. It would require time to build transports, and meanwhile Pompey, whose name was held in great esteem in the

East, would gather large forces and take charge of the provincial armies of the eastern provinces. Caesar therefore decided to set the machinery of a favorable government going at Rome, secure the grain provinces of the West which Pompey had tried to hold in the hope of starving Italy, put all the shipyards of Italy to work building a fleet, and, picking up his Gallic legions on the way, proceed to Spain to destroy the Pompeian veterans on his rear. He secured all Italian ports readily, but Massilia (Marseilles), influenced by the proconsul Domitius, refused to espouse his cause. Since this Greek port might readily receive a garrison from Pompey and block the communications between Italy and Spain in his absence, he left a part of his army under Decimus Brutus to reduce it, and himself proceeded to Spain. Here Pompey's lieutenants, Petreius, Afranius, and Terentius Varro, the great scholar, commanded seven legions. In a campaign of 40 days, in which Caesar assumed the most hazardous risks for the sake of saving time, he defeated them. He dismissed the captive officers, as was his strangely generous custom, and accepted the services of most of the troops in his own army. Then returning, he remained at Massilia till it was stormed, marched on to Rome, and, accepting the dictatorship for a few days, had himself and a friend, Servilius Isauricus, elected consuls for the next year.

As consul he passed a law giving the citizenship to the Transpadanes for which they thanked him by recruiting liberally for service in his army. He also attempted to restore business credit and induce the circulation of money by declaring a moratorium, putting into effect a liberal bankruptcy rule, and permitting a limited repudiation of debts by ordering the courts to allow debtors the privilege of deducting interest already paid from the principal. A general repudiation, which was urged by the many bankrupts who had joined him, he refused to consider.

Now he set out for Greece with seven legions, but having

transports for only half of these he had to divide his forces. Pompey's admiral, who had raked the Eastern harbors for ships, patrolled the Straits of Otranto day and night. Caesar, however, slipped through with his first division. With this portion he dashed for Dyrrhachium to seize Pompey's supplies, but was outraced by Pompey who was now returning from his Thessalian recruiting grounds. Caesar was now in danger of being overwhelmed, since Antony had thus far been unable to bring the remnant of his army through Pompey's patrol. Indeed Caesar put out one stormy night in a small boat to lead them over in person, but he too failed to make the crossing because of high seas. When finally Antony appeared Caesar undertook to besiege Pompey's army at Dyrrhachium. The task turned out to be impossible because of the extent of the walls that must be covered. Caesar indeed has been criticized for thus inviting failure, but it must be remembered that his engineers had grown to be experts in trenching and barricading in the sieges of Gergovia and Alesia. He doubtless had reason for his faith in the attempt. Pompey eventually broke through his circumvallations, and Caesar in want of supplies, since he did not control the sea, retreated to the plains of Thessaly.

Pharsalia. Pompey's intention was to avoid battle till his troops were hardened and till the army of Caesar should begin to suffer from want of food. But the consuls and senators were impatient to return to Rome and divide the spoils. Pompey, who had formally accepted the position of obedient servant to the government he carried in his train, yielded to their demands, and against his better judgment offered battle at Pharsalia. He had in fact an army about twice as large as Caesar's with a very superior force of cavalry, but individually his soldiers were no match for the toughened veterans that had for ten years under Caesar outfought huge armies of barbarians. It was chiefly a question of whether Caesar could stem the first

attack of Pompey's large force of cavalry which would naturally try to ride around his flanks and enclose his rear. He did this successfully by a skilful disposition of ambushed cohorts at critical points behind the lines. When the cavalry attack had thus been parried, the rest was not difficult. Pompey's army was completely routed. The general escaped from the field and took ship for Egypt where he hoped that young Ptolemy might show him kindness for his part in restoring the king's father to his throne a few years before. When Pompey arrived, however, Ptolemy chanced to be encamped with his army near the coast, on the point in fact of attacking the forces of his sister and co-ruler Cleopatra. The king's advisers, fearing that the Roman contingents of the Egyptian army (the troops sent to aid the king in 56) would espouse the cause of Pompey and thus draw Egypt into war, advised that the safest course would be to dispose of Pompey and welcome the victor. Pompey was accordingly invited into a small boat and treacherously slain as he was about to land. It is reported that Caesar later had the murderers put to death.

Caesar at Alexandria. Since Egypt might possibly prove a rallying point for his enemies, Caesar decided if possible to go to Egypt and establish peace between Ptolemy and Cleopatra and pledge them to his cause. Their father had indeed decreed that both should rule, but the ministers of state and the army refused to recognize Cleopatra. Angered by Caesar's intervention, they suddenly attacked him, and but for his presence of mind they might have sealed his fate. Caesar, however, blockaded in the center of Alexandria, held out tenaciously against all attacks until his officers had scoured Palestine and Syria for a rescuing force. It was not till March of 47 that he was relieved. Since the king had perished in the struggle Caesar now placed Cleopatra on the throne, and, it is said, remained for two or three months to inaugurate her in her onerous duties as queen,

for she was very young and inexperienced—and very beautiful.

The siege of Caesar at Alexandria which had so nearly caused his undoing encouraged his enemies to gather their forces. Many of the senators, following the lead of Cato and Scipio, went to Africa where the Numidian king was known to be friendly to the Senate. Pharnaces, the son of Mithradates, had also refused to submit to the new cause and had defeated a Roman army. At home there was also much dissatisfaction. In fact the hotheaded Caelius, whom Caesar had left as praetor, apparently to please the radical element, had declared a new moratorium without permission, and in his court had entertained all sorts of requests for the remission of rents and debts. He had to be deposed by Mark Antony, Caesar's master of horse, and now Dolabella, the tribune, was making similar efforts through madcap legislation. Caesar turned first to the East, marched quickly across to Pontus, and in the summer of 47 put an end to Pharnaces' forces at Zela. It was from that battlefield that he sent home the theatrical but famous dispatch: *Veni, vidi, vici*.

Caesar at Rome. Returning to Rome he strengthened credits again by disowning the radical elements. In the early winter he ordered his troops to embark for Africa. However, the legions stationed in Campania mutinied when ordered to embark, marched on Rome and demanded their arrears of pay and discharge. The famous tenth legion which had been his favorite in Gaul seems to have led in the movement. Caesar's prompt daring on this occasion greatly impressed the Romans, and was no doubt significant of the swift and penetrating judgment which played so large a part in his success. Though threatened with personal violence he went out to the camp, faced the soldiers, and in a few cutting remarks that wisely referred to past successes and future triumphs he discharged them. In a moment they were on their knees begging to be taken back.

At the elections, which of course he controlled, Caesar accepted the consulship again together with Lepidus, a willing tool of his, but he also retained the dictatorship. Governorships were distributed, and in a spirit of conciliation he chose Marcus Junius Brutus, who had been in Pompey's army, for Cisalpine Gaul, one of the most important posts at his disposal. This Brutus bore a name distinguished in five centuries of Roman history for stubborn love of liberty, and though he had submitted to Caesar after the battle of Pharsalia, we have no reason to think that he loved Caesar or made any effort to capture the good graces of the dictator. It was rather Caesar who sought out Brutus. He had too many bankrupts and upstarts in his following and too few men who were trustworthy and respected. Brutus also was related by blood or marriage to a large number of the noble families of Rome, the Junii, Livii, Porcii, Servilii, Hortensii, and others, and would obviously be a great asset. There is little ground for the criticism that historians have heaped upon the young man because he accepted office from Caesar. When Brutus assumed the governorship Caesar had not yet revealed his intention of establishing an autocracy. Brutus received his office by means of the legitimate channels of appointment, and since provinces must be governed and governed by the best possible men, Brutus was only serving his state by accepting.

The Battle of Thapsus. During the sixteen months that had elapsed after Pharsalia, the republican forces gathering in the province of Africa had grown very strong. King Juba of Numidia contributed a large army and especially a strong cavalry force accustomed to fighting over the hot sands of the South. Scipio and Cato were names that attracted republican partisans from all quarters, and they had the services of practiced generals in Labienus, Afranius, and Petreius. Caesar spent the first three months of 46 in holding his own on a narrow coast of Africa till he had

gathered enough of an army to strike. On April 6, he attacked the forces of Scipio on the field of Thapsus and again won a decisive victory. Of the leaders only Labienus escaped. Cato fled with a few others to the city of Utica where he advised the townsmen to surrender to Caesar. Then he withdrew to his room and committed suicide. It was perhaps this act of martyrdom which more than all the deeds of his life made him a vital force in Roman history, for, though a man of unquestioned integrity and indomitable courage, he had lacked both the appealing human traits and the broad-seeing wisdom that make an effective leader of men. The manner of his death touched with sentiment those virtues which during his life-time had made his personality somewhat repellent. His name was henceforth of great inspiration as long as Rome survived.

Caesar's government. The war now seemed to be over, for no one expected that the feeble-witted sons of Pompey hiding in Spain could cause any real trouble. All eyes were on Caesar anxiously watching for signs of a definite policy. Some dared to hope for a return to constitutional forms, but in vain. Many feared that Caesar, now that complete power was in his hands, would wreak vengeance in a proscription as had both Marius, his uncle, and Sulla. This he did not do. In fact he declared openly that he had no punishments to mete out and that he would make no difference between Pompeians and Caesarians. In a letter that he wrote early in the war he had announced this policy to some of his friends, although in terms that seem to reveal only the calculating politician. The gist of the letter is this: "Since most conquerors have failed to hold power because they have averted sympathy through cruelty, I shall attempt to win lasting power by a policy of clemency." However it may be that this letter betrays the spirit of the recipients rather than the actual motive of the writer. Caesar's was, on the whole, a generous nature, and it is only fair to say that wholesome instincts played a larger

rôle in his behavior than did calculation. Nevertheless there was some suffering. The rights of heirs were not always closely considered when the properties of fallen republicans were put up at public auction. His nearest advisers and intimates were to a large extent small-minded flatterers so that men of the opposite party seldom had a favorable hearing. Cicero alone of the old Pompeians had the heart to undertake the disagreeable task of begging him humbly for the life and restoration of forgotten republicans in exile. And these speeches are uttered in a tone of deference that prove liberty obsolete. In a free state such speeches would have had no effect. Here they accomplished their purpose.

During the seven months that Caesar remained at Rome in 46 (July to December, with two intercalated months) he accomplished an immense amount of work. There had of course first to be a splendid triumph, for he had not yet celebrated his victories even over the Gauls, and the Romans had so largely escaped the need of participation in the wars—the old Gallic army had borne the brunt of all contests—that they needed a visual demonstration of what had been achieved if they were to comprehend the sequel. Four days were set apart for four separate triumphs, over Gaul, Egypt (nothing could be said regarding Pompey), Pontus, and Africa (Juba and not Cato was officially named as the enemy). Magnificent games were given, each soldier received about \$1,000, and bounties in money and food were lavished on all citizens to pay the expenses of the holiday season. Thus began the efforts to make autocracy popular. At a most impressive ceremony Caesar dedicated a temple to Venus Genetrix, for which a very beautiful statue of a goddess created by edict was made by the best artist of the day. The name implied of course that Caesar was of divine race, a common enough boast in Asiatic monarchies. The Roman people took it as a pleasant whim and passed on. They were doomed to

learn very soon that this act was full of the deepest significance.

In this year's legislation Caesar was most seriously concerned in repairing the machinery of government and getting it into steady action. The means did not concern him greatly though he generally employed the Senate and Assembly in their recognized functions. As consul he frequently proposed administrative measures to the Senate, but he first filled up the Senate with his partisans in order to secure favorable action. All measures proposed in the Senate or Assembly—he employed either or both as best suited his purpose—were drawn up beforehand under his supervision. Bills that bore his approval were not discussed or vetoed. They were invariably adopted; and no one ventured to propose bills without his approval. Much was done even more expeditiously by orders from the dictator (he had now been voted the office for ten years) or by a free use of his powers as perpetual censor. Some of the more important measures that seem to belong to this period may be mentioned in order that we may note the trend of Caesar's statesmanship.

First he called in the best astronomer of the day, a Greek scientist of Alexandria, and with him reformed the Roman calendar. The old year of 355 days which required an intercalary month every second year was replaced by a calendar of 365 days with a leap year every fourth year. This calendar, with a slight revision made by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582 A. D., is of course still in use. To adapt the old to the new system it was necessary to insert 67 days between November and December.

Much wisdom was displayed in Caesar's method of caring for discharged soldiers. They were not like Sulla's veterans colonized in groups to become turbulent masses later, but were scattered about where individual lots were found available. The unemployed urban crowd was also dealt with. The clubs that had frequently been used by

Clodius for political purposes were abolished, with the exception of the bona fide industrial *collegia* that had had charters of long standing. A commission was appointed to cut down to less than half their size the enormous number (320,000) of those receiving free grain. Every application was scrutinized and state aid was given only in accordance with reasonable principles. We shall see later that Caesar colonized in foreign parts great masses of these urban poor.

Sumptuary laws were also needed in order to remind the thoughtless spendthrifts that when finances are in a critical condition money has to be drawn into legitimate business and investments by repressing luxurious living. Caesar had market inspectors to control prices and the amount that could be purchased of certain rare commodities, and he designated a specific amount that he thought a reasonable allowance for the monthly bill for the table. The bread and meat cards that have recently been so extensively imposed in European countries hark back to a very ancient precedent. He also reimposed the 5 per cent import taxes for Italy which had been abolished in 60 B. C. This aided somewhat in reducing imports, and it also laid upon the Italians some small part of the expenses of government, which they had been too lightly escaping.

He also concerned himself seriously with the question of how to promote a better citizenship. Slaves had to a dangerous extent been the body from which the Roman population grew. They were practically the only immigrants since they could be bought and brought in to fill every new need. He did not indeed attempt to stem manumission, though he presently sent out great hordes of freedmen to colonies, but he laid down the rule that grazers—who were of course the extensive users of slave labor—should employ at least one free citizen to every two slaves. This might serve as the beginning of a reform. And he opened the door to a healthier immigration by granting

citizenship liberally to medical practitioners and to all teachers of the liberal arts. His most important measure for the betterment of the status of Roman citizens throughout Italy was his *lex Julia Municipalis* which provided a model charter for all municipalities. Such a model had long been needed since the Social war, which had nominally given citizenship to all Italians, had been followed by civil wars and by Sulla's unsympathetic *régime* with the result that the Italians had had no help from Rome in founding local governments when their tribal organizations broke up. They were therefore floundering in all sorts of blind experiments. Caesar's model charter—which we have in part in a broken inscription—adopted the conservative principle already in vogue in older Roman municipalities of using a city council of a hundred ex-magistrates as *decuriones* in whose hands lay the power of making all city ordinances. Democrat though he claimed to be Caesar did not think it proper to employ the general town-meeting for this purpose. The executive and judicial power was held by a board of four men elected annually, the elective power remaining in the whole democratic assembly of citizens. The division of power was laid down very specifically and the arrangements for street paving, for policing, fire protection and the like were thoroughly thought out. It is a charter on which municipalities could still govern themselves with success.

Such was the work Caesar accomplished in the few months while planning the Spanish campaign. The great problem of Rome's own constitution he did not touch directly. Whatever he intended finally to do with that, he could better do after he had accustomed the Senate to the exposure of its helplessness. It was not yet time to reveal his final intentions. But in the circumscribed program that he now chose to assume one sees in every detail the result of keen observation, a detachment of judgment, and a scientist's eagerness to obtain the relevant facts in the case.

He possessed in very great measure that analytical mind which reveals itself in almost every page of Rome's code of laws; which the Gracchi possessed but dulled with sentimental impulses; which Sulla also possessed though he let the spirit of revenge distort the aim of every law he devised.

Caesar in Spain. Meanwhile Labienus and the two sons of Pompey were gathering the remnants of Pompeian and Sertorian forces in Spain and adding large bodies of Spanish mercenaries in order to prepare for a final struggle. Caesar sent on an army in the autumn of 46 and at the end of the year set out to join it. It is characteristic of the man's power of concentration that on this journey he sloughed off cares of state and thoughts of war to such an extent that he composed a long poem about the journey called "Iter," a grammatical treatise, and a criticism of Cato (the *Anti-Cato*) in answer to the laudatory "Cato" which Cicero had just published. In March (45) the opposing forces met at Munda in Spain, and Caesar won his last battle. He remained for some months punishing rebellious tribes, rewarding loyal ones by the gift of full citizenship or "Latin" rights, and in general consolidating Roman interests in the province. On his return journey he gave much of his attention to Octavius, his grandnephew, an intelligent and attractive youth of seventeen years. As soon as he reached Rome he drew up a new will in which—apparently without informing Octavius—he made him his son and heir.

Caesar's position in the state. On receiving the news of Munda, the Senate passed a series of decrees very extensively increasing Caesar's powers and honors. A fifty-day thanksgiving was decreed, the month Quinctilis was renamed Julius (Oriental kings had had such honors), the title of *pater patriae* was given him, and his portrait was to appear on Rome's coins—another ominous custom adopted from Oriental kings.

His powers were made supreme by the gift of all magisterial power. First he was voted the consulship for ten

years, but this he refused. It was not his policy to lend dignity to old republican offices. The Senate took the hint and designated him dictator for life, adding the proconsular office for life (by virtue of which he kept the supreme command of all armies), full censorial power under the title of "praefectus morum" (which gave him control of all lists of senators, knights, and citizens), and the perpetual *intercessio* or *Tribunicia potestas* (whereby he could prevent any attempt at independent legislation). He was now autocrat in more than name, and his acceptance of these powers after refusing the ten-year consulship is proof sufficient that he had invited these offices through his agents and that he had not been laden down with them against his will by a servile Senate, as his apologists claimed after his death. Nor need we blame him. There were numberless things still to be done at Rome by way of correcting ancient abuses, and Caesar frankly assumed the powers which would make it possible to do this work quickly and without tedious opposition. His acceptance of autocratic power was not necessarily an indication of the form of government he meant finally to devise. Sulla for instance had employed autocratic powers for the restoration of senatorial rule.

There was another series of honors which Caesar accepted—and we must conclude, invited—which was even more significant of his intended course, honors which pointed to a desire to lift himself above ordinary men to the position of a divinity. And he had already suggested this course when he invented the new goddess Venus Genetrix—Venus the parent of the Julian gens. It was certainly not without suggestions from Caesar's agents that the Senate voted that a statue of Caesar was to be carried among statues of divinities in the stately procession at the games, that one was also to be placed in the temple of Quirinus (the deified Romulus) where a bust of a mere human being had no right to appear, and finally that his palace on the Palatine should have a pediment like that

of temples—suggesting to all passers-by that the inhabitant was a god. It was his acceptance of these un-Roman honors—nay the conviction that he invited these honors—that most angered old patriots. These are the things that Cicero in his guarded letters to intimate friends mentions in deep rage, not the dictatorship and other insignia of autocracy. Had Caesar gone mad? Had he lost his comprehension of what Romans would endure? Was he too drunk with power to remain a man among men? This has been the problem that students of Caesar's character have endlessly debated. One group of historians has attributed his behavior to a loss of self-control associated with an increased manifestation of epileptic attacks; another has insisted that the honors were maliciously bestowed for the purpose of destroying Caesar's popularity.

Recently a third explanation, more in accord with all the available facts, has been offered. Briefly, it is that Caesar, like Alexander the Great, observing that in all Oriental nations autocracy had succeeded only where the ruler based his power upon the theory of divine rights, had deliberately chosen to accustom the Roman people gradually to acknowledge the superhuman character of their ruler. In Persia as in Egypt the king was more than man. He was a descendant of gods, a spokesman of gods, or himself a divinity, whose utterances could not be gainsaid. Alexander, comprehending the fact that his reforms and his great plans for unifying Greece were hindered on every hand by treaties, laws and constitutions, and that he might over-ride these only if he could accustom the Greeks to the idea that his decrees, emanating from a superhuman source, were final, had deliberately spread the story of his descent from Zeus Ammon. Julius Caesar, who was a close student of the career of Alexander, who knew Asiatic and Egyptian customs from personal observation, seems to have adopted a similar policy. He knew that the Romans, accustomed for five centuries to democracy,

would not easily be trained for autocracy, that the Senate would for a while remain subservient since it had been packed by his partisans, but that these too would grow to the dignity of their office, imbibe the spirit of independence, and revolt. Though he was belittling the consulship by putting weak men into the office for brief terms, accidents might happen; some incumbent might one day assert his independence, and kindle a revolt. Caesar's plan, difficult to comprehend in the light of modern customs, was after all very reasonable in the society of that day. Rome was filled with Orientals who were accustomed to the theory of divine royalty. The mob at least would only too readily adopt the idea and would be all the more devoted to the ruler for his elevation. Many of the senators also who had held provinces in the East remembered how the Orientals had preferred to bow before them as to semi-divine beings. They were already half trained to accept the idea. And Caesar's plan was to be brought in gradually and with due caution. He intended to be declared *rex* at first not over Italy but over the provinces. An oracle was found which seemed to declare that only a *rex* could conquer Parthia. He would remain in the East for some years, conquering and organizing the empire as far as Persia. He would probably take up his headquarters in Alexandria or at Troy, which was according to rumor to be rebuilt. At such a center he would, during a few years, call his Senate to attendance, and at such a center in surroundings wholly Oriental even the senators would accustom themselves in time to the pomp of a royal court of the Oriental type. Such seems to have been Caesar's plan.

If we grant that the huge Roman empire could no longer be ruled by senatorial cliques and a confused assembly we must also admit that Caesar was right in assuming that the most reasonable and obvious experiment—though not the only possible one—was to centralize imperial and urban control in the hands of one man. And in view of the fact

that the old kingship of Rome was according to tradition elective, a system which was provocative of civil war, we must also admit that the hereditary autocracy of the well-known Hellenistic type was the obvious one to choose. Considering therefore the difficulties of instituting a *regnum* over occidental peoples accustomed to democracy, we may finally admit that it was wise to try to infuse a religious sentiment into the autocratic institution, which would at least reconcile the mixed populace to the idea. There was a great danger that the nobles of Rome would find the idea revolting, but Caesar had now for so many years been absent from Rome at the head of armies that he was no longer a familiar presence. He might well succeed in imposing his plan upon them, and if he succeeded for a few years, the danger would gradually lessen. At any rate his plan seems to have been carefully thought out, and that it came so near succeeding is proof that he well understood the requirements of that day's society. Of course we know that it failed and that his heir after dallying with the idea for some time rejected it, but it was Caesar's plan which was eventually adopted, and it was not till a very few years ago that modern occidental nations were able through a harrowing war to rid themselves of the last vestiges of the Oriental notion that kings ruled *Dei gratia*.

Caesar's plans. It was Caesar's intention to set out for the East in 44 for an extended campaign, and before going he laid out a large number of projects which were to be carried out in his absence. Only a few were brought to completion by his successor, who inherited a looted treasury, but the program is interesting in revealing the character of the empire-builder.

As a basis for scientific taxation and colonization in all the provinces he conceived the stupendous program of having a complete survey and census taken throughout the empire. Hitherto citizens alone had been taken into consideration. The day was approaching, in Caesar's view

of society, when the Roman and Italian should have no advantages above the Gaul, the Greek, and the Asiatic. He was turning the empire into a melting pot. Gauls and Spaniards, even sons of ex-slaves, were elevated to the Senate by him. Whole cities of tribes recently subdued were turned into Romans by his command. Colonies of veterans, on the contrary, were settled at Narbo and Arles in Gaul and a colony proposed for Lyons. These cities of Provence made the Rhone valley a new Italy. Spain received colonies of Romans, Spaniards and legionaries at Cordova, Seville, Tarragona, New Carthage, and Urso. The last named received chiefly freedmen from Rome for whom Caesar drew up a plan of government which still exists. From this colonization dates the rapid Romanization of Spain. Large groups of citizens, chiefly freedmen, were also sent to rebuild Carthage, long a waste, Corinth, so cruelly destroyed by the Senate in 146, Sinope and Heraclea, far off on the Black Sea. These had once been important trading cities, hence Caesar chose for them freedmen who were more calculated to make successful tradespeople than farmers. He even had the Isthmus of Corinth surveyed with the intention of cutting a canal from the Aegean to the gulf of Corinth where he placed the colony. In a word the empire was to be unified and the subjects were to be lifted to equality with the Italians as soon as possible; and as a voucher for his sincerity he abolished the unfair contract system of tax-gathering in the collection of the regular tithes and diminished all exactions to a marked degree. So far was he willing to consider the convenience of subjects that the Jews were exempted from paying the tribute for Sabbatical years when by an old stupid custom they remained unproductive.

There were also liberal plans drawn for the betterment and beautifying of Rome and Italy. Rome was to have an up-to-date harbor with breakwaters, deepened channel, and docks at Ostia, and a canal was to provide cheap barge

traffic for all of Latium from Tarracina along the coast line to the Tiber. The Pomptine marshes and Lake Fucinus were to be drained and large expanses of good land made available for agriculture—projects that were carried out at immense expense in the nineteenth century. At Rome the Campus Martius was to be given over to building sites, a new Campus being planned farther northwest, and to make room for this the Tiber was to be thrown to the foot of the Vatican hills. Plans were also drawn up for new government buildings, for a theater on the slope of the Capitoline and for a large public library. Finally we must mention Caesar's project of making a digest of laws and edicts, a work for which a noted jurist was chosen. Caesar's death put an end to this undertaking also, and the labor had to await the far less competent hands of Justinian's jurists. When one sees what Rome lost in social and economic betterment by Caesar's death one cannot but regret that autocracy could not this once have had an opportunity to prove its efficiency. A man of such broad sympathies, keen vision, daring imagination, and energy was not to be given to Rome again.

CHAPTER XVIII

INTERNAL CONDITIONS

We have followed the external and political history of Rome through a century of crises. It is time to stop and take a brief survey of the less obtrusive activities of the people.

Education. The Roman Republic had long hesitated to assume any burdens beyond those of governing. Economic and social welfare was considered the concern of the individual. It seems to be generally true that paternalistic autocrats are those who have most extended the functions of government. The Roman household had always cared for the education of children and continued to a large extent to do so during this period. Private schools were, however, increasing rapidly in number. When boys had learned the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic, their parents were apt to send them to a teacher (a *grammaticus*) who taught them Greek and read Homer and the Greek dramatists with them, drilling, explaining and lecturing. The poems of Ennius, Livius, and Lucilius came similarly to be Latin text-books used for study. After this if the pupil desired further guidance in general reading he was apt to go to Athens, Rhodes or Naples, and attend lectures under several masters, some of whom taught philosophy, others literature and the rules of composition. Most Roman boys of good family however kept in mind the possibility of entering a public career. They therefore combined lectures in composition and "rhetoric" with actual attendance upon some distinguished friend of the family who practised law and spoke in the Forum.

The "rhetorical" training was precise and extensive. The pupils studied model selections of oratorical prose

in Greek and Latin, analyzed the faults and virtues of each, tried to comprehend the rules of composition even to the point of knowing, for instance, some sixty different figures of speech and the applicability of each. The attendance on some man actually engaged in the Forum brought knowledge of content as well as form. It even performed the functions of a course at law by use of what may be called an applied "case system." That is to say, the young apprentice could help in working up the brief, could take notes in court of the manner and method of his preceptor and of the opponent, and could have his preceptor's comments upon all phases of the case. So also he would attend in the Forum when political speeches were made, imbibing the secrets of mob psychology while observing the style and delivery of the speaker. It was in this way that Rome's great public men were trained for their work. Since moreover a young man could not enter upon a curule office till he was at least thirty, his years of general study (unless he went into army service) were apt to continue, at least in a desultory fashion, for a long time. In Cicero's day most young men of good families were well read in Greek literature and philosophy.

Philosophy. The philosophic discussions of this period were no longer very fruitful, for philosophy had made its way into a cul-de-sac as it were. The brilliant Greek thinkers of a few centuries before had set out to follow the thinking process wherever it led, and it seemed for the moment to lead to infinite possibilities. Intellect seemed for a while capable of explaining the secrets of the universe, the nature of God, and the composition of matter. A faculty that could ferret out the harmonies in numbers revealed by geometry, that could organize society into states, and that could by an effort of the imagination beget atomic theories seemed capable of everything. And since the behavior of the mind seemed far more interesting than dead matter, philosophers chose to rationalize rather than

experiment. This is why philosophy so quickly soared into metaphysics and hesitated so long to undertake minute researches in mere physical nature. The greatest and most promising field was obviously to be tried first, and it required some centuries to explain it and discover that in order to make progress man has patiently to begin at the humbler task of acquiring data from a careful examination of the physical world. By the time philosophy came to Rome the first great period of exultant discovery was over. Metaphysics had discovered its shortcomings. The Skeptics had found out that imagination was not a reliable guide to truth, and that even man's senses with which he tried to acquire firm data were apparently not wholly reliable. Then came a period of depression and doubt. The successors of Aristotle were humbly confessing that the great facts of the universe were probably unattainable, and that philosophy should perhaps busy itself with the humbler task of defining man's social and political duties. Thus it is that in Cicero's day the teachers of philosophy, mostly Stoics and Epicureans, were for the moment concerning themselves generally with questions of conduct, that is with ethics. The fault lay neither with the Greeks nor the Romans. It is simply a natural reaction that always comes at a certain stage of thought, as it has again returned after a century of enthusiastic post-Kantian metaphysics which has ended in a reversion towards Stoical "pragmatism."

Stoicism still remained popular at Rome. Men of strong character, who had inherited the family traditions and temperament of an unsentimental puritanism, as very many of the Roman nobles had, found a natural appeal in its firm call to duty and in its encouragement of political activity. Its pantheistic metaphysics had to be taken on faith, and faith did not ordinarily appeal to the practical-minded logic of the Romans, but there seemed to be a justification for pantheism in Rome's own political experience, the rapid establishment of a world-empire. Since ultimate cause was

admittedly an inscrutable thing, the Stoic metaphysics could at least be tolerated—and neglected. That the philosophy had a great positive influence we do not find. On intellectual progress its effects were on the whole banal, for it tended to satisfy the inquisitive mind of man with empty phrases, to discourage philosophic and scientific investigation, to insist that man's thinking must be directed wholly to ethical ends and that any science which had no direct bearing upon the conduct of man towards his fellowmen was wholly futile. And philosophy, as well as science, which aims only at practical ends soon decays at the core.

Epicureanism was growing more popular in the Caesarian period. The Stoics derided it because of what they called its immoral implications in that it frankly accepted hedonism. This, however, was a phase with which the early Roman devotees of Epicureanism, like Lucretius and Vergil, did not concern themselves. In fact the loftiest ethical teachers of Rome happen to belong to this school. What attracted them especially were the atomic theory and the theory of evolution which, incomplete though they were, enabled the rationalistic Romans to break away from a crude and already despised mythology as well as from the aprioristic mysticism of such solutions as Stoicism offered them. The Romans had by this time passed through several centuries of startling experiences in large governmental problems, in law making, in the intricate logic of courts. They had grown to like the tangible and common sense point of view in logic. A cosmology based upon the clash of atoms seemed to them far more sensible than transcendental hypotheses. This theory also dignified intellectual activity. It acknowledged that the search for universal causes was worth while even if it had no bearing upon conduct. And men being endowed with the instinct to search felt a sense of relief in a philosophy which took cognizance of this instinct. Unfortunately the Romans had not yet had time to develop the tools and methods of scien-

tific research—skepticism of metaphysical methods had barely had time as yet to do its work—but they were searching out the new way. When Lucretius argued the theories of the indestructibility of matter, and the constancy of connections between cause and effect, he did not, to be sure, devise laboratory methods by which to test these theories, but he did use nature as a laboratory, observe very keenly how nature worked, and based his conclusions on such observations. This was the beginning of the inductive scientific method; and because of such preliminary work the modern laboratories found the way clear to continue research by use of direct experimental work. Had Epicureanism had a fair chance against imperial opposition—which was exerted on ethical grounds—and against mysticism—which came on with Oriental immigration—it might well have brought in the day of scientific research by following up the enthusiastic propaganda of such young men as Lucretius and Vergil.

Ethics and morality. To the modern student trained from childhood to base his conduct on an authoritative system of conduct, it is always a curious question what civilized men took as their standard of conduct before Christianity imposed its dictum. He wonders how it is that men like Cato and Cicero, Vergil and Horace, might even now be accepted as living exemplary lives in any modern community. They were not after all prepared each seventh day by moral discourses to keep up their standards of conduct for the week. We do not find an answer to this question in Roman religion, for the early religion, which had shown a tendency—not very strong—to take on ethical import, had long ago been overwhelmed by Greek mythology, which despite its beauty was as pagan as a luxuriant imagination could well make it. Indeed the Greek gods had rather to be moralized by the Romans. Nor do we find a serious answer in philosophy. The Epicurean tenet which held that only a well regulated life led

to true happiness brought no compulsion, for the young man was at liberty to chose immediate pleasure in preference to ultimate happiness if he cared to assume the risks. The Stoic argument was too elaborate to be quite convincing. It did try to find a universally binding sanction for good conduct by saying that nature's laws are to be followed, and that since what was peculiarly natural to man was his reason, he should at all times consult his reason. Good conduct naturally followed. But the query might readily suggest itself to the young man whether instincts were not as natural as reason. And if he decided that they were, his philosophy held up no authority nor any fear of consequences in the Stoic Nirvana of collective survival of souls to deter him from following natural impulses of which his reason might not approve.

Nevertheless the standard catalogue of virtues emphasized by the Romans, though it does not quite coincide with Christian doctrine, differs less in content than in a shift of emphasis. The Romans possessed a keen sense of equity which, at least up to the time of the civil wars, manifested itself in honest dealing. It had begotten the liberal spirit in politics that made the federation of Italy a success, for Rome's word was trustworthy, and this sense of equity was the element in Roman law which adapted it to the use of all courts in all lands. Polybius has especially remarked that in contracts the oath of a Roman could be relied upon as that of Greeks could not.

The Romans also had a strong feeling of fellowship, based apparently on a social instinct which was inherited from of old. No state has in the past grown very great whose citizens prized individuality above cohesion. This is doubtless the instinct that made Romans place so high a value on the social groups, the state and the family. For state and family they always assumed that they were to risk everything. In private life this quality manifested itself in a generous apportionment of private property by

gifts and bequests to worthy persons and in the erection of buildings for public use.

Physical courage was also rated high, as was necessary in a state so dependent upon military success. For centuries the army had been organized on a system that sent the noblest and wealthiest men into the front rank of the army. Even in Cicero's day we hear of strong social pressure applied to uphold respect for valor. When, for instance, Scaurus had failed to stem a barbarian invasion in northern Italy, his father refused to admit him to his presence, and the young man in chagrin committed suicide.

On the other hand meekness and humility were not especially lauded. Rome had too long been a ruling race, and pride in ancestral records was too much encouraged in the young for the Romans to look with patience upon qualities customarily desiderated in slaves and subjects. Indeed there were few factors so influential in affording moral training to Roman youths of good family as pride in ancestry. What more effective means of training her son had a mother than to conduct him through the long gallery of ancestral *imagines*, recalling the passages in Ennius and Fabius that narrated the deeds of each and pointing at last to the niche awaiting his bust if he should prove worthy of the curule chair. A few lessons like that sufficed to inspire the young nobleman to spend a life of earnest endeavor for what the Romans called *gloria*. The fame of ancestors was so constantly with him that "Gloria" came to be almost an end in itself, as Cicero clearly reveals in a splendid period of his *Pro Archia*. This driving force long held the nobility firmly to high standards of action, and high standards in the leading classes afforded excellent examples to those who took their cue from them.

It is patent, however, that there was danger in the elevation of *Gloria* to a position it did not deserve. In the nervous days of the last century of the Republic the dignity of curule office and of triumphs afforded too great a temp-

tation, and men began to take illegitimate short-cuts by means of lavish expenditures of funds at elections and by "triumph-hunting" in the provinces, so that what had conduced to virtue, now drove beyond the goal into vice. It also tended to make the ruling class imperious and cruel in its dealings with subjects.

Finally we find that there was less emphasis upon chastity at Rome than upon the qualities of self-mastery and moderation. The social evil was at one time sufficiently controlled by a natural temperance that belonged to the Latin stock, and by wholesome family traditions. When the city was small, the families of the ruling classes all knew one another, and divorce was then considered a disgrace which it was difficult to escape. Sound traditions had a compelling force in such a life. In Cicero's day, however, strict family customs were giving way partly because the civil wars tended to disrupt families, so that old alliances were broken and new ones made, partly because marriage had from patriarchal times rested simply on family contracts, not on religious or legal sanction, and it was found that when patriarchal customs gave way, or when the parents who made the contracts died or took opposite sides in the civil strife, there was left no external binding force. We must also add that the break-up of sound family traditions was concomitant with the increase of wealth resulting from the exploitation of the wide empire. Pampered children growing up in ease mistook whims for necessities, and lost the power of self-control. Petulance and self-concern do not help to cement society or the family. He who reads Cicero's letters finds abundant proof that "lack of sympathy" came to be regarded as a sufficient cause for divorce.

Such were the tendencies in moral education at Rome. An analysis seems to indicate that the burden of keeping conduct at a respectable level rested neither on religion nor on any far-reaching philosophy. Puritanic instincts inherited

from a well-trying ancestry counted for a great deal, parental teaching of rules of decorum that would lead to a life of respect and honor, and the ordinary pressure that society exerts upon those not willing to obey the social code—these were generally relied upon to do the rest. But we have also seen that the time had already come when these things no longer sufficed.

"Social life." Despite the fact that women had always been held in high esteem at Rome, they had not till in the late Republic become a distinct element in social intercourse. The men of the ruling classes led a serious and busy political life. They were somewhat too much weighed down with cares of state to take any interest in a life of gayety and light conversation. In the Ciceronian period there appears for the first time at Rome what the Sunday newspapers call "society," what of course had manifested itself long before in the court circles of the East where there were idle princesses who had to be entertained. Servilia, the mother of Marcus Brutus, was a woman of wit and presence of mind, of wide reading and—what attracted Romans—a keen comprehension of politics. It is perhaps not incorrect to speak of her "salon" where brilliant men like Caesar were to be met. Clodia, the wife of Metellus, the sister of the notorious politician Clodius, was another woman who kept open house. A group of young radicals hovered about her palatial home on the Palatine, her gardens at the river, and her summer home on the bay of Naples. She, too, dabbled in politics, using coquetry as a bribe for votes, but her wit and her brilliant conversation attracted men of letters as well. Finally we may mention Sempronia, the mother of Decimus Brutus, perhaps the daughter of Gaius Gracchus, at whose house met the reckless young nobles that supported Catiline out of dare-deviltry. Sallust, when he had grown old and crabbed, spoke of her with stern disapproval: "She knew her Greek and Latin literature and she danced better than a woman of good reputa-

tion should." He assures us that she sometimes refused to pay her debts. "But her wit was beyond cavil, she could write verses, draw forth laughter, speak with dignity as well as with coquetry. Indeed she was a woman of great intellect as well as charm." Sallust found it difficult perhaps to be fair to the mother of one who had counted as a leader in the conspiracy against Caesar. These three at any rate may be mentioned as significant of a social change which becomes prominent in the Augustan age when the nobles, relieved of strenuous political cares, began to amuse themselves at various social gatherings in order to escape ennui.

In the Ciceronian period men of importance in the state were still apt to live a life largely determined by their serious concerns, and to satisfy their desires for companionship in the course of their daily round of duties. In the morning, and the Romans were early risers, they talked over personal concerns with their crowds of attending clients, giving aid and advice. The forenoon was often spent in sessions of the Senate, in political discussions with fellow senators and in correspondence. In the afternoon there must always be time for exercise with their fellows at some game of tennis or handball and a swim at the "baths." These establishments also contained resting and lounging rooms where friends could be met. The dinner, which was the only important meal of the day, was usually the meeting time of the family and intimate guests. It was often an elaborate meal at which reciting, dancing or singing by trained slaves filled the interim between many courses. The evening was brief for men who must rise with the sun.

Into this life the people who engaged in commerce and banking very seldom entered, for the political aristocracy were very jealous of their own social status. We may suppose that the commercial classes copied the fashions of their superiors, but we are not informed what their life

was since no one seems to have thought it worth describing.

Literature. Strange as it may seem, this century of turmoil produced literature which at its best seems to have been quite oblivious of the horrors of war, and that too despite the fact that the writers took their share in the activities of state. There is one very interesting group of writers—the very circle that buzzed about the glow of Clodia's brilliant presence—who, during the first triumvirate, were busy aiding Cicero by lampooning Caesar and Pompey, and who later were, by means material or by the simple authority of his personal charm, drawn over to fight Caesar's battles for him in a series of contests in verse and prose pamphlets. We hear much of the verses of Catullus, Calvus, Cornificius and others, but only those of Catullus have survived the dull censorship of the dark ages.

Catullus became a poet when he met Clodia and fell in love with her. The poems which pursued her, pleading, enticing, chiding, in passionate devotion or in jealous rage and despair ring with a music that seems foreign to the Latin language. The sincerity and intensity are compelling, the naturalness and ease of expression and the liquid flow of the verse are startling to one who has read the prose of that day. It is as though one came suddenly from Bach to a song of Schumann. He wrote many other minor poems too that reveal the same directness of genuine art, poems of generous friendship, of satiric anecdote and especially stinging epigrams flung at the great Caesar. Unfortunately, Catullus' life was very brief: he devoted less than five years it seems to writing, and the latter part of this short shrift he gave to the composition of versified tales (*epyllia*) in the Alexandrian style then prevailing. They are interesting as studies in a new romanticism which was attempting to break away from formal rules of art and experimenting in themes of sentiment and emotional experience. But they took the poet from himself and

from his idiom. It is by the group of earliest poems that he has lived and will live as long as poetry is read.

Lucretius. Catullus died in 54 B.C., just at the time when the "triumvirate" began to break up. That same year Cicero was editing the posthumous works of Lucretius, who had died the year before. The great poem on Nature (*De Rerum Natura*) sets forth in hexameter verse the important doctrines of the Epicurean philosophy. Here the poet attempts to explain the atomic nature of matter, the material composition of the soul, the nature of mental processes, the evolution of the planetary system and the later evolution of social institutions. In subject matter Lucretius is an orthodox follower of Epicurus, so that his book can safely be used as a guide to the master. What has attracted readers to him is, however, not so much his precise statement of the materialistic philosophy as his spirit and art. His great gift is a visualizing imagination that makes his story of evolution flash before one in a series of vivid pictures. His personal attraction lies most perhaps in the fervid enthusiasm with which he proclaims his doctrine. You feel that he has found something in the story of evolution that has aroused him out of a humdrum and stupid existence and filled the universe with meaning and with poetic beauty. He wants all the world to come with him and see what he sees. Finally, he has the true artist's instinct of writing with absolute directness and sincerity. Materialism has been called a prosaic philosophy. One would never suppose so from reading Lucretius. To him it was the life force and energy of the atom that counted, and by following this atomic energy through pulsating nature to man he has bridged the gap between nature and man. His prooemium was perhaps the first adequate romantic treatment of nature in literature.

Prose Writers. This period also witnessed a great stride forward in prose literature. The bitter contests of parties called forth autobiographies and histories with a purpose,

for statesmen felt the need of justifying their course of action. The noble Rutilius Rufus, who was banished at the instigation of the knights, Aemilius Scaurus, who led the Senate in the days of Marius, the old patrician Lutatius Catulus, who fought the Cimbri with Marius and lost the honor he thought he deserved because Marius was the popular hero, Sulla, even, though he seemed so impervious to criticism, and Lucullus, who was called back from the East to give place to Pompey, all these wrote autobiographies which were in reality partisan political pamphlets. In the Sullan days Claudius Quadrigarius, Valerius Antias and Cornelius Sisenna wrote very voluminous Roman histories for the general reading public, for the political contests had now extended throughout Italy and aroused a great interest in the story of Rome's amazing growth. These men wrote with a bias in favor of the aristocracy; consequently a brilliant writer, who was also a democratic leader, C. Licinius Macer, wrote the story with special emphasis upon the constitutional progress of the plebeian element. All of these writers considered history as a subject for literary treatment, and attempted above all else to make their books fascinating, an indication that education was now quite general, if not very thorough. Before Cicero died, a new tendency set in which reflects an interest in sounder research and greater attention to accuracy in special branches of antiquarian lore, a tendency found to-day in histories written for university men rather than for the masses. Terentius Varro, in particular, whom Caesar selected to organize the first public library, Tubero, and others, wrote voluminous treatises on the development of the law and the constitution, on religious institutions, on literary history, linguistic history, the history of philosophy, and what not. All the prose works that we have mentioned and scores of others have been lost, but we have the results of some of their researches in the histories of Livy, the

biographies of Plutarch, the antiquarian books of Pliny and elsewhere.

Cicero's works have fortunately survived to some extent. This statesman, the best representative of Roman culture, was practically driven out of active political life by Caesar, as we have seen, and did not again take a leading part until some months after Caesar's death. In the interim of twelve years he devoted himself to metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy and the discussion of Roman prose literature and style. To his philosophical works (*De Officiis*, *De Finibus*, etc.), which are the works of a well informed amateur, the Romans who could not read Greek owed their first adequate discussions of the philosophic systems then in vogue; and we owe to them most of our knowledge of the later philosophers whose works are lost, as well as a large part of our philosophical vocabulary. Cicero's great work on the state, *De Republica*, has survived in a broken palimpsest which is readable only in brief portions. We have enough of it, however, to discover that it had no small influence in shaping the constitution which Augustus later adopted. Most of his stylistic discussions (*De Oratore*, *Brutus*, *Orator*, etc.) have survived, and these have in fact formed, through successive generations of text books on "Composition and Rhetoric" that have inherited his rules, the backbone of educational instruction in composition almost to our day. The best examples of Latin oratory have also come to us from Cicero, in the fifty-eight orations of his that have survived.

While Hortensius had trained himself in an elaborate and florid style suited to the senatorial juries of Sulla's day, and Caesar, whose favorite audience was the plebeian assembly, had studied to be brief, direct, and incisive, Cicero practised the art of being both clear and artistic. He believed that a speech should by all means accomplish its object, but he refused to disregard the claims of the cultured portion of his audience who could appreciate

sonorous Latin. And he was a man of such rich endowments that he seemed capable of molding his phrases to every possible effect. His wide studies had put him in command of an immense vocabulary that he could use with precision; a sensitive nature and a sympathetic imagination brought him into instant contact with every mood of his audience. His wide experiences in politics, business, and literature made him at home in the courts, in the Senate or before the assembly. A very ready wit, a strong memory, a quick fancy, a gift of epigrammatic and pungent phrasing enabled him especially to meet sudden emergencies in the Senate and in the courts. A remarkably delicate ear for the full melodiousness of Latin speech induced him to use by preference those massive and stately periods that have never been equaled in dignity, but he knew when to use this style and when to avoid it. Unfortunately, the fall of the Republic destroyed, even before he died, the audience that could appreciate his style. Senatorial debate—except for a brief revival in 43—came to an end when Caesar crossed the Rubicon. After that the sight of the unsheathed sword taught men to say their say briefly and be done. The blunt and simple Atticistic style of Caesar was adopted by Calvus and even by Brutus, and the next generation had no use for Cicero. His orations have remained as a splendid witness of how the aristocracy of an Imperial Republic once spoke. It is not likely that any democracy of the future will return to the model.

Finally Cicero's correspondence deserves at least a passing mention. We have 864 of his letters, about one-half of those originally published by his friends after his death. Written to all the great men of his time, Caesar, Pompey, Brutus, the various consuls and generals and governors, to his intimate friends, and even to his slaves, they give us an indispensable picture of the times. In no other period of history does the student depend so

constantly for accurate information upon a packet of personal correspondence.

The Arts. There is not much to say for the fine arts of Rome at this time. Sculpture and painting, unlike literature, are universal in their modes of expression, and the best work of the day could most readily be procured by inviting well-known artists from Greek cities where men were now too poor to support them. In fact, many Greek artists were migrating from the decaying courts of Alexandria and Syria to Rome and Naples, where they worked and invited orders from wealthy Romans who were now decorating their new villas on the bay of Naples. There are many fairly good busts of Romans, of Caesar, Cicero, and not a few unnamed persons, still in existence that deserve notice, but most of them were probably made by imported sculptors. For his extensive building program at Rome, Caesar called in an Athenian architect. Greece was still, as it were, the Ecole des Beaux Arts for the West.

Of *economic and social conditions* we shall speak in detail later. A few general words must suffice here. Romans were still drawing their wealth largely from Italian farms and ranches which were managed on a large scale. The revolt of Spartacus had, however, pointed to a danger in the employment of too many slaves. Hence, there is noticeable a tendency to resort to tenant-farming more than before, and not only were free peasants invited to rent land on a share of the produce, but trusted slaves also were encouraged to take portions and to save enough whereby to purchase their freedom. This system encouraged industry, and Italy seems under it to have improved in productivity. It also directed more attention to horticulture, for the small farmer needed a wider range of produce than had the specializing plantation owner. Varro mentions that Italy was again acquiring the appearance of a garden. To encourage the same tendency of reducing the proportion of slaves on ranches Caesar passed

a law, as we have seen, requiring every third laborer in the service of grazers to be a free citizen.

Capital, when there was any surplus, was still apt to go into farm lands and real estate rather than into industry and commerce. The knights' companies, engaged in public contracts, still accumulated and used large sums to carry the annual contracts, but politics played havoc with these corporations from time to time. They grew rich and powerful for some thirty years after the death of Gaius Gracchus, then, because they began to enter politics and abuse their control of the courts by forcing governors to give them opportunities to exploit the provincials, Sulla took away their privileges with the courts as well as their larger contracts, and Lucullus cut into their funds by reducing their credits. They were still strong enough to help Pompey get his command, but they never again were allowed their old grip on the provinces. In Caesar's day they made money by controlling the port and pasture dues, and being engaged in this work they also entered into banking and commercial relations with the eastern cities for occasional profits. Caesar finally, shortly before his death, laid down restrictions which considerably reduced these profits also. Their risks, therefore, had been great, and they had suffered heavy losses. What remained at the end of the Republic was that Roman business men had become acquainted with the eastern provinces, had secured a vast amount of business by way of lending money to semi-bankrupt cities at high rates of interest, had bought much provincial land from people in financial distress and had drawn in much more on mortgages which could not be redeemed. Knights had also engaged in foreign real-estate enterprises as agents or partners of Roman senators who did not wish to appear openly in such transactions. In consequence, extensive properties in the East were now owned by Romans, who drew their incomes from this source.

Commerce. Romans had not yet entered commerce to a

great extent except to carry and sell the produce that was collected by way of tribute, but this kind of activity was serving as an entering wedge. Most of the ships were still owned by Asiatic, Syrian, Greek and South-Italian firms and individuals. Into *industry* also Romans were slow to enter. The manufacturing centers of Italy where industry was carried on on a large scale were in Campania, in and near Naples, and in Etruria. The factories, of which we shall speak later, continued in the hands of people who were not of Roman stock. These conditions account for the fact that the Senate had not yet interested itself in financial legislation. Even Caesar, who had great sympathy for men of affairs, and comprehended as no Roman statesman before him the needs of business, had done but little before his death to show that the problem was pressing. The colonization of Corinth, Carthage and Sinope, the plan of digging canals at Corinth and in Latium are, however, a few proofs of his interest. The Italian tariff law was probably not conceived for the protection of industry, since the duty was hardly high enough to serve that purpose. Our conclusion is not that Caesar's sympathies were narrow, but rather that Rome's investments were still so extensively agrarian that there was as yet little demand at Rome for legislation in the interest of industry.

CHAPTER XIX

FROM AUTOCRACY TO DYARCHY

The death of Caesar. To Greeks and Romans there was nothing shocking in the thought of assassinating tyrants. It was supposed that republics could not survive otherwise. The national song of Athens, which all Romans knew, was a hymn that honored Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and two of Rome's most distinguished families, the Junii and the Servilii, rested their fame on the suppression of "tyrants." Marcus Brutus was considered to be the last scion of both of these families, and as far back as the first "triumvirate" it was rumored that he belonged to a group of young nobles who were considering the possibility of removing both Pompey and Caesar by use of the dagger. The rumor seems to have been baseless, but it reveals the attitude of Romans on the question. Devotion to the republic and to liberty was wellnigh a religion among the older families that carried on the ancient traditions. If men of such families should be fully convinced that Caesar would not restore the Republic, and that he intended to hand down autocracy to his heir, thereby making it permanent, they would consider it their sacred duty to remove him by force, and hesitation would only convict them of cowardice.

Caesar had been too astute to announce his plans, for he knew Rome's feeling thoroughly. After the great triumph in 46, which had made the older senators wellnigh lose hope, Caesar had ostentatiously recalled several of his most bitter opponents, thereby again winning respect for a season. Cicero was, for the moment, so optimistic that in a speech in the Senate he suggested that the time was near at hand when the restoration of the Republic

might be looked for. But in 45 Caesar's acts, one by one, revealed a constant trend toward autocracy. His acceptance of divine honors could, to Romans who knew the kingdoms of the East, mean only one thing. When he heard of Caesar's statue placed in the temple of Quirinus, Cicero for the first time uttered the fatal word. He could only wish the tyrant's death. Then Caesar began to prepare forces for the Parthian expedition and rumors had it that before his departure he was to be declared *rex*, at least over the East. The significance of this Parthian expedition was not lost. There had been no actual provocation for it unless Caesar chose to find it in a desire to punish the enemy for the old disgrace at Carrhae. The collection of sixteen legions could only mean a vast plan of military conquest and an aggressive imperialism that would elevate Caesar to the position of an Alexander in the East, and make a senatorial republic permanently impossible. Caesar talked also of extending the Macedonian and Thracian frontiers to the Danube and the Gallic frontier deep into Germany. The Senate knew well that the empire was too large for the old constitution. A man as clear of vision as Caesar could not plan such expansion unless he had firmly determined upon autocracy.

How the conspiracy arose we are not told, for the conspirators naturally kept silence as they had sworn to do. Furthermore, the historians of the late Empire who wrote most fully were apt to distort the facts, since under the emperors tyrannicide had come to be the blackest of crimes. Men like Brutus, who were respected for their other virtues, were then represented as inveigled into the deed against their will. The most significant fact is that, aside from Cassius, the most distinguished members of the conspiracy were two Junii and two Servilii. Such men were influenced chiefly by family traditions and a sense of duty toward the Republic. That some conspirators acted from other motives

we can hardly doubt. Young men who had expected to enter politics as a permanent career could not well view with complaisance the absolute control of all elections by one man. Others found themselves shoved aside for men who were more subservient to the master. But the conspirators could not afford to scrutinize motives. They naturally invited the aid of all whom they discovered to be dissatisfied with Caesar's régime, and some sixty men joined in the plot. The directing minds were those of Brutus and his brother-in-law, C. Cassius Longinus, both praetors of the year 44, and Decimus Brutus, a relative of both.

The plan to do the deed at the elections of February fell through, but at the Senate meeting of the Ides of March 44, a meeting called, it is said, to declare Caesar *rex* just before his departure for Parthia, the last opportunity was at hand. Tillius Cimber was chosen to present a plan for his brother's recall from exile, the conspiring senators approached Caesar as though to add their entreaties, at a signal they drew their daggers and struck him down.

Antony's ambitions. The city was full of Caesar's veterans, some to receive allotments of land, others merely to bid farewell to their hero. Their anger was roused, and Mark Antony, the older of the consuls, was quick enough of wit to take advantage of the situation. When he saw that the conspirators were greeted by hisses in the Forum and were forced to withdraw to the Capitoline for safety, he decided that it might be possible to establish himself in Caesar's place. He at once seized Caesar's papers and ready money, an immense sum, entered into agreement with Lepidus, Caesar's master of horse, who had command of the soldiers in the city, and awaited developments. Numerous partisans gathered on both sides so that neither dared take the offensive. Finally having secured the reins of power, Antony offered to call a meeting

of the Senate and agree to a decree of amnesty for the "liberators" if the Senate in turn would accept the validity of Caesar's acts and accord Caesar an honorable burial. This arrangement was accepted. At the funeral, however, which took place a few days later, Antony read Caesar's will to the crowd in the Forum, revealing the fact that their hero had given them his gardens and had left a sum of 300 sesterces to each individual. Then in a stirring harangue he related the exploits of Caesar, described the murder, and displayed the mangled body, rousing the mob to such fury that they dashed with any weapon they could seize to find the guilty. The conspirators made haste to leave the city and Antony pursued undisturbed and unguarded his plans for strengthening his control. There seemed to be only two serious difficulties in his way. Decimus Brutus had been assigned to Cisalpine Gaul as governor and had now gone to take possession. If Antony dared declare himself dictator Decimus would, of course, march down with his army. Antony, therefore, decided to follow a more patient course. In June he cajoled the people into voting him the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul for the next year, and, fearing that Decimus might not give it up, he also asked them to put him in command of the four legions which had been quartered beyond the Adriatic in preparation for the Parthian war. The liberators took this to mean that Antony was preparing to cross the Rubicon at his convenience at some future time. Marcus Brutus sailed off to Greece where he had many friends, and Cassius went to Syria where he had once commanded the legions stationed at Antioch. Their plan was to bide their time, and if Antony should attack their comrade in Gaul before his term was ended, they would be stationed where they had the best chance of raising forces.

However, Caesar's grandnephew and heir, Octavian or, as he was known after his adoption, C. Julius Caesar, stood

in Antony's way.¹ This lad of eighteen was near the east-bound legions at Apollonia studying rhetoric and philosophy with his tutors while awaiting Caesar's arrival. He was a quiet and apparently modest young man about whose existence the liberators had not concerned themselves. They probably did not know that he was to be Caesar's heir. Antony knew him better, and knew, too, that he might become a political force if he should happen to appeal to Caesar's veterans. But Antony had at the funeral made himself the friend of the veterans, and he had stripped Octavian, he thought, of power to do harm, by seizing Caesar's ready money in the name of the state-treasury, to which he kept the keys. It seemed quite possible to overawe the young man. When Octavian heard of Caesar's death he at once set out for Rome to claim his inheritance, stopping on his way at Cumae to see Cicero who, as a senator not implicated in the murder, might be a convenient friend. When Antony refused to give up Caesar's treasures, Octavian sold his own possessions and the real property of Caesar, paying the donations required by the will, and this deed naturally made him very popular. When Antony sent for the four legions beyond the Adriatic, Octavian, who knew the officers intimately, succeeded by promising lavish pay in enticing two of the legions to revolt and to withdraw to a strong position and await his command. Thus he hoped to force Antony to recognize him as Caesar's heir. In these daring, not to say well-nigh treasonable acts, Octavian had the approval of Cicero, who saw in the young man the only chance of keeping Antony from the dictatorship.

Cicero as leader of the Senate. At the end of the year Antony marched into Gaul with the two legions that re-

¹ His name after adoption should have been C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, but the latter cognomen he never employed. Yet since contemporaries frequently spoke of him as Octavian and historians have since continued to do so in order to avoid ambiguity, we may be permitted to employ that name. After the year 27 contemporaries generally called him Augustus.

mained faithful to him and demanded that Decimus Brutus surrender him his province at once, though it apparently had been granted him by Caesar till March first. Brutus refused, and Antony undertook to besiege him at Mutina. Now the state was in a turmoil again. Marcus Brutus, who had apparently been attending philosophic lectures at Athens, called upon the officers of the Macedonian legions to put themselves at his disposal, and they did so. Cassius issued a similar decree in Syria with equal success. Cicero, their friend, though holding no office, came to Rome and assumed the leadership of the Senate, old and out of harness though he was. But his presence was essential because the two young consuls of the year, Hirtius and Pansa, both former officers of Caesar and friends of Antony, were none too reliable. It was only the constant influence of Cicero that could hold them true to the Senate. The amazing energy of the old orator, who planned and coaxed and pleaded for loyal support, is revealed by the fourteen *Philippics* delivered in this year, and the scores of semi-official letters in which he urged the many lukewarm governors of the various provinces to declare in favor of the Republic and against Antony. Since the Senate had no army with which to aid Decimus against Antony, and the efforts of Hirtius and Pansa to build up a new army made little progress, Cicero had the Senate give Octavian praetorial powers and recognize him as commander of the two legions that he had enticed away from Antony. Brutus and Cassius were raising strong forces, but could not come West until they had cleared the province of Asia, which was held by Antony's partisan, Dolabella. Furthermore, it was considered inadvisable for them to appear, since their presence would cool the ardor of Caesar's veterans, who made up a large part of the new recruits and of Octavian's army.

In April, 43, an indecisive battle was fought between Antony and the senatorial forces, at which Pansa was mortally wounded. A few days later the decision in favor of the

Senate came at Mutina, but in this battle Hirtius fell. The result was disastrous. Octavian, who had willingly lent his forces to Hirtius and Pansa, refused to work with Decimus Brutus, who had been one of Caesar's murderers, and Antony accordingly succeeded in escaping with a large remnant. He fled to Transalpine Gaul, where his old friend Lepidus had command of strong forces, and was received.

The triumvirate. The Senate gave the command of the senatorial forces in Gaul to Decimus Brutus. Octavian, fearing that he would merely be set aside by the Senate, which naturally sympathized with Brutus and Cassius, appealed to his soldiers to support his position, and though he was not yet twenty years of age, sent a demand to the Senate that he be given the consulship. The Senate refused and summoned Brutus and Cassius home. But Octavian had the advantage of being nearer at hand; he marched upon Rome with his legions, meanwhile inviting Antony and Lepidus to make common cause with him. The Senate yielded perforce; he was elected consul with his cousin Pedius, and immediately proposed a law declaring all the murderers of Caesar to be outlaws. But his perils were not yet over. Antony and Lepidus, who had meanwhile scattered the forces of Decimus Brutus, were entering Italy with 17 legions. Octavian was therefore not yet sure of his prize. The three met on a small island of the river near Bologna, and after much bargaining—for Antony was inclined to look upon Octavian as a youthful upstart—they came to terms. They agreed that they should be "triumvirs for settling the affairs of the commonwealth" (*Triumviri Reipublicae constituendae*) for a period of five years, Antony and Octavian were to wage the war against Brutus and Cassius, Antony was to have command of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, Octavian of Sicily and Africa, while Lepidus was to govern Spain and look after Italy in the absence of the other two. The division shows that Octavian fared badly. The older men were apparently giving him the least

possible portion, and that only because he had the favor of Caesar's veterans.

What followed this settlement was one of the coldest deeds of cruelty in Roman history. As Octavian had demanded the outlawing of the conspirators, so the other two demanded the death of their enemies. It is however pertinent to comment that while the Roman moral code would recognize as reasonable Octavian's desire to avenge the death of his uncle, no one would consider legitimate a decision to exact the death penalty for mere political hostility. Unfortunately the need for money overrode all reason. The three generals had gathered their legions only by means of lavish promises of money, and since all the East was in the hands of the republicans and the Roman treasury was empty, they knew that they must at once get funds by confiscation, or their soldiers would desert them. They accordingly drew up a proscription list of 300 senators and 2,000 equites, taking into consideration not only acts and words of hostility, but also the wealth of each. They pretended that history had proved in the case of Sulla and Caesar respectively that cruelty and firmness offered a safer policy than clemency. The terror in the city during November and December, when the lists were posted, was indescribable. Soldiers hunted out the marked persons, cut off their heads and brought them in, receiving gold for each head. Even slaves were rewarded for betraying their masters.

Among the rest Cicero fell a victim to Antony's vengeful hatred. Finding himself among the proscribed, he escaped from the city, and, securing a boat, had himself rowed down the coast of Italy; but he had no heart to go to Brutus, who had unfairly charged him with having made the initial mistake by accepting the services of Octavian. Deciding that his usefulness was ended he returned and went up to his villa at Formiae. When the murderers came his servants placed him in a litter and tried to rescue him, but they were

overtaken. To save his attendants he forbade them to resist and gave himself up. Antony, to the horror of Rome, had Cicero's head nailed to the Rostra.

The responsibility for this policy of terror has usually been laid upon Mark Antony, and no doubt rightly. He was a strange combination of cool efficiency, of sentimentality that revealed itself in persuasive speeches to the people, and of ungovernable storms of passion. Seldom have such excellent natural qualities been corrupted by failure to submit to discipline. Antony was at this time a man of thirty-nine years. Lepidus was forty-six—the oldest of the three—but he had never been a man of decision, having been advanced by Caesar because, while representing a very old family, he was willing to serve the master in any cause. Antony employed him for the present because of the provincial army which he had. Octavian, it is difficult to estimate. It is not likely that he viewed these deeds with complaisance—the rest of his life reveals very few traces of a cruel disposition. Shrewd he was, calculating, and ambitious; and his life during his impressionable years, so close to his imperious uncle, had given him no opportunity to enter into normal human relationships. He had grown up to accept the belief taught him by Caesar's career that the strong man, the superman, takes what he can and what he desires, and having a deep faith in his capacity to accomplish as much as Caesar had, he had assumed that he might become Caesar's heir in power as well as property if he would but lay out his course wisely. At the conference at Bologna his elders attempted to push him aside. He was so young that this seemed possible. He decided not to be trodden under foot, and through the loyalty of Caesar's old soldiers who had grown used to personal devotion, he was able to hold his place, though it was an inferior one. But he was hardly in a position to oppose the policy of cruelty that Antony insisted upon, and not having the moral courage to sacrifice his future for a principle, he acquiesced in the deeds of hor-

ror, and prepared to bide his time. That he did not risk everything to save the life of Cicero, who had vouched for him, is the greatest blot on his career.

The Battle of Philippi. The next task of the triumvirs was to subdue Brutus and Cassius. Brutus now had command of five legions in Macedonia. Cassius was in Syria, having gathered a force of nearly twelve legions from the garrisons of the eastern provinces. Since Dolabella, Antony's partner, held the province of Asia between Brutus and Cassius, it seemed wise to them to remain in the East and clear this province before marching westward, especially as Cicero then seemed to have the war with Antony well in hand. Cassius besieged Dolabella through the summer of 43, and Brutus marched into Thrace in the autumn to make sure that the land-road between them was passable. Meanwhile Octavian's sudden coup had changed the aspect of things at home. The triumvirate was formed very quickly and it controlled immense forces that could not possibly be met in Italy with an unorganized army. Brutus and Cassius therefore spent the winter of 43 in subduing Rhodes and Lycia, which had espoused the cause of the triumvirs. Unfriendly tribes and cities left in their rear might prove very troublesome by providing ships, provisions, and landing places for the enemy. They also exacted huge sums from the cities of Asia with which to pay their troops. These exactions were considered as forced loans authorized by the Senate and supposed to be paid back later. Since the republicans ultimately lost and the triumvirs naturally would not repay these loans—in fact they demanded an indemnity for aid given “to rebels”—the provincials suffered very severely through the war. In the summer of 42 the two republican armies set out westward for the final contest and met the forces of Antony and Octavian at Philippi in northern Macedonia just above modern Kavala. The republicans, having command of the sea, desired to put off the battle, but the Thracian and Asiatic auxiliaries

proved refractory and Brutus urged haste. In the first contest Brutus' right wing facing Octavian won an easy victory, but Cassius on the left yielded before Antony's superior attack, and believing the day lost had himself put to death. Three weeks later the decisive battle was fought; Brutus, completely defeated, fell upon his sword, and his surviving officers surrendered their forces to the triumvirs.

It was perhaps as well that it ended so. Brutus and Cassius, had they won, would certainly have attempted to restore the old outworn city-state constitution; for they were both devoted to the conservative aristocracy. The Senate, deprived by the proscription of all its leading men, would have been more unfit than ever, and it is doubtful whether Brutus was not still too much of an idealist and dreamer to apply the stern measures that Rome's government needed. In a day of higher political standards Brutus might have become a leader of great distinction. He possessed all the prestige of powerful family connections, his probity and moral courage¹ lent great weight to his word among his friends, he proved also to have skill as an administrator in Gaul, and as a general at Philippi. His decisions and judgments during the critical period in 43-2 prove to be sound when rightly understood. That he had not prepared to cope with the trickery and ambition of Antony immediately after the Ides of March is perhaps his only serious blunder, but that miscalculation was well-nigh inevitable in a man who had no means of imagining the devious ways of a scoundrel. His failure now was in the main due to the fact that he had lost touch with the people he had to deal with, lost it by an incapacity to stoop to their level to comprehend them. Octavian, who had seen only civil war and bloodshed and trickery, comprehended fully the game that was being played, and was himself not incapacitated by too strict a conscience from par-

¹ It has recently been shown that the severe criticism usually directed against his financial transactions was by no means deserved.

ticipating in that game. Fortunately he was soon rid of Antony and could then grow to the full measure of his task.

After Philippi a new division of provinces was agreed upon. Lepidus was sent to Africa to be out of the way. Octavian took charge of Italy with the disagreeable task of finding land for 170,000 soldiers. Antony chose the East, where responsibilities would be light, where he would be far from the families of the senators and knights he had murdered, and where there were abundant opportunities to satisfy his extravagant love of pleasure. He also promised to exact money with which Octavian might purchase lands, but very little of this ever reached Rome. Octavian set about his task at once, and with cold directness. Sixteen cities selected by the triumvirs as unfriendly to their cause lost their land, which was given to the discharged soldiers. The distress of the evicted, among whom were three young men destined to become the greatest poets of the period, Vergil, Horace, and Propertius, was poignantly described in the first *Eclogue* of Vergil. The poor victims fled to cities to find work, where all the work was already in the hands of slaves, or they drifted to Rome to beg enough grain at the public crib to keep body and soul together, or, as Vergil pictures them, they migrated to new lands, Africa or Britain, to begin life anew.

To make matters worse the consul Lucius Antonius, the brother of Mark Antony, and Fulvia, Mark Antony's wife, took advantage of the confusion and played upon the distress of the evicted, pretending that Octavian had done the deed contrary to the wishes of Mark Antony. It would seem that they hoped for an opportunity to overwhelm Octavian and bring back Mark Antony as dictator of Rome. Their real motives are difficult to determine in the confusion of charges made by historians, some going so far as to assert that the affair was but a stratagem on Fulvia's part to bring Antony west, away from Cleopatra's influence. At any rate, Lucius Antonius gathered an army of

the discontents, and seized Rome, but was driven out by Octavian's general Agrippa. He was finally besieged at Perusia (Perugia) during the winter of 41-40 and compelled to surrender.

Antony meanwhile had marched through Asia exacting indemnities of the cities that had aided Brutus and Cassius, and had begun his revels with Cleopatra so vividly dramatized by Shakespeare's paraphrase of Plutarch. In Egypt he remained while the Parthians overran his province of Syria, and while his wife and brother were being besieged at Perusia. Finally he bestirred himself. Sending Ventidius, a trusted lieutenant, against the Parthians, he mustered a large fleet and sailed against Italy, arriving only after the fall of Perusia and the death of his wife. A new civil war seemed imminent between Octavian and Antony, but mutual friends intervened and peace was made between them (the peace of Brundisium, 40 B. C.). The pact was sealed by Antony's marrying Octavia, the sister of Octavian, and Vergil celebrated the auspicious peace by writing the fourth *Eclogue*. For three years Antony lived at Athens with Octavia and directed the affairs of his provinces with laudable attention to duty, while his legatus, Ventidius, drove back the invading Parthians in two successive campaigns.

War with Sextus Pompeius. Octavian, on the other hand, was constantly occupied in a naval war with Sextus Pompey, who still controlled Sicily and refused to allow grain to be shipped to Rome. In 38 Octavian lost his whole fleet—a large part in a defeat at the hands of Pompey, and the remnant in a storm. He then decided to construct a great naval base where he could conveniently build a fleet as well as protect it from storms and sudden attacks. For this purpose he chose the beautiful crater-lake of Avernus—Vergil's famous description pictures it as he had seen it before this transformation—connected it with the sea by means of a canal, and covered its banks with docks and

piers. After the renewal of the triumvirate for another five years, in 37, he set out again with 300 ships in 36 to end the war with Pompey. After another disaster in a storm, in which Octavian nearly perished, the decisive battle of Naulochus in September sent Pompey fleeing to Asia, where he was put to death by Antony's officers. This battle also marks the end of Lepidus' part in the triumvirate, for he seized the opportunity of attempting to take possession of the evacuated island, was intercepted by Octavian and sent to Rome to live as a private citizen. Octavian meanwhile went on with his work. His steady and evenhanded rule in Italy gained him the confidence of all classes. He encouraged talent wherever he could find it, gave aid to young poets like Vergil and Horace, watched over the courts, rebuking laxity and rewarding industry; and he led the army in person to pacify the frontiers still disturbed in Dalmatia and Pannonia.

The war with Antony and Cleopatra. Antony, however, had again fallen into evil ways after the renewal of the triumvirate. Octavia at that time returned to Rome, and Antony immediately betook himself to Cleopatra's court. A renewed invasion of the Parthians in 36 brought him out only to be shamefully defeated. He returned to Cleopatra to forget his disgrace. Now he began to assume the position of an Oriental royal divinity and pose as the husband of Cleopatra. To the queen he actually gave the Roman dominions of Phoenicia, Cyprus, and a large part of Cilicia, on the pretext that they had once belonged to the Ptolemies, and he finally went so far as to bestow the title of king upon the two sons that Cleopatra had borne him, setting apart in his will certain Roman provinces to be their domain. This was, of course, treasonable, and the facts were disclosed at Rome by men who in disgust deserted Antony. Antony's will was opened and the damning facts made known at Octavian's order. Since the term of the triumvirate came to an end in 32, the Senate brought matters to a crisis in that

year by declaring war on Cleopatra, the purpose being not only to avoid the appearance of civil war but also to lay a basis for annexing Egypt so that the temptations of this dangerous kingdom should not again lure a Roman from his duty. The opposing forces met at Actium in 31. Octavian led the land forces, while Agrippa commanded the navy. The victory was easily won, since Cleopatra, seeing that her chances of success were meager, gave orders to her sixty ships to flee as soon as the contest began. Antony followed hastily. After a few months spent in the eastern cities Octavian invaded Alexandria. Antony receiving a false report of Cleopatra's death—apparently sent by her in order to be rid of him—committed suicide. She hoped to find Octavian as amenable to her charms as she had found Caesar and Antony, but a conference with him convinced her of her mistake, and hearing that she was being reserved for the position of captive queen in his triumphal procession she took her own life.

Octavian assumed control of the kingdom of Egypt, and control there was almost equivalent to ownership, since the Pharaohs and the Ptolemies after them had claimed personal ownership of all lands that their irrigation system watered. He had no intention of leaving this rich country open to any possible rival, for its wealth and position were such that it might sustain very large forces. He therefore appointed his personal representative, the poet Cornelius Gallus, as prefect to govern it and manage its extensive state monopolies. He received into his own hands the enormous annual revenues, which he employed wherever he saw fit to the best advantage of the Roman treasury. He spent some months organizing Egypt and its business establishments, even ordering improvements in the irrigation system. Then going through the eastern provinces on a tour of inspection, he returned home to celebrate his triple triumph in the autumn of 29, showering such distinctive honors upon his young nephew Marcellus (his only child was a daughter,

Julia) that men concluded the boy was designed to be his heir.

Octavian's position in the state. Octavian's power at this time rested on no constitutional basis, since the second period of the triumvirate had come to an end in the year 32. But he proceeded on the slim basis of the consulship, to which he was being reëlected annually, and on the prestige which his victories and factitive control of the armies gave him. That the Senate was willing to grant him any and every office that he chose to accept, and even the divine honors formerly accorded Caesar, everyone knew, since after Actium the Senate had voted that when public libations were poured to the divinities Octavian's name should also be mentioned. Octavian did not refuse this honor, nor did he make known what he thought of it. Indeed the poets of the time openly wrote of him in the fulsome terms that Julius Caesar had taught Romans to use. For the present Octavian quietly and sagaciously kept his own counsel, waiting until his plans for a practicable constitution should be complete. He set about restoring the temples and public buildings which had been neglected during the wars; the great temple to Apollo, with its public library, was dedicated in 28. But he revealed the trend of his thoughts when, employing his censorial powers, he cut down the Senate by 200 unworthy members and honored it by requesting that he be elected to the old republican position of *princeps senatus*. The surviving members of the Senate saw in all this a respect for old institutions very different from the antagonistic attitude of Julius Caesar.

Finally, on the 13th of January, 27, Octavian went before the Senate, declared that he desired that the Republic be restored, and that, while retaining the consulship to which he had just been elected for the seventh time, he would surrender his command over all provinces, including the armies and revenues of the provinces, and all privileges and powers not consonant with the position of a republican

consul. The Senate immediately voted him proconsular powers and control of the provinces where there still seemed to be need of armed intervention, namely, Syria (bordering on Parthia), Gaul, upper Spain, and Egypt (where the prefect was suppressing Nubian invaders). Then it proceeded to vote him the title and name of Augustus (the revered), and in his honor changed the name of the month Sextilis to Augustus, a name it has since borne. This would of course give a distinct connotation to the word, since the other months that bore special names all had divine appellations. These honors Augustus, as he was henceforth called, accepted with thanks. He had surrendered all extra-constitutional power, he had in a very regular way received back the command of Rome's most important armies, and he could of course by means of these become whatever he might choose at Rome. He was then thirty-five years of age.

This act of self-abnegation has been endlessly discussed. Was Augustus playing a well-pondered rôle? Had he arranged with his closest advisers, Maecenas and Agrippa, what offices should be given to him if he placed himself at the mercy of the Senate? Was he actually eager to see a restoration of the Republic, or was he merely silencing criticism by shifting from an extra-constitutional to a legal basis? These questions cannot now be definitely answered. Augustus doubtless knew that the Senate, which had very few of the republican nobles left and which had for twenty years become accustomed to obedience, would certainly not accept complete independence. The Senate would hardly dare propose it, if it should prove that Augustus was simply testing their loyalty. On the other hand, certain facts show clearly that Augustus had definitely turned his back on Caesar's autocracy, that he desired the Senate to become a responsible body and share in the burden of rule. For instance, his elevation of the Senate in the preceding year, his selection of the best possible men for the consulship, his

abolition of the custom introduced by Caesar of granting the consulship for only a few months, his consistent refusal to invite unquestioned deification, his moderation in accepting merely the proconsular power when he might have had the dictatorship or any other office for life, and finally his immediate departure from Rome for nearly three years, giving the Senate every opportunity to prove its capacity—these things all tell strongly in favor of the theory that Augustus was sincere in his offer. Even if he agreed with his advisers beforehand that the proconsular power in some provinces should be returned to him, he cannot be charged with duplicity. That arrangement gave the Senate a chance to manage domestic affairs and several less dangerous provinces, thus growing into their responsibilities without being so overburdened as to fall into immediate disaster. And it gave the people comfort in the thought that partial failure on the part of the Senate would not end in civil war. Whether or not Augustus actually desired a "restoration of the Republic," he clearly did not intend to follow Julius Caesar, he certainly invited the old republican government to accept a considerable share in the new régime, and he gave it an opportunity to prove its capacity.

Soon after this Augustus set off for the west with an army. It was thought at the time that, besides pacifying some revolting tribes in Gaul and finally bringing the unruly tribes of Spain to complete subjection, he might also re-invade Britain, which had repudiated all connections with Rome. The immediate call came from Spain, where Rome's *legatus* had found the Cantabrians beyond his power. The guerilla warfare in the Pyrenees proved a tedious task, and Augustus very soon fell ill. For two years he lay ill at Tarraco, directing the campaigns through his *legati* and conducting a census and reorganization of Gaul. Meanwhile Maecenas, holding a semi-official prefecture, kept him well informed of affairs at Rome, and his friend Agrippa, a man of much practical experience, kept the people

well satisfied by directing the imperial building program, erecting the Pantheon and the elaborate "baths" and playgrounds named after him.

The Dyarchy. Augustus returned in 24, comprehending well that the Senate had had its opportunity to no purpose. It had never made any decisions without first ascertaining his will, and whenever he sent proposals for senatorial action the Senate had answered that his word should be law without action on the part of the Senate. His absence had not even served the purpose of a safety valve, for in 23 Murena, his colleague in the consulship, the brother-in-law of Maecenas, conspired with some friends to put Augustus out of the way. For such reasons, it would seem, Augustus now arranged a new division of powers with the Senate. About the middle of the year he resigned from the consulship (which he did not again accept for eighteen years) and accepted in its place the *tribunicia potestas* for life, an office of humbler rank but of larger possibilities. Henceforth he controlled the frontier provinces, which contained the standing army, by right of the proconsular imperium, a gift of the Senate, and he controlled the legislative and veto power through the *tribunicia potestas*, a gift of the people. He could, therefore, afford to dispense with the consular office which formally bestowed executive power only in Rome and Italy. The ancient forms of a republic were perhaps even more respected than before by this arrangement, while Augustus' powers were made supreme in the two vital departments of the government. By this act Augustus virtually notified Rome that he would hold the reins of power for life, but that he still invited the Senate to a dignified share in the administration. The government thus constructed has well been called a *Dyarchy*, and it was on this basis that the government continued at least in form for the next three hundred years. From this time (23 B.C.) on, the inscriptions upon public buildings show that Augustus dated a new era by specifying in each the number

of years that he had held the *tribunicia potestas*. Thus inscriptions of Augustus made in 10 B.C. all bear (after about July 1) the legend "Trib. Pot. XIII." And it has become customary in most modern histories to begin the story of the Roman Empire with the year 23 B. C. It must be admitted, however, that the change was made so quietly that very few men at Rome supposed the event epochal; and the people at large were quite unaware that anything worth a second thought had at that time transpired. It is only fair to the spirit of history therefore to continue the story of this chapter to another event that did impress Rome as epochal, even though it proved afterwards to have been of little political significance.

The administration of Augustus. The year 23 brought great grief to Rome because of the death of the much beloved Marcellus, Octavia's son, whom men had begun to look upon as Augustus' probable heir. Those who have read the sixth book of Vergil's *Aeneid* know what a loss the state sustained in this death. In the next year Augustus set out on a tour of the provinces again, going first to Sicily to see what could be done by way of procuring a food supply for Rome, since the harvests were now constantly poor and grain prices high. Apparently the soldiers settled by the triumvirs on the choicest lands of Italy were not succeeding as farmers. And Sicily had not improved under the rule of the degenerate son of Pompey. From Sicily he proceeded to the East, his chief purpose apparently being to make a demonstration against the Parthians, who had long ago promised under threats of war to return the standards that they had captured from the luckless Crassus thirty years before. It was quite contrary to Roman traditions that any foreign people should be allowed to flaunt trophies captured from a Roman army. The new threats now succeeded, and Augustus was able to return in the year 19, bringing with him the rescued standards. Meanwhile he had, through wise diplomacy, settled disputes in many of

the client states, thereby avoiding the devastating wars which republican governors had too frequently invited for the sake of acquiring booty and triumphs. In fact the provincials were already learning that whether or no Rome enjoyed having a monarch they at least had lived to see a day of better governments.

On his return Augustus made full use of his *tribunicia potestas* in proposing a series of reform laws, particularly touching the improvement of social and family institutions. He was deeply concerned about the number of divorces, the evidences of what we have come to call "race suicide," the unwillingness of men and women to assume the burdens of family life and the rearing of children. The chief cause for this condition was probably a general pessimism and a change of attitude towards civil duties that came on during the proscriptions and the terrors of the civil wars. Men began to suspect that they could hardly be in duty bound to rear large families only to see them destroyed in civil strife; and the uncertainties of life and of property made it very problematical whether the children of the next generation could survive. As we have intimated, the legal status of the family at Rome also had something to do with the problem. The Romans could not approach such social problems in the modern spirit, for the evolution of their family institutions was wholly different. We still consider the family in a large measure from the viewpoint of a church that ordained marriage as a religious duty and forbade divorce, and canon law has in this matter strongly influenced civil law. At Rome a marriage had been a contract under patriarchal care which the state need bother little about except in determining questions of inheritance and of legitimate citizenship. And now that patriarchal rule was weakening under the general growth of national legislation, the family, still unprotected by law, was, as it were, left in the air. Something needed of course to be done, but Augustus, who saw the need, was still too much influenced

by Roman tradition to think of the possibility (if indeed it was a possibility) of placing the institution wholly under civil control. He did what seemed most reasonable by trying as a first experiment the imposing of penalties upon those who did not choose to marry, and by giving special privileges to those who reared families. He did not choose to have the civil authorities perform the marriage or say when to refuse a divorce. His law, so far as we know it, had these several provisions. Inheritance privileges and the right to attend public functions were restricted for those who did not marry after a certain age, for married persons who had no children, and for widows who did not remarry within a year. On the other hand, mothers of three children were given the property rights of men and freed from the *potestas* of their husbands and guardians. And furthermore, in order to invite women of property to marry, clauses were added securing to them protection of their dower-portion. There was also a somewhat surprising clause recognizing the citizenship of children born of the union of citizens and ex-slaves (except in cases involving senators). Augustus was apparently not afraid of "race mixture." Finally, severe penalties were imposed for adultery. To allay the criticism evoked by the law a respite of three years was given before it went into effect. This, we see, is very much in line with new experiments that have been tried in some European countries since the Great War.

Besides these laws *de maritandis ordinibus*, many of the clauses of which we presumably do not possess, we also have brief and vague notices regarding a sumptuary law, and a corrupt practices act which was invited by the heavy election expenditures that were made at the polls during his absence in the East. Finally, he attempted a complete reconstitution of the membership of the Senate. For this he adopted an elaborate scheme whereby the Senate was enabled to select the best men of the state with as little interference from him as possible. Each of thirty first chosen were to select five,

and out of this 150, thirty were to be chosen by lot, and this process was to continue till 600 had been chosen. To be sure this long drawn-out process evoked such envy and ill feeling that he had finally to finish the invidious job himself, but the Senate list was at any rate thoroughly revised and the inferior element excluded.

Peace seemed now to be established, the government was running in good order and the most essential reforms made. Augustus wished Rome to have an impressive celebration and to take time to consider her present greatness in the light of the past. By an intricate system of calculations he convinced the Senate that this was the proper time for the hundred-year celebration of Rome's birth (certain *saecula* were for the purpose calculated at 110 years instead of 100). Splendid games were given, gifts distributed to the people, very solemn sacrifices performed by day and by night, and the poet Horace was asked to write a hymn to be sung by boys and girls. We have this song (the *Carmen saeculare*) among the Odes of Horace, and not many years ago there was found the great inscription on stone which gives a full description of the ceremony. The people participated with great rejoicing, thoroughly impressed and fully convinced that never before had a nation risen to such dignity through such heavy trials, and that the rule of Augustus had fully justified their faith in him.

CHAPTER XX

GOVERNMENT, ARTS, RELIGION

The Government. Before we proceed with the narration of political events it may be well to take a brief survey of the Roman world to see how it was governed under the new order, how it lived, and worked, and what it accomplished. The republican machinery as such survived and performed its usual functions, though in a restricted sphere. The two consuls, the Senate, the praetors, aediles, tribunes, quaestors, the minor officials, and the popular assembly still had many tasks to perform. The consuls, like the other magistrates, were elected annually by the assembly—the centuriate had now been completely merged with the tribal assembly—but the princeps usually let his preference for the most important offices be known, and his candidates were always elected. Indeed by use of the tribunician veto he could have prevented the election of any candidate who did not meet with his approval. The consuls, however, had little independent power, since Augustus had charge of the armies, and even in the administration of Rome and Italy they proposed no important measures without consulting him.

The Senate continued to be a body of ex-magistrates, though Augustus freely exercised the censorial privilege of excluding the unfit. In function it nominally had work of a wide scope, for contrary to the customary practice of Caesar, Augustus treated it as a competent legislative body; that is to say, when a *senatus consultum* had been passed Augustus seldom took the trouble to carry it to the assembly. He put it into force at once. Thus the assembly gradually came to be merely an elective organ, and the Senate

inherited its legislative power. Augustus also recognized the old-time judicial claim of the Senate that it was competent to serve as a court. It was a convenient body before which to try cases involving important political persons, and as Augustus was a member and voted first, his judgment usually prevailed. It would have been more difficult to impress his judgments gracefully on the regular jury courts. On the other hand, the Senate's scope of activity was greatly reduced by the fact that it no longer controlled the frontier provinces. It no longer assigned men to important fields of activity, it did not determine Rome's foreign policy; envoys from subject states usually appealed directly to Augustus, not to the Senate. It did retain a nominal control of religious cults, it was supposed to be responsible for administrative measures, in Rome and Italy, and it appointed the governors of the senatorial group of provinces. Finally, except for Egypt, senators alone were chosen by Augustus as governors of his provinces. The tribal *assembly* continued through the rule of Augustus as an electoral body, but after his death this function also fell to the Senate, and the assembly disappeared.

Praetors performed their usual functions as judges of the regular standing courts (*quaestiones perpetuae*), though it must be added that Augustus carried several cases directly to the Senate, and even assumed judicial functions himself by inviting a hearing before himself and his bench of chosen jurists (his *consilium*). Hearings before the emperor may at first have been considered as belonging to censorial or martial procedure. At any rate no one ventured to question their legality, and the practice became more and more common in the Empire. In the praetors' courts we are surprised to see that Augustus reverted to a Gracchan practice of making knights instead of senators jurymen. His purpose, however, was not to belittle the Senate. As provinces were now governed there was little room for the old-time antagonism on this score. Finally, praetors continued

to serve as provincial governors and were also called upon more and more for civil service offices. So, for instance, Augustus for a while placed praetors instead of quaestors in charge of the state treasury (*aerarium Saturni*).

The *aediles* for a while had to bear increased burdens, for Augustus organized a regular police department as well as a public fire department (*vigiles*). Since, however, the inexperienced officials who held office for but a year proved to be inefficient administrators of these permanent bureaus, Augustus in 6 B.C. organized these departments, detailing to them seven cohorts of about 1,000 men each under military discipline and placed over them a permanent *praefectus vigilum* of equestrian rank who was directly responsible to the emperor. Similarly he created a department of the food supply, for the supervision of which he appointed a *praefectus annonae*. This department continued to provide cheap grain to about 200,000 of the poor, and Augustus personally assumed the burden of expense, paying the costs from profits accruing from his provinces. Agrippa took personal charge of the water supply, restoring the old aqueducts and building a new one (Aqua Virgo, 19 B.C.) at his own expense. After his death a water department (*cura aquarum*) was also organized under imperial supervision. Thus we can understand that the *aediles* came ultimately to look upon their position as a sinecure.

Tribunes also found less to do after Augustus assumed the *tribunicia potestas*. These young officers hereafter ventured neither to propose nor to veto bills, and their position came to be an empty honor after the assembly lost its functions as a legislature.

Quaestors lost control of the treasury and of most urban tasks, but with the increase of care in the administration of provinces, they found occupation as financial agents of the provincial governors abroad.

We find then that the offices of the old *cursus honorum*

provide a large senatorial class interested in affairs of state and trained by diverse duties for civil service. Indeed, he added to the formal dignity of the *cursus* by insisting that young men should, before standing for the quaestorship, be tested out by service on one of the four lesser boards; these were the *decemviri stlitibus judicandis* (the ten men who presided over the lowest court), the *tresviri monetales* (officials of the mint), *tresviri capitales* (who executed capital sentences), and *quattuorviri viis in urbe purgandis* (commissioners of city streets).

Thus far we have spoken of the survival of the republican governmental machinery, and have noticed that there was a constant tendency for this to yield to the rival power in the dyarchy, the *princeps* and his retinue. We must now examine the position of the *princeps*. As proconsul of the frontier provinces—and after the year 23 he had this office renewed for successive terms of five or ten years—Augustus had charge of most of the army, and of the provinces which, in point of fact, brought in the best revenues. As holder of the *tribunicia potestas* he could completely control legislation; hence he could, *de facto*, accept *senatus consulta* as the equivalent of laws, and he could also issue administrative decisions, rescripts, and edicts with sufficient assurance that no one would question their validity even if he did not submit them to the Senate. It is probable that he rested the question of their validity on the general order issued more than once by the Senate that Augustus' edicts did not need senatorial validation. But it is also necessary to bear in mind that during the three centuries of the principate the validity of the prince's unsupported *acta* ceased at the death of the prince unless they were validated by the Senate. To such an extent was the government not yet an absolute monarchy.

In view of his constantly enlarging administrative powers the *princeps*, like the Senate, had a retinue of civil servants. This group came to be very elaborately organized later.

For the present the foundation of the system was being laid. To conduct important wars Augustus appointed senators of high reputation, usually members of his family, like Tiberius and Drusus, his stepsons, or his able friend and assistant Agrippa (who had married Julia). As *legati* of his own provinces he invariably chose senators, except in Egypt, where some knight was always sent as prefect. The ancient explanation for this exception was that he dared not permit a representative of a noble family in that position. We may suspect that he also took into consideration the fact that the prefect of Egypt would presumably be engaged chiefly in looking after the vast financial concerns of the state monopolies, so that knights, because of their experience in business, seemed preferable to senators for the post. For the bureaus which he gradually organized at Rome (water, police and fire, grain, etc.), he invariably chose the prefects from the equestrian class. Finally, he drew a line between the state treasury (*aerarium*) and his own, a thing that Julius Caesar had neglected to do. The state treasury was again put under the charge of the Senate, and to that flowed, of course, the revenues of the senatorial provinces. Augustus, on the other hand, had charge of the funds that came from Egypt, a very profitable possession, and from the other frontier provinces. It was this imperial treasury that soon came to be called the *fiscus* (the basket). Its resources and liabilities were very much larger than those of the *aerarium*. And we may add that since Augustus was more apt to have a surplus in the *fiscus* than the Senate in the *aerarium*, he frequently made subventions from it to the state treasury and constantly assumed new liabilities against it. Indeed, he freely made subventions also from his own private accounts (the *patrimonium*, and the *res privata*), which were exceedingly large, since men of wealth often left him generous bequests at death (such bequests amounted, it is said, to about 70 million dollars). There was of course no authority that could audit his rec-

ords of imperial moneys. According to the eastern theory of sovereignty now generally accepted at Rome, the provinces were his by right of conquest. In fact, his own book-keepers and personal financial agents, all trusted freedmen of his own household, managed the affairs of the *res privata* for him.

Augustus' standing army usually counted about eighteen legions, plus their full quota of auxiliaries. Four legions were stationed in Syria to guard the East; six legions guarded the Balkan frontiers; three stood on the Rhine, three in northern Spain, one in Numidia, and one in Egypt. None were needed in Asia Minor, since the client kings of Cappadocia and Galatia protected that region. Ex-praetors and ex-consuls commanded the armies, but the other officers, the *tribuni militum* and the *praefecti* of the allied auxiliaries were all drawn from the equestrian rank. Indeed, it was to supply a reliable officers' corps that Augustus honored and carefully watched over the semi-noble rank of the knights.

In the government of the provinces Augustus made many improvements that the Senate followed in time, though very reluctantly. He did away with many abuses of the contract system that had in the past led to so many grievous exactions. In the place of the equestrian publicans, he set his personal procurators to collect the tribute, and these men were carefully held to account for any wrongdoing. The provinces were duly grateful for the protection they had so long desired. His provincial governors, though senators, were *legati* of the emperor, and constantly under his eye. The crimes of a Verres could not now be committed in the provinces under his charge, and he was not so busy that he did not also keep an eye on the senatorial proconsuls and call the Senate's attention to any act of misgovernment that might be committed.

The emperor's relation to the province of Egypt was peculiar. The administration was in the hands of a prefect

who was appointed by Augustus. Private property in land in a strict sense of the term was unknown. Since land had little value except in so far as it was watered and fertilized by the Nile and the canal system controlled by the kings, the kings had "owned" all the land of Egypt. When Augustus took the kingdom he naturally fell heir to this property and became the legal owner. On wheat lands he, like his predecessors, charged in rental from one to three bushels per acre, according to the productivity of the soil. For oil-producing crops a certain percentage of the yield was charged; the state bought all the oil at a fixed price, manufactured the edible products from it in state factories, and distributed these products to small agencies to be sold at fixed prices. This is an illustration of what took place with almost all products. Augustus not only owned the land, and controlled the production, but converted the raw materials in state factories and sold the finished products. It was he accordingly who regulated the manufacture and sale of flax, hides, salt, oil (the butter of the ancients), honey (their sugar), natron (their soap), brick, timber and much else. This enormous business establishment brought the imperial fiscus of Augustus a revenue of about ten million dollars per year. And yet Augustus required only one legion to hold this province.

Such in brief was the government that Augustus devised by the amalgamation of the fragments of a republic and a repudiated monarchy. We know now that it failed. Later emperors, drunk with power, encroached upon the Senate, while the Senate, drawn apparently from an anaemic stock, neither performed its share efficiently nor withstood encroachments. Yet Caesar's type of autocracy, given men like Caligula, Claudius, and Nero, would certainly have been worse. Augustus' experiment was worth a trial. It at least gave the Republic another chance to make good by keeping its machinery intact. It was partly his fault that the best blood of the senatorial aristocracy had been wasted

in the proscriptions of the triumvirate, but no deed of his during his long régime as *princeps* can be blamed for the failure of the generous plan of government that he shaped so patiently and tactfully.

Augustan literature. The influence of Augustus made itself felt even outside of political life. He had for instance learned from Julius Caesar that it was good policy as well as a duty for a political leader to encourage literature. It would be an overstatement to say that Augustus directed the trend of literary art by his criticism, though he had clearly conceived views that were well-known. What was more serviceable, he helped dignify art in the general estimation by encouraging the better poets, and he made it possible for his friend Maecenas to divert property, by way of a state pension, to some of them. When one remembers that writers could not draw any adequate compensation from their productions, since all books had to be copied by hand, and unauthorized copying could not be prevented by any copyright law, one sees that patronage was absolutely necessary if literature was to flourish. This Augustus went very far to provide, and it is not apparent that either he or Maecenas imposed their own judgments in return for aid. It is not an accident that the phrase "Augustan age" of literature has come to be nearly synonymous with "Golden age."

Vergil. P. Vergilius Maro was of course the first poet of this age. As a boy he had been brought up in the sound traditions of the Cisalpine province, his ancestors being presumably of that large group of frontier folk who went north to find new homes in the second century when large plantations and slaves crowded free citizens out of Italy. He was thoroughly schooled in Greek and Latin at Cremona, in rhetoric and law at Rome, he served as a soldier under Caesar in the civil war till his health was broken, then his enthusiasm for Lucretius carried him to Naples to study philosophy under the Epicurean masters there. His early work, which he suppressed during his life-time, shows

the marked influence of Lucretius and of the romantic poets belonging to Catullus' group. What brought him fame was a collection of ten pastoral poems, the *Eclogues*, in which he pictured the idyllic life of the simple Greco-Campanian shepherds and peasants about Naples at the very time when these people were being evicted by the Triumvirs to make place for soldiers. This work attracted the attention of Octavian and Maecenas, who restored the properties he had lost in the confiscation and made it possible for him to continue his writing at leisure. Next the farmer's son wrote a didactic poem on the art of agriculture, the *Georgics*, a work suffused with a romantic love of nature which grew partly out of the simple animism still alive in rural Italy, partly out of Lucretius' energistic philosophy.

Vergil's greatest work is of course the *Aeneid*. It was a happy thought that led him to choose Aeneas as hero, the mythical founder of Rome's government, for it enabled him to call men's attention away from the disastrous wars of the immediate past to the story of those sturdy ancestors who could be represented as typical of the qualities that had made Rome. By a skilful use of the mantic cave at Avernus he could pass in review the conspicuous characters of Rome's history. The *Aeneid* thus became a national epic in the truest sense. As a national epic it has a story which cannot now carry the interest that it did to the Romans. But we can still feel the compulsion of its stately and sonorous hexameters, the genuine humanity of its essential philosophy, the play of romance about its theme and its characters, and we can appreciate its adequacy as an epitome of Roman culture.

Horace. One of Vergil's most intimate friends was Quintus Horatius Flaccus, who had also lost his property by eviction, more deservedly perhaps than Vergil, since he had been an officer of high rank in Brutus' army at Philippi. Living in poverty and in disappointment at the turn of political affairs he wrote satires in his spare moments. Vergil

discovered him and on his behalf appealed to Maecenas, who secured him a farm in the Sabine mountains in return for the property he had lost. Leisure and a competence restored his temper, and after a decade there appeared the three books of odes which have secured his fame. Horace did not follow in the steps of Catullus. Harrowing experiences and many years of battling with actuality, not to mention a severe literary training at Athens, had removed him far from romantic illusions. The simple artlessness of Catullus' first style seemed to him too naïve, and the Alexandrian sentimentalism of the later pieces offended Horace's sense of the dignity of poetry. When Horace began to write lyrics his youth and impulsive passions were but sad memories which he blotted out. Friendship and loyal comradeship, good cheer and song seemed to him the essence of life. Of such themes he chose to write in verses perfected to the very last requirement of a meticulous taste. As a result he has produced a group of poems which has ever since been a touchstone of art to poets who have cared for classic grace and finish. In his later days he wrote in easy hexameters a series of epistles that embody the poet's principles of conduct, an unaffected, gentlemanly, and wholesome code, and in this series he included the famous "*Ars Poetica*," giving expression to the sound poetic principles which he had imposed upon his age in the face of the disheveled art that he found popular in his youth.

The sentimental school, however, persisted despite the classical reaction to which Horace contributed. *Cornelius Gallus*, a wealthy young Celt whose father may have received Roman citizenship from Caesar, carried the Catullan traditions into new and fruitful forms. Falling in love with a well-known actress of the day, and presently deserted by her, as he might have expected, he impulsively sang of his own grief as Catullus had done before him. The form he adopted was the elegiac couplet adapted to pastoral song, and because of his success this form was henceforth adopted

by Roman poets in the writing of subjective lyrics. Augustus, perhaps in order to encourage Gallus, employed him in high offices of state, choosing him in fact for his first prefect of Egypt—which of course was the end of his poetry. Why Augustus should have selected of all men a romantic verse-writing Celt for this astounding task of organizing a vast monopolistic empire, of digging canals and superintending oil, beer, and clothing factories is beyond comprehension. Memories of school day versatility—for they had been schoolmates—may have influenced him. At any rate it was the poet's undoing. He vaunted his military successes, lost whatever control over himself he may have had, and, offending Augustus deeply, he was recalled. The shock of this disgrace was more than his delicate sensibilities could endure, and he took his own life. His literary type—the subjective elegy—was inherited by *Propertius*, an exile from Perugia with boyhood memories of the awful destruction of his native city during the Perusine war. This poet, imaginative and morbid, passionate and self-centered, spent the few years of his youth ringing all the changes on the theme of unrequited love. At his early death he left five books of brief elegies. A man of sunnier nature who carried the elegiac form into a more idyllic setting was *Tibullus*, a poet of quieter imagination and temperament. We have but two books of elegies from his pen. Tibullus died the very same year as Vergil, Propertius survived them about three years.

Shortly before these poets died, *Ovid* began to write for the court-circles that craved entertaining stories and ennuidispelling amusements. His early books of *Amores* are elegiac lyrics of the Tibullan type, more facile indeed, but less sincere. His *Art of Love* was a daring challenge to Augustus' social reforms, which it wholly disregarded. The *Metamorphoses*, which performed the inestimable service of transmitting practically all the fanciful Greek myths to the medieval and modern poets, is a work of remarkable brilliance. Here swift facility in the narrative art is com-

bined with imaginative vividness and sure judgment in the choice and combination of stories. Ovid was very popular in the younger profligate set of the court, and he reflected all too faithfully its tone and spirit. When late in life Augustus had to banish his own granddaughter Julia because of her conduct, several of her intimates were also exiled, and Ovid suffered with the rest. He was sent to Tomi upon the Black Sea never to be recalled.

Among the many poets whose works have been lost we may mention *C. Asinius Pollio*, who as *legatus* of Mark Antony was instrumental in bringing the triumvirs to a peaceful compromise after the Perusine war, and was for this deed lauded by Vergil in his fourth *Eclogue*. Pollio had to his credit many tragedies that were highly praised in his day. Another writer of tragedies was Vergil's fellow townsman and life-long friend, *Varius Rufus*. A score of other poets of this time are known to us only by the bare titles of works now lost.

Prose. We have suffered even heavier losses in prose. *Pollio's* great history of the civil wars through which he lived would have been of inestimable service had it survived, for he had taken an important part in them, he wrote brilliantly, and he had the moral courage to be fair to both sides. His many orations also would have been appreciated now, for he was considered by many a worthy rival of Cicero himself.

Of *Sallust's* histories we possess only two pamphlets, the *Catilinarian Conspiracy*, a youthful and rather amateurish booklet with a democratic bias but written in a pleasingly concise style, and the *Jugurthine War*, which seems to be more reliable. His later work, an extensive history of the Sullan period, is to our great regret lost except for quoted fragments.

Of *Livy's* great Roman history we have only thirty-five of the original one hundred and forty-two books. Considering that the complete work was about twelve times the

size of the book before you, we are not to suppose that the whole rested on first-hand research in the archives. Indeed modern historians have been able to find in it many traces of hasty work. But though Livy usually relied upon secondary materials he knew which of his predecessors were the most trustworthy and he generally knew how to counter the bias of apologetic biographers. He also had the courage to do justice to the republican cause though writing for the Augustan public. In a work written for the general reader, he avoided, more than we should prefer, giving full details of constitutional changes, and in attempting to visualize the important scenes without the aid of illustrations, such as modern histories use, he dwells upon picturesque and dramatic occurrences more than it is now customary to do. Granting his aim and his public, however, the work constitutes one of the great feats in literature. Livy's characterizations of historical persons by means of the spoken words put into their mouths make them dramatically real, his portrayal of the mood of the crowd or the army at a critical moment reveals a sympathetic imagination of the highest order, and his swift, easy, exuberant and malleable style has seldom been matched. His history was brought down well into Augustus' reign. It is not an exaggeration to say that if the last ninety-eight books of this work were to be found not one page of our histories from the Third Punic War to the beginning of the Empire would escape revision.

Concerning *prose style* in general it may be said that this was a period of transition. Cicero's Philippics were the last examples of the rotund and periodic style that had flourished in the senatorial circles of the free and leisurely Republic. Pollio and Messalla, the foremost speakers of the Augustan day, practised the direct and businesslike mode of speech which recognized that persuasion no longer came by word of mouth but by brief imperial notes. Augustus, Agrippa, and Tiberius spoke openly in favor of the matter-of-fact style, though Maecenas in the fragments of his prose

that have survived reveals a peculiar love for an ornate and indeed meretricious style. His sentences might indeed be called a kind of "imagist" and "polyphonic prose." The schools were at a loss what to teach. They pretended still to be preparing their pupils for a public career through the art of declamation when everyone knew that a public career depended now more on judicious silence than on volubility. Perhaps they harbored the hope that the Republic would return. Meanwhile they attempted to make an art out of the terse style by insisting upon verve, point, and vivacity. Thus the prose of the schools came in time to be excessively and unnaturally pithy and epigrammatic, and in the hands of tasteless writers it took on forced conceits and far-fetched antitheses. It was in these schools of rhetoric that Seneca learned to write.

Art. In the arts other than that of literature the greatest progress was made in architecture, and this was induced by the demand for temples, theaters, and public buildings of a larger size than the Greek cities had needed. Architectural form was to a large extent determined by the building material available in Latium. Rome, for instance, had no marble within hundreds of miles. The volcanic tuff which lay everywhere was usually an extremely ugly tobacco-brown, while the travertine—a calcareous deposit from the warm springs below Tivoli—seemed too porous to be very serviceable. It was indeed coming into use, but it was only later that the finer grades were discovered. On the other hand Rome was fortunate in having near at hand inexhaustible quantities of volcanic ash which when mixed properly with lime made a very strong cement. By throwing crushed stone into this a concrete of remarkable durability was made. But this too was ugly and had somehow to be veneered. In the Augustan period it was therefore customary to make the walls of large blocks of tuff or of concrete lined with neatly cut lozenges of tuff, and coat the whole with stucco. If the stucco was to be very fine it was

made of lime and powdered marble. Finally for the more splendid buildings the facing was made of slabs of marble clamped firmly to the concrete. The various kinds of marbles were very expensive, however, since they had to be transported long distances, and hence they were used chiefly as a veneer, as in the interior of the Library of Congress at Washington. But great care was used in attempting to secure effective color schemes. The dull golden marble of Numidia (*giallo antico*), the fine white marble with purple veins of inner Asia Minor (*pavonazzetto*), the serpentine and dark red porphyries of Africa were the favorite decorative marbles, but there were varieties to the number of 500 of which specimens have been found.

For the roofing of large spaces new methods had also to be discovered. The cantilever principle had already been freely used in making wide spans for roofs, but, not having sufficient water pressure, the fire brigade had difficulty coping with fires which destroyed timbered roofs. Free stone arches were liberally used over smaller spaces, even the straight arch was invented to take the place of wooden architraves, but the arches when thrown over large spaces exerted a thrust with which it was difficult to deal. Hence the solid concrete dome was invented. A temporary domed ceiling of timber was first constructed on scaffolding, then brick arching laid over this, after which layer upon layer of concrete was spread. This concrete hardened into a solid cap as firm as metal and with no outward thrust. It bore straight down upon the solid walls. Then of course the temporary wooden ceiling was removed and the inside of the dome was stuccoed with suitable patterns. The interiors of such buildings were impressive for their spacious majesty even though the exteriors too often gave a sense of mere bulk. The massive dome of the Pantheon still standing at Rome (as rebuilt by Hadrian) has a diameter of over 140 feet with a height equal to the diameter. The chief criticism of a structure so roofed would be that the

decorative columns and cornices were not an integral part of the structure but had to be fitted into it afterwards. This flaw, however, is due to the mass of the structure and rigidity of the material, and it is the same criticism that has to be faced by the modern architect who is forced by needs of great modern cities to use iron, an equally ugly and rigid material. It must be admitted that the Romans solved with great skill the new problem of building dignified structures for large gatherings out of what would seem to be very refractory material.

In the sculptured decoration of such structures we also find a new note. Romans were intensely interested in their history and their national concerns. Domitius' altar¹ to Neptune (35 B.C.) was effectively decorated with sculptures and bas-reliefs referring to his exploits on the seas: figures of marine divinities, a group of soldiers receiving their honors, the dignified offering of the *suovetaurilia* by the admiral. Similarly the magnificent Ara Pacis,² dedicated by Augustus in 9 B.C., portrayed in the impressive reliefs of its frieze processions of Roman dignitaries marching to the dedicatory sacrifices in honor of the eternal peace which was to be. The art is pleasing and correct and in a dignified classic spirit befitting the age of Horace and Vergil.

It was Augustus' boast that he had found Rome a city of unbaked brick and left it marble (*Latericiam accepi, marmoream reliqui*). This is acceptable as a general statement, though it would have been more to the point to say that he had found Rome built like a Latian town and left it with an architecture worthy of a world empire. The question was after all not so much one of the introduction of marble, as of great principles of building. Unbaked clay had not as a matter of fact been used for temples and public buildings for a long time. It had been and was still used under stucco for small private dwellings. The struc-

¹ Strong, *Roman Sculpture*, pp. 33 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

tures built by Augustus and Agrippa did very much to dignify the city—the great Apollo temple with its library, the Theater of Marcellus, the great Forum of Augustus with its temple to Mars Ultor and its sculptured epitome of Roman history, the temple to the Divine Julius, the Pantheon with the baths of Agrippa, in addition to the restoration of eighty-two old temples. But this was not all. The Augustan reign was a period of great prosperity and of peace that gave many private citizens the courage to build themselves new palaces on the many hills of Rome. Everywhere men adopted the suggestions of Augustus' architects, and replaced their humble houses with lofty and spacious structures of concrete decorated with marble columns and capitals, and such private dwellings did perhaps as much to change the appearance of the city as did the personal undertakings of Augustus.

These private palaces of the wealthy in general followed the lines that we know from the larger houses of Pompeii. The front part embraced an atrium or court which was but partly covered, and into this opened several dwelling rooms. In the more spacious rear part the rooms similarly opened inward upon a quadrangular portico or peristyle that in turn surrounded a rather large garden. It was the fashion in the Augustan period to acquire the services of skilful painters who decorated the interior walls, while the stucco was still wet, with scenes from mythology, literature, or nature and with decorative arabesques in what has been called the "second style." Here again the aim of the architect was to enhance the beauty of the interior rather than of the exterior. Such houses usually spread along the ground, they seldom made much use of a second story since the inner garden was very important to them and must not be shaded by high walls. Humbler folk, however, who could not afford homes of this kind—and land inside the walls was naturally scarce and expensive—were more and more drifting to tenements and apartment houses built in

blocks. And to meet the needs of the growing city, capitalists were now building a great number of these. The use of concrete had developed to the point where it was possible to construct huge apartment houses rising to six stories or more. These buildings resembled in all essentials the apartment houses found in every large city to-day. There was, however, little attempt to beautify them, since they were meant for poor people who could pay but little rent. The rooms were small and not too well lit—some had only secondary light—and the ceilings low; but since the whole structure, even the staircase, was usually of concrete, such buildings were fairly sanitary and nearly fire proof.

Religious Cults. The Greco-Roman religion, still recognized by the state, the ceremonies of which the priests dutifully performed, had now but little influence. Augustus, however, insisted that all the old rites should be carefully observed, thinking perhaps that these at least helped to keep out foreign cults of questionable value, and that they gave the people a certain sense of security at times of excitement. He was very careful to keep all temples in good order, and to see that the augural, fetial, and pontifical boards were filled by men of dignity. The Romans viewed these cults of Jupiter, Mars, and the rest very much as many Italians of to-day view the rites of the church. Even though they may never attend mass, except at the time of marriage and at the death of a relative, they wish their children to attend and are ready to seek the consolation of the church in times of great distress. What the state had occasion to fear was the gradual increase of worshipers at the shrines of Asiatic and Egyptian deities. The devotees of Magna Mater, Mithras, and Isis were largely Syrian and Egyptian people who had come to Rome from the East as slaves and who when they were set free and became citizens began to exert pressure upon the state to let them have at Rome the rites to which they were accustomed. The faith

in immortality and the practice of rites of purification, which these religions brought, were perhaps beneficial. But there were also in some of them orgiastic mysteries and an over-emphasis upon the sexual element that displeased the Romans. Augustus therefore took care that new shrines of foreign divinities should not be permitted inside the walls of the city. Whoever wished, however, to perform such rites outside the walls was permitted to do so.

The simple folk of the country had never departed far from the animism of a primitive day. They still said their prayers to the unnamed spirits of the harvests, of the fields, and of the springs. A general name for the spirits of the fields and homes was the word "Lares," good angels, as it were, that were satisfied with some slight token of devotion. "If when you pray to your 'Lares' you bring some salt and meal with a sinless hand it is enough," says Horace consolingly to the farmer's wife.

And here we come to a very strange innovation made by Augustus in the latter half of his rule. As we have seen he had, in 27 and 23, when he shaped his plan of government, definitely rejected Caesar's plan of accepting deification. Later, however, he did much to associate his name with religious rites in such a way that the Senate drew the desired inference and after his death recognized him as Divus. It is difficult to discover the reasons for this new policy; perhaps Augustus simply yielded to the inevitable wave of Orientalism that was now sweeping westward. We can easily trace the progress of this "Imperial cult." In the East the provincials had become so accustomed to "bowing the knee" before kings that they had even insisted upon kotowing to Roman proconsuls. Caesar had made no effort to stop this custom during his dictatorship, nor had Antony after him. Augustus, though he made it clear in 27 that he desired none of it in Italy, had permitted the name of Augustus to be associated with the Goddess Roma in a state cult that rapidly sprang up all through the East. Then seeing that

this cult might become a symbol of patriotism and devotion to the ruling city, he encouraged the rite in the western provinces though not in Italy.¹ Accordingly in Gaul and elsewhere provincial *concilia* were formed to which each tribe sent representatives whose chief function was to carry on this peculiar cult. Then the cult came into Italy in two modified forms. The prominent freedmen of the cities, who were generally Orientals, were organized, and six of the foremost (*seviri*) were each year selected as *Augustales* to remember the ruler in their devotions. This institution served the double purpose of providing offices of some dignity for an otherwise despised class, and of binding them directly to a state-cult which to them would seem natural. In the second form practised by other humble folk, both in the cities and in the country, the general devotion to the Lares was linked up with the name of Augustus. With the Lares of the street shrines was associated the "Genius Augusti," a spirit sufficiently indefinite to find a place in the pantheon without creating any religious shock. And thus it was that before his death, Augustus, who had at first refused to be a deity had practically become one by this association of his name with Oriental ruler-gods and Italian animistic cults. The imperial cult first recognized by Caesar had thus returned and remained throughout the Empire one of great significance among the people. It was not long till tyrants made it a weapon with which to test men's personal loyalty to the throne.

¹ There were also temples in Italy in the later years of his reign where Augustus was actually worshiped as a deity, but these temples had as a matter of fact been dedicated not to Augustus but to the "*Genius Augusti*."

CHAPTER XXI

THE BUSINESS-LIFE OF ROME

The student of the history of modern democracies, who has to explain many constitutional changes by reference to the desires of labor, capital, importers and exporters, producers and consumers, finds Roman history strangely devoid of such explanations. And he suspects that the historian of Rome is old-fashioned when he continues to connect politics with individuals and parliaments. But industry at this time played no such rôle in affairs of state at Rome that one can justifiably seek an "economic interpretation" of historical events. It is entirely sound to write the history from Sulla to Augustus as a story of a strife between ambitious political leaders and groups of leaders. Tariffs and strikes and capitalistic monopolies, which are in general concomitants and results of modern democracy, have no serious part in the story of Rome. The old nobles of Rome were, to be sure, interested materially in the success of senatorial rule, which often prompted well-ordered expansion. That has been recognized. But they were never "captains of industry" or commerce, and they cared little for these. The *equites* went a little further in that they invested not only in land but also in provincial tax-gathering and in provincial money-lending which entailed landholding. But they concerned themselves very seldom with industrial questions. As for the laboring man, he was usually a slave who had no way of making his voice heard in the Forum. Commerce continued to be largely in the hands of the shippers of Egypt, Syria, Asia, Greece, and to some extent of South Italians. They had secured open seas, free trade, and protection from Rome without the asking, for the very

reason that the Senate had cared too little about trade to think of restricting it or controlling its channels. Industry was partly controlled by provincials, partly by Campanian and Etruscan manufacturers who had no standing in Roman society, but more largely by petty shop-keepers to whom it never occurred to ask favors of the government. We have, therefore, usually found it best to omit economic arguments from the story of the political changes at Rome. But it is now necessary to consider what were the methods of production and of distribution and to see how far capital and factory organization entered into them.

The artisan-shops of Pompeii. If we survey an ordinary block of dwellings and shops at Pompeii—the only ancient Roman town left us for first-hand examination—we find something like this: the residences are in the center, the streets are lined with small shops. These shops, though badly looted, usually show traces of display-counters in front for the sale of wares, and a work bench, forge or furnace in the rear for the making of such wares. That reveals the system. These are combination workshops and sales-rooms of petty specialists and craftsmen who made and sold their own articles: cutlery, locks and keys, baskets, shoes, harness and what not. As yet we have not come upon what we may call a large factory, or wholesaler's warehouse. Pompeii at first glance gives one the impression of a medieval gild-town concerned largely in what has been called "town economy."

That is the first impression, and, to a large extent, it is a true one. Such town economy is fairly representative of more than half of the machinery of production in Augustus' day. However, we must modify this picture by a more careful scrutiny of articles of trade found in European museums, articles that bear trademarks and makers' stamps, and we shall then find that even at Pompeii wholesale trade in factory-made goods had made considerable in-

roads. Probably further excavations near the harbor will reveal the ruins of warehouses and factories.

Methods of production: pottery. The ordinary tableware of Augustus' day was a red-glazed pottery figured in low relief, called Arretine ware. Most of it came from Arretium and Puteoli. Some of the factories have actually been found. One at Arretium had a mixing basin of 10,000 gallons' capacity. Most of the decorated pieces bear the name of the maker so that we can identify the products of the different factories. Hence we know that the ware which is scattered over all the Mediterranean except the South-East, i.e., a territory of over 1000 miles, came from a few centers. What were the forces that made for centralized factory production? Not a patented trade-process nor a copyrighted trademark; for those things were not yet known.

However, the requisite fine clay was not to be found everywhere; the secret of the delicate red glaze was probably guarded as well as it could be; the furnaces, though not elaborate, called for the concentration of men skilled at the potter's wheel, and, above all, the necessity of having highly skilled and presumably expensive artists to make the designs suggested the advisability of minimizing the overhead expense of the designers by producing on as large a scale as possible.

Here then we have a true factory, producing for "international" trade.

Glass-ware. The same tendency may be noticed in the glass trade, after the blowpipe was discovered. Glass paste, especially variegated colored glass, had been made everywhere for hundreds of years before Augustus' day. Clear glass was, however, difficult to produce when the glass paste had to be poured into molds; for a separate mold had to be made for each article, and the particles of the mold were apt to adhere to the glass on the inside. Strabo says the invention that made clear glass cheap—one cent

per article—was new in his day. The inventors were apparently some Syrian glassmakers of Sidon, who were so proud of their work that they had their names molded on their articles. Now, glass articles with the names of Neikon and Artas are found from Sidon to Spain. Here then we seem to have a factory system based upon an invention that doubtless was well guarded.

Metal-ware. Why was there no steel trust? Not only the Greeks and Romans but the barbarians of Spain and the Alps made as well-tempered steel blades as we have to-day. The reason for the failure to concentrate lay in the failure to find a cheap method of mass production. Individual smiths at home-made forges could make as good articles as anyone. What was needed was a blast-furnace with a powerful valved bellows that would keep a constant blast going, so as to melt the ore thoroughly. That was discovered a trifle too late, in fact not till the 4th century A.D. Had the secret of making cast-iron been discovered a little earlier Roman industry might have been revolutionized.

Concentration there was to some extent. Diodorus writing in Vergil's day tells us that Puteoli near Naples had captured a large part of the iron-trade of the world. The ore came from the island of Elba and was there smelted down as far as could be "into a spongy mass," he says. Then manufacturers near the great harbor of Puteoli bought this crude pig-iron, gathered numerous skilled smiths who worked it into all the forms of arms and implements needed.

Here is concentration of industry, but hardly a real factory; for the smiths were after all doing only what individuals elsewhere could do. The only advantage of the system was that by this concentration large orders could be executed speedily, and large orders were sometimes placed at short notice, especially in arms and armor. We may suppose that the trade drifted from Etruria, where the ore was

found, to Puteoli, because wood was plentiful there, the harbor was good, and most ships that resorted to Italy put in there.

What Diodorus says, finds interesting confirmation at Pompeii—just across the bay from Puteoli. Despite the small-shop system that we have noticed at Pompeii, we do find retail hardware stores there without benches and forges. Apparently the producers of Puteoli could supply retailers nearby more cheaply than could the city's own smiths. However, we must not suppose that the individual smith was generally driven out by this competition. The Roman dedicatory and sepulchral inscriptions erected by individual smiths, cutlers, swordmakers, shieldmakers, etc., are very numerous.

We find then that the favorable location of Puteoli made for concentration of a simple kind; but the lack of a labor-saving invention retarded the growth of a factory system.

The manufacturers of copper and bronze utensils on the other hand seems to have developed a real factory system, partly because large-scale production was possible in foundries, partly because artistic skill of a high grade was called for in conjunction with the work. Wine containers, cups, ladles, and table-ware of artistic shapes and beautifully patterned were used in large quantities. Hence it was necessary to gather under one roof men of diverse training: furnace-men, molders, smiths who forged, carved, polished, and worked in repoussé. For a long time it has been noticed that Roman ware found in Scotland and Sweden often bears the same firm names as that usually unearthed at Pompeii, and recently it has been pointed out that these are names frequently found on Capuan inscriptions. It will be remembered that Cato and Pliny call Capua the best market for bronze ware, and that medieval church bells were first produced at Capua.

Considering the extensive distribution of this fine Capuan bronze-ware we may safely say that very large factories

employing hundreds of men must have existed there, and it was the existence of these large foundries that made it possible for Roman artists to have their numerous bronze works of art, especially the magnificent equestrian statues, cast in Italy.

What has been said of bronze ware applies also to silver plate. At one time it was customary to attribute the fine pieces of the Hildesheim and Boscoreale treasures to Alexandrian artists, but there is good reason for supposing that large silverware factories near the bay of Naples must have the credit for much of this exquisite work.

Brick-factories. Finally, we may notice an industry in which, at a somewhat later day, concentration was in part due to an accident. Modern economists class brickmaking as an industry in which, because of the facility of the process and of the weight of the article in transportation, a monopoly is not apt to arise. At Rome, however, the brickyards practically all came into the possession of the estate of Marcus Aurelius, inherited through his mother and grandmother from Domitius Afer and his sons who seem to have profited by the building boom which arose after the great fire of Nero. The facts are never thus baldly stated, but what we know is that before the fire brick was little used for building, that a few brick stamps bearing Afer's name occur before the fire, that after the fire almost every building of importance contains some stamps from his yards, and that during the next three generations, the family, by purchase, inheritance, and intermarriage with other yard-owners, procured virtually a control of the industry in the city. But this is a very special case. It may be, of course, that Afer happened at the time of need to own the alluvial strip of the Tiber above the Mulvian bridge where the best brick soil existed.

We may now turn to some industries where centralization was for some reason obstructed.

Clothing. The ordinary clothing was generally made in

Italy from homegrown wool, other fabrics were generally imported. During the Empire silk cloth was carried over by caravans from the far East and seems often to have been unraveled and respun. Fine linen was produced in quantities by the Ptolemaic state factories of Egypt which Augustus inherited, and home-spun linen was also imported from Spanish centers. In Asia Minor, whence we still draw so many handwoven rugs, there was much scattered production of finely woven and embroidered fabrics. At Rome the staple cloth was wool, and a large part of the raw wool came from sheep pasturing over all the mountains of Italy.

But there were no cloth factories in Italy, not even handicraftsmen in guilds of spinners or weavers. The reason seems to be that spinning and weaving could be done most cheaply by using the unoccupied time of household slaves. Slaves were very numerous in every household of wealth, and since fashion dictated that each slave should have a particular assignment as chambermaid, hairdresser, waitress, holder of the fan, keeper of the cosmetics, etc., it was as well to have an additional task that might keep them out of mischief when not otherwise engaged. All woollen cloth was therefore made as an inexpensive by-product and it was obviously not profitable for a manufacturer to attempt to compete with such cheap production.

But there are still unsolved problems concerning the industry. Who distributed the wool, and where was the woven cloth disposed of? Homespun, right off the loom, was not worn by the average Roman. The oil must be boiled, stamped, and washed out; there was need of carding and clipping, bleaching and dyeing.

In England, as we know, when the cloth industry began to develop, either the wool-grower, or the weaver, or the fuller, assumed the rôle of organizer and directed the article from household to household till it was ready for

the market, where the drapers of Blackwell Hall took in hand the task of distribution.

We have signs of something of the same kind at Pompeii. There about the time of Augustus several fulleries were established by renting or buying old residences and fitting them up with elaborate vats, tanks, and dyeing tubs. These served, of course, in part as laundries and dyeing shops for the city—the lack of soap made ordinary washing a difficult process—but they were too elaborate for just this. Furthermore at the side of the forum there is a spacious hall given to the fullers, according to an inscription still there. The building is a hall for sales-booths like Blackwell Hall, of medieval London. It would seem, therefore, that the fullers were the enterprisers in the business. Very likely they bought the raw wool that came down from the mountains, distributed it at the households where spinning and weaving was done, then after cleaning, bleaching and dyeing the stuff marketed it at their hall. And this is apparently a common procedure in many other towns to judge from inscriptions which speak of fullers' halls.

The rest of the clothing trade was probably simple. A man's toga, for instance, was worn almost in the shape in which it came off the loom. A few stitches and some clasps sufficed for the tailoring. We know, of course, of tailors' shops, but slaves in the household, or, in the family of the poor, the housewife herself, usually finished the garment.

Water pipes. We may take one more example to illustrate the conservatism of much of Rome's industry. In the manufacture of leadpipes, for the elaborate system of water-mains generally laid by the householder, a large-scale production somehow did not emerge, despite the fact that large quantities in standard sizes were frequently needed. Here we get our information partly from Frontinus' business-like account of the water supply of Rome, but mainly from the stamps upon the pipes which indicate their owner and maker. In general, the imperial water-bureau provided for

the main aqueducts of Rome and for the distribution of water to all public places, that is, to the imperial palaces, to the public baths and gardens, and to a large number of free public fountains whence the poor carried their water. In Frontinus' day the bureau owned some seven hundred slaves to do the requisite work, a part of which consisted in making and laying the lead pipes of the public service; indeed such pipes usually bear the name of the maker besides those of the water commissioner and the emperor.

At Rome the larger number of pipes, however, was contracted for by private individuals who had secured water rights, a group that included most of the well-to-do of the city. Such pipes were quite regularly stamped with the owner's name in order to afford ready identification in case of repairs—for often several lines lay parallel to each other under the pavement. Usually the maker also took this occasion to have his own name recorded. Now these names reveal some singular circumstances. From the great mass of material recovered and the numerous names recorded, it does not appear that any one firm secured large contracts or tried to build up a stock for large orders, although certain standard sizes were in demand. A maker's name in fact very seldom recurs in two widely separated regions of the city, and furthermore when a contract was large it was apparently divided among several plumbers. Moreover, it is clear that the names stamped upon the pipes were almost invariably a part of the original mold, which indicates that the pipe was made to order and that no stock was accumulated. The system in vogue, therefore, was this: small shop-owners with a few slaves, with no large capital, and with few facilities, took the orders when they came, bought the metal, melted it and rolled it into plates which were cut into the requisite strips and soldered into pipes, and finally they laid and connected these. That is to say, the plumber was also the maker of the pipe. Why this time-consuming system was conserved it is difficult to understand. It would

seem that the inertia of this industry is simply an illustration of how tenaciously the small-shop system conserved itself against obvious economic inducements toward centralization—a phenomenon too well known and recognized to need further illustration.

Food. In the production of food a rather primitive system generally prevailed, since the Romans then lived on vegetables far more than now. The central open markets were daily filled by farmers of the neighborhood, and the fruit and meat stalls nearby were also to a great extent supplied directly by the producer. Even the wine and oil were usually brought down to the retailer by the farmers in small quantities, as we can see by examining the marks on the wine casks. But, of course, Rome needed some middlemen both because it had outgrown the power of production of its vicinity and because the wealthy demanded the finest wines of the East.

Baking was seldom done in the household at Pompeii, the difficulty of getting fuel and of having the grain ground into flour may be the reasons. Bakeries with a capacity of three or four thousand loaves daily are found in many regions of the city.

The factory versus the artisan shop. We seem then to find in Italy an industrial system which in many respects resembles that of early nineteenth-century New England, where the native artisans of inland towns not yet connected by steam power produced most of the articles needed by each town. However, many of the Roman cities were now growing large and the number of wealthy men who demanded and could pay for luxuries and delicacies far exceeded that of our early republic. To gratify such men an extensive commerce had long existed, and in some lines of production industries aiming at a wide market had already arisen.

The forces that worked in favor of large-scale and monopolistic production differed but little from those of a

similar tendency to-day. The possession of a new device for glass blowing seems to explain the success of the Sidonian glass-makers; the accumulation of skilled workmen and artistic designers at places providing a desirable clay enabled the Arretine potters to capture for that ware the trade of half the world; and similarly the possession of good recipes gained a wide market for certain food specialties. The production of silver and bronze ware tended to concentrate, partly because a combination of many highly trained molders, designers and engravers was required, partly because the expensive raw product demanded capital. The same is true of many kinds of furniture that required skill in working expensive woods, metals, and marble. The extension of the fulleries and tanneries illustrates how mass production was encouraged when chemical preparations and apparatus not easily procured by the public were required. In wholesale breadmaking the centripetal forces were the desire to save labor and space, the increasing cost of fuel, and the difficulty of procuring flour in the home. To some extent certain towns specialized in iron ware. Here doubtless the problem of fuel reckoned in the account, and it may also be assumed that the irregularity of the demand for arms and armor, and the seasonal suspense of the trade in farm implements, discouraged individuals who had not sufficient capital to wait for the market; ordinary cutlery which found a steadier sale was doubtless produced to a considerable extent in small shops. Finally the behavior of the brick monopoly at Rome illustrates the chance aid that an industry might receive from such an accident as the great fire which threw enormous contracts in the way of a few men who happened to have ready the facilities for production when needed.

A genuine factory system did not, of course, fully develop in all of these lines, but division of labor and the employment of some labor-saving machinery and technical processes were present in the production of silver and

bronze ware, pottery, glassware, furniture, brick and of some table delicacies; while in most of these wares there is evident a capitalistic production having a world-wide trade in view.

Certain centrifugal forces, on the other hand, were still very strong. With the slow transportation of that day perishable goods could hardly pass from town to town. With the concomitant cost of transportation heavy articles of low value like cheap earthenware could not advantageously be shipped. Lack of patent laws must also have retarded concentration, since new processes quickly became the property of any rival. The heaviest drag upon industry, however, must have been the all-dominating slave system. The abundance of slaves enabled fastidious householders to have everything possible done in their own houses in accordance with their personal tastes. Among the slaves of Statilius Taurus, the magnificent friend of Augustus, we find trained artisans engaged not only in performing extravagant personal services but in making articles that the industries of Rome might well have supplied: smiths, fullers, tailors, spinners, weavers, shoemakers, masons, cabinet makers, carpenters, workers in marble, and others. This was hardly a condition calculated to help the marketing of factory-made goods. Moreover, a plentiful supply of cheap labor discouraged a demand for new labor-saving devices which might have created new products for a potential market, and might also have tended toward the accumulation of expensive tools and trade secrets to the benefit of industrial concentration. For instance, the invention of a valve in the bellows used in iron furnaces to create a continuous blast, an improvement that any intelligent and interested free workman might have conceived, would have revolutionized the iron industry by making smelting and casting possible on a large scale. But the slaves who performed the work were not expected to bring quick interest to their tasks. Finally, the general disrespect for industry, due

partly, of course, to a conservative devotion to land, found in all aristocratic societies, but indelibly fixed by the association of industry with slavery, turned aside the capital and the intelligence of strong Romans which might otherwise have flowed into industrial development. It now seems a fair conclusion that Roman industry had reached as high a degree of advancement in Augustus' day as it was likely to do so long as slavery persisted.

Labor. The laboring men in Italy were largely slaves and ex-slaves. In the factories, potteries, and brickyards spoken of above, the signatures of the factory managers reveal the fact that these were generally freedmen, a fact which in turn implies that the workmen were slaves. Farm managers were regularly slaves, hence in general the farm laborers also. We happen to have thousands of names of the servants who worked in large urban households, names rescued from the common burial grounds of such households, and these too prove to be names of slaves. In Cicero's voluminous correspondence there are many casual references to all kinds of servants, including secretaries, tutors, librarians, stenographers, and even literary assistants: they all prove to be slaves or ex-slaves. Finally, we happen to have on inscriptions many membership lists of labor guilds, especially of the guilds of carpenters and shipbuilders. Since slaves were not admitted to many of these guilds, few servile names appear on these lists, but after all the members seldom appear to be Romans of the old stock; most of them are freedmen who had once been slaves, or men whose parents were slaves. Since this is the situation we can well understand why wages were low at Rome and why there never were any labor strikes during the five centuries that we happen to know best. If the freedmen in a factory should strike for shorter hours or higher wages they would immediately be replaced by slaves, and have to face hunger.

The situation in the individual artisan shops was somewhat better. Cabinet-makers, cutlers, smiths and the like,

who rented small shops and produced for immediate sale a few specialties by their own labor, were to some extent Latins and Romans of the old race, but even here slaves and freedmen of foreign stock preponderated. Well-to-do Romans who owned rows of shops often fitted these up and placed in them skilled slaves to manage and work for them as agents, or again owners of many slaves would by way of rewarding the diligent "set them up in business" either gratuitously or on a percentage basis.

The conditions of slaves varied greatly. In the old simple days when slaves were few, they were treated much like "farm-hands" in western America. But that was now seldom the case on large plantations, in mines, and factories, where slaves seldom came into personal contact with their owners. The managers, themselves slaves and freedmen, bent on gaining their master's gratitude by means of large profits, were often cruel. In such places there were no "maximum hours," and the lash and chain were not infrequently used on the unruly. Yet where personal contact was possible we find evidence of the old customs. There was of course little race prejudice to complicate the problem, since most slaves were indistinguishable from citizens in appearance, and the practice of liberal manumission continued. The custom also of rewarding diligent slaves by equipping them in shops on a percentage basis gave remarkable opportunities for economic freedom; and the employment of slaves as secretaries and trusted business agents placed such people in positions where they could acquire both freedom and property.

Measured merely in economic terms, the freeborn laborer had a more precarious life than many slaves and freedmen. He had less opportunity to reach the sympathy and support of a rich patron. He had no access to positions of trust, since these fell to loyal slaves, well-trained and long known. The free laborer had no master from whom to get funds for shop-keeping, and he did not fit in well with a troop of

slaves either on the farm or in the household where discipline must be uniform. In factories, in mines, or at the docks he might perhaps find work if he asked no more than the daily cost of a slave, which seldom exceeded fifteen cents a day. A slave drudge could usually be bought for less than two hundred dollars, that is, about twenty dollars per year, capitalized and insured. His annual keep would come to twenty or thirty more, including the price of two tunics, a pair of shoes, some twelve or fifteen bushels of wheat, some table leavings in the form of oil, wine and vegetables, and a straw cot in the slave barracks. On the assumption that his job was temporary and therefore did not incur any expense in idle seasons, the free man might ask for a trifle more than this, but only a trifle.

Was it possible for a man to live on such a pittance? If he could have work constantly he might, since in buying the ordinary food the purchasing power of money was then about three times that of our own currency in 1910 (to take a year of normal values). And the government, recognizing the fact that work was not always to be had, kept him at least from starving by distributing grain to the poor. The poor man's list of necessities, however, had to be cut down to the lowest point. He needed fifteen bushels of wheat each year at about 75 cents a bushel. He ate no meat, or only when the priests on holidays gave meat away after a sacrifice. He needed one cent's worth of oil per day and as much wine; a small portion of vegetables cost about as much; a pound of cheese, reckoned then at about seven cents, sufficed for several days. These were the usual articles of his menu. He needed only about two tunics a year, the wool for which cost a dollar. Half a dollar sufficed for a pair of sandals which he seldom wore. In his own room in the tenement house (which cost him little more than \$15 or \$20 per year) he had no fire except for cooking. The state supplied amusements on holidays free of charge, and there were free public baths, where he went

chiefly to meet his friends. If he was out of work the state also supplied his grain. It was, therefore, possible for him to live, and also to have a family if his wife would spin and weave. But it was a precarious life, and it is not surprising that unpropertied Romans migrated to the provinces, or took to brigandage, or joined the army.

Collegia or gilds. The laborers of every craft, whether working in factories, or independently in their own small shops, had their gilds. Since these had been used for political purposes Caesar had suppressed them, and thereafter they were allowed to form again only if they were able to secure a state charter by proving that their purpose was useful. Thus in Augustus' day and later the *collegia* grew up under new forms, their purpose being mainly to give burial aid to the poor and to provide a slight sum to the family of the deceased. This was an exceedingly important factor in the life of the laborers, since few were able to save any money out of their meager wages. Such a society would build a hall with niches for hundreds of funeral urns, provide for the cremation of the deceased, and procure a suitable urn and a small slab of marble with his name inscribed upon it. The cost of the whole would amount to but a few dollars. It is probable also that the social feature contributed not a little to its popularity. For the members were permitted to meet once a month over wine and sandwiches, but not oftener. The following lines taken from the "regulations and by-laws" of such an organization will afford some insight into their purposes, and although the inscription dates a century later than Augustus, it fairly represents conditions in the earlier gilds also.

"It is unanimously voted that whoever wishes to enter this society shall pay an initiation fee of one hundred sesterces (about three dollars at this time) and an amphora of wine, and monthly dues of three cents.

"If a member in full standing dies there shall be drawn for his account three hundred sesterces, one-sixth of which shall be

divided among the attendants at the funeral. The funeral procession shall go on foot.

"Any member who commits suicide shall not be buried by the society.

"If any member who is a slave shall become free he shall provide the society with an amphora of good wine.

"If an officer elected in due order does not give a dinner to the members he shall be fined one dollar. The officers are each to furnish for such dinners an amphora of good wine, two cents worth of bread, four sardines for each member, and provide for the service.

"If any member causes a disturbance by changing his seat he shall be fined twelve cents; if anyone insults another member the fine shall be thirty-five cents; if he abuses the presiding officer the fine shall be sixty cents."

Capital. Roman law was not fond of joint-stock companies and corporations. It liked the idea of personal responsibility and personal liability. Business corporations that may be called real joint-stock companies in the modern sense were allowed only in the public service, in tax-gathering, in contracts for public works and the like. By such companies *partes* and *particulae*, corresponding roughly to stocks, were issued. In other businesses, although Roman law permitted partnerships freely, they were partnerships of unlimited liability. When a partnership was caught defaulting, both or either one of the partners could be sued to the full extent, and if one was thus sued he could have recourse to the courts to recover a fair share from the other. Partnerships of *unlimited* liability, therefore, existed in all forms of business, but needless to say these seldom sufficed for larger enterprises. Banks cannot usually accumulate large funds when all the capital must come from one person or from a simple partnership plus such amounts as the partners can borrow on their own credit. Furthermore, business enterprises based upon such partnerships could seldom grow through several generations, since they dissolved as a matter of course upon the withdrawal or

death of one partner. Accordingly, we can well understand that powerful banks did not arise, and also that few large business corporations arose to require the services of large discounting institutions. This does not imply that Roman business enterprise was checked primarily by the law, for other, perhaps more important, checks existed. But it is true that the corporation law was not adapted to the modern scale of business.

In Augustus' day, however, many large bankers were doing an extensive business. They received deposits on current accounts on which they paid interest. They did some discounting. They bought and sold real estate on their own account, and as agents for others. Their exchange departments were also important. They often kept expert business agents at the disposal of customers, particularly men versed in provincial investments, who traveled far and wide abroad. They acted as agents and formed temporary partnerships for the granting of large loans to foreign cities, states, and potentates. Finally, they usually had a chain of affiliations in the important eastern centers of commerce in order to facilitate the passing of bills and to provide Roman travelers and officials with letters of credit. All of these things could be and were done then as now, though not by any means on the same scale. Syndicate banking, now so important, was then unnecessary, since large corporations could not be formed, and the deposits which now give the banks such power, because of their volume, could hardly have been large owing to the lack of protection for depositors. Hence men who accumulated some capital were much more apt to ask the banks to find a borrower or a real estate investment for it than to leave it at the bank on deposit.

The surplus capital of Romans, as we have noticed, had for centuries followed the expanding armies inland. Time and again, when the population of the city became dense and there were signs of a drift toward the sea or toward

commercial outlets, a new advance on the border had required military colonization, and the familiar call of the land, which Romans were accustomed to heed, turned men inland once more. When in the second century B.C., however, Rome's armies went beyond Italy, annexing Spain, Africa, Southern Gaul and parts of Asia, the settler did not follow with the same alacrity. Land beyond the sea did not seem to offer a congenial home to the average Roman, and even Gracchus found little support for foreign colonies.

In Italy, however, Roman wealth must have expanded rapidly in those days. It has been estimated that the land in Italy thrown under Roman cultivation by the expropriations of the Punic war and by the seizure of the Po valley doubled the former acreage, making the total of *ager Romanus* over fourteen million acres, which at the very modest price of fifty dollars per *jugerum*, usually given for unimproved land, totals almost a billion dollars in soil value alone. This would indicate a high per capita property rating for the 320,000 citizens of Gracchus' day. When we remember that large land-holding was already the rule we may be sure that there were many thousand Romans who were well-to-do.

Ready capital may, however, have been scarce. The typical farmer seldom went to the bank; the turnover of money is exceedingly slow in agriculture; the strong box in the *tablinum* could take care of any surplus until the owner found another neighboring patch of land in which to invest. Later this process of land investment extended into the provinces. The surplus wealth of the average Roman always lay easiest that found its resting place quickly in some form of real estate. Cicero's properties were mainly in farm and city holdings, Atticus had large estates in Epirus and Italy, Varro in Campania and Apulia, Caesar's prefects, men like Labienus and Mamurra, who were enriched by booty, at once invested in land. Cicero's civil suits usually had to do with titles to land in Gaul or Etruria or

Lucania, and his letters of recommendation are full of references to large estates in Greece, Sicily, and Asia.

This real estate investment in the provinces had been facilitated especially by the activities of the Roman tax-gathering companies. The agents of these firms looked about for profitable opportunities for themselves and for Roman clients. And favorable occasions were numerous. Greeks and Asiatics harassed by war, poorly protected by their own none too trustworthy courts, often reckless in the conduct of business, were everywhere on the point of bankruptcy, and they were frequently helped over the precipice by these agents who were ready to find bargains, to foreclose mortgages and to take possession. For the agents knew well that with the coming of Roman rule the border would be safeguarded, radical revolutions suppressed, and property rights conserved in the courts. Hence, they thought, property ought to rise in value, and it did. On the eastern mortgages, too, they could get two or three or even five times as high a rate of interest as at Rome, because business risks had been so perilous in times past that the rate of interest was high. We hear much of these *negotiatores* in Cicero's day and later. It is an interesting commentary on the trend of Roman investment that the word actually changed its meaning during the Augustan period. In Cicero's day a *negotiator* was a Roman who lent money mostly on real estate mortgages in the provinces. In the language of Tacitus the *negotiator* is not a money lender and real estate speculator, but a merchant. The secret of this semantic change is that business opportunities had changed. Under Roman rule and Roman courts the risks of the land owners had lessened. Caesar and Augustus had withdrawn most of the publicans, hence the economic system was stabilized, the interest rate had fallen, and land speculation was less lucrative. The Romans who remained in the East stayed to trade. Here is a case where the history of a word tells an important story in economic history.

Commerce was now to some extent falling into the hands of Romans, as this fact implies. We unfortunately have not very much information about the practical machinery of shipping. Perhaps the best picture of what shippers had to contend with is to be found in the story of St. Paul's journey to Rome as given in the twenty-eighth chapter of the *Acts*. It is the tale of a painfully slow journey with several transfers from one ship to another, of having to winter in harbor because of storms, and finally of a dangerous shipwreck.

It is to be noticed that all three of the ships that St. Paul had to employ on this journey were Greek, not Roman. This is not an accident. The Romans still owned but few ships. The misfortunes in his case seem not to have been unusual. The truth is that without a compass ships had to hug the shore when the weather was not clear, and sailing close to shore meant running the risk of dashing on rocks whenever a wind arose. The frequency of wrecks was by no means due to poorly built or small boats. The ordinary freighter was then of two or three hundred tons, as large therefore as those that carried our early Salem skippers to India and China.

The sea-farers. The Greek merchants, like our skippers of colonial days, had usually been independent shipowners, sometimes even shipbuilders. They "tramped" from port to port with whatever cargo seemed to promise best profits. They employed their own capital, or sums borrowed at high maritime rates; they personally conducted the buying and selling of their cargoes, and when the season neared its end they found, if possible, a desirable cargo for the home port, whither they repaired to await the return of the spring sun. Of course, they also "rented space," as they called it, to merchants who filled orders for foreign consignees, but this was considered a minor part of their business. "Packet boats" with regular schedules or prescribed routes seem to have been unusual. When a trader grew wealthy he was

apt to acquire more boats in which he placed trusted agents to do the same kind of business for him. Since, however, these agents had less discretion than the owner, and generally had to be advised what courses to take and in what articles to trade, the growth of such shipping houses tended somewhat to reduce tramp-trading in favor of more regular packet shipping. But progress along these lines did not continue far in Greece.

In Cicero's day the irregular service pictured by the Greek writers apparently still prevailed, especially in eastern waters, where Greeks and Orientals seem to have dominated the seas. The interesting mariner's guidebook of the Neronian era, called the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, implies that the merchant trader of the old type dominated the Arabian, Persian, and Indian trade. From the decree of the Emperor Claudius, designed to encourage the importation of grain to Rome, one infers that shipbuilders, shipowners, and grain merchants were sometimes identical, and the ubiquitous Trimalchio is pictured as a merchant who built his own ships.

When, however, the Romans began to build ships and invest in foreign trade a more regular system made some headway. The writers of the Empire usually assume that the owners of vessels (*exercitores*) employ shipmasters (*navicularii*) who transport goods for, or, as they call it, "rent space to" importers and exporters (*mercatores*) very much as is generally done to-day. They even assume that ships often have regular routes, engage in a definite line of business, and that some, like those running between Brundisium and Dyrrhachium, specialize in a regular passenger service.

This advanced specialization and organization of the business was to be expected from the conditions prevailing at Rome. When timber became scarce in certain centers of industry and orders had to be placed at more favored ones, shipbuilding naturally specialized. Merchants who

grew wealthy in trade and extended their business far and wide had to employ agents and super-cargoes to supervise a part of it. And this tended to create import and export firms that directed the course of commerce from a main office. When, moreover, the emperors undertook to encourage and ensure shipping with the grain-producing provinces in order to make certain of Rome's food supply, organized schedules were established to so many important points that shipping companies could depend upon the service and conduct their business from their offices.

A study of Puteoli, Italy's chief port, the town at which St. Paul landed, is illuminating from several points of view. The reason why Eastern freighters preferred this port (150 miles from Rome) to Ostia, Rome's own harbor at the Tiber mouth, is obvious. Here, if anywhere, return cargoes could be got—in Puteoli's iron, earthenware and sulphur, and Capua's bronze ware. Rome was not a center of industry. Furthermore, Puteoli's proximity to Naples, a Greek town of old commercial traditions, made it possible to find crews and shipbuilders and also business agents for connections with the Oriental cities.

Puteoli soon acquired a semi-Oriental appearance because the traders of all the great Eastern seaports established agencies there. Such foreign colonies rented particular docks and warehouses, took possession of a separate quarter of the town, erected their own temples and had their own cemeteries. In the second century A. D. the "station" of the Tyrians at Puteoli was still paying annual rentals and dues to the amount of 100,000 denarii (then about \$10,000), although the colony was "then far smaller than formerly." The colonies of Beirut, of the Nabataeans and of other peoples had temples of their own at this port; the people of Baalbek had a cemetery of four acres; and dedicatory inscriptions erected by natives of Asiatic cities are very numerous.

We need not here follow the vicissitudes of commerce

through the Empire. Suffice it to say that when Claudius dredged out a good harbor at Ostia and built jetties to keep the Tiber mouth clear, Puteoli lost much of its shipping and especially its grain trade. However, the lack of return cargoes at Ostia still prevented that new harbor from monopolizing all the shipping. Many boats preferred to make port at Puteoli and send the goods bound Romewards by road or by small coasting vessels.

Exports and imports. The trade of Italy was, of course, very unevenly balanced; even Puteoli in the best days of Campanian industry could never fill the ships that came in loaded. Latium exported very little. Italian wines went eastward through Egypt, according to the *Periplus* cited above, but these were doubtless Calenian and Falernian wines carried cheaply as ballast. The Alban varieties could not compete with the numerous good Greek brands. Latium began to export some olive oil in Cicero's day, but this did not last long. In the Empire when Rome had learned the value of this article, very large quantities were imported from Spain and Africa. No manufactured articles of importance seem to have gone from Latium; in the long lists of goods enumerated in the *Periplus* Rome is not even mentioned. Campania exported chiefly iron and bronze ware, some pottery, wine, olive oil, and Capuan ointments. The rich Po valley exported wine, pitch, lumber, grain, pork, wool and cloth, chiefly to Rome, and jars that contained Venetian and Istrian products have been found far up in the valleys of the Tyrol. Arretine pottery, as we have seen, also found a market all over the western provinces until in the early Empire the branch potteries of Gaul captured the trade of the mother firms. That completes the list of important Italian exports. Needless to say, in such circumstances, Italy could not sustain an equilibrium of trade. Her ledgers balanced only because of the large credit accounts on provincial real estate investments and the constant inflow of tribute. Even then the government found

the outflow of currency disturbing and had to resort to desperate measures to keep it at home. We are reminded of recent governmental orders by the law which Gabinus had passed in 67 B.C. forbidding provincials to borrow money at Rome, and by the effort that Cicero made in his consulship to have custom officials at Puteoli seize all silver and gold that was being taken out of the country. Such measures were, of course, futile in the long run. Pliny, a century later, informs us that at least five million dollars per year went to China, India and Arabia for articles of luxury.

The principal imports, aside from grain, originated in the East. The provinces of Asia and Pontus supplied some grain, salt fish, timber, dried fruit, precious stones, wine, and the tapestries, draperies, and rugs for which Anatolia is still famous. Syria sent much glassware from factories in Sidon and the famous purple dyes and cloths for which Tyre was noted. The linens of Byblus and Beirut and the cedar of the Lebanons were also highly prized at Rome. In times of peace northern Syria tapped the caravan trade of Parthia, whose merchants brought Chinese silk and Indian cotton, pearls, ivory, and spices. To Gaza in the south came the Nabataean caravans bringing Arabian incense, spices, myrrh, and precious stones. The state factories of Egypt exported much fine cloth, glass and paper, and Alexandrian merchants sent out Ethiopian ivory, beasts for the games, and black slaves, besides transporting from the harbors of the Red Sea all the products of India and Arabia. This eastern sea trade received a great impetus from Augustus, who, contrary to Roman traditions, adopted for Egypt the mercantilistic policy of the Ptolemies, so far improving upon it that the shipping of the harbor at Myos Hormos, on the Red Sea, quickly tripled and quadrupled.

From the West came fewer finished articles, but more raw materials. Marseilles, then an independent Greek city controlling the trade of the Rhone, brought down metals, hides, rough wool, salt meat, cheese, slaves and amber

from the north in return for Italian iron, bronze, earthenware and the fine handiwork of the east. Her traders also brought tin from the British Isles by way of the Rhone and Seine. Further west the Roman colony of Narbo established a new road by way of the Gironde for traders who went in search of British tin, and tapped the mines of Aquitania. From northern Spain came rich stores of metals and also finished products made of the excellent Spanish steel. The central portions produced good fabrics of wool and linen, and the south an ever increasing quantity of olive oil, wine, wheat, salt pork, fish, and leather.

The machinery of distribution. Despite this great amount of trade the machinery of transportation is so far from showing uniformity that we can hardly expect well organized systems of salesmanship and distribution. In general we may assume that every harbor had a wholesale market where buyer and seller might meet. But the use of this market varied according to time and place. In the period when commerce was mostly of the "tramp" class, the condition which in fact created these market-places, the incoming merchant unloaded whatever wares he thought he might sell, and displayed them in the market while his ship stood at anchor. At the same market he could look over the wares of his competitors, buying and taking on board what seemed to him to promise good profits elsewhere. To the same market came of course the small shopkeepers of the town to buy stock for their retail trade. In this system, which still prevailed to some extent in Caesar's day, middlemen, buyers and salesmen were not essential. But there was an advanced stage of trade, already noticed at Puteoli, which also dispensed with middlemen to a certain extent. The Tyrian exporters, for instance, did not sail the seas with their cargoes, but rented warehouses and dock space at Puteoli, where their countrymen, agents or partners, received consignments, presumably displaying and selling their wares to retailers, in their local offices. They had a

similar *statio* at Rome, to which their Puteolan agents sent out such parts of the consignments as were destined for that city. Puteolian inscriptions prove that this system was used by many Eastern cities. Indeed, the Italian *agora* at Delos is apparently an instance of occidentals adopting the same system, and the *stationes* of Ostia were apparently erected by the Roman government for analogous purposes. With the development of the shipping business and the growth of exporting firms that operated from land, there doubtless also arose commission houses at the ports of entry, though we are not explicitly informed about them.

Of a developed system of salesmanship there is little trace, probably because there were few large factories such as now send out salesmen and "drummers," and the general existence of market places created by a more primitive system generally brought the product to the buyer with sufficient success. There is, however, an indication that some factories did not have to bring their goods to the market place. At the potteries of Auvergne there have been found large invoices of goods that are thought to refer to orders placed by wholesale pottery merchants for manufacture and future delivery. If this be a typical case, the buyers sent to such factories as then existed and placed their orders.

In general it may be said that the producer was in that simpler day nearer the consumer than at present, that in foreign trade the shipper brought his goods to the harbor market-place for the retailer or consumer to purchase, and that, to a far greater extent than to-day, the producer of domestic articles was himself an artisan and shopkeeper who sold directly to the consumer what he made in his small shop. Middlemen were relatively very few.

This review has shown the growth of an adequate commerce on the seas, and a commerce also that changed from the Greek tramp type to a regular and dependable system very much like our own. But it has also shown that the Romans never became a seafaring people. Greeks, Ori-

entals, and South Italian Greeks who had developed the trade before Rome rose to greatness, succeeded in keeping at least the larger share of the commerce on the high seas.

The Romans had so long found a sufficient outlet for surplus capital in developing the opportunities in landed investments disclosed by their expanding armies that maritime trade never became fashionable with them. Moreover, the great merchant is apt to rise out of the retailer, and for the retailer Roman public opinion, shaped by the landholding nobility, never had anything but scorn. The shopkeepers at Rome were very largely foreigners and freedmen.

Even the freedmen who engaged in the lucrative pursuits of banking and commerce therein, and grew wealthy, found that they must wash their hands of the taint of business in order to acquire any social standing. They changed their names, sold their business, moved out to country villas, bought some books and pictures and passed as gentlemen farmers.

The famous Trimalchio, described by Petronius as a favorite freedman of Maecenas, is typical of the class except that when intoxicated he talked too freely of his past: "I too was once like you," he says to his poor but respectable guests from Rome,¹ "but by my ability I've come to this. It's brains that makes the man. . . . After wheedling my fool of a master to set me free I went into business. I built five ships, loaded them with wine, but every ship was wrecked. Do you think I lost courage? No, by heaven! I built more ships, larger and better ones. I loaded them with wine again, pork, beans, perfumes and slaves. In one trip I cleared a million. At once I bought up all the farms that my master used to own, and went into cattle-raising. [Note the progress to respectability.] Everything I touched prospered. When I found that I had more than all the citizens of the town put together, I retired from active business and made my freedmen agents for me. [He

¹ Petronius, *Cena Trimalchionis*, 75-6, condensed.

is now banker by proxy.] Then I retired to this estate and built this palace. It has four dining rooms upstairs; it has a very fine porter's lodge and plenty of rooms for guests. Take it from me, if you've got something, you're worth something. So your humble servant, who was a pauper, has come to be a prince."

Agriculture in Italy had shown a wholesome tendency in Caesar's day. Sicily, which had long supplied the grain for Rome, had now been "overcropped" and was providing only scanty harvests; hence prices began to rise, and all the more rapidly because extra quantities of food were needed to feed Caesar's large armies. The Italian farmers were then called upon to supply the want, and when they tried it they found that their once exhausted soil had recovered during a generation of grazing. Hence we hear not a little of the fertility of Italian soil at the end of the Republic. The farmers, moreover, taught by past experience not to put their trust implicitly in grain, took the occasion to combine sparse vineyards and fruit orchards with cereal raising, planting the vines or trees far apart, and the grain and small crops between the rows, a device which the very strong sunlight of Italy permits.

But this good era of farming did not endure everywhere. The triumvirs, as we have noticed, confiscated the lands of some of the richest portions of Italy to give them to their thirty legions, and many of these soldiers were shiftless adventurers from the city who knew nothing about farming, or Gauls who did not comprehend Italian needs and methods. And what added to the misfortunes of Italian agriculture, many of the dispossessed migrated to Africa, where they presently turned that province into wheat fields by an elaborate system of irrigation and mixed farming. Before long shiploads of grain from Africa came to capture the markets of Italy from the bandit soldiers. With lack of success in Italy, the lands again began to fall under the control of fewer landlords, and presently the cry again is

raised that large plantations and ranches are ruining the whole peninsula.

If we wish to have a picture of the methods of the capitalist landlords and the business-like manner in which they specialized on the most productive crops when they had fertile lands, we can do no better than examine a country villa at Boscoreale, two miles beyond Pompeii, where the ashes of Vesuvius have preserved the farmhouse almost intact. The place was buried in the eruption of 79 A. D., but the system in vogue differed little from that which we know prevailed in the days of Augustus. That the owner was a practical farmer is clearly apparent from the abundance of farm implements, wine vats, and the like on his place. That, however, he was a man of urbane breeding and social connections, with wealth enough to gratify very fastidious tastes, is proved by the fact that his silver plate is now reckoned one of the special treasures of the Louvre.

Whatever other plantation owners may have done, this landlord, from the point of view both of production and of consumption, was part and parcel of the world's commerce and industry. So-called domestic economy has no place in his system. He produced a few specialties for the market with a view to profit, caring little whether or not he succeeded in satisfying the needs of his household from his own estate. The main part of his farm was devoted to vine culture, as two strong presses and a storeroom of jars with a capacity of nearly twenty thousand gallons testify. That there was also provision for some olive-growing is shown by a mill, a press, and jars of a few hundred gallons capacity. Little provision was made for stock raising and there was apparently small need for hay. A survey of the implement room is instructive. The abundance of hoes and picks and pruning hooks as well as the absence of scythes and hammers and shears indicate the narrow limits within which the work of the farm was confined. A small mill and oven show that there was grain enough for home use, but

nothing has been found to bear out the orthodox assumption that a house of this sort should have a staff of slave women spinning and weaving. Since the soil near Vesuvius was too rich to be given over to pasture the farm probably produced no wool, and the clothes were probably bought. Moreover, the supposition that large plantations were independent of the market in the matter of labor and implements seems to break down here. It is hardly necessary to mention that the house was built by skilled masons, as the fashionable type of reticulate masonry indicates, frescoed by an expert painter from the city, decorated with terracotta ornaments, and fitted up with standard bathtubs and an elaborate hot-water system that must have required the services of Pompeii's highest-priced plumbers. These things are in harmony with the silverware, the artistic bronzes, and the shop-made furniture. But even the implements of the stockroom are of the standard forms, made by skilled artisans, the crudest pottery bears the factory stamp, and the bricks bear trade-marks known from Pompeii. In fact, the landlord had proceeded far beyond the earlier practice of agriculture according to which the householder adapted his system of livelihood to the productions of his farm. This man's connections with his land were quite incidental. To him the land was a factory for the production of a special article from the profits of which he could make a living. And he lived upon his farm, when he did, only because he chose to be near his business or because he liked the air, not because it gave him his bread and cheese and homespun. But this was also a system whereby one man drew all the profits of a large estate. Slaves did his work, and Italy's citizenry profited little by his success.

CHAPTER XXII

AUGUSTUS AND THE EMPIRE

Advance into Germany. We left Augustus in the year 17 B. C. celebrating amidst great jubilation the "seventh centenary" of Rome's foundation. During those days there were few citizens or subjects who did not pray fervently that Augustus might live and reign to a ripe old age; and their wishes were fulfilled, for he was destined to rule for thirty more years.

The year after the celebration began with a long series of northern frontier wars, when the Usipetes and Tencteri, Germanic tribes once punished by Caesar, crossed the Rhine and defeated the Roman army of defense. The whole frontier question needed settlement, and Augustus began the new work in thorough fashion by bringing into subjection the Raeti, who held the Tyrol and the Brenner pass, so that Germany might if necessary be approached from two sides. He chose his two vigorous step-sons, Tiberius and Drusus, to do this preliminary work, the former pushing eastward through Switzerland from the Rhine, the latter marching directly north through the Brenner pass. Raetia and Noricum became provinces in consequence of this brilliant dash, and the exploit was celebrated in one of Horace's most successful national odes. Roman culture found its way northward, never quite to be driven out, and the fact that "Ladin" is still spoken in southern Tyrol indirectly influenced the decisions of the conference at Paris in 1919.

In the year 12 B. C. the general advance northward began, Tiberius and Piso subduing the eastern country as far as the Danube, where the provinces of Moesia and Pan-

nonia were laid out, while Drusus, then only twenty-five years of age, pushed directly into Germany from the Rhine, subjugating the tribes in the region of modern Cologne. When and why the momentous decision was adopted of pressing on to the river Elbe (Albis) and of making that the frontier instead of the Rhine, we do not know. Perhaps the easy success of Drusus and his youthful optimism influenced Augustus to take the step. At any rate, it was not an unreasonable plan, for now that the Danube had become the frontier in the northeast, the line to be guarded would be very much shortened if the Elbe were adopted for the frontier line running to the sea. The program was carefully mapped out for advancing by successive stages to the Ems (Amisĭa), the Weser (Visurgis), and finally to the Elbe. The fleet operating on the Rhine was strengthened and a canal was dug from the Rhine to the Zuyder Zee (Lacus Flevo). Then, while the fleet coasted along the shores of Frisia to the Ems and up that river, Drusus marched inland toward the north and east, advancing as far as the Weser. The next year he subjugated the tribes farther south, establishing the line of the Weser to its upper course, and placing forts at Mainz, Strasbourg, and Bonn. Finally, in the year 9, Drusus advanced to the Elbe, reaching it in the neighborhood of modern Magdeburg, where he erected a trophy. On his return towards winter quarters he fell from his horse, sustaining injuries from which he died after many days of suffering.

Tiberius was sent to take his place, but for reasons which we are not given, he confined his operations within the line of the Ems. He spent the year of his second consulship (7 B. C.) in Rome, and in the next, because of a disagreement with Augustus, he retired to Rhodes, where he lived in seclusion for many years.

Tiberius and the succession. This unpleasantness between Augustus and Tiberius, which proved disastrous to one of Rome's important enterprises, concerned the ques-

tion of who should be Augustus' successor. Since Augustus had no male heirs, Tiberius had had every reason to suppose that he was to be the choice. Augustus' wife, Livia, was a woman of determination and of no little influence over her husband. Her desire to see her sons, Tiberius and Drusus, elevated to high office seemed to be on the point of fulfilment, when, after Agrippa's death (12 B.C.), Tiberius was mated to Augustus' daughter, Julia. But the marriage had been far from happy. Julia, it was said, was suspected of being too intimate with certain young profligate nobles who had nothing to do. Furthermore, Julia's two sons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, were already adopted by Augustus and were so constantly honored that Tiberius seems to have concluded that he had been given Julia as wife not in order to become Augustus' heir, but to serve as a reliable guardian to the future heirs. It was indeed a peculiar position for him, the stepson of Augustus, to have as *his* stepsons the adopted sons of Augustus. This anomalous position led to the disagreement of which we have spoken and to Tiberius' untimely retirement.

As the years passed, Tiberius, in voluntary exile, grew morbid and Julia's profligacy became a public scandal. The reports of her behavior finally came to Augustus' ears in 2 A. D. Julia was banished to the island of Pandateria, off Campania, and Jullus Antonius, the son of Mark Antony and a man frequently honored by Augustus, was put to death as being her paramour. In the same year Lucius Caesar died, and two years later Gaius Caesar. The only direct male descendant left was the third son of Julia, Agrippa Postumus, a boy of feeble intelligence. Augustus, who had in succession lost Marcellus, Agrippa, and his two beloved grandsons, each of whom at some time had been looked upon as a prospective heir to his position, was now forced to adopt Tiberius, after having offended him deeply and by his mistreatment made a morose cynic of a once sturdy and efficient helper. Tiberius in turn was made to

adopt Drusus' son, Germanicus, a boy two years older than his own son, Drusus, and was thus forced into the position of placing his nephew in line of succession over his own son. This made his days no pleasanter. Meanwhile he was given the *tribunicia potestas* for ten years, which was now recognized as bestowing powers of peculiar significance. Then he was sent to the German border.

Evacuation of Germany. In Germany Tiberius undertook to reestablish the frontier along the Elbe, reaching the river with his army and navy in the year 5 A. D. Most of the Germanic tribes within the line acknowledged Rome's dictation. However, the Marcomanni, under King Maroboduus, had some time before migrated eastward, taking possession of Bohemia from the Boian Celts dwelling there (whence the name Bohemia). Since Marbod now straddled the frontier line which Rome wished to draw from the Elbe to the Danube he must next be dealt with. Hence Tiberius took charge of the army of the Danube, leaving the Elbe army under the charge of Sentius, the plan being to advance pincers simultaneously from both rivers. Success seemed assured in establishing this line, a success which would certainly have resulted in the Romanizing and civilizing of the major part of Germany. It may be futile to conjecture how history might have been changed if Tiberius had succeeded, but one can hardly escape the logic of the historian who has argued that the war of 1914 would probably not have taken place. However, just as Tiberius set out, the Pannonians and Dalmatians revolted, apparently in opposition to the taxes and conscriptions recently imposed upon them. Tiberius had to turn back from Bohemia and three years of hard fighting were required to restore peace. Meanwhile the thought of annexing western Bohemia was given up. But this was not all. No sooner had Tiberius stemmed this revolt than the Germans, under Arminius, led P. Quintilius Varus, the Roman general of the Rhine, into a skillfully placed ambush in the Teutoburg forest, and annihilated

ated his three legions. This disaster took place in 9 A. D. Tiberius was hurried to the Rhine, but it seemed futile to try again to conquer Bohemia, and without that the Elbe line was useless. He did little more than reassert Rome's position among the tribes along the Rhine. It was then decided to fall back to the old Rhine frontier, and Augustus' last instructions at his death confirmed this decision.

The organization of the Empire. In the other provinces there was but little warfare. Augustus, however, passed each under scrutiny and laid down the boundaries and administrative forms for each with meticulous care.

Spain was divided into three provinces, *Lusitania* (Portugal) and *Tarraconensis* (Northern and Western Spain), both governed by Augustus' legati, and *Baetica*, the peaceful and prosperous southern province governed by a proconsul of praetorian rank sent by the Senate. The north was now completely pacified, the south so thoroughly Romanized that Latin was spoken by most of the urban people there.

Britain was not considered a part of the empire by Augustus.

Further Gaul, conquered by Caesar, was divided into three provinces, all governed by legati of Augustus: *Aquitania*, which now extended as far north as the Loire (Liger), *Lugdunensis*, most of old Celtica, with its capital at Lyons, and *Belgica*. At times the three were given to one *legatus* if he was an important person like Tiberius or Drusus. Augustus' wisdom and liberality were especially in evidence in the organization of the Gauls, for he dealt directly with the sixty tribal units, recognizing them as autonomous in civil affairs, assigned the tribute on the basis of a census, and even permitted the *concilium* of Gallic representatives to make suggestions regarding the apportionment of the tribute. During his long reign we hear of only one serious effort to revolt in Gaul; the process of natural assimilation through trade relations proceeded rapidly.

Augustus, however, did not continue Caesar's more liberal policy of giving citizenship freely. *Narbonensis* continued as a senatorial province.

Sicily, *Macedonia*, *Achaia*, *Cyprus*, and the combined *Crete* and *Cyrene* were all left to the charge of the Senate, which sent praetorian proconsuls to rule them.

On the Danube, *Raetia* and *Noricum* were, like *Sardinia*, governed by Augustus' prefects, while the two mountain districts of the *Maritime* and the *Cottian Alps* (modern Savoy) also had prefects sent to suppress brigandage and keep the roads open. *Pannonia*, *Dalmatia* and *Moesia*, on the other hand, not thoroughly subdued and lying near the powerful Marcomanni and Dacians, were governed by Augustus' *legati* of consular rank; while *Thrace* was still left in charge of a client king.

In Asia Minor the two old provinces, *Asia* and *Bithynia*, were considered peaceful enough to be left under the Senate's care. *Galatia* was made a province on the death of its king and kept in imperial hands. The people here still spoke Celtic that could be understood by the Gauls of the west, but they were rapidly assuming Greek customs. *Pamphylia* was severed and became a separate province, but *Lycia* and *Rhodes*, probably because of the suffering they had endured at the hands of Brutus and Cassius, were allowed to remain independent allied states in the midst of the great empire. *Cappadocia*, a diminutive *Pontus*, *Paphlagonia*, and *Lesser Armenia* were ruled by autonomous princes recognized by Augustus as clients. *Armenia* and *Parthia* were two powerful kingdoms which from time to time recognized Rome's distant suzerainty by accepting Augustus' nominees as kings, but Rome's temporary successes in this region were due rather to internal jealousies in and between these kingdoms than to any direct compulsion on Rome's part. At any rate, it cannot be said that Augustus succeeded before his death in placing upon these

peoples the permanent impress of his claims to sovereignty over them.

Syria remained under the emperor's care since it harbored the four legions quartered in the East against the Parthian border. Within the sphere of operation of the Syrian *legatus* were several peculiar client-states of the Oriental type. The Arab kingdom of the *Nabateans*, holding sway from Damascus to Arabia, recognized Rome's overlordship. The theocracy of *Judea* had been included in Syria by Pompey. Caesar had allowed the Idumean royal house to extend its parasitic sway here, as though it were not enough that the people had to pay tithes to their own priests and tribute to Rome. King Herod, however, angered his subjects by his constant attempts to Hellenize them and to suppress theocratic ideas. He died in 4 B.C., and though his policy had been one which could only have profited Rome, Augustus, in 7 A.D., put an end to it, and permitted the Jews to become directly responsible to Rome. Judea then became a petty province governed by a procurator, who was probably considered a subordinate of the Syrian *legatus*. Another temple state was at *Emesa*, obedient to a local Baal whose priest was considered king. This king was a proverbial example of insignificant pomp, but he deserves mention because a mad descendant of his, Heliogabalus, later became the lord of the Roman Empire. Two other client kingdoms were *Commagene*, north of Antioch, and *Palmyra*, situated on an oasis through which passed the trade route to the Euphrates. To these also we shall have to refer again.

Arabia had been invaded by the prefect of Egypt at Augustus' command but without permanent results. Of the remarkable prefecture of *Egypt* we have spoken elsewhere.

Finally, *Africa* is interesting in revealing Augustus' policy of moderation. King Juba of Numidia had made the mistake of aiding Cato in the civil war. Caesar, therefore, had seized his kingdom and included it in the province

of Africa. Augustus had the courage, despite the protests of chauvinists, to disannex Numidia again and place the younger Juba, then a hostage at Rome, on the throne. However, "hauling down the flag" was no more popular then than it has been since. Augustus finally yielded to criticism, gave Mauritania to Juba, and again brought Numidia into the province of Africa, which was now a senatorial province.

The end of Augustus' Reign. The last years of Augustus were not happy ones. His granddaughter Julia had followed in the footsteps of her banished mother, and she too was exiled, and at the same time the poet Ovid, whose writings Augustus thought contributory to the laxity of morals. He tried to check the increase of immorality by sharpening the edge of the marital laws which he had passed many years before. Perhaps he was too old and severe to understand the difference between youthful exuberance and immorality; perhaps also he struck too much at symptoms instead of at causes. For the conditions his régime cannot be held wholly blameless. The strenuous and full-blooded youth of rich and noble families did not have enough responsible work to do under his paternalistic rule. In the Republic such men had had at least to educate themselves for a severe political career. Now they got offices through influence, and found the offices sinecures when they reached them. Moreover, too much of Rome's wealth came without effort. Men were simply gathering in the proceeds of the imperialistic investments of a strenuous Republic. "Coupon-cutting" on a vast scale does not make for national morale. Finally, the peace and prosperity of the Roman world, when wars were fought mainly by auxiliaries and only on the far distant frontier, gave a new care-free experience in spending the too rapidly accumulating wealth. The platitudinous rhetoricians were beginning to say, not without truth, that Rome had won the whole world only to lose her own soul.

Augustus died a very old and tired man in 14 A.D. He knew all too well that his reign had not brought the far-heralded age of gold. He was buried in the magnificent mausoleum in the Campus Martius which the Romans to-day use as a concert hall. Outside of his tomb there was inscribed a full "account of his stewardship" which he had himself made for the purpose, a statement of how he had been invited to power though he had offered to "restore the Republic," of the many wars that he had waged "without wrongful aggression," of the buildings he had erected, of the moneys he had received, given away, or spent for purposes of state. We happen to have a fairly complete copy of it, found on the walls of a temple at Angora in Anatolia. It is of course a very valuable historical document.

At his death he asked his friends whether he had not well acted the drama of life. It was easy to answer in the affirmative. When one remembers how the great Caesar had misread his people, what use the brilliant Antony had made of power, what confusion the Senate must have wrought had it been restored, one can only call Rome fortunate in happening upon the services of Augustus at the critical moment. Even the republican zealots could not accuse him of having labored to weariness for self-aggrandizement, for he kept well intact the machinery of a Republic for the use of anyone who might care to prove that Rome was still capable of using it.

He had in his youth, to be sure, participated in the crimes of his elders in a way that a young man of the earlier Republic could not have done. But that this sin was not of his own nature, but due to association with an autocracy that made men callous, he proved by his later life. He was not a great general; he seems to have lacked both the magnetism and the constructive genius of a great tactician. But he was both courageous and dependable as the leader of armies. He left no laws that show unusual penetration, but his legislation was never of a chimerical nature. His

sympathies were extensive though restrained; they did not carry him into fanatical paternalism anywhere. As a prudent organizer and administrator he was at his best. Caesar had indeed pointed the way, but Augustus deserves the credit of devoting infinite pains and thought to the problems of the external empire. It speaks well of him also that he could win the enduring loyalty and constant service of disinterested advisers and efficient helpers like Agrippa and Maecenas. That the intimates of his last years were not of the same type may be attributed to the natural querulousness of advanced age. It is in great measure due to the solid qualities of Augustus' thought that the dyarchy was able to carry Rome safely through some of the harrowing experiences that lay in store for her in the reigns of such men as Nero and Domitian.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE JULIO-CLAUDIAN EMPERORS

Tiberius, 14-37 A.D. Augustus had left no doubt about his choice of a successor, though, true to his policy, he had not formally put forth the claim that he could name one. He had bequeathed the bulk of his estate to his stepson, Tiberius, whom he had adopted some ten years before, and he had secured for him the *tribunicia potestas* by which he could legally control the Senate, as well as the proconsular *imperium*, which placed the armies in his hands. It was an important question for the future of the state whether Tiberius would or would not assume that this unofficial designation was sufficient, or whether he would recognize the Senate or people as free and competent to select their *princeps*. What he did was at once to assume command of the armies, and to call a meeting of the Senate and place before it the question of the succession. Although the Senate hesitated to assume that it could designate Augustus' successor, Tiberius took the stand that it must do so, and by that day's procedure there was established the precedent, followed for two centuries, whereby the Senate came to be considered the power which "selected" the *princeps*. Tiberius to bring the Senate to action stated that the burden of rule was too heavy for him but that he would assume whatever part the Senate saw fit to lay upon him. Some senators preferred to consider this mere hypocrisy, and Asinius Gallus baldly asked Tiberius to state what part he desired. Tiberius refused to give an explicit answer and the play of futile remarks continued for some time, though everyone knew how it would end. The Senate finally bestowed the *tribunicia potestas* and the proconsular *imperium* anew—this time without limit—and the position of

princeps senatus; then the consuls called upon the Senate, the magistrates, and the people to take the military oath of allegiance to Tiberius. This is a fair illustration of the practical method by which so many of Rome's constitutional precedents were shaped.

Tiberius was now fifty-six, and though he lived twenty-two years more his great work was already done and his fame and character established. In the wars in Germany and Pannonia he had proved himself one of Rome's greatest generals. His reliability, shrewdness, integrity, and his great wisdom in administrative affairs could not be questioned. But he was also known to be a haughty and cold man who, like the long line of Roman nobles from whom he descended by two distinguished families, would never unbend to seek popularity. It was also known that he had grown to be cynical and distrustful. His career could hardly have resulted in anything else. Called by Augustus to divorce a wife whom he loved in order to marry Julia for reasons of state, he had obeyed, and when thus elevated he had been flattered by all the young nobles as Augustus' possible successor. Then when Augustus had made it plain that his young grandsons, Gaius and Lucius, were first in his intentions, and Tiberius had withdrawn to Rhodes, flattery had suddenly given place to neglect and occasionally even to insults, until, on the death of the two youths and the recall of Tiberius to power, the old adulation was resumed. Those who had been guilty of such behavior were now in the Senate before him, and it is hardly strange that he felt no love for them and refused to assume gracious airs. His reign began in an era of suspicion and stiff ceremonies, and ended in hatred.

It did not increase his popularity that he at once transferred the elections of magistrates from the people to the Senate, nor did the Senate like it when he heeded the request of the two Greek provinces, Macedonia and Achaia, and took them under his own charge away from senatorial super-

vision. Moreover he lost favor with the army when in order to save expense he recognized the fact that army service was now virtually a life profession and extended the term again to twenty years. A dangerous mutiny at once broke out in almost all the northern armies, both in Pannonia where his son Drusus commanded, and in Germany where Germanicus, his nephew and adopted son, was proconsul. For a while it seemed that Tiberius' rule was at an end. Indeed Germanicus, who had inherited the extraordinary devotion which the Rhine army had paid the elder Drusus, was being urged by his soldiers to march upon Rome and assume control. This he loyally refused to do, and succeeded by his personal influence in checking the mutiny and having the ringleaders punished. He then, to engage their thoughts by means of other occupations, invaded Germany on the excuse of avenging the disgrace Varus had suffered. He succeeded in defeating the offenders and bringing back the eagles, and in fact marched his legions again to the river Elbe. When, however, he asked for permission to reconquer all the lost ground and make the Elbe once more the frontier as his father had done, Tiberius refused, saying that Augustus had decided upon the Rhine frontier, and that this decision could not be revoked. In fact Germanicus was recalled, and two military districts designated as Upper and Lower Germany, commanding both sides of the Rhine, were now formed. Four legions were stationed in each.

In the year 17 A.D. Germanicus was sent to the East with a *maius imperium* over the eastern provinces in order to settle all unfinished business there. He succeeded through wise diplomacy in placing a friendly king upon the throne of Armenia, and also in having the Parthian king acknowledge Rome's right to do this. Then he changed the client-kingdoms of Cappadocia and Commagene into provinces, since these regions commanded the roads to those far distant protectorates which seemed most likely to give

trouble in the future. At this point, however, Cn. Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria, quarreled with his superior and created friction that jarred the machinery of state for many a year. Piso seems to have made the reasonable guess that Tiberius could not eventually favor Germanicus over his own son Drusus, that while he was loyally carrying out the instructions of Augustus for the present, his parental instinct must finally assert itself and greet with relief any accident that might befall the popular Germanicus. Germanicus' wife also, Agrippina (the elder), who was a granddaughter of Augustus and exceedingly popular with the soldiers because of her affable and democratic bearing, had incurred the jealousy of many of the Roman women. Piso at any rate took the reins in his own hands and rescinded several of the orders of his superior, whereupon he was commanded to leave his province. When Germanicus soon after died a sudden death at Antioch suspicion fell upon Piso, and he was ordered to Rome to stand trial. He was acquitted on the charge of poisoning, but fearing that he would be convicted for disobedience to a superior he committed suicide. The people in their devotion to Germanicus were convinced of Piso's guilt on the first charge also, and attributed his escape to the supposed interference of Tiberius, who accordingly became the more disliked and distrusted.

In the year 23, Drusus, the Emperor's only son, died, murdered as was later discovered by order of the praetorian prefect, L. Aelius Sejanus. This man was a knight from Etruria who had gained the complete confidence of Tiberius, and had conceived the bold scheme of removing the legitimate heirs of the emperor one by one and of finally seizing the reins of government himself. He induced Tiberius, who was now in poor health, to withdraw to Capri, and succeeded in making himself the only channel of communication between the emperor and the government. The tired emperor placed him in control of all armies by the

gift of the proconsular *imperium*. In command of the police and secret service at Rome Sejanus was able to imprison all who were suspected of standing in his way. Even Agrippina and two of her sons were arrested on the charge of treason, and one son was presently put to death.

When finally Sejanus had the boldness to ask for the *tribunicia potestas*, which would have given him control of the Senate, Tiberius suspected what was on foot. He investigated, and learned enough to justify the arrest and execution of the traitor. When from Sejanus' own wife he received the evidence proving that Sejanus was the murderer of his son Drusus, his fury passed beyond all control. The friends of Sejanus, senators and knights who had so recently been the powerful men at Rome, were tried and executed in quick succession. When the deed was done Tiberius found that of male heirs there were left of a large family only one weak grandson, Tiberius Gemellus, and a somewhat older grandnephew, Caius (Caligula), who was the son of the popular Germanicus and Agrippina.

Tiberius lived six years more after the fall of Sejanus, but was hardly fit even for the merest routine of office. His unendurable experiences had utterly destroyed his judgment, and he listened to and paid for every vile rumor that treacherous informers cared to invent. For a century after his death he was remembered chiefly as the creator of the accursed institution of the "informers" (*delatores*), and he was blamed also for having enlarged the scope of the indictment for treason (*laesa majestas*) to include any mere expression of ill-will toward the emperor. He never again could bear to enter Rome. It was in the year 37 when he was nearly 79 years of age that he came finally within a few miles of the city along the Appian Way. But he turned without entering Rome to go back to Capri. At Misenum he died. The Senate did not declare him Divus, as it had Caesar and Augustus.

On the whole it was Rome alone that suffered from his

rule. The empire, whose needs he understood, received as a general thing good administrators from him. And peace continued on the frontiers, thanks largely to his former efficient work performed under the auspices of Augustus.

The reign was marked by an incident of which the government then took no notice, but which has since proved to be the most significant of the epoch. This was the trial and execution of Jesus of Nazareth. The religious import of this act lies beyond the scope of a historical survey of Rome, but since the trial took place in a Roman province and partly within Roman jurisdiction, the story should be told if only to illustrate the methods customarily followed at the time by the Roman government in giving free scope to local autonomy in the provinces. Judea was then autonomous, being governed by a senate (*synedrion*) of Jewish elders presided over by a high priest whose name was Caiaphas. The high priest usually was nominated by the Roman procurator. Augustus had gone so far in respecting the autonomy of the Jews—such was in fact his policy with all provincials—that he had forbidden his procurators to let any of his soldiers appear in Jerusalem, simply because the imperial image on the Roman standards was an offense to the Jewish religion. Pontius Pilate who was made procurator about 25 A.D. by Tiberius, probably at the suggestion of Sejanus, at first broke this rule, but was so severely criticized by the natives that he withdrew the garrison to Caesarea.

At the time in question he had apparently gone up to Jerusalem because of the great crowds that attended the passover festival, and he had a few of his soldiers with him. It happened that Jesus, who had been preaching throughout Palestine for some three years, had incurred the enmity of the ruling party at Jerusalem by his severe criticism. They had him arrested, brought before the *synedrion*, and tried on the charge (probably) of blaspheming Jehovah.

According to their law this was a capital offense, and, though they had difficulty in finding satisfactory witnesses, Jesus himself made certain statements on cross examination which seemed to provide sufficient evidence against him. They accordingly condemned him to death. It had become customary, however, to permit the Roman procurator to review capital sentences. The fact that the highpriest was nominated by the procurator implied, though it did not formally require, such a review of capital cases. It was also the custom of the Roman procurator to confirm whatever action the synedrion took. In fact the procurator would probably not venture to offend the synedrion by reversing a decision unless he considered the case so important that he felt called upon to refer it to Rome. In this case Pilate saw no need of putting a man to death on the charge of blaspheming a deity that Rome knew nothing about, and he said so. The priests, however, tried to show that there were Roman interests involved, because if the culprit claimed to be the "Messiah" he thereby claimed to be a king of the Jews, consequently a traitor to Roman rule. Pilate could see no real danger to Rome even in such claims on the part of a poor and apparently lone preacher, and he begged the synedrion to dismiss the case, or at least to let him pardon the man under the customary passover amnesty. A flogging he said might suffice in such a case. They would not have it so. Now he saw another possible way out. Hearing that Jesus was originally from Galilee, where Herod and not the synedrion had jurisdiction, he sent the prisoner to Herod, but the latter preferred not to assume any responsibilities in the case, and sent him back. To Pilate the prisoner seemed not quite worth bothering the Roman courts about, and so he did what was customary and recognized the right of the synedrion to decide the matter according to their own laws. He confirmed the sentence, and his soldiers carried it out. It may be added that the soldiers of his few cohorts were mainly Palestin-

ians, and that the gospel account is wholly plausible which represents them as in sympathy with the priests. As to the real teachings of Jesus, Pilate of course knew nothing. But it is not to be supposed that he would have been interested if he had. Romans who prided themselves on their conquest of a world could hardly have comprehended the point of view of one who preached humility, meekness, and non-resistance. Pilate might have remarked that this was a useful doctrine to preach to provincials, but it would be the last thing to inculcate among the rulers of the world if one wished to keep up their morale. That within three centuries the state would accept the doctrines of this lone and silent prisoner would have seemed beyond comprehension to any Roman of that day.

Caius Caligula, 37-41 A.D. The four years of Caligula's rule offer nothing of interest. While the young madman entertained himself with murder and theft, the empire beyond Italy merely continued in its appointed course, thanks to the fact that Augustus had created a durable organization with which Caligula had little time to interfere, thanks also to the fact that when he did interfere there were responsible proconsuls holding office who were ready to modify his orders in the interest of the empire even at the risk of their own lives.

The young man had been unfortunate in his bringing up. Germanicus, his father, had died when he was but seven years of age, and like all the children of Germanicus he was spoiled by the foolish devotion of the populace. In fact his nickname of "Little Boots" came of his fond mother's dressing him in a diminutive uniform to please the soldiery. Later his mother, Agrippina, and his two elder brothers were imprisoned by Sejanus, and the boy lived some time with his grandmother, Antonia, who, having spent her childhood in Cleopatra's court, harbored several eastern princelings then being "educated" at Rome. It was not a

wholesome influence, this intimacy with Syrian lordlings who talked of Oriental customs, of autocratic privileges, and worshiped eastern Baals. Then Tiberius, now grown suspicious of the real parentage of his sole surviving grandson, brought Caligula, who was his grandnephew, to his disagreeable *entourage* at Capri. There he lived for seven years, learning to study the whims of a morbid tyrant who meanwhile allowed Agrippina, his mother, and his two elder brothers to be put to death.

He was twenty-five when Tiberius died. The emperor to be sure had not adopted him, but he made him co-heir with his grandson, who was younger. This fact provided the senators with the excuse of selecting the son of the beloved Germanicus rather than the descendant of the hated Tiberius. They accordingly annulled the will of Tiberius, gave Caligula the title of Imperator, and formally voted him the powers and offices which Augustus had received from the Senate. Henceforth this was the formula by which emperors were elected by the Senate.

All the world was happy. Gaius at once assured the Senate that he would recognize its participation in the government in the same way as Augustus had done, and that informers should be banished. Tiberius had frugally filled the treasury; it is said to have had about one hundred million dollars then. The young emperor at once spent a large part of this sum in games, donations to citizens and soldiers, and in public banquets. He made his co-heir and cousin harmless by adopting him as his son. After he had ruled some six months he fell dangerously ill, and when he recovered he seemed to be completely altered; whether the sickness had deranged a mind never very firm, or whether he simply chose this occasion to break from his advisers and follow his own whims we do not know. At any rate the hypothesis of insanity seems alone adequate to explain some of the deeds that followed. It is hardly worth while

to enumerate his acts, but some of the more significant ones that left consequences of a political or social nature may perhaps be noted.

One of the first things he now did was to order his adopted son murdered. Presently he gave a series of gladiatorial games in which he commanded citizens who displeased him to enter the arena. Several Roman provinces, among them Judea, Commagene, and Pontus were restored to the native princelings whom he had met as playfellows in Antonia's house. Herod Agrippa benefited especially by this, a man who spent much of his time at Rome and knew how to please the emperor. Caligula's religious pranks came to be particularly offensive, betraying the effects of his early association with Orientals. He built a temple on the Capitoline to his own sacred person, and ordered his statue worshiped throughout the world. The Jews alone refused, and only his timely death saved the nation from extermination for the offense. From his own home on the Palatine he built a bridge across the Forum to the Capitoline so that he might the more conveniently visit his "brother" Jupiter. He, too, was the first to invite to Rome the worship of Oriental divinities. The Isis-temple of the Campus Martius, which later came to be a very important center of mysticism, was now built.

A reign of terror began before his first year had ended. Men were murdered at his secret orders, or they were commanded to commit suicide, or ordered to fight in the arena. Then finding the treasury low he had men killed for their possessions. The easiest method to procure the money was to have the Senate condemn men for *lèse majesté* upon evidence provided by his spies, for this method entailed the confiscation of the goods of the condemned. Consequently he reintroduced the custom of rewarding men for secret "information."

This could of course not continue forever. In fact his

own sisters, for whom he had procured divine honors, joined a conspiracy against him in the third year of his rule. He was then in Gaul pretending to be earning military glory. Soon after his return a more successful plot was formed, and he was struck down by an officer of his praetorian cohort in a corridor of his own house.

Claudius, 41-54 A.D. Caligula was the last acknowledged heir of the Julian line. The Senate, therefore, met to decide the future form of the government. Many advocated a return to a republican form, while various groups began to advance the candidacy of different nobles for the principate. While the Senate was wrangling, the praetorian guards settled the matter. They searched out Claudius, a brother of Germanicus, who had managed to escape the eye of Sejanus by feigning indolence and stupidity. Claudius, after recovering from his first fright, accepted the invitation to the throne, and promised each guardsman a large gift of money. He was then brought before the Senate, and elected by compulsion, according to the same formula as Caligula had been.

From the point of view of the Senate Claudius proved to be no better than his predecessor, for though a man of mild manners, he was soon found to be subservient to a wife full of jealous intrigues, the infamous Messalina, who took the occasion to retaliate upon the ladies that had stood nearer the throne in the preceding reign. So the trials for *lèse majesté* continued.

The power of the imperial freedmen also increased to unendurable bounds under Claudius' facile régime. It will be remembered that while the Senate had Roman quaestors and aediles to administer their bureaus and departments, Augustus had organized his bureaus as a part of his personal household. His own financial agent—who according to business custom was a freedman—continued to be the fiscal agent even after the enormous revenues of a dozen

provinces came into his hands. Such agents and secretaries naturally secured ever greater power as the emperor's power grew. Under Caligula and Claudius they might well be called cabinet secretaries, ex-slaves though they were. Pallas, the financial agent (*a rationibus*) of Claudius, thus grew to be a finance minister who looked after most of the income and expenses of the empire. He was powerful enough to procure for his brother Felix, also a freedman, the governorship of Judea. (It was before him that St. Paul was tried.) Narcissus was Claudius' private secretary (*ab epistulis*), and hence assumed charge of all the correspondence with provinces, generals, and foreign potentates, being in fact a kind of Secretary of State. Finally Callistus, Caligula's filthy-handed freedman who had aided Claudius to the throne, now became his secretary of petitions (*a libellis*). In that capacity he was able to sell at a good price the privilege of appealing to the emperor. On such men Claudius was largely dependent, since he had had no experience in affairs of state, and these men seem to have made the greatest possible profit out of their positions. But it is also easy to comprehend how bitter was the experience of senators who were compelled to flatter, bribe, and kowtow before freedmen if they wished an interview with the emperor or desired to have a petition presented. How coarse was the society of the imperial court, where freedmen could by hints of disaster compel nobles to entertain them in their own families, we can picture by reading the fragments of Petronius' novel called "Trimalchio's Banquet." It was written during the reign of Claudius, and though the scene is not laid at Rome, it is doubtless intended to give an impression of conditions at the Roman court. The senators therefore did not feel that Claudius was in any respect a better ruler than Caligula.

Claudius, however, despite his subservience to Messalina and his freedmen, concerned himself deeply about the Em-

pire, as Caligula had not done. During his many years of secluded life he had read Roman history eagerly, he had a mind stored full of examples of what great things had been done in the past, and he had imbibed a certain feeling of responsibility for the high office that he now held. Lacking constructive imagination he at least decided to adopt what he considered wise precedents from the examples of older Romans—especially of Julius Caesar—and thus to accomplish something of moment during his reign.

He was clearly following Caesar's example when in 46 he invaded Britain in person with an army of four legions, for Augustus had decided to abandon this island. The emperor finding himself less courageous than he had expected to be withdrew after 16 days, but his skilful officers continued the attacks upon the Kentish troops of Cymbeline (Cunobelinus) until a respectable province was established, and the Roman armies continued from that time to advance in the island until most of it was conquered. He also followed Caesar's precedent in extending citizenship widely in Gaul, though we may infer that his personal observations made in his march through Gaul may have been the decisive factor. The Senate of course did not like it when he compelled them to admit several Aeduan chiefs into their august body. A fragment of the speech made upon this occasion has survived. It is pedantic and rambling, but the purpose of it we can hardly fail to admire. But we can also comprehend the attitude of the Senate which—to quote Seneca—feared that he would not cease till he had put all the Gauls, Germans, and Britons in togas.

He also adopted a part of Caesar's program for internal improvements. Most notable is the great deepwater harbor at the mouth of the Tiber which Caesar had projected but never begun. In connection with this Claudius proposed subsidies to shipbuilders and to shipowners who carried a certain amount of grain to Rome. It would be

interesting to know whether this first instance at Rome of extending state-aid to commerce was adopted with a view to promoting Roman commerce in general. The few facts that we have seem to lead to the inference that Claudius was here chiefly interested in seeing the urban crowds satisfied with grain, and that he did not conceive of a general commercial policy. Finally he deserves to be remembered for the aqueduct which brought water to Rome at a higher level than before. Many stately arches of this work still stand, lending a peculiar fascination to the scenery of the Roman Campagna. Unfortunately some of the contractors did their portions dishonestly, and as a consequence some sections quickly decayed, destroying the value of the whole structure.

While Claudius was occupied with these works his infamous young wife was planning to elevate her paramour, Gaius Silius, to the throne. She had carried the game so far under his dull gaze as even to go through a wedding ceremony with Silius, pretending to Claudius that she was merely taking measures to save his own life since an oracle had threatened an early death to "the husband of Messalina." Narcissus finally revealed to Claudius the real intentions of the woman, and procured permission to take command of the guard for one day. On that day Messalina was arrested and put to death.

But another wife must be found for Claudius. Agrippina, the sister of Caligula, who was ambitious to win a high place for her son Nero, then only eleven, had the audacity to suggest herself to Pallas as a suitable spouse, though she was the Emperor's niece. Claudius consented and the Senate was induced to pass a decree declaring virtuous what had hitherto been a sin. Her one aim was now to secure the succession to her son in preference to Claudius' own son Britannicus. She recalled Seneca—once Rome's foremost teacher—from exile to educate her son, she had

Nero betrothed to Octavia, the daughter of Claudius, and had him given the proconsular *imperium* when he was but thirteen years of age. Two years later the wedding took place, and in 54 Claudius died, apparently poisoned to make room for the boy who was now ready for the throne. Nero was presented by his sponsors, not to the Senate but to the praetorian cohort. Here he was acclaimed Emperor, and he paid the expected donative. The Senate accepted the choice perforce and added such imperial powers as had not yet been bestowed upon him in childhood.

Nero, 54-68 A. D. Nero's reign began, as was now the custom, with the recall of exiles, political amnesty, assurances that the rights of the Senate would be observed, many games and festivals, and general rejoicing that another tyrant was gone. Nero's promises to the Senate were couched in the carefully phrased paragraphs written by Nero's former tutor, Seneca, who now as intimate adviser in affairs of state, became practically prime minister. It was fortunate for Rome that Nero happened upon an adviser of high principles and broad views of state, for the young ruler seemed impressionable and desirous of following his precepts. Seneca also exerted his influence in retaining as prefect of the praetorian cohort and head of the army Afranius Burrus, a stern and honest soldier who chose men of integrity for high military posts, and supported Seneca's policies loyally. Thus the era of freedmen rule came to an end. However, a full restoration of the Senate to its share in the government was thwarted by the Senate itself, for, selected as it had been by emperors who had honored only the subservient, it consisted of spineless men who never dared vote on any question without first having extracted an expression of opinion from Nero.

Agrippina also created trouble. Her whim had been law in the days of Claudius, and she insisted upon having it so now. Nero seemed inclined to do deference to her,

and since her influence was destructive of all principles of equitable government, Seneca and Burrus set themselves the task, at the risk of their own lives, of weakening her power and training Nero to assert himself and to assume a responsible rôle. This policy succeeded all too well. The young man's impulsive and imperious temperament, inherited from such ancestors as Mark Antony and Domitius, soon proved that it needed a bridle rather than a spur, for when Agrippina, rebuffed by him, threatened to throw her influence in favor of Britannicus, Nero had his possible rival poisoned—at least the deed was charged to Nero by most of the Roman historians.

Seeing that their pupil was breaking all bounds, Seneca and Burrus changed their tactics. As they knew, Nero was inordinately proud of his ability to write verses, to play the lyre, and to sing. They now encouraged his vanity in these pastimes, partly to bring out humaner qualities, partly to keep him from affairs of state wherein his warped judgment and impetuosity could only create mischief. Accordingly the policies of state were largely shaped by these two men for some time, and, except for the gruesome murder of his cousin, the first five years of Nero's incumbency deserved the name of the "golden quinquennium" as Hadrian, a good judge, called it.

It is to be noted that Seneca and Burrus were both from the provinces, Seneca being from Spain, Burrus from Gaul, though doubtless both were descendants of Italians. This circumstance may account for their interest in the empire at large, which had been too much neglected by Claudius and Caligula. Claudius in fact had permitted Armenia to fall from the position of a Roman protectorate into the control of Parthia. This had made the Mesopotamian state very dangerously strong in the East. No sooner was Rome in more responsible hands than Domitius Corbulo, a very able general, was sent to reorganize the army of the East,

and lay claim to Roman suzerainty in Armenia. The task of reshaping the army was perhaps the more difficult of the two, for the troops billeted about in the cities of Syria had lost all idea of discipline in riotous living. Corbulo drilled the army for two years, then invaded Armenia. After several campaigns he compelled Parthia to acknowledge Rome's right to crown the king of Armenia. With this provision, Tiridates, Parthia's candidate, was permitted to reign.

This forward policy was also continued in Britain with some success. Unfortunately, while the governor, Suetonius Paulinus, was absent, the procurator stirred the natives to the point of rebellion by his harsh exactions. Boudicca (Boadicea) the chieftainess of the Iceni, headed a well-planned revolt (61 A.D.) which destroyed the Roman towns from Colchester (Camulodunum) to London (Londinium) and caused the death, it is said, of 70,000 Romans. Suetonius soon returned and suppressed the revolt, and Rome, accepting the lesson wisely, sent governors with instructions to employ conciliatory methods more and the sword less. It may be worth noting how vast the emigration from Italy must have been at this time, when, in a province so far distant and invaded only eighteen years before, there were to be found 70,000 Romans in a relatively small district north of the Thames.

Meanwhile Nero had fallen under the influence of Poppaea Sabina, the beautiful and unscrupulous wife of Salvius Otho. Her husband proved to be no obstacle in her way. She secured for him the lucrative and far-distant governorship of Lusitania. To become Empress in fact, however, she must have Agrippina removed, Octavia divorced, and perhaps Seneca and Burrus would also have to be made powerless. The contest for the control over Nero began between Agrippina and Poppaea. The latter won, of course, and compelled Nero to promise her the death of

his mother. From any legal point of view, Agrippina had earned death on more than one count of treason and murder. But she was not slain by any legal process. Nero ordered a freedman to have her drowned, and when this attempt failed she was struck down by a blow of the dagger at Nero's explicit command. Seneca and Burrus were called in after the deed was done and ordered to explain to the Senate that it was an execution carried out in the interest of the state. They might have refused, and resigned from office. But this would not only have entailed the death of both but would have thrown the whole government into the hands of Nero, or rather, of Poppaea. They chose the more moderate course and advised the Senate to accept the execution as legal.

Octavia still stood in the way. And when Poppaea demanded her removal Burrus courageously insisted that if Nero put away the daughter of Claudius he "at least restore to her the Empire which was her dowry." Unfortunately Burrus died in 62, and Tigellinus, a man of the lowest character, was put in his place. Against Poppaea and Tigellinus Seneca's insistent arguments and warnings had little influence. He finally saw that the struggle was hopeless and retired to private life. Octavia was then divorced and banished, and Nero married Poppaea. This raised such a riot of criticism at Rome that Poppaea demanded the death of the innocent woman. Some ridiculous charges were accordingly trumped up against her and she was executed (62). The Senate decreed the customary thanksgiving to the gods.

Two years after this the greater part of Rome burned. When Nero confiscated a large section of the burned area for a private park it was of course charged that it was he who had ordered the city destroyed, but this accusation at least seems groundless. The fire started behind the Palatine, swept back over the packed hovels of the Aventine as

well as north over the imperial palace, then down across a part of the Forum, over the newer palatial sections of the Esquiline, and across the Campus Martius, where many large "business blocks," apartment houses, and public buildings had recently sprung up. There were enough of the old timber houses to carry such a fire in a strong wind, and roofs of timber were still largely in use even in public buildings and temples. And even when the concrete walls did not fall, it was found that the marble so extensively used as a veneer in recent buildings crumbled in the intense heat.

The work of reconstruction was carried out in an effective way, with liberal aid from the state treasury. The rubbish was gathered in barges and floated down the river to the marshes near Ostia. Surveyors and architects were employed to lay out wider streets on a more regular plan. Wise restrictions were laid down as to material, and open spaces were provided so as to hinder a recurrence of the disaster; and as the streets would, when widened, be too open for Rome's warm climate, Nero provided for the liberal construction of porticoes along the shop-fronts. What one can less readily admire was his confiscation of a vast area extending from the Palatine to the upper Esquiline for an imperial park. Here he laid out what we would call "Italian gardens" with woods, lakes, flower gardens, and porticoes all about a series of palaces. The whole was called the "Domus Aurea" because of the lavish display of gold and precious adornment of every kind. It was the decaying ornamentation of some of the surviving rooms of this *domus* that suggested to Raphael the adornment for the corridors and the *stanze* of the Vatican palace.

The fire has been remembered chiefly in connection with the legend that Nero came to Rome to view it from his high tower, singing arias from his own tragedy on the "Fall of Troy" while the city burned. Whether or not the story

is true it at least seemed to contemporaries so consistent with Nero's nature as to gain general credence. Of more importance is the fact that the fire was instrumental in disclosing the existence of the Christians in a most unfortunate manner. When Nero was being accused of having burned the city, his advisers decided to prove his innocence by finding some culprit to bear the charge. Someone happened to suggest that there was at Rome a peculiar religious sect called Christians that had spoken freely of a general holocaust destined soon to come. Some of these people were haled to court and examined. No definite evidence was found as regards the fire, but it was discovered that these Christians believed that the world in general and the whole Roman empire in particular were doomed to an impending destruction as punishment for sin, that they placed the law of the Jewish scriptures over and above Roman law, that they avoided service in Rome's armies which entailed labor on their sabbath, and that for religious reasons they refused to take part in Roman festivals, and finally that they refused to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor. These things clearly established the proof that, whether or not the Christians had burned Rome, they could plausibly be charged with "treason" as that term had been applied by Caligula and Nero. The court could condemn them for treason, and the report could be circulated afterward that they were being put to death on the charge of burning Rome. Moreover, since Christians refused to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor, there was a ready method at hand for discovering them. One need only bring forth a statue of the emperor and order a simple sacrifice. Cross-examination and witnesses were not required. To be sure, the Romans had never before demanded orthodoxy in religion, nor had they put men to death for refusing to accept the imperial cult. Nor were these the vital questions now. The important

thing was to find some scapegoat; the Christians were "traitors" if not incendiaries, they could be put to death on the charge of *lèse majesté*, and finally they could be discovered by a very easy method: they accordingly would serve the immediate purpose. A great number of them were quickly found, and being mostly slaves and freedmen they were put to death in the most horrible manner that Nero's imagination could devise. This was the first "religious" persecution in Roman history; but it is not quite correct to call it religious in a real sense. The group was to be sure a religious sect, but the occasion was an accident that had nothing to do with creeds, and the charge seems to have been treason as interpreted not by Roman law but by the tyranny of autocrats. The misfortune for the future of the sect was that the official records henceforth contained the general judgment that confession of Christianity was declared to be *per se* a confession of treason, and from this time on it was possible for prejudiced magistrates to employ this imperial precedent without going through any preliminary trial to establish a proof of treason. And, as we have seen, the charge that a person was a Christian could without full examination of the charges be established by the simplest of methods.

Despite Nero's efforts to clear himself his subjects were still suspicious; in fact the cruelty of his persecution awakened only pity for the victims. The lavish waste of treasure in his "golden house," when his people were suffering from want and the state treasury was empty, did not count in his favor. New confiscations of property and added taxes did not suffice to cover the bills. Nero consequently helped himself by debasing the coins that he issued, reducing the weight of the denarius about 15 per cent and mixing in this smaller coin about 10 per cent of cheap alloy. Thus it appears that he paid for his contracts and for army service in coins that would before long bring their future possessors

only 75 per cent of what the standard coins had brought. This was a trick which later emperors did not fail to improve upon till, after two centuries, the denarius was worth only about one-fiftieth of the Augustan coin.

It is not surprising that Rome was rife with rumors of conspiracy. An unsuccessful one in the year 65, led by a senator of the old family of Piso, resulted in many deaths. In fact it was badly organized and too openly discussed to succeed, and when Tigellinus started on his hunt for victims he found a horde of cowardly members who were willing to betray their fellows in the hope of immunity. The only loyal member, it seems, who refused to give testimony under torture was a Greek harlot of the name of Epicharis who strangled herself rather than betray her trust. Among those who fell were Lucan the poet, a nephew of Seneca, and Lucan's father, Annaeus Mela. Seneca, though apparently guiltless, was also implicated by Poppaea who still hated him. Receiving a command to die he opened his veins, and his wife, Paulina, followed his example, though she was rescued before death resulted. Petronius also, the author of the brilliant novel from which we have quoted a few phrases above, was ordered to die, though there was no proof of his participation in the plot. Writing out an elaborate list of Nero's crimes as he knew them, he sent it to the emperor, and inviting his friends to a banquet he indulged in one last evening of jesting while the blood was slowly flowing from his wrist. The leaders of the Stoic sect could not escape at such a time. The stern and independent Thræsea would hardly have associated with the actual plotters, most of whom he despised, but Nero was tired of his refusal to participate in the Senate's servility. Soranus and his daughter Servilia suffered at the same time. But such persecution only made a religion out of a cold philosophy, and the sect gained many new adherents.

The next year Nero turned to less harmful amusements. He had for several years given private exhibitions of his playing and singing. Now he shocked the city by appearing in public and inviting all Rome to attend. And as the recital seemed to him a success he set out for Greece to win the prizes for poetry at all the old centers of culture. Of course he took all the prizes and this so pleased him that at the Isthmian games he proclaimed the "freedom of the Greeks" as Flamininus had done over two centuries before. Achaia was no longer a province, the tribute to Rome was canceled and the cities of Greece became for a while independent states.

It was about this time that a serious revolt broke out in Judea. The causes were many. The Jews were in hard straits since they had not only to pay the regular Roman tribute, but also a tithe to their priests and something in support of a king—the line of Herod having been restored by Caligula. Furthermore both Roman procurators and the kings supported the more liberal Sadducee nobility because it was sympathetic with Hellenistic practices, whereas the Pharisees stood strictly for Jewish custom and spoke incessantly of independence. The clash came when Nero decided that the Jewish minority of Caesarea (the residence of the Roman procurator) should have no part in the government of that city. A riot ensued in which the Greeks of the city massacred the Jews—20,000 it is said. The Jews of Jerusalem retorted by killing the Greeks and Romans, including the Roman garrison, of Jerusalem. Presently riots between Jews and Gentiles broke out in Damascus, Alexandria and a number of other cities. The *legatus* of Syria was sent down to establish order in Jerusalem but was quickly defeated by an army of zealots. In 67 Flavius Vespasian, a tried officer, was placed in command of an army of 50,000. In a year he regained Galilee and the sea coast, and then proceeded to hem in Jerusalem by cutting off Samaria and

the trans-Jordan area. He was on the point of laying siege to Jerusalem itself when the death of Nero called him to a different task.

Nero's absence in Greece furnished an opportunity for renewed plotting against his life at home. Secret messengers were constantly passing between Rome and various armies. Nero was warned that he must return home. On charges, regarding which we have no information, he ordered the execution of three of his best generals, Corbulo who had served the state well in the East, and the two commanders of the Rhine armies. Soon after his return to Rome Nero learned that Julius Vindex, now an officer in Gaul, though the son of a Celt, had raised a revolt in Gaul and that Galba, the proconsul of Spain, had given his adherence to the movement. The conspiracy seems at first to have been formed against Nero alone, but after a great many Gauls had joined, it gradually became a separatist movement aimed at winning complete independence for Gaul. When this turn came, Verginius Rufus, the commander of Upper Germany, felt that loyalty to the state was his first duty, and, though his own troops offered him the throne of Rome if he would join the conspiracy he not only refused, but suppressed the Gallic revolt. Galba, however, though 73 years of age, continued to muster forces with which to attack Rome. Nero, who might readily have defended himself against the small Spanish army, utterly lost command of the situation and of himself. He went into hiding, thereby losing the respect of his followers, who felt that their own doom was sealed unless their leader would stand up for his own position. The Senate saw their opportunity, met hastily and condemned the coward to death. On being told of this decree he tried to take his own life but had not the courage to strike, and was finally dispatched by his freedman at his own orders. He was then 31 years of age and had reigned for fourteen

years. In the latter years of that short period he had won such fame for his stupid brutality that history has placed him beside such tyrants as Richard the Third and Philip the Second; but he lacked the physical courage of the former as he lacked the pernicious energy of the latter. Nero was not a mere accident. He was a representative descendant of such unscrupulous nobles as could survive in power through the peculiar selective processes established by autocracy. And it was the strongest indictment against Julius Caesar that his work and example tended directly toward creating a world in which those best adapted for survival were such men as Caligula, Claudius and Nero.

The year of civil wars: Galba, Otho, Vitellius; 68-69 A.D. There had now passed some thirty years of irresponsible tyranny which had fairly crushed Rome, and made her ready for any form of subjection. But the armies and provinces and their governors were not wholly crushed. The news of Nero's death raised the hopes of frontier officers in several provinces, but in the absence of means of quick communication plans made in far distant provinces were only too likely to fail of coördination. Each provincial army had time to reach its own decision and set out towards Rome before news came of what was being done elsewhere. Galba was acknowledged emperor by the Senate at once, but before this was generally known, the *legati* of Numidia and of lower Germany had decided to claim the throne for themselves. Galba had the former executed, the latter was put to death by his own officers. Galba indeed proved himself unsatisfactory before long. Thinking it necessary to be firm and act with energy he had several senators executed for lending their support to his rivals; he was also disliked by the Rhine legions for having supported Vindex, whom they considered a traitor to Rome. He neither satisfied the populace with donations nor checked his somewhat overbearing friends, and when finally he chose Piso as his heir, a man of small claim to experience in affairs

of state, he thereby offended Otho who had been the first to declare himself in favor of Galba. Accordingly a revolt broke out almost simultaneously at Rome and on the Rhine. At Rome the agents of Otho secured the adhesion of the praetorian cohorts, who slew Galba.

The Senate then took what seemed the prudent course and conferred the powers of empire upon Otho. On the Rhine, however, the troops of the Lower Province had two weeks before saluted their commander Aulus Vitellius as emperor. He had been their commander only a few weeks and had made a good impression. Neither man was fit for the position. Otho had revealed his quality when he accepted Lusitania from Nero in return for Poppaea; Vitellius, recommended chiefly by the fact that he was the son of a very distinguished father, was too indolent even to lead his loyal troops to the impending conflict. It was his capable officers, Caecina and Valens, that marched the legions down into Italy. The opposing forces met before Cremona just three months after Otho's accession. The generals of Vitellius won the desperate battle, and Otho took his own life.

Vitellius, however, affable, lazy, and extravagant, was far from being adequate for the position into which he had been pushed. Mucianus, the governor of Syria, who knew that failure was impending, urged Flavius Vespasianus, for whom he had very high esteem, to claim the position. All the governors of the Eastern provinces, including the prefect of Egypt, men who had learned to know the sturdy general, declared for him, and Mucianus volunteered to lead the armies to Italy, leaving Titus, Vespasian's son, to continue the siege of Jerusalem. No sooner did the news of this revolt spread than the legions of the Danube acknowledged Vespasian, and under the command of Antonius Primus, a subordinate officer, set out to defeat Vitellius before ever Vespasian's troops could arrive. It was

from all appearances a foolhardy thing to attempt, for Vitellius still had the main part of the victorious Rhine army with him. But Caecina, his general, espoused the enemy's cause, and though he did not succeed in betraying his army, his legions were without a commander when the contest came on. The opposing armies again met outside Cremona, and such was the eagerness for battle that although they met at night-fall, after several days of forced marches, they nevertheless dashed against each other, and fought all that night in the light of the moon. Strange tales are told of how they would stop when a cloud made it too dark to fight, how they then conversed across the lines, brought up food which they shared with each other, and then returned to the fray. At daybreak the Flavian army routed the enemy, broke into Cremona and looted and burned till they were exhausted. This was a natural consequence of building armies largely of barbarian troops.

Antonius Primus now offered Vitellius terms of peace, but while Vitellius carried on negotiations slowly, unable, it seems, to come to a decision, his own guards at Rome attacked Sabinus, the brother of Vespasian, who represented the Flavians, stormed the Capitoline, burned the temple of Jupiter, and put Sabinus to death. Antonius then attacked Rome, broke through the walls and fought his way from street to street to the Palatine. The barbarian cohorts behaved as they had done at Cremona. Vitellius was killed, and fifty thousand Romans are said to have fallen. Soon however Mucianus arrived with his eastern army and established order. It is a pity that he had been preceded by Antonius. Vespasian was granted all the usual powers by the Senate. The original record of the *senatus consultum* has, by good fortune, survived. It is the famous inscription which Cola di Rienzi showed to the Romans thirteen centuries later in order to prove by its terms that even in imperial days the Roman people had been sovereign

and had by free choice elected their emperors. It would probably have amused Vespasian had he been told that this vote, taken under compulsion by terrified senators, would later provide the proof for such an argument. Vespasian soon after arrived in person. Rome had at last found a successor worthy of Augustus.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FLAVIAN PERIOD

Vespasian, 69-79 A.D. T. Flavius Vespasianus was a man of determination and energy, of quick decisions, and of wide experience in practical affairs. These qualities were now needed, for he found the armies demoralized, the credit of the government disappearing among the provincials, Rome in distress, the treasury empty, war in Palestine, and a devastating mutiny on the Rhine. The siege of Jerusalem had been left to Titus and his six legions, a siege that ended in a terrible waste of humanity. Had the Jews been able to unite in a common policy the city might well have been saved, for Titus again and again offered them reasonable terms. But there were several leaders in the city, each jealous of the others, each holding one part of the city under his control. Moreover the fanatic peasant population that acknowledged the commands of the extremist John of Giscala had unfortunately crowded the city in overwhelming numbers before the siege began. These zealots, who would hear of no compromise, put the leaders of the moderate factions to death and held out to the bitter end. Titus, however, is justly blamed for pushing the attack insistently at a needless cost of lives when it was clear that the city had a larger population than it could support. He might have starved the city into submission, but it is apparent that he was not averse to buying military glory at the expense of blood. For months the incessant attacks continued, wall after wall had to be broken, and in each case partial victory ended in the sacking of a portion of the city. Finally the upper part of Mount Zion was starved out and Jerusalem fell. All in all it is said

that a million people perished during the six months, and a hundred thousand were sold into slavery. The Jewish state came to an end, Jerusalem was a ruin, and the Roman tenth legion pitched its camp on the devastated site. The triumphal arch of Titus commemorating the victory may still be seen at the upper end of the Roman Forum.

The great revolt on the Rhine was not equally disastrous, but it threatened Rome's interests more intimately. The headstrong Antonius Primus was in no small measure to blame for this, as he was for the sack of Cremona and Rome. Vespasian indeed owed him little gratitude. Antonius while advancing on Cremona had written ill-considered letters not only to the legions on the Rhine, but also to the Batavian, German, and Gallic auxiliaries, urging them to revolt from Vitellius in favor of Vespasian. The legions were not likely to heed such a request, since Vitellius had first been elevated by their acclamation, but the barbarian auxiliaries were often on bad terms with their associates in the legions. When Antonius sent a special request to these he must have known that he was inviting mutiny of a very dangerous kind, the more so since a large part of the regular Rhine army had followed Vitellius to Rome, thus leaving the frontier badly exposed. It was Julius Civilis, a Batavian nobleman, till recently an officer in Rome's army, who made the most of this opportunity. He not only urged the 8,000 Batavian auxiliaries to declare themselves for Vespasian, but he called upon all the nearby Batavian and German tribes to do likewise. From the first he seems to have planned in secret to use his forces eventually not in behalf of Vespasian but in winning independence from the Romans. The Batavian cohorts left the Roman camps and cut their way to Civilis, thus providing him with a respectable army trained in Roman tactics. He at once besieged the northernmost garrison of the Romans at Vetera (Xanten), ostensibly fighting in behalf of Vespasian.

But it happened that just then the news came of the defeat of Vitellius at Cremona, and the Roman legions as a matter of course declared themselves also partisans of Vespasian. Civilis should now have laid down his arms and made peace. But, as the Romans suspected, he cared nothing for Vespasian. He drove his blows home with all the more vigor because he knew his opponents were disheartened by the fall of their emperor at Rome. The Roman commander in Gaul relieved Vetera after a desperate battle but was forced by the desertion of many Gauls to retreat to headquarters at Novaesium. And here came the last disgrace to Roman arms when the Roman legionaries themselves mutinied and killed Flaccus, the commander-in-chief of the Rhine army. Presently the news spread throughout Gaul that Vitellius was dead and that the Capitoline temple was burned. The Druid priests solemnly proclaimed that this was prophetic of the fall of Rome. Three Gallic noblemen, all trained in Roman armies—Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor of the tribe of the Treveri, and Julius Sabinus of the Lingones—called upon the Gauls to assert their independence. Several tribes responded, establishing the "Empire of the Gauls" and four of the Roman legions, surrounded completely by the enemy, took the oath of allegiance to this rebel state. Now, however, when all the North seemed lost to the Romans, the weakness of the enemy became apparent. In the first place, Civilis with his Batavians and Germans refused to cooperate with the Gauls lest they be subjected to Gallic rule, while the Gallic tribes also began to fall apart, each fearing that some other would become the dominant member of the "Empire." The same tribal jealousies now came into evidence that had so effectively aided Julius Caesar in his conquest of Gaul.

By this time, Rome was again well under control and Vespasian sent a faithful friend, Cerialis, with six legions to put down the revolt. He first attacked the Treveri and

Lingones, who had been deserted by their fellows, then he defeated the Germanic tribes under Civilis at Vetera, followed them in several combats beyond the Rhine, and forced them to make peace. The Gauls and Germans were restored to their former condition without added exactions, but their military cohorts were no longer permitted to remain grouped together in garrison duty near home and under their own officers. In fact Vespasian applied to all armies the lesson learned in this rebellion. Auxiliary cohorts were henceforth sent to serve in armies far from home, and they were put under the charge of officers drawn from Italy. The legionaries that had mutinied were discharged in disgrace and without the customary "bonus."

While these wars were being settled in a way that demonstrated to all the world that Rome once more had a responsible government, Vespasian was busy at home placing Rome and the empire on a stable basis. He was first of all a business man, in fact, the only strong organizer that the business classes of Rome ever supplied for high position. His grandfather had been a money-lender in the Sabine country and his father, at first a publican—an honest one at that—had spent his last days as a money-lender in Switzerland. The young man had gone into the civil service at his mother's urging—she seems to have been of better family—but men always found in him the traits of a money maker. This to Rome seemed something of a disgrace, but Rome's opinion was very conservative. There was in Vespasian a sense of honesty, a respect for property-rights, a faith in sound national finances, which the Roman nobility too often failed to comprehend. Such disrespect for elementary business principles as had permitted the Julio-Claudian aristocrats to waste the state funds till they were driven to confiscate private property in order to balance their ledgers might be a mark of aristocracy, but that did not make it a royal virtue. Nor can it be truthfully

said that his business training had made Vespasian scornful of better things. It was precisely this scion of business-men who was the first prince at Rome to endow public institutions of learning and give stated pensions to artists and literary men.

The need for financial reorganization was great. After examining the records of the treasury Vespasian made the statement that it would take some two billion dollars to put the state on a sound financial basis. That was then a staggering sum and, of course, it was never secured. He got along with far less, but he also was forced to cut down the army to a dangerous point, and he probably refrained from many public improvements that he knew to be needed. He had to pay up the arrears in the soldiers' pay, he had to strengthen the navy, particularly on the Rhine and the Danube, he had to build roads, especially military roads. His work in road-building was particularly remarkable, and he accomplished it with meager funds only by resorting to the unpopular device of employing unoccupied legions upon it. We find his milestones deep in the sandy wastes of Africa, all along the German and Austrian frontiers, through the mountains of Spain, and far off on the upper frontier of Armenia, not to speak of the roads built and repaired in the nearer provinces. Much of Rome had to be rebuilt, and he went somewhat beyond immediate needs by adding a Temple of Peace on the north side of the Forum, and, after destroying Nero's park, building the vast amphitheater (Colosseum) where Nero's lake had been. His son Titus was permitted to turn a part of the "Golden House" into a large public play-ground with free baths.

The insistence upon a sound treasury balance did not of course bring him popularity. He angered many by restoring Augustan tariffs and taxes on sales that had been remitted by Nero and Galba. He had all titles to public property looked up, and was thus able to acquire for sale

many parcels that had fallen into private use. He instituted many petty taxes, so that Titus was led to remark that their money was tainted. In answer Vespasian took a coin out of his pocket and asked his son whether he could detect any odor on it, giving currency to an expression which is of course still used. The provinces suffered perhaps unduly, for Vespasian not only increased the tribute wherever possible, but he also removed most of the Oriental client-princes, making the peoples of such states directly tributary to Rome. Indeed he made Greece once more a tribute-paying province, saying—doubtless with good reason—that the Greeks no longer knew how to use freedom. And he likewise made a province of Lycia and Pamphylia, where the hardy mountaineers had so long enjoyed immunity. But he also bore his share of the sacrifice. He abandoned the use of most of Nero's palaces as being too expensive, and confined himself to a very modest house on the Esquiline. There he lived frugally and in the manner of a private citizen, keeping open house to all callers. The expensive and thieving freedmen were also banished from the higher offices, and his son Titus served as his secretary, holding a position practically of Secretary of State.

Having gained an intimate knowledge of imperial affairs from his army service in Britain, Gaul, and Syria, Vespasian showed particular skill in organizing the provinces, their frontiers and their armies. For Britain he chose excellent governors: Cerialis, who had quelled the rebellion of Civilis; Frontinus, whose illuminating books on strategy and on Rome's water department we still have; and Agricola, Tacitus' father-in-law. These men by prudent advances carried the frontier to southern Scotland. Spain was treated as almost ready for citizenship. He accorded to all urban communities of the province the *jus Latii*, and we still have fragments of two of the city charters (of Malaga and of Salpensa) given by his son in accordance with this grant.

This measure at once made Roman citizens of all annual town magistrates and all their descendants.

In Gaul, Vespasian completely reorganized the army, as we have seen, and in order to connect the Rhine frontier directly with that of the Danube he took into the province upper Baden, running a military road eastward from Strasbourg to the Neckar and on to the Danube. It was characteristic of the emperor's fiscal policy that he claimed this new region as an imperial domain and settled it with tithe-paying tenants. The road through the Schwartzwald made it possible in the future to hasten troops from the Rhine to the Danube and vice versa, and hence he found it possible to cut down the standing armies on the whole front.

The Danube front also received attention. Had Vespasian but known what a ferment of folk-wanderings had already set in far off in the East and North he would have employed all his resourceful military experience here. To be sure, the Marcomanni and Quadi, who bordered the river as it skirted the provinces of Raetia, Noricum and Pannonia, had given promise of being friendly, but the Dacians and Sarmatians living (in Rumania) over against Moesia had already indicated what might be expected of them when by taking advantage of the civil war they had crossed the Danube in 69, and Mucianus had had to turn from his path to drive them back. The Dacians were a Thracian tribe that had long lived west of the Black Sea without causing much trouble, for except in Augustus' day, when Horace repeatedly mentions them as a danger, they had broken into factions that effectually checked each other. Now a resourceful prince, Decebalus, was uniting them into a powerful people coalescing under pressure from the Sarmatae. The Sarmatians were a very numerous Iranian tribe of nomads related to the old Persians and had slowly moved westward through the steppes of Russia. They are

very important to history, for it was from them that the Goths later got much of their culture, and groups of them, called the Alani, eventually combined with the Goths in raiding a large part of southern Europe. They spoke an eastern dialect of the Indo-European language, and seem to have lived under matriarchal institutions; indeed, their women dressed like the men and went to battle with them. It is likely that the old stories of the Amazons refer back to members of this tribe. Two tribes of these Orientals had now approached the Danube, the Jazyges, living in Hungary, west of the Dacians, and the Roxolani, who were pushing down along the west shore of the Black Sea. The danger to Rome from all these people lay in the fact that the Huns would soon start westward from the far East, while the German tribes were beginning to push down from the Baltic toward the Black Sea. It is easy to see that the Dacians and Sarmatians must bridge the Danube sooner or later if they were to survive.

The Romans knew but little of these wanderings at that time. Vespasian, taking a hint from the slight movement in 69, made one important change on the northeast border. He gave up the inland garrison on the Drave, and sent the legions to strong forts on the Danube, one at Vienna (Vindobona), one at Carnuntum, two in the region of Belgrade, and two nearer the mouth of the Danube. Then he strengthened the Danube flotilla, which was to connect these stations and patrol the river at points of danger. On the easternmost end of the empire he helped safeguard the northern boundary of the protectorate of Armenia by aiding in the building of city walls along the Caucasus, where other Sarmatian tribes threatened to break through.

A brief review of the positions of the legions as placed by Vespasian will convey some idea of where a well-informed general considered the critical points of the em-

pire to be. A full and absolutely reliable list is not attainable, but the following is at least approximately correct:

Spain had but one legion, no. VII, called the *Gemina*.

Britain had three legions: II *Augusta*; IX; XX *Victrix*.

Lower Germany four: II *Adjutrix*; VI *Victrix*; X *Gemina*; XXI *Rapax*.

Upper Germany four: I *Adjutrix*; VIII *Augusta*; XI *Claudia*; XIV *Gemina*.

The Danube line, six: XIII *Gemina*; XV *Apollinaris*; I *Italica*; IV *Flavia*; V *Macedonia*; VII *Claudia*.

Syria three: III *Gallica*; IV *Scythica*; VI *Ferrata*.

Judea one: X *Fretensis*.

Cappadocia two: XII *Fulminata*; XVI *Flavia*.

Egypt two: III *Cyrenaica*; XXII *Deiotariana*.

Africa one: III *Augusta*. Two or three other legions are not accounted for.

The legions at this time consisted of about 5,000 men, and if full each one was divided into ten cohorts and subdivided into 60 centuries. Attached to each were 120 horsemen divided into four *turmae*, and as an additional aid one or usually several cohorts of non-citizen auxiliaries, a cohort when full consisting of 1,000 men. Similarly, there were with each legion one or more *alae* of non-citizen cavalrymen, which when complete consisted of 24 *turmae* of 40 each, making 960 horse for each *ala*. These auxiliary troops formed the light-armed forces of the army and their numbers depended largely on what kind and strength of light-armed forces were requisite for the sort of warfare that must be undertaken in any given province.

The legionaries were of course citizens, whereas the auxiliaries were provincials who were given citizenship only at the end of the full period of service—in Vespasian's time twenty years. But we must not suppose that even a majority of legionaries were recruited from citizen-municipalities. As is implied in the names of some of the legions, the mem-

bers were to a large extent recruited wherever they could be found in the provinces and given citizenship on the day of enrolment. Indeed, Vespasian seems to have discouraged recruiting in Italy entirely, except for the praetorian guard and for cohorts of volunteers to be used at special crises. He may have had economic or patriotic reasons for this, but it proved a danger later when armies made up wholly of provincials were tempted to support with arms the claims of a fellow provincial to the throne. However, this danger might have been avoided if later emperors had followed Vespasian's precedent of distributing national groups into widely scattered cohorts, and stationing soldiers in general somewhere else than near their native country.

Vespasian ruled but little over ten years. As we have seen, he was too exacting and firm to be a popular ruler. There were charges that greed led him even to dishonesty, but of this there is no respectable evidence. A hard exactor of taxes could not escape the charge of greed, and we have evidence enough that the income of the empire went very far. Charges of cruelty may perhaps have a better basis, for Helvidius Priscus, the Stoic philosopher, was banished by him for his constant criticism. Priscus was finally put to death, though Vespasian is probably not to be held guilty of the order of execution. It must be said in extenuation of Vespasian that Priscus rested his criticism chiefly on the ground that he was not permitted to take vengeance upon an informer who had done him and his family a wrong. Perhaps some of Vespasian's unpopularity was due to his custom of going to work before sunrise and insisting that his heads of departments must be at their desks at the same hour. He certainly managed to get himself and them through an immense amount of work in ten years.

It appears to us somewhat strange that Vespasian should have given encouragement to acts of emperor-worship. He probably cared not a whit for the farce so far as it applied

to himself, for he was utterly democratic in his converse with men, and when on the point of death he alluded jocosely to the cult by remarking dryly: "I fear I am turning into a divinity." His sense of humor indeed seldom deserted him. But it is true that the imperial cult had now come to be a real patriotic force in all parts of the empire, and Vespasian had been in the East long enough to know that loyalty to the empire if put in terms of devotion to a divinity was most easily apprehended by many subjects. He, therefore, did nothing to discourage it.

He was nearly seventy when he fell fatally ill. His last words might have seemed pretentious from another, but they seem fitting enough for this embodiment of energy. As he felt death near he rose from his bed saying, "An emperor ought to die standing," and fell dead.

Titus, 79-81 A. D. Upon the news of his death there was great rejoicing through the land, for Titus, genial, good-natured and prodigal, was to succeed his father. In fact, the son had for several years smoothed the father's hard path by his ever ready charm and courtly manners. Rome loved him and he repaid Rome by doing all that was expected of him, even to the point of refusing to marry Berenice, his betrothed and mistress, because as a princess of the Idumaeen house she was not congenial to Rome. What kind of a ruler Titus would have made we cannot say, since he died in two years, but his greed for praise, his readiness to please everyone, his willingness to lavish a hundred days on games at the opening of the Colosseum can hardly be interpreted as promising. Suetonius calls him *deliciae generis humani*, "the darling of all mankind," but the human race had shown poor judgment in estimating similar qualities in Caligula and Nero.

The only event of Titus' reign that was long remembered was the eruption of Vesuvius in 79, which buried Herculaneum under lava and Pompeii under a load of ashes. It

has been estimated that more than 50,000 people lost all their possessions at this time and many more suffered severely; but a large part of these escaped alive, since earthquakes and heavy falls of ashes continued for hours before the wave of poisonous fumes descended which choked out the lives of those who attempted to brave it out.

Domitian, 81-96 A.D. Vespasian had never left any doubt of the fact that he was founding a dynasty. He had said openly that his sons, or no one, were to succeed him, and he had associated Titus with himself from the year 71, by obtaining for him from the Senate both tribunician and proconsular power. Domitian's position as a potential successor was also indicated by his repeated designation as consul during Vespasian's lifetime. But he was not granted the distinctive imperial powers either by his father or his brother, nor was he ever permitted by either to hold any high office in the army, though he earnestly begged for it. He was distrusted in fact because of an unreliable and impetuous temperament, and it is probable that if Titus had had a son as he desired he would have endeavored to procure the succession for his son rather than for his brother. Both Titus and Domitian, so unlike their sturdy Sabine father, seem to have had a taint in their blood. Their mother in fact was said to have been a non-citizen from Etruria, a woman of merely "Latin" rights when Vespasian married her. It is difficult to comprehend what this means unless it is that she was a descendant of the Etruscans who were lowered to the "Latin" status by Sulla for supporting Marius.¹ Such a heritage might account for the peculiar mixture of religiosity and lustfulness, of thirst for blood and love of beauty in Domitian.

Domitian succeeded to power in 81, when he was nearly thirty years of age. At the death of his brother he presented himself to the praetorian guard before he went to

¹ She may possibly have belonged to the class of freedmen called *Latini Juniani*.

the Senate, an act as significant of the impotence of the Senate as it was of Domitian's intended course. In fact, when the Senate asked him to take the oath that he would put no senator to death—an oath which was meant to secure a recognition of its immunity from imperial jurisdiction and therefore its position in the dyarchy—he simply refused. He had in fact no intention of treating the Senate as an equal. He intended to be sole ruler, and it was not long before he requested and secured the censorship for life, an office by which he could add to and subtract from the Senate at pleasure. He was the first of the emperors to add this function to the imperial powers as a permanent and essential part of those powers. It is by this autocratic behavior toward the Senate that he raised the most strenuous opposition to himself, and that he pricked the more stubborn members of the Senate into resistance which usually ended in their death on the charge of treason; and it is because of the criticism aroused by such acts that the senatorial writers of the day, men like Tacitus and Pliny, found it impossible to write fairly even of his conduct of imperial affairs. To them he appeared to be merely a tyrant and a fool. To us who may look beyond the Roman Senate to the empire at large he seems indeed foolishly tyrannical in his policy toward the Senate, but for the rest a well-meaning and industrious, though impulsive, short-sighted, and autocratic ruler of a world too large for his capacities.

He began very early in his reign to revise the Senate list, pruning out members whom he declared unfit; and it was said that the most decisive mark of "unfitness" was a show of independent judgment. This undertaking led to mutterings of dissent which were answered by edicts of banishment, and presently a granting of favors to informers who brought him data of "treasonable" expressions. So the *delatores*, whom he had begun by avoiding, came back once more. Domitian made a particular study of the life and

documents of Tiberius in order to find precedents for methods of imposing his will upon the Senate. He discovered abundant precedents not only for turning the Senate itself into a court of treason but also for holding trials in the imperial presence, and he followed both customs.

Fortunately for Rome, he was called away to the German frontier in the second year of his rule. Here he undertook to extend the work of his father, who had made tithe-lands of the region now included in lower Baden. North of that district, especially along the river Main, many Gallic settlers had found homes after the Chatti had been punished in the days of Augustus. Wiesbaden, in fact, had already become a health resort. Domitian now took the legions of the army of the upper Rhine across the river (we do not learn on what excuse) and by driving out the Chatti pacified the country from above the Taunus range down as far as the Neckar. For this he was voted a triumph and the laudatory cognomen Germanicus, though Tacitus doubtless expresses the true attitude of the Senate when he reports that the victory was hardly worthy of mention. Whether or no Tacitus was right—and he was not inclined to be fair in this case—Domitian left his mark on the future policy of Rome by drawing a strong line of forts some 120 miles long marking his new frontier. His system of fortifications consisted of earthen forts interspersed with wooden watch-towers where advance guards might be posted, and behind this line, well connected by roads, a series of large stone forts capable of holding larger detachments which could dash to the defense of any point endangered. This "limes," as it was called, extended from above Coblenz on the Rhine eastward north of the Taunus range, then southeast past modern Frankfort, striking finally down through Württemberg towards the Danube. The line was apparently not at this time completed all the way to Ratisbon, but the credit of having stabilized the frontier on practical lines from the Rhine to the Danube—a problem

Augustus had failed to solve—seems to belong to Domitian and his engineers.

While this work was being accomplished the Dacians (apparently in 85) crossed the Danube again and defeated and killed the governor of Moesia. Domitian rushed to the scene with several legions of the nearby provinces and drove the Dacians back. It is probably at this time that the Roman wall still to be seen in Dobrudja was built. Returning home Domitian permitted his general Fuscus to undertake a punitive expedition into the enemy's country, but Decebalus, the great Dacian king, proved the better soldier. Fuscus was thoroughly defeated at Adamklissi, and Decebalus not only took many prisoners but also, what he prized more, a great many engines of war which he used as models for building up a strong artillery.

Domitian at first sent Julianus to restore order on the Danube, for he found his attention occupied in executing senators who had in his absence abetted Antonius Saturninus, a rebellious governor of lower Germany. (The treason-trials of the year 88 were indeed among the worst acts of tyranny in his bloody career.) In 89, after Decebalus had been defeated by Julianus, Domitian returned to the Danube and foolishly undertook an expedition against the Germans of the Bohemian mountains, the famous Marcomanni, on the plea that they had not sent contingents in the previous campaign according to their promises. The enemy were not eager for the fray and sent him envoys whom, it is said, he treacherously slew as enemies. Domitian might have read Roman history to advantage. He crossed the Danube, but was defeated by the Dacians and driven back in disgrace. He felt that he had had enough of war for a while and, securing favorable terms from Decebalus, he made peace. Decebalus indeed went so far as to acknowledge the suzerainty of Rome, which was indeed a great deal, but he also demanded in return—to make a show at home of independence—some gifts and the use

of Roman engineers, who were of course to teach his army the art of war against future invasions. Domitian had perhaps accomplished enough for a legitimate Dacian triumph. And he had no need of mentioning his ill-starred expedition into Bohemia. But the Romans were not accustomed to such bargains with enemies and the bestowal of gifts upon the conquered. The senatorial writers chose to call the Dacian expedition also a failure, and the gifts a sign that Domitian "paid tribute to the barbarian." The gossip about the defeat in Bohemia drove Domitian to one more trial with the Marcomanni.

Unfortunately we get no clear details about this expedition. We are told that the Germans were aided by the Sarmatians. One wonders what would have happened if the left bank of the Danube had been held by a homogeneous people instead of by German, Iranian, and Thracian tribes intermingled. Domitian seems to have had success enough to win favorable terms, but not even he, who usually saw his deeds through a magnifying conceit, dared claim a triumph this time. It was left for better men to meet the onset which he had now provoked.

As for the rest of the frontier, Agricola was still continuing the advances in Britain begun under Vespasian. He was indeed prospering, but Domitian saw little use in spending blood and money in winning dominion over northern Britain and over Ireland, which Agricola wished to invade. The ambitious general was wisely recalled. The Roman boundary in fact remained in Britain where Domitian's decision left it.

The latter years of Domitian's reign were not relieved by any expeditions to the frontier, and the Senate suffered in consequence—the Stoic group most of all. Herennius Senecio had written a laudatory life of Helvidius Priscus, Junius Rusticus had written one of Thræsea. Both were tried for cynical references to the government which were interpreted as treasonable, and both were executed. Fannia,

the wife of Thrasea, was banished for having supplied material to both, and finally a general edict went out banishing all philosophers, an edict which exiled Epictetus and Dion Chrysostom, two men that Rome could ill afford to lose.

Domitian is also credited by the writers of the church with persecuting the Christians. In a sense the charge is true. Flavius Clemens, his own cousin, was accused of "infidelity" and put to death, though Domitian had already chosen the two sons of Clemens as his heirs. They were his nearest of kin. Clemens' wife, Flavia Domitilla, was banished at the same time. Connected with this was the condemnation of Acilius Glabrio, a member of a very old family. It has been supposed that the strange religion espoused by them may have been the Jewish one, since we know that many Romans found an appeal in this monotheistic cult at this time, but the stories of the church fathers receive support from the fact that the earliest Christian catacombs are actually found on the property of Domitilla and the Acilii. Whether, however, the charge of Christianity was at this time made the real basis for the persecution may well be doubted. Clemens, as the father of the chosen successors of Domitian, could hardly have had an easy life in the vicinity of the unreasonable tyrant. Since the "persecution" was not extensive, it is likely that Domitian had executed Clemens and Acilius on grounds of personal dislike, that perhaps he let the charge of "infidelity" be made for the sake of appearances, and that the later Christians, knowing of the execution of these early members of the group, counted them among the "martyrs." It is, however, very interesting to find that men of such rank had thus early gained access to Christian writings and had found them convincing.

The death of Clemens, 95 A. D., was probably influential in stirring up the conspiracy which ended the emperor's career, for it was Domitian's own wife, Domitia, who, realizing how close to his own family he could strike, directed

the plot. She was a daughter of Nero's excellent general, Corbulo. Her life had been difficult. For a long time she had had to be content with a marriage in the simple form of *usus*, not knowing whether she would be recognized as empress if Domitian came to the throne. Then she was formally married, but after her son died her husband proved untrue to her for many years. Recently he had called her back to be his wife again, only to tyrannize over her. It ended by her forming the plot with some of the household freedmen, and various senators were informed of it. After selecting Nerva as his successor, a man universally respected and yet colorless enough not to be identified with any faction, the conspirators designated some of the freedmen to strike the tyrant down in his own house.

CHAPTER XXV

THE LITERATURE AND ART OF THE FIRST CENTURY

The first century A. D. was not a period of great literary production. It would perhaps be unsafe to assume in general that political tyranny is destructive of artistic forces, but at Rome, where intellectual life had so largely drawn its inspiration from the activities of the Forum and Curia, this assumption seems to be correct. To be specific, prose suffered directly by the suppression of liberty, because Roman prose had dealt so largely with oratory and history. The time had now come when the whole literary course of study was upset. The public career, for which in particular it had prepared the student, had now practically vanished; and as for prose history few men cared to write the story of what was being done, and some of those who tried it suffered for telling disagreeable truths. Under Tiberius, Cremutius Cordus, the historian, had to endure the disgrace of seeing his books burned because he had spoken highly of Cato and Brutus. Under Domitian, Senecio and Rusticus were put to death for their biographies of martyred Stoics.

But one need not confine one's inquiry to such specific cases. It requires but little exercise of the imagination to comprehend how oppressive to the free spirit of genius must have been the constant dull hatred and fear, the pall of disappointment and disgrace, that rested over all of Rome during a large part of the century. The members of the better classes, who had always contributed generously to Rome's literature, would especially feel this. On the other hand, if there were by chance men of small means who felt inclined to resort to literary work they would have to face

the fact that the emperor must be accepted as patron and that his patronage could be gained only at the cost of menial flattery. What that cost was we can see in the works of men like Martial and Statius. How many poets determined to burn their work rather than pay the price we shall never know.

But the ultimate cause of the literary decay may lie even deeper—in the dangerously extensive uprooting of the Roman and Italian people that had taken place. When one remembers how slave-culture had pushed out Italians for two centuries before Augustus, how the Social and Sullan wars had destroyed some 300,000 men, how the triumvirs had driven out whole communities to make place for 200,000 soldiers, how Augustus and Tiberius had withdrawn from the young manhood of Italy most of the recruits that made their 30 frontier legions, how Romans and Italians, disgusted with tyranny, refused to bring up children and themselves emigrated to the provinces to escape to a cleaner atmosphere—and these are but a few of the significant facts—one wonders that Latin literature survived at all.

The old noble families had almost completely disappeared. The proscriptions of Sulla and Marius had begun the work. Three hundred senators, according to Appian, lost their lives in the awful proscription of the triumvirs, and in the thirty years of tyranny that began in the latter days of Tiberius one noble family after another was uprooted. But that was not all. Life became such a series of suffering and dread in the circles of the proscribed that men refused to marry and bring children into such distress. Of the forty-five patricians that are known in Caesar's day only one is represented by known posterity in Hadrian's time. Of all these the Cornelian family alone seems to have survived. The Aemilii, Fabii, Claudii, Manlii, Valerii, and all the rest have disappeared. Augustus and Claudius raised twenty-five families to the patriciate, and all but six of these disappeared before Nerva's reign. We have the record

of some 400 senators, many of them of recent elevation, in the year 65 A. D. A generation later every trace of half of these is gone. In fact, old Rome is no more. If Scipio could have risen in Domitian's day to see his native city, he would have found stately marble temples and palaces in the place of huts, but the features of the new Romans would have amazed him. The crowd of the Forum would have resembled the populace he once saw at Pergamum and the senators would have differed little from the people on the streets. One has but to imagine the shade of Washington parading the Bowery.

Do these facts account for a diminution in literary production and a change in the tone of what was produced? A definite answer can hardly be given. But it seems significant that no great writer of the Empire, so far as we can ascertain, was born at Rome. A few, Petronius, Persius, Juvenal, Tacitus, may be credited with more or less certainty to central Italy. But it is noteworthy that these men are one and all essentially satirists. The springs of inspiration that had not dried up had at least been embittered. Indeed, during the first century of the Empire Spain produced many of the best literary men for Rome: the Senecas, Lucan, Columella, Martial, and Quintilian came from Spain. They were doubtless the scions of the Romans and Italians who settled Spain in great numbers after the Hannibalic war. These men were in a sense belated Italians, brought up far from harm's way in the ideals, manners, and literary traditions of Republican Rome, to be given back when the mother city needed a reminder of her former self. On the whole, however, their work was retrogressive. Seneca, to be sure, returned to Rome in his childhood and quickly fell under the spell of imperial fashions, but Lucan became the rhapsodist of the dead Republic, Columella harked back to Vergil's youthful work, Martial owed allegiance to Catullus, and Quintilian spent his life in a hopeless attempt at rehabilitating Ciceronian style and thought.

This, in fact, was not the way of progress. These men probably would not have composed had they not been permitted to live in the atmosphere of the past, but after all they were all a generation or two behind their time.

The new stock of Rome failed also. For reasons that elude analysis, the motley multitude which had poured over Italy produced no great writers. The natives of the provinces did somewhat better, but they either responded to influences wholly native and spread the stream of production into diverging deltas, or, to prove their orthodoxy, imitated the earlier Romans. To the first group belong particularly a number of Africans who began to write in the second century. Apuleius, for instance, with his extravagant mysticism and disheveled temperament, had to create a new conglomeration of styles in order to use the Latin language at all, and the fiery enthusiasm of the African Christians, like Tertullian and Cyprian, is more nearly akin to the Hebraic spirit than to that of Caesar and Cicero. In the second group we may place such later writers as the Alexandrian Claudian, and the Gaul Ausonius, who carried coals to Newcastle by bringing old Roman classicism back to Rome as proof that they, though foreigners, had imbibed the spirit of Rome. That, too, was mistaken art.

It seems significant then that imaginative literature fails to appear in Italy when the Italian stock fails, and that it does in some measure spring up anew in the areas to which the Italian colonists had gone in a former day. The colonists of Cisalpine Gaul had similarly brought in their harvest in the Augustan day. Had Rome lived longer, perhaps the mixed stock of the Empire might have fused into a new people, conscious of spiritual powers of its own, and daring enough to sever itself from the Latin literature of the Republic, and to give its own ideals expression; but about that it is useless to conjecture. Evident it is beyond a peradventure that the Latin stock that had made Rome what it was had scattered and lost itself long before Rome

fell, and that with the disappearance of that stock went very much of Rome's power to think and act in Rome's characteristic manner.

In turning to actual works we may mention along with those surviving a few that have been lost, in order to give an idea of the scope of literary interests during this period. In the late Augustan and early Tiberian day Pompeius Trogus wrote a universal history in forty-four books that has been lost, though it was once widely read. Fenestella's lost annals of Rome gave some attention to social history. Vitruvius wrote an interesting book on architecture, which we are fortunate in possessing. Julius Hyginus, the director of the great library of the Apollo temple, wrote learned books on everything from literature to agriculture; while Verrius Flaccus was perhaps Rome's best lexicographer. Several generals, like Corbulo, Paulinus, and Vetus, wrote commentaries upon their wars including ethnological notes about the peoples they conquered. Few of these books could, however, be called literature.

The first piece of purely imaginative literature is a small fragment of a very long novel, the *Cena Trimalchionis*, which has been mentioned above. The author was evidently the *Petronius* who met death in so picturesque a manner when ordered by Nero to slay himself. The novel seems to have been a string of adventures shaped in the form of a burlesque Odyssey, but the portion that we have gives the dining-room scene in the home of a millionaire Syrian freedman who had been Maecenas' slave when a boy, and had amassed his fortune in trade, cattle-raising, and banking. The guests are men of the same type, men who had made their wealth as rag dealers, undertakers and pettifoggers. Petronius has the rare gift of knowing how to let his characters betray themselves. There can be little doubt that his readers saw in the picture the unforgettable scenes enacted any evening in the ex-slave millionaire society of Claudius' entourage, for the book was written dur-

ing that reign. If by some good fortune the excavations of Herculaneum should ever restore this book, we should no doubt place it among the most important works of fiction.

The most voluminous writer of Nero's age was *Seneca*, the tutor of Nero, and thereafter for several years his chief adviser and minister. He was from Spain, in fact from Cordova, which had been founded two hundred years before his birth as a village of Roman citizens. His forebears were therefore in all probability Roman colonists. Beginning life as a teacher he was implicated by the disreputable Messalina in some scandal intended to serve as an excuse for getting rid of a rival, and was banished to Corsica. While there he wrote several tragedies to while away the time. The plots were judiciously composed, but the characters are in no case convincing. The plays could not possibly have been staged, and yet such was Seneca's fame in the middle ages that they alone of Roman tragedies have survived. We have also from his pen a volume of twelve "dialogues," mostly ethical treatises, a large volume of moral letters, and a volume on "Problems of Nature," in which he betrays more ignorance than knowledge of science. Some of his essays, especially the brief ones which he includes among his letters, are worthy of a place among the best of ethical writings. There is, for instance, a modern spirit in much that he says on such subjects as slavery, the duties of government, the "brotherhood of man," the necessity for wisdom in charity. Unfortunately he was also a thorough-going advocate of the ultra-modern doctrine that all education, in fact all scientific training, should be confined to immediately practical ends.

His style is particularly interesting in revealing the extreme consequences to which the anti-Ciceronian revolt had led. Caesar's democratic victory, which had brought senatorial discussion to an end, had given the death blow to Cicero's influence in prose style. In the period that followed

few speeches were made except to the populace in the Forum or the conglomerate of peoples that constituted the army. Before such people, many of whom could not comprehend any but the simplest colloquial Latin, elaborate periods would have been wasted. Spoken prose consequently broke into fragments. Each sentence must be short and pointed when delivered before hearers who had not the wits to retain more than a few simple words at a time. Even in the schools brevity became the first essential of every sentence; but as the professor must have something to teach, he trained his pupils to make the most of each short fragment, to tessellate their words effectively, to strive for epigrammatic effects and antitheses. Each brief sentence must hit a mark, and a discourse is like the discharge of a machine-gun. All this was, in a word, the result of an artistic treatment of a Latin shaped for democratic immigrant ears. The evolution of Latin style was not unlike that which English has had to endure in some of our larger cities, where popular newspapers have for a generation debased prose into a smartly simple jargon to catch the attention of semi-literate immigrants, and where teachers of English, in order to be considered "progressive," have accepted such journalistic usage as the foundation for a new literary style.

Seneca had two brothers who had also reached high positions. One was Gallio, the governor of Achaia, before whom St. Paul was made to appear at Corinth. The *Acts* relate that "he cared for none of these things" that Paul preached. Yet the incident helped to connect St. Paul with Seneca in legend, and that was enough to induce medieval monks to save Seneca's writings. The other brother was Mela, who held high offices of state, but is perhaps best known as the father of *Lucan*, the epic poet. *Lucan's Pharsalia*, which tells the story of the last days of the Republic, was widely read at a time when men were fighting their last losing battles for political liberty, for it is inspired with

a deep love of freedom. Indeed it is apparent that Lucan himself, in the composition of the book, wrote with such fervor for the cause of Cato and Pompey, that he preached himself into a revolutionist and hence joined Piso's conspiracy against Nero. However, apart from the fact that the poem was unfinished when Lucan was put to death, it has serious flaws that make it difficult to read. Intended for oral recitation in fragments, it falls apart into scenes, and the lines are loud and sonorous, rather than beautiful. Indeed, there are hardly half a dozen brief passages that can truly be considered inspired poetry.

Persius was another youthful rebel against the sins of the Neronian age, but his inspiration was also due to indignation rather than to imaginative vision. We have from him only a brief volume of satires, in which the lines are intentionally obscure and the subject matter the commonplaces of Stoic tirade. It is written, however, with a deep sincerity and the righteous wrath that all men of conscience must have felt in that day of decadence.

Under Vespasian the world recovered its poise somewhat and at least found an interest in life if not yet the enthusiasm that makes for great literature. *Pliny the Elder*, an admiral under Vespasian, deserves mention for his encyclopaedic work in 37 books called the *Historia Naturalis*, to which we owe many of our facts about ancient arts, crafts, and sciences. *Quintilian* was born in a Spanish garrison town which was a Roman municipality in the days of Augustus. His grandfather had been a teacher among the natives, and was doubtless devoted to Ciceronian Latin, which his descendant tried all his life long to rehabilitate at Rome. He furnishes a good example of that literary conservatism that is usually found in a colonial stock. The book that has survived from his hand is the *Institutio Oratoria*, "The Training of the Orator," which is our best guide to the Roman pedagogical methods as well as to the Roman literary criticism of the time. His enthusiasm for the best

literature, his sound judgment in literary matters, his high pedagogical ideals, and his versatility as a practical teacher, combine to give the book a high rank among its kind. Many of our rules of composition go back to Quintilian, and many a recent book on pedagogy has only brought forth methods that this man was advocating in his day. *Frontinus* may be mentioned for his technical description of Rome's water system, written when he was at the head of the water department in 97 A. D., and for his book on strategy inspired by his experiences as a general in Britain.

Among poets Valerius Flaccus wrote the *Argonautica*, Silius Italicus the *Punica*, and Statius various epics as well as some minor lyrics, but all of these works are imitative of the greater poets of an earlier day, and hardly repay the reader. *Martial*, on the other hand, is one of the few poets whose work has been of such marked individuality as to give for all time its own impress to the form it adopted. He chose to write epigrams, but after he had written them the reader necessarily thought of "epigrams" as being the witty, pointed lampoons that he produced, not the inscriptional poems called epigrams by his predecessors. He came from a Roman municipality of Spain, as did so many other writers of this period, but he was more successful than some of his fellows in entering into the gay, nervous life of the metropolis. His love of the sardonic and satiric and his unmoral cynicism make him kin to Plautus on the one hand and to Catullus on the other, rather than to the Stoic-minded satirists and preachers of his own day. There is consequently apparent in his work a general suppression of poetic sentiment. But he has both imaginative vision and a deep love of beauty which he betrays when, at rare moments, he forgets Rome to think of his old home and his boyhood friends. And even when he prefers to play at his favorite game of lampooning he reveals a sure taste for rhythm, sound, and word. To the student of civilization he is, quite apart from his intrinsic worth, indispensable because of his

frank pictures of everyday Rome. It is he, more than any other writer, who makes it possible for us to feel that we are quite thoroughly familiar with the Rome of 100 A. D.

Art. The vast building programs of Nero and Vespasian could hardly have been carried out without gathering to Rome the best architects and artists of the whole empire, and testing their ingenuity to the utmost. New problems were proposed and solved in many directions, and yet such was the petty ambition of most of these emperors to have the credit upon inscriptions for everything done under them that art remained anonymous and subsidiary, as it were. The stimulus of personal fame which creative art must have in order to prosper, a Nero or a Domitian would not think of providing. This is one of the ugliest sides of that tyranny.

Yet some exceedingly fine work was done. The Arch of Titus, completed, it seems, under Domitian, still remains, and though the two largest designs have been badly marred they afford excellent examples of Flavian sculpture. One represents the beginning of a triumphal procession with the emperor and a figure of victory in a chariot; the other shows the part of the procession which carried the implements of the captured temple of Jerusalem, especially the great candlestick, the table of the shew-bread, and the trumpets. The artist has here attempted much more than was ever proposed in the static bas-relief processions of the Augustan day and hence he has betrayed to the first glance the inability of his art to treat perspective in stone. But, except for this, the work is the best plastic representation of bodies in vigorous movement that ancient art has yielded. Not only does the whole column of soldiers plunge forward with irresistible motion, but one feels for the first time in ancient relief work that, by a daring use of backgrounds, the procession is free from the block, as it were, and moving where it will. There is something of the same quality to be seen in the panels representing hunting scenes on Constan-

tine's arch, for these were also made originally for some Flavian arch.

Of portraiture in sculpture we have not many good examples from the Flavian period, but the bust of Vespasian, now in the National Museum at Rome, reveals an art that adequately conveys the spirit of the subject through means chiefly naturalistic. Decorative painters were also experimenting, as we can see in the so-called fourth-style work at Pompeii. There was now less of a tendency to cover large spaces of wall with copies of famous paintings of the past. The delight in the new open air architectural designs, especially in those of seaside villas, had caught the imagination. Painters sought for the effects of space by opening the wall, as it were, by fanciful architectural representations of porticoes and pergolas, and by throwing into the center of such spaces a garden or villa scene. The colors were artistically chosen and the illusion pleasing, if at times fantastic. Of this post-Neronian art one critic¹ has said: "Never again has European painting attained in decorative creations such freedom in the choice of colors, and in the extreme refinement of their color-sense the artists of this style have never been rivalled except by the Japanese, just as their contemporaneous sculpture can only be compared with the most delicate nature studies of Eastern Asia." And yet one feels that the imagination was rather fantastic than creative, and that these paintings at their best are only superficially decorative, suited to please the jaded taste of wealthy and luxurious spendthrifts. There is little real content in any of them. The spirit that called them forth was that which inspired the art of Fragonard.

¹ Wickoff, *Roman Art*.

CHAPTER XXVI

FROM THE TYRANT DOMITIAN TO THE PHILOSOPHER M. AURELIUS

Nerva, 96-98 A.D. Most of the emperors of the first century were spoiled children bundled into the throne by fond parents; we come now to a line of emperors, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius, who grew up in private life without knowing what the future would bring. Only after they had proved their worth were they selected for their high office by adoption. When one compares the former line of rulers with the latter, one is tempted to the conclusion that the palace is not a fit place for the rearing of children. M. Cocceius Nerva was 60 years of age and childless when he was called to power. He was of course not a man of outstanding character; had he been so he probably would not have survived so long. Yet he was generally trusted and had escaped Domitian's wrath by tactful and harmless compliance rather than by base subservience. And since he was a man who would bend before a superior, Domitian had enjoyed the privilege of lending respectability to his own despised *entourage* by calling Nerva a friend.

Nerva, on accepting the throne, accorded the "dyarchy" formal recognition, took the much-desired oath that he would put no senator to death, called back political exiles, suspended the laws of treason, and invited the Senate to appoint a commission to coöperate with him in placing the state's finances upon a sound basis. When the Senate desired furthermore that he should let them have their revenge on Domitian's *delatores* he refused. He knew too well that he and the other senators were not without blame,

since they had humbly voted at past trials in the way that the emperor demanded, and he was too honest a man to play the pharisee now.

These acts were on the whole promising, but the reign was too brief to reveal what he could do. There is, however, one very striking institution which is credited to his devising, though it is difficult to estimate its ultimate effects. It was he who first set apart large sums of state funds for the double purpose of providing "rural credits" and "mothers' pensions," if we may use modern terms. In the beginning the sums were probably small, and doubtless only a few districts were at first chosen for the experiment; but as the work extended under Trajan it seems that most of the municipalities of Italy were eventually taken into the plan, and it has been estimated that a sum of about 100,000,000 dollars was finally involved. The state's commissioners deposited with each municipality a given amount which the municipality in turn lent in small sums to local farmers on mortgages at a fairly low rate of interest (5 or 6 per cent). These funds, therefore, served in the first instance the very same purposes as the farm-loan banks recently instituted in America. But they performed a second service as well. The interest was not to revert to the state but was given to the municipality to be used by it in providing for the livelihood of poor boys and girls. The purpose of this was apparently to induce poor parents to rear larger families than was then customary; in other words, to provide what some states to-day have called a "pension for motherhood." Our knowledge of the plan comes mainly from fragments of the stones upon which were inscribed the records of the mortgages, but there are a few literary references also which show the spirit of the institution, for they speak of it as a plan to "bring new life into Italy."

The whole plan seems to be an indication that not only was Italian agriculture in straits, but that the population

was also failing to keep up. That this fact had long been apparent we may infer from Vespasian's policy of discouraging army recruiting in Italy. This is then the second very interesting experiment in sociology and economics undertaken by the emperors. We shall find more of these experiments later, all apparently failing adequately to stem the tide of decay.

Whether such paternalism was wise, whether it was anything but an external panacea and a salve to conscience, is a question that cannot be answered with the facts available. It is at least interesting to see the social conscience awakened to the recognition of disease, and also to see how far the ancient state was ready to leave the narrow beaten path of politics for social reform.

Nerva has been criticized for employing the surplus of provincial funds in the "pauperizing" of Italy, which did not so much as supply soldiers for the army. However, that criticism seems trivial. If we grant that the imperial rule was worthwhile which gave peace to all the provinces and saved the civilized world from external invaders, we must also grant that Italy, the buffer territory of the ruling metropolis, must be peopled by a healthy and strong race ready to defend the metropolis at any crisis, and ready also to supply the defensive troops if any part of the front line broke. The emperors, in other words, were saving Italy not alone for Italy's own enjoyment of life but to provide the last defense of the empire. Whether Italy served that purpose best after generations of coddling is another question. Rome was still a great experiment station in world government, and Nerva's new policy was at least laudable as a permissible experiment.

Trajan, 98-117 A.D. Nerva had not been in office more than a year when he learned that power was slipping from his hands and that he must have aid. The praetorian cohort demanded, under threat of mutiny, that he put to death the murderers of Domitian. To save the situation he

yielded against his wishes, but he also comprehended that a younger and stronger man must at once be called to power. So he adopted M. Ulpius Trajanus, then *legatus* of Upper Germany, gave him the name of Caesar, and asked the Senate to confer upon him at once the tribunician and proconsular powers. Trajan was born in Spain, the first emperor in fact from the provinces, but his native city was Italica, which had been the first Roman settlement in Spain, and his father had long been a senator and even proconsul of Asia. Trajan had passed through the regular *cursus* at Rome, and was favorably known to the Senate before he entered his military career. It would be wholly misleading to call him a Spaniard, as is sometimes done. In January, 98, a few months after his adoption and before he had returned to Rome, Nerva died. Not even then did Trajan return, for he was busy planning the roads and forts of the *agri decumates* that had been incorporated by Domitian; and he felt impelled to study the needs of the Danube provinces, for his experience on the frontier made it plain to him that Domitian's treaty with the Dacians must be revised. He came home after a year, and made a good impression on the Senate, to which he gave the usual formal promises. He also proved himself master of the praetorian guard by punishing the mutineers, and by granting only a half of the usual donative. He felt so strong in his position that on handing the sword of office to his new praetorian prefect, he made bold to say: "Use this for me if I do well, against me if I do ill."

Since the "Lives of the Caesars" by Suetonius ends with the reign of Domitian we have but meager information about the reign of Trajan. The causes of the great Dacian wars, for instance, are not given us. We are not reliably told that Decebalus began them; in fact, we may conclude from Trajan's general policy in foreign affairs that he would sooner or later denounce Domitian's treaty, refuse to send gifts to Decebalus, and demand the return of the Roman

engineers whom Decebalus was employing in the building up of a strong military machine. At any rate, Trajan invaded Dacia in the spring of 101 with a powerful army made up of all the Danubian legions and at least one legion from the Rhine front. The Dacian capital, called Sarmizegethusa, was in Transylvania, well guarded by mountains and woods. In the first year Trajan won a notable victory, but it was not till near the end of the second summer that he succeeded in reaching and taking the capital. Decebalus was made a client-king after surrendering the Roman workmen granted him by Domitian and after accepting a Roman garrison in the capital as well as in several other forts. Trajan returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph. He had apparently not aimed at extending Rome's boundaries beyond the Danube and was satisfied to have a strong buffer state above the river at the point where pressure from the northeast was most to be feared.

However, it soon became apparent that the problem was not yet solved. It was reported that Decebalus was building new forts, strengthening his army, and making secret alliances in contravention of the terms of 102. In 104 the Senate declared war, and in the following spring Trajan crossed the river with increased forces. This time the army made a brickyard on the river and constructed a permanent bridge of brick, parts of which are still to be seen. This was proof to the Dacians that Trajan intended to annex Dacia. The barbarians therefore defended their city till it was set on fire, and when all hope was lost a number of their leaders withdrew to the palace and drank poison to escape capture. Decebalus was pursued until he too was on the point of capture, when he also committed suicide. Many of the inhabitants were hunted out of the mountain fastnesses, where they had taken refuge.

But the region was now more dangerous to the Roman colonies than before, since it would only invite more barbarous folk from the North. Dacia must be settled, and

men could not be spared from Italy for this task. How Trajan got his colonists we are not told, but we find that soon afterwards there were several colonies and *municipia* with new names in the province, and, to our surprise, a large number of religious inscriptions were presently erected there to all the gods of the East: Mithras and half a dozen different Baals. The new province had, it appears, been populated chiefly by colonists from Syria, Asia, Palmyra and Commagene. The land was doubtless kept in the possession of the state and rented out on the tithe system as the *agri decumates* had been. For the working of the gold mines, which were then very productive in Transylvania, miners were imported from Dalmatia, and procurators were sent out from Rome who let out the mining contracts on a percentage basis. Thus the Roman treasury, which had for some time felt the stress of a diminishing gold supply, was for a while relieved. It was in these gold mines that our first—though not the oldest—examples of ancient wax tablets were found.

The province, which included Transylvania north of the mountain range and the lesser Wallachia to the south (but not eastern Rumania), endured for about a century and a half, when it was finally overwhelmed by the barbarians of the North; but the circumstance that Rumania to-day has a language which closely resembles Italian is in some measure due to the temporary occupation of this region by a Roman colony.

Trajan's own history (now lost) of this war was celebrated; it may have been fully illustrated; if so, it was probably from sketches made for his history that the sculptors drew the long series of illustrations with which they covered the remarkable column which now alone remains of Trajan's magnificent Forum. The column stands a hundred feet high, and the procession of events from the crossing of the Danube in the first war to the death of Decebalus in the second is told in a continuous spiral that twines about

the column from the bottom to the top, making a scroll more than 600 feet long that contains over 2,500 figures. To the historian the scroll has great value, not only in giving the order of events but especially in the faithful reproduction of scenes, costumes and armor, portraits, buildings and landscapes. The artist was certainly present in the expeditions, taken along doubtless in order to illustrate Trajan's books as well as to supply the sketches for the tableaux that were to be used in the triumphal procession.

While Trajan was busy in the North, he sent the governor of Syria, Cornelius Palma, to annex Arabia, a task which Augustus had unsuccessfully attempted long before. The Nabataean Arabs held the region of Damascus and the country east of the Jordan as far as the desert. Further south along the coast of the upper Red Sea reigned minor Arab sheiks. The purpose of this aggression was probably to get control of the trade routes, for caravans from Mesopotamia came well laden by way of Damascus, while many Indian and Arabian products, especially precious stones and spices, were being brought up the eastern shore of the Red Sea, and then by caravan to Gaza. It is doubtful whether Roman traders brought influence to bear upon Trajan to include Arabia in the empire in order to facilitate their trade. It is more likely that the emperor acted with a view to strengthening the income of the treasury, for the export and import taxes, the sales taxes, and the tithes of this region would be considerable. The expedition of Palma succeeded, the province of Arabia Petraea was formed, and the *pax Romana* extended the border of safe trading so that caravans came through by shorter routes, and the village of Bostra, on the edge of the desert, became a flourishing city.

Trajan now remained at home for several years and gave his time assiduously to a thorough renovation of the administrative machinery of the whole empire, including Italy and the senatorial provinces. An eager advocate of effi-

cient management, he discovered where city governments were carelessly or dishonestly run, and sent city-managers or *curatores* to ferret out the trouble, to order reforms, and to see that they were executed. He gave these *curatores* much discretion, but he also made it plain that he and his council of experts were always ready to take the responsibility for any disagreeable decision, so that there should be no delay. Just how this procedure worked we happen to know, because Pliny the younger, who was assigned to Bithynia, preserved the correspondence that passed between him and the emperor on every minute question. Pliny asks, for instance, whether the towns may use Roman soldiers for police guards as had been customary. Trajan answers that the soldiers must be sent back to their colors and that the cities must provide their own police. Might the city of Prusa build a new bathhouse? Yes, if it does not impose new taxes for it. Nicomedia has wasted money on an aqueduct and left it incomplete, what is to be done? Trajan answers that the city must have good water, but that the men must be punished who had been guilty of the misuse of former appropriations. Nicaea has spent \$400,000 on a theater which is so poorly built as to be unsafe. Can an architect be sent to inspect it? Trajan answers that Rome has not enough architects to spare and that Pliny must find some Greek builder and decide what is to be done. The people of Apamea desire to have their accounts examined, though they have a treaty forbidding Rome's interference in local administration. Trajan advises Pliny to examine the accounts. The Byzantines spend \$500 annually to send an envoy to Rome to bear their honorary decree to the emperor. Could not this sum be saved? Trajan answers that the money can be saved by letting the governor carry such decrees.

There are a great many of such rescripts which prove the good judgment, the liberal-mindedness and the untiring devotion to conscientious duty on the part of the emperor,

but one comprehends also that such paternalism on the part of the master will, if long extended, destroy the sense of responsibility in the local government, and, if exercised by a ruler of bad judgment, can only bring in its train the evils of autocracy. His was a very great departure from the Republican practice of recognizing the autonomy of subject cities, and the precedent established by Trajan led to many dangerous practices later.

In Italy Trajan extended the farm loans and the alimentary institution begun by Nerva. Indeed by his care for the revenues he was able to accumulate funds and add large amounts to the sums to be distributed. Public improvements were also carried on vigorously: a new enlarged harbor at Ostia, for instance, several roads, an aqueduct that brought water to the poor people living beyond the Tiber. (This duct is still used for the fountain of the *Acqua Paola*). He also used a portion of Nero's paradise for the construction of a public bath for women, and he extended Augustus' forum northward in a series of buildings which constituted perhaps the most impressive group in existence in that day. A forum at one end and a basilica at the other inclosed the space for two library buildings, between which stood the column which has been mentioned. The porches of the library gave access to the upper circles of the column, so that its scroll was, as it were, the most elaborate picture-roll of the whole library collection.

The flaw in Trajan's character, which marred some of his best work, is evident enough in what has already been mentioned, a flaw inherent in Rome's over-emphasis upon "gloria." Trajan paid too high a price for applause. He was too honest to bribe the guard, and he treated the Senate with only a formal dignity, but he was very fond of the plaudits of the people of the streets, and they were already spoiled beyond salvation. It is difficult to comprehend how one so prudent could have justified a donative, after each of the Dacian wars, of about a hundred dollars per man

(650 denarii) to the citizens of Rome, and a holiday season of four months at which ten thousand gladiators are said to have fought for the amusement of the people. Not even Nero had gone to such extremes.

One is tempted to find this strain of megalomania in the campaigns of eastern conquest with which his life ended, for Trajan attempted to bring Armenia as well as a large part of the Parthian empire under Roman sway, a policy which his successor abandoned. But it is still a debatable question whether his was not the best way to establish a scientific boundary in the east. Rome needed to control Armenia in order to check the invasions of Scythian and Sarmatian nomads. From the time of Lucullus and Pompey, Armenia had in fact served Rome as a buffer client state without creating much trouble, except when the Parthian kings interfered and placed their own nominees on the Armenian throne. What brought Trajan to the east was precisely this Parthian intervention. The Parthian king Chosroes (or Osroes) set aside Trajan's nominee for the Armenian throne and placed his nephew, Parthamasiris, there. This was contrary to treaty as well as a declaration of suzerainty in a Roman client-state. Chosroes must be compelled to withdraw of course; the question was whether Rome should try to settle the difficulty permanently by annexations. Armenia could readily be turned into a province, but to hold the province permanently would be expensive. The Parthian kingdom had now expanded not only over the whole of Persia, but also through the whole of Mesopotamia. The Arsacid kings of Parthia could over-run Armenia and probably overwhelm any army that Rome could afford to station there. Should he annex Parthia also, as Julius Caesar had threatened to do, and could Rome extend her boundaries as far as Afghanistan?

Trajan asked the Senate to declare war in 113, but when he arrived in Syria he found the legions in bad condition.

After a year of severe training he led them into Armenia by the upper Euphrates. Parthamasiris offered to accept the crown from Trajan, but he was ordered to vacate the throne, and presently in some unknown fashion he met his death. Armenia was overrun and annexed to Rome as a province. Then Trajan turned southward and made a province of upper Mesopotamia. The Parthians, being badly organized, offered little resistance. The ease of this task seems to have induced him to undertake the subjugation of Parthia. After wintering in Antioch he returned in 116, went beyond the Tigris, and swept the region of Nineveh into a province of Assyria; then, going back to the Euphrates, he sailed down in a flotilla that he had had built, crossed by the royal canal to the Tigris above modern Bagdad and took Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital, and finally carried his army down to the mouth of the river on the Persian gulf. But by this time the natives of upper Mesopotamia in his rear had raised an insurrection. He had to march north again to recover the ground lost. The provinces were reestablished and he went so far as to declare the Parthian throne vacant and to place upon it Parthaspates, the son of Chosroes, as Rome's client-prince. However, he had no sooner returned to Syria than he learned that Chosroes was back at Ctesiphon and on his throne again.

It may be that he intended to return for a third attempt, but at present it was impossible, for the Jews who had at the fall of Palestine scattered to their outlying settlements in Alexandria, Cyrene, Cyprus and several Mesopotamian cities, now took the opportunity to get their revenge. On a fixed day they massacred Romans and Greeks indiscriminately. In Cyprus it is said they put 240,000 to death, in Cyrene 220,000, while in Alexandria their plan turned to their disadvantage and they were practically all killed. Trajan sent his best generals to the scenes of these riots, while he, learning of new trouble on the Danube front, set

out for home. It is very likely that Chosroes had a hand in all of these revolts. At any rate they saved him his kingdom. Trajan died in 117 in Cilicia while on his way home. Hadrian, his successor, surrendered the new eastern provinces, except upper Mesopotamia, to their own kings.

What contemporaries considered Trajan's outstanding acts we learn from the pictures of the arch at Beneventum, erected at the northern end of the great *Via Trajana*. Their view has proved to accord with the judgment of posterity. The conquest of Dacia and of Mesopotamia stand out of course, for military deeds appeal to the imagination, but the artist did not omit other deeds equally important if more difficult to represent. The panel representing the merchants of Ostia thanking the emperor for a new harbor is given a prominent position; not less so the charming group of children brought by their parents to thank him for the benefits derived from the alimenta. The artist has also pictured the recruiting of provincial youths in Rome's army, conceived of as a Romanizing process to be highly prized, and the bestowal of colonial lands to citizens. The illustrations of the arch emphasize the wide interests of a very capable administrator.

Hadrian, 117-138 A. D. P. Aelius Hadrianus, though an experienced general and governor, Trajan's own cousin and constant companion and married to Trajan's nearest relative, was not adopted until two days before Trajan's death. This hesitation may of course be due to Trajan's love of attention, but it is probably also an indication that Hadrian did not inspire complete confidence. He was too versatile, too many-sided in his interests, and somewhat too temperamental to seem a safe choice. The story is probably untrue that it was Trajan's competent wife, Plotina, who alone succeeded in having this man adopted, yet the story was believed, and that itself gives a hint of the man's character. There can be little doubt that he

would have received a larger vote of confidence from the women of the court than from the generals in the field. He was a trustworthy and prudent soldier, but he cared for military glory neither for himself nor for the empire. He loved pleasure without being a slave to his physical wants, for on his campaigns he gladly lived as a common soldier. He was fond of social gatherings, and yet, endowed with a very sensitive temperament, he was prone to give and take offense. His friendships were usually brief. He delighted in good literature, and to judge from the whimsical lines he uttered to his own fleeting spirit on his death-bed, he might have been Rome's most original poet. There is nothing else so strangely modern in Latin verse:

Animula vagula blandula
Hospes comesque corporis,
Quae nunc abibis in loca
Pallidula rigida nudula,
Nec ut soles dabis jocos.¹

What with his devotion to philosophy, to painting, to the early drama, to constant travel in ancient cities, to new experiments in architecture, he was a rather unusual choice for the throne of Augustus and Trajan. And one cannot forget that he trudged up to the top of Aetna, 10,000 feet, to see the sunrise! Yet the choice was justified. He lifted the great burden with ease and gave Rome an administration for twenty-one years that was surpassed in wisdom by few.

Hadrian had his cognomen from his far off forebears who had come from Hadria in Picenum. Several generations of the family however had lived in Italica in Spain, and his great-grandfather was the first of his line to win a

¹ "Lifeling, changeling, darling, the body's comrade and guest,
To what world now wilt betake thee—
Weakling, shivering, starveling—nor utter thy wonted jest?"

senator's seat at Rome—doubtless under Julius Caesar's liberal policy. His advancement through the many stages of the *cursus* and his high offices in the army were doubtless due to his cousin's presence on the throne. But for that he would doubtless have gone a different road. He was not popular with the senators, partly because he came to his succession while in the East and for obvious reasons had to ask for the army's acclamation before the Senate knew what was happening. Trajan had several great generals in the East, and any delay would have meant a division of the army into factions and consequent civil war. But a large part of his unpopularity was also due to his frank acceptance of Trajan's policy of administering Italy and senatorial provinces in almost complete disregard of Augustan traditions. He divided Italy into four judicial districts. He placed senators in charge to be sure, but the innovation not only interfered with the autonomy of Italian municipalities but also encroached on the domain of the Senate.

The very basis of his whole vast administrative reform centered around the idea that since senatorial government had failed, imperial civil service machinery must be built up adequate to the great task and dignified enough to be worthy of the empire. Obviously if this was to be done, the offices of this *cursus* must not be in the hands of mere household freedmen. He removed these completely from high office. On the other hand it was not easy to draw senators away from republican offices into imperial ones. Hence it is that he built up the new bureaus largely with the aid of *equites*, who were free from established prejudices. Perhaps he went tactlessly far at times, as when he placed Marcius Turbo, a knight, over all the Danube provinces. To be sure, he gave him the title of "Prefect of Egypt," because the Egyptian command was an equestrian office and carried military duties with it. But the Senate did not like to see a knight in command of an army. In the

gathering of the revenues also freedmen were avoided. The procurators came more and more to be *equites*, and there was added to the bureau a separate staff of *advocati fisci*—these also being knights—whose duty it was to bring in arrears in revenue and guard the interests of the treasury in court proceedings. We also hear now for the first time of a regular post-horse department (for state mail and state traveling) in charge of a knight, the *praefectus vehiculorum*. Heads of bureaus of this kind were continued in office during good service and were well paid—from 60,000 to 300,000 sesterces a year (at this time worth from two to ten thousand dollars). The highest paid were the ministers of state (who in Claudius' day had been freedmen); *a rationibus*, *ab epistulis*, *a libellis*, and a few others. The next in grade were the procurators or financial agents of the provinces, then several heads of bureaus that once belonged to the city aediles, e. g. *procuratores alimentorum*,—*aquarum*,—*bibliothecarum*. This system had of course been growing up slowly under the preceding emperors, but the organization bears particularly the mark of Hadrian's monarchical ideas. It was the existence of this well-organized group of administrative bureaus which made it possible for the imperial machinery to run moderately well through the third century when the executive division of the government was wracked by civil strife.

Hadrian's first military task was to deal with the Sarmatians, who, learning that Trajan had called some of the legions to the East, began to attack the new province of Dacia. Hadrian seems to have brought about peace without a war; in fact he was so eager to avoid bloodshed that he sent the enemy presents to vouch for his desire for a peaceful settlement. But he made a careful survey of the military situation, and set the army at work on a strong line of forts to protect the frontiers of Dacia and of lower Moesia which now extended beyond the lower Danube as far as Bessarabia. Before he returned he heard of a

serious conspiracy against him as well as of its suppression by the Senate. It was led by some of Trajan's best generals whose services Hadrian had not employed, especially the Moorish general, Lusius Quietus, who had been Trajan's chief cavalry officer in Dacia and Parthia, and Cornelius Palma, who had some years before conquered Arabia. It stands to reason that this military group had favored Trajan's expansionistic policy, and in turn grew suspicious of an emperor who at once surrendered all that they had gained in the East in three hard-fought campaigns. The Senate seems to have disposed of the four leaders without awaiting word from Hadrian. All four were executed. The severity was attributed to Hadrian by the populace, we are told, and was never quite forgiven.

The next eleven years Hadrian spent in extended tours from province to province with a view not only to establishing the frontier organization but also to encouraging the provincial cities everywhere to participate in promoting public work. He began at the Rhine frontier where he ordered the completion of the *limes* to the Danube. Along the whole *limes* he adopted a new policy in that he broke up the base forts, and sent the army in cohorts to the very wall to do guard duty. This was doubtless more effective for the time being, but it also immobilized the army and turned it into a stationary garrison. The consequences were not wholly satisfactory. In connection with this he made each legion its own recruiting agent, as a result of which the legions soon came to be made up of natives of the nearby regions. This of course facilitated the upkeep of the army and made service more attractive, but it disregarded the lesson that Vespasian drew from the revolt of Civilis; and the next century suffered from the nationalistic *esprit de corps* of the Illyrian and the Gallic armies. Next he went to Britain, where the ninth legion had recently suffered defeat. Here too he set a permanent boundary by building a wall about eight feet broad and twenty feet

high across the whole island from the Tyne to the Solway, parts of which are to be seen to-day. York henceforth became the northern garrison. This is one of the most definite indications that in Hadrian's opinion Rome need never again adopt an aggressive policy.

Proceeding across Spain and along the African coast he spent two years in the East. He visited Chosroes in the friendliest manner, sent back to him his daughter, whom Trajan had taken away as captive, and promised to return the golden throne of Parthia which was now one of the showpieces at Rome. This was a very unusual course for a Roman, but entirely in harmony with the answer he gave chauvinistic senators who complained about "hauling down the flag" in Mesopotamia. He pointed out that during the Republic the Senate had done the same thing in Macedonia at Cato's advice. There are times when Hadrian seems to be what modern diplomatists like to call an impractical idealist. Before returning home he visited a great number of the famous ancient cities, encouraged them to improve their public buildings as well as their finances, visited their theaters, their games, and their lectures, and encouraged their literary men. New buildings were begun everywhere, usually on popular subscriptions, to which Hadrian gave generous sums. Corinth received a new aqueduct with public baths, Smyrna a gymnasium, Ephesus a temple to Rome, Megara one to Apollo, and at Athens, in which he remained a long time, he completed the great temple to Zeus which Pisistratus had left uncompleted seven centuries before. He wished to recall to the Greeks their former greatness and to instill in them a pride and optimism that might if possible engender the spark of creation once more. Nothing enduring came of it, but one can only admire the enthusiasm that insisted upon trying. At any rate it was not his fault that the old Greek blood had been diluted by dulled mixtures that possessed no creative force.

Returning home in 126, he presently visited the province

of Africa, where the exhaustion of the soil was beginning to cause distress. The Roman settlers and the soldiers of the third legion had made Africa and Numidia blossom into a very productive country during the preceding century. The third legion, stationed by Augustus at Theveste, a hundred miles south of the coast, had built a city in the very desert. Trajan had moved the camp to Thamugadi (Timgad), somewhat to the west, to be nearer Mauretania. The impressive foundations of this camp-city with its splendid praetorium, its baths, temples, and library, are perhaps the best evidence of Rome's method of city-building that can be found. Hadrian now again moved the camp nearer Mauretania to Lambaesis, and its ruins to-day are only less remarkable than those of Timgad.

But what especially engaged the attention of Hadrian was the condition of the agricultural folk in this province, which had supplemented Sicily as the granary of Rome. The region had been settled by many Romans who had had to migrate in search of new homes when their lands were confiscated by the triumvirs. Owing to the fact that farming was not a success in Africa without expensive irrigation, rich landlords with ready capital soon got possession of vast tracts, employing the small farmers now as their tenants. And since Nero had proscribed many of these wealthy landlords and had brought their property into the fiscus, the state had great domains here. Under Vespasian and Trajan the procurators of the state would lease out these imperial domains to large contractors (*conductores*) who would sub-lease plots to peasants (*coloni*) on condition that they turn in as rental a percentage of the crop and also six days' labor per year on the domain lands which were not sub-leased. In Hadrian's day we find, from inscriptional records of tenants' grievances, that, since the thin soil was beginning to give out, the tenants were appealing to the state's agents for reductions in rent, for the privilege of taking up and replanting abandoned farms on

easy terms, and for exemption from the forced labor which the contractors were imposing over and above the six stipulated days. In fact it seems that the contractors had gradually been imposing a mild kind of serfdom on the tenants. The whole problem is particularly interesting because it shows how serfdom began on the state-domains of the empire. For the present Hadrian examined the situation and issued an edict rectifying the grievances, and this was inscribed in various copies and set up here and there on the domains for the protection of the *coloni*.

In the year 129, after a few months' rest at Rome, Hadrian set out upon a second long journey of four years, this time chiefly in the East. He visited numerous cities as before to show that he was eager to see how far his plans had been carried out. While in Syria he made the mistake of founding a colony on the site of Jerusalem. This act drove the Jews who still remained into a desperate revolt under the leadership of Bar Cochba, who claimed to be the Messiah. This guerrilla war continued for several years, and since the insurgents would neither come to terms nor surrender Judea was nearly depopulated. Hadrian left the conduct of the war to a *legatus* while he went to visit Egypt. There he extended his tour of inspection as far as Syene. It was in Egypt that Antinous died, a young Bithynian on whom he seems to have lavished a sentimental devotion. It was said that Antinous had heard of a strange prophecy that Hadrian was doomed to an early death unless a victim were found to sacrifice himself in the emperor's place, and that in consequence the young man drowned himself in the Nile. Hadrian, deeply touched by this act of devotion, proclaimed Antinous a deity and had his statue made in many replicas with the attributes of Dionysus. But this was a proof of mysticism that did not wholly please Rome. Hadrian returned by way of Athens where he dedicated in 132 the great temple of Zeus now nearing completion.

Of his last years, spent mostly in a sick bed, we hear little except that he built his mausoleum beyond the Tiber, the present Castel Sant' Angelo, and continued to add to his villa below Tibur, the ruins of which are still most impressive. It is probable, however, that some of his administrative reforms belong to this period. We have mentioned those of the civil service above. A reform in legal procedure is perhaps of greater importance. Preceding emperors had come more and more to assume judicial functions, and had often employed jurists to aid them in writing decisions. Hadrian now formed a permanent bench, a privy council, of *consilarii Augusti*, consisting of senators and knights well grounded in law. They were regularly appointed and received salaries. This change was extremely important, for hitherto the councillor was too frequently expected to be the emperor's spokesman who could find the right argument for him. Henceforth the council consisted of an independent body of responsible men who were expected to vote according to the dictates of logic and law. It may well be that a new emphasis upon humanitarian principles which enters Roman law at this time is due to the activity of this council. Slaves, for instance, were now given a standing in court, whereas they had hitherto been at the mercy of their masters, and it was also forbidden to sell slaves for immoral purposes. A digest of old praetors' edicts, the so-called perpetual edict, was also made by Julianus, one of the chief councillors, and this became law by enactment of the Senate.

As his successor, since he had no children, Hadrian chose for adoption a young man, L. Ceionius Commodus, of whom we know very little, and to whom of course he gave his own *nomen*, so that he was called L. Aelius Caesar. Aelius however soon died, leaving a son, L. Verus, only seven years old. Hadrian, therefore, chose again, this time selecting a senator of over fifty years of age, T. Aurelius Antoninus, who for his kindness to his adoptive

father came to be called Pius, and Antoninus in turn was asked to adopt his wife's nephew, the Marcus Aurelius of history, then an attractive young man of eighteen, as well as the boy Verus. The choice of Antoninus proved good, but it did not satisfy some senators who had imagined that they were in line. Especially embittered was Hadrian's brother-in-law, Servianus, who, though ninety years of age, hoped that because of his relationship and his long years of excellent service he might at least win the succession for his descendants if not for himself. Indeed a conspiracy seems to have been reported to the emperor, and Servianus as well as his grandson were put to death. This was an act of cruelty, due doubtless to a fevered temper, which only added fuel to all the resentment already felt in the Senate. Hadrian died in 138 after attempting suicide, thoroughly hated by the Senate. It was with difficulty that his successor saved his name from the treatment accorded that of Domitian.

T. Aelius Antoninus Pius, 138-161 A.D. Antoninus Pius was also a returning scion of those Roman colonists who had been planted in a healthier day in the provinces. His native town was Nemausus (Nîmes) in Southern France, which Augustus had founded with veterans in 16 B. C. It is probably to him that this beautiful city owes the amphitheater which is still in use there and the stately Pont-du-Gard north of the city which carried the aqueduct high over the deep river to serve the colony. Marcus Aurelius, who had the greatest admiration for his adoptive father and patterned himself after him, has at the beginning of his "Meditations" written very frankly if rather sentimentally of the man's qualities. Antoninus seems to have had the firmness of resolution, the industry and perseverance, the complete self-control and poise, that one expects from a Roman of the old school, but there was a gentleness, tenderness, and modesty that amounted almost to meekness, which typical Romans of the old Senate had

seldom displayed. It would be difficult to find in any modern ruler such a complete catalogue of the very virtues taught in the Gospels as Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius both manifested throughout their reigns. The best of paganism and of Christianity seems to be combined in their codes of daily conduct.

There are very few startling deeds to record during Pius' twenty-three years of ruling. The Brigantes in Britain rebelled but were quickly reduced (140 A. D.) by Lollius Urbicus, a legatus of ability, and the captives were brought to the Roman *limes* on the Neckar and employed in raising a new advanced line of forts against the Germans. In Britain a wall was built north of Hadrian's line at the narrowest point of the island. In the East the Alani were again checked when they attempted a raid across the Caucasus mountains, and the people of that far distant region above Armenia acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome voluntarily. Antoninus kept on good terms with the Parthians, as Hadrian had done, by friendly interchange of letters. Chauvinists assumed that this mild policy only strengthened the pride of the barbarians and made them all the more ready to attack Rome later, but of this there is no proof. The provincials were treated with every possible consideration, many cities receiving the Latin or the Roman status, and the tribute was considerably reduced, since by care and frugality Pius was able to show a respectable annual surplus in the treasury despite diminished exactions.

Perhaps the only evidence of any innovations of striking character is to be found in Roman law. The *Digest*, at least, cites many well-reasoned decisions from the days of Pius, and they are always based upon wholesome and liberal principles. Pius was himself no mean jurist and as such he chose for his *consilium* the foremost lawyers of the day. The innovation of Hadrian in founding a permanent privy council that was independent of bias was giving Roman law

an opportunity to go back to the great traditions of the Republic and to continue the structure on the basis of equity. Antoninus Pius died in 161, having long before secured the regular imperial powers for his adopted son, Marcus Aurelius. In fact he had given his daughter, Faustina the younger, to him in marriage instead of to Verus, as Hadrian had desired. At his death he made no mention of Verus, who had turned out to be a youth of bad habits and no power of industry, but Marcus Aurelius, desiring to be absolutely fair to the young man, at once betrothed him to his sister and asked the Senate to give the same powers to Verus as to himself. So long as Verus lived, therefore, there were two Augusti, and formally, at least, the executive power was for the first time in the Empire divided between two rulers.

Marcus Aurelius, 161-180 A. D. (Lucius Verus, 161-169). M. Aurelius Antoninus, the philosopher-king, was the scion of two families that had risen to great wealth by means of the brick industry. His mother, Domitia Lucilla, was the great-granddaughter of the Domitius Afer who had possessed almost a monopoly of the brick-kilns in the Neronian period of great building, while his father, Annius Verus, seems to have owned most of the yards that did not belong to Lucilla. The young man was, therefore, very wealthy in his own name when he came to power. There was but little of his fortune left at the end; he was too sensitive to the needs of his people to be able to retain any of it.

The philosopher is known to all the world through his "Meditations," a book of intimate jottings of an over-sensitive and morbidly self-critical soul. This book, lacking all the sturdy self-assurance of the Stoic philosophy, which it purports to teach, has made a very deep appeal to later generations imbued with the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount. And yet those subdued sentences

and phrases were apparently written during spare moments in the campaigns of a series of terrible wars.

Even before Aurelius came to power, the Parthians had broken into Armenia again. They quickly overwhelmed the Cappadocian and Syrian armies that came to stem the tide of invasion. Aurelius sent Verus to the East to superintend operations, perhaps to draw the young man out of his irresponsible career of pleasure at Rome. Verus only continued his dallying at Antioch, but fortunately Rome had tried officers to do the actual work. Statius Priscus came with strong forces from the Danube and cleared Armenia, while Avidius Cassius organized the Syrian army and invaded Parthia. He reëstablished Roman rule in upper Mesopotamia, and by taking Ctesiphon again compelled the Parthians to sue for peace. The work was hardly done however before it was announced that the Germans were invading Italy and the army must return home. The returning soldiers of Verus now brought home an infection that was worse than many wars, some plague of the Orient which quickly swept the whole empire. A full half of some cohorts fell sick and died. Rome suffered unspeakably; wagons were heaped with the dead that were drawn out to be burned. And all through Italy cities and villages were thinned down till there was a question of who should till the fields. It was a miserable beginning for a war of defense when all of Germany seemed to be overrunning the Danube.

What had happened in Germany we do not know, but it seems that the great folk movements which finally overwhelmed Italy, France, England, and Spain had begun. The Marcomanni and Quadi, the tribes nearest the Danube, were the chief offenders, pressed on by others from behind. But several of the tribes of the Sarmatians,¹ coming on from Russia, also took part, as did many of the German tribes

¹ Recent researches seem to indicate that the Sarmatians were of Iranian stock.

like the Vandals and Lombards that had hitherto lived in the far interior, and, to judge from the portraits and costumes pictured on the Aurelian column at Rome, even Slavic tribes, now for the first time disclosed to history. The front on the lower Danube held at first, but the Marcomanni and Quadi broke through from Bohemia and dashed on as far as the Adriatic. The Emperor took personal charge of the defense, and in 166 relieved Aquileia in time to save Italy. There was some heavy fighting in Pannonia during the winter, but by the spring of 167, the lands below the Danube were clear again, as was Dacia, which had been overrun as far as the mining region. But new tides of barbarians kept flooding over, and it was not till 170 that the Romans could take the offensive. They advanced across the river at Carnuntum, attacking the Quadi first in order to divide the Germans from the Sarmatians. Defeating the Quadi and compelling them to give up their booty and prisoners, the army struck eastward against the Lombards and the Sarmatians. Again the Marcomanni crossed the upper Danube, and Aurelius had to turn west. Aided by a second army led by the skilful Pertinax, later emperor, he cleared Raetia. The enemy was whipped at the crossing of the river and pursued deep into Bohemia. Numerous prisoners were taken and sent to Italy to work as subject tenants on land that had been depopulated by the plague. It might have been beneficial to all concerned had this original idea been carried much further. The subjection of the Sarmatians had now to be begun again, but they were overwhelmed by the Roman legions, who now advanced as far as the Vistula beyond the Carpathians.

At this point unfortunately the emperor was suddenly called off. Avidius Cassius, the governor of Syria, on receiving a false rumor that he was dead, had declared himself emperor, and so far committed himself and several provinces that he did not choose to withdraw when the

truth was learned. Cassius had in fact never been known for loyalty. Verus while in the East had reported his misbehavior to Marcus, suggesting his removal, but the latter had, with a lofty altruism hardly to be expected of a pagan, answered simply: "Cassius is a good soldier and his services are needed by the state. If he is a better man than my own children he has a right to the throne." But Cassius had struck at the wrong moment. Aurelius had to hurry from a very important task to put down the revolt. Cassius was, however, struck down by his own officers before Aurelius arrived. On his return journey, the emperor's wife, Faustina, to whom he was deeply devoted despite rumors of her infidelity, died. He asked the Senate to accord her divine honors, and in memory of her he set aside large sums in a trust-fund for the support of daughters of poor parents.. The beneficiaries were called *puellae Faustinianae*.

Aurelius returned to the Danube again in 178 to complete his work. But before going he had to come to the relief of the treasury which had been wholly depleted by the expenditures in the plague and in the war. A large part of his own fortune went at once and then he stripped the palace of all the objects of value that could be disposed of, much that his predecessors had left, and much also that his own wife had collected in the form of jewelry, tapestries, furniture, and works of art. The public sales in the Forum lasted for weeks.

Reaching the frontier he sent forces across to take and fortify important points, for he rightly felt that Bohemia could best be controlled as a province, and if Bohemia, then also the Sarmatian wedge between that and Dacia must be occupied. In fact he set out to add Marcomannia and Sarmatia as provinces to the empire. But before this was done he died at Vienna (Vindobona) in the spring of 180. His unworthy son Commodus abandoned both provinces

and hurried home to enjoy and abuse the power he so little deserved.

The humanitarian ideas evident everywhere in the legal and governmental reforms of Pius are also apparent in the acts of Aurelius, as we should expect from a reading of his book: encouragement of manumission, relief measures for the poor, relief of provincial debtors, enlargement of the scope of "equity" in legal procedure. It is characteristic of him and his day that the monument in honor of Faustina was not a great building but a charitable foundation which was to care for 5,000 children of the poor. But Aurelius had lived long enough at Rome to realize that the same liberalism could not be applied to the government, given the feeble Senate and subservient populace that Rome now had. Hence while he continued to recognize old constitutional forms in a correct manner, he actually centralized power and continued to build up the imperial bureaus. Although he dutifully attended all sessions of the Senate when at Rome, and went so far as to refer all important matters to it, he nevertheless chose to present all such matters in person so that in point of fact there was no debate and his "reference" amounted to an account of *faits accomplis*.

The imperial cursus was also built up, and graded titles were given to the *equites* who had charge of the bureaus; these were, in order: V. Em. (*vir eminentissimus*) the title of the praetorian prefect, V. P. (*vir perfectissimus*) the title of the great procurators of Rome, the "secretaries of state," and V. E. (*vir egregius*) that of other procurators. The senators were distinguished by the title V. C. (*vir clarissimus*). He was enough of a student of human nature to know the secret of securing consistent service in public office. The *curatores rei publicae* were continued as were the *juridici* of the four regions of Italy—though Pius had sacrificed the latter for a time to the resentment of the Senate. Finally he hoped to bind the

important office of the praetorian prefect more closely to the civil interests of the city and of the emperor by choosing eminent jurists rather than ready soldiers for this position. At his death he left a well organized governmental machinery which required for successful manipulation only a reasonable amount of common sense, of fair judgment in the choice of officials, and of loyal good-will toward the state. That Rome would in the future fail to find even those modest requirements in her rulers was hardly to be expected after the experience of the second century.

CHAPTER XXVII

ART AND GOVERNMENT IN THE SECOND CENTURY

Literature. In the period of the "good emperors" there was considerable literary activity but little poetry was produced worthy of attention. There is no dominant school, the mingled peoples that came from every corner of the empire are lost, as it were, in a confusion of tongues. Imperial Rome might have been a "melting pot" of the races, but the crude ores that went into it were largely low grade, and the fire beneath the pot too feeble to extract any precious metal. The gold was lost in the slag. Among the better classes, too, the dominant spirit was that of a pessimistic Stoicism which preached the doctrines of a practical education. Creative imagination, rarely found, had no market value.

One man of genius, *Cornelius Tacitus*, a senator and consul, devoted a large part of his life to history. In his first work, the *Dialogus*, written apparently in the reign of Domitian, he shows that he at least knew some of the causes of the intellectual decline. He knew that the fall of the Republic was a blow to independent mental activity, and also that the general demand for practical results in education was destructive of all artistic creation. His life of *Agricola*, his father-in-law, whose conquests in Britain have been mentioned, gives us a valuable review of the early history of that colony as well as a summary of Rome's provincial policies. His *Germania* was a hastily produced "war-pamphlet" issued when Trajan was completing the work of fortifying the Rhine frontier. It is an ethnological book of inestimable value for the history of primitive social

customs among European barbarians, though it must be admitted that the author pictured his barbarians in bright hues in order to use them as a contrast to decadent Rome. His *Historiae* gave the story of the Rome of his own day. Only a third of this work has survived. The loss of the part treating of the Flavian emperors has left us to the mercy of Suetonius, a far inferior writer. The last great work of Tacitus was the *Annales*, a full history of the Empire from the death of Augustus to that of Nero. More than half of this is also lost.

Like Livy, Tacitus desired to make his history a work of literary value, and like him again he tried to visualize the story, to compensate, as it were, for the lack of illustrations by effective pen sketching. He had, if possible, a deeper love of the Republic than Livy. As a senator in the days of Domitian when that republican body was being crushed by a tyrant, he wrote with intense hatred of tyranny. Indeed Tacitus himself had come very close to death at that time. This circumstance makes him a less well-balanced narrator of the past than Livy, and his burning hatred of every emperor who struck at the old constitutional forms renders him powerless to apply that calm impartiality which he honestly professes to strive for. The reader must, therefore, be on his guard, especially in the story of Tiberius, who seemed to Tacitus the first of a line of tyrants and therefore the most guilty of all; and care needs to be exercised all the more since few historians have had a literary gift comparable to that of Tacitus. The range of his style from studied simplicity to sublime magnificence, the masterful terseness and incisiveness of his narration, the power to bring out his characters with a few well-chosen strokes, his indelible pictures of political crises,—these are things that compel the reader to see the empire of the first century through the eyes of Tacitus. And it must be admitted that in the main effect his version is as true as history can be. He was careless

in recording military movements—in fact he had no patience with tactics—his estimate of minor personalities seems to betray hasty research, and his ethnology is not always first-hand or sound, but he knew Rome, he comprehended human nature, and he had the ability to picture what his mental eye saw. A dozen tomes accurately listing all the facts with strict fidelity to chronology would be no adequate substitute for Tacitus.

Pliny, the younger, C. Plinius Caecilius Secundus, a consul and friend of Tacitus, also deserves our gratitude for his volume of genial, commonplace and somewhat pedantic letters. These letters have not quite the value as historical documents that we accord those of Cicero, for Pliny wrote them with a view to publication, and as he was very sensitive to praise he made sure that they contained nothing that might not be considered *comme il faut* in the best circles. *Mutatis mutandis* they might have been written a hundred years ago by some sentimental country gentleman of England who prided himself most on the esteem of his tenantry, his verses in imitation of Pope, his gamebag, and his seat of honor at the Duke's table. Yet, pretentious as he is, Pliny has given a picture of an extensive society whose existence one would not suspect from the pages of Juvenal and Tacitus, a picture of a correct, but forceless and unoccupied Roman aristocracy whiling away its time harmlessly at literary recitals, charity, and dinners with the right people. The most important part of his volume is the tenth book containing his letters of inquiry to Trajan from the province of Bithynia and Trajan's masterly answers.

Juvenal (D. Junius Juvenalis), the satirist, was not a member of Pliny's correct circle, though of about the same age as Pliny. He seems to have been an unsuccessful lawyer who turned to soldiering for an occupation, and as tribune of a barbarian cohort saw service in Britain as well as in Egypt. Born at the small town of Aquinum, and

seeing much of a simple world in his provincial service, he could comprehend Rome in a way that the aristocratic Pliny could not, and what he saw aroused his indignation. His scorn for the pretentious futility of the court circles and the unconscionable wantonness of unoccupied and bored society women is as bitter as for the motley rabble on the streets that could not even understand Latin, and the business men who drew their income from illicit gain. There are sixteen of these gruesome satires. The best known are doubtless the third, paraphrased in Dr. Johnson's "London," and the tenth, adequately reproduced in his "Vanity of Human Wishes." As an antidote to Juvenal one must read Pliny; for a true picture of the capital a composite of the two would probably suffice.

C. Suetonius Tranquillus (about 75-160) was a polymath whose works hardly belong to literature. His "Lives of the Caesars" down to Domitian, the only work of his that has survived, has much that is of interest to historians. Suetonius seems to be more impartial than Tacitus, partly because he has no fixed point of view and gathers his material from all sources. In fact he lacks either the ability or the desire to compose consistent characterizations, yielding rather to the easier task of heaping up facts and anecdotes; and his work is vitiated by that deep interest in mysteries and superstitions which had now begun to spread over the Roman world from the East. The great value of his work lies chiefly in the fact that as Hadrian's secretary he used the imperial archives, at times preserving materials accessible to no other historian.

M. Cornelius Fronto has left us some of the letters he wrote to his former pupil, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. They interest us chiefly by showing how the Latin language of the day was losing its native vigor and returning imitatively to a pretended likeness to that of Cato. This "elocutio novella," as it was called, reminds us not a little of a certain immigrant English that appears in cheap metro-

politan magazines at times. The basis was an artificial Latin acquired in school reading, Catonian, Ciceronian, and Vergilian. Into this went a condiment of recent colloquial expressions, while the imagery was apt to be floridly Oriental. It is precisely what one would expect of an African like Fronto whose native language was probably Carthaginian, and who had been brought up in the provincial schools where the republican authors were still in vogue. That such a style could impose itself on Rome as a commendable kind of Latin proves how many there were who had not acquired the real native savor of the language from Roman parents.

Apuleius is a more interesting African who, though like Fronto he put away his native tongue for the best "new Latin" available, refused to shape his imagination into an orthodox Roman mold. Besides several books of indifferent lectures, orations, and dialogues,—for he was also a lawyer and teacher—he left a very delightful story-book called the *Metamorphoses*, recounting the adventures of a man who had by magic been turned into an ass. Several of the stories that occur in the course of the narrative have been retold by Boccaccio and others, and the best one, that of "Cupid and Psyche," has entered the stock of tales known to everyone. *Apuleius'* style is a conglomeration of Latin acquired in the correct school books and that which he found on the streets, the whole colored by native idioms not forgotten, and by an un-Roman exuberance of phrase. He sometimes rises to imaginative heights, at times he shocks us by crudities of taste and expression, but he is at least always entertaining.

This is not the place to speak fully of the many Greeks who were now writing, though it must be said that by this time practically all of them came into direct contact with things Roman, and many of them owed their inspiration to Roman themes or Roman patronage. *Plutarch*, for instance, though he lived most of his life in Greece, received

the honors of a consul from Trajan. And his enjoyable "Parallel Lives" deal as fully with Roman statesmen as with Greek. He could read Latin and frequently used Roman sources. It has long been recognized, however, that he concerned himself little as to whether his portraits were very accurate, provided only they served the purpose of "boys' books" in being readable and in providing a "moral." Even *Lucian*, the one literary genius of the second century, ended his days at a Roman civil service desk. This Asiatic of Samosata, whose witty dialogues are to Juvenal's satires what a Damascus sword is to a bludgeon, proves by his trim Attic speech that the Greek world, like the Latin, had lost itself, and had to go back to a preceding age to find its language.

The strangest phenomenon in all the literature of this day however is the book of the emperor *Marcus Aurelius*, the scion of wealthy business men who wrote his philosophic meditations in a facile scholastic Greek. It was the book of the slave Epictetus, who had to flee from Rome in Domitian's reign, that inspired him; and the crushed spirit of the meek and pessimistic drudge seems nowhere so out of place as in the palace of the Roman emperor. It would seem that when the Romans had subdued the world—*debellare superbos*, Vergil called it—and destroyed the spirit of independence and taught the subdued the beatitudes of humility, the world of subject-races with the code of subjects had taken its revenge, flooded even the metropolis, and now at last forced upon the rulers themselves the acceptance of its gospel.

Art. In the art of this period there is perhaps more originality than in the literature since the imperial conquerors provided many great deeds to be illustrated in new ways and gave extensive commissions to sculptors and architects. We have mentioned the great column of Trajan on which the sculptors had the wholly new experiment to work out of telling the story of a picturesque war in the

form of a winding scroll. It was a very bold conception, and had to be executed in such a way that it could hardly fail to jar upon the taste of Romans fond of realism. Space and time must both be put into subjection, and picture must merge into picture progressively to suit the extended frame and hide the suppression of space. The artists were, to be sure, still unable to solve the problems of perspective, but many difficulties were successfully overcome. The eye is constantly guided from incident to incident by the unifying figure of the recurring emperor, variety is attained by the employment of every kind of incident, and a sense of actuality by attention to the minutiae of Dacian and Roman landscape, portraiture, and costume. The "continuous" style invented for the decoration of Trajan's buildings left its influence for many hundreds of years.

On Trajan's arch at Beneventum, to which we have also referred, the more conventional style suited to separate panels occurs again. But here too there is an admirable facility shown in seizing what is most typical and characteristic in the emperor's career, and in embodying the spirit of his reign in simply composed and impressive scenes.

In the days of Hadrian, the great traveller, there were fewer attempts to try new problems. Hadrian was a man of catholic tastes and few prejudices. His sprawling villa below Tivoli, with its suggestions borrowed from every corner of the Greek East, shows how he preferred to gather artistic reminders of things his memory liked to dwell on. And it is likely that in his travels he also sought out artists wherever he found pleasing work done, brought them to Rome and gave them commissions. His period therefore, though it has left much good work, is not dominated by any artistic accomplishment of outstanding originality.

The most striking work of art in the days of Marcus Aurelius is a column illustrating the Marcomannic war, a shaft which like Trajan's is a hundred feet high, and still standing in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. It is of course

done in the same continuous style, and the actual workmanship is hardly inferior. The interest is not so well sustained, however, since only isolated pictures could be taken out of the emperor's eight years of campaigning, and these seem to be employed without regard to their chronological position, perhaps in order to obtain greater effects of contrast. One feels also that a pictured roll, pertinent enough when set up by Trajan between his two libraries, need not have been repeated in the Campus Martius, where after all it must have been rather bewildering. The individual scenes are, however, appealing. Marcus Aurelius doubtless had a share in choosing many of them and in suggesting various details, for there is here less of the joy in battle than in Trajan's column and not a few suggestions of the unsmiling Stoic fate which so pathetically peers out of every page of the *Meditations*.

Religion. Had Scipio returned to Rome in the days of Marcus Aurelius he would not have felt at home. Nor would the magnificence of the city have compensated for the strange-looking people on the streets, the jargon of tongues they spoke, the lion-hunts, and gladiatorial shows in the Colosseum, and, we may add, the servile Senate. But what would have astonished him most would doubtless have been the weird and noisy processions of the worshippers of Isis, the blood offerings of devotees of Magna Mater seeking life eternal, the mystical congregations of Mithraic initiates performing incomprehensible antics in underground churches. He may have seen such things in Asia in his war with Antiochus but he could hardly have supposed that Rome would ever be overwhelmed by this strange baggage.

Why it is that Europe has never created a great religion while Asia has provided the religions of Zoroaster and Buddha, of the Jews and Christians, of Mithras, Mohammed and all the rest, has long been discussed. When the Roman proconsuls went out to their eastern provinces

they were struck particularly by the fact that the provincials were intensely in earnest about the mysteries of religion. Whatever might be the name of the strange deities, the devotees generally believed in a life after death and made it a very important part of their daily routine to secure admission to that on the best terms possible. They seemed never to feel a consciousness of sin or at least of physical impurity before a deity, and an eagerness to cleanse away the stain so as to be fitted for communion with the deity. They interested themselves in rites of purification, in fasting, in bodily torment, in initiations and sacraments which they had learned to consider efficacious. They looked in general upon this world as unhappy, the woes of which could be compensated for by joys in a life beyond. They rejected the validity of reason with reference to religious questions and insisted that the intellect must subject itself to an act of faith, a complete unquestioning surrender to revealed authority. The old Romans of Cicero's day could not comprehend such things; occasionally they played curiously with the rites of the Eleusinian mysteries because these were old and "Greek," but that was all. Their attitude was in general that which we may call European. They found this life satisfactory and reasonable and evinced no particular longing for another; men did best to follow Nature, indeed man's natural inclinations were not full of sin and taint, they needed only the reasonable control of the intellect. And as for accepting faith as a guide, nothing seemed more stupid to the Romans, since man had the guidance of reason as his proudest faculty.

This difference of attitude was perhaps the result of a real physical and mental difference between the Romans and most of the Asiatics. It has been suggested that the semi-arid and unreliable country of western Asia made for the survival of a nervous and apprehensive temperament, and that the continued failure of democracy to establish itself and the inevitability of autocratic governments in

that region are but other phases of the same condition. Be that as it may, Arabs and Syrians, Cappadocians, Jews, and Armenians seem to have differed but little in their religious attitude. Even the Etruscans who had come to Italy from Asia had carried with them the same religious "fussiness," as the Romans called it, and had imposed it to some extent on the Roman ritual when they ruled Rome. But Republican Rome had done much to confine the ritual to a cold and formal cult, the interest in which dwindled more and more among the people as the Etruscan element in Italy diminished. In the Empire, however, when, as Juvenal puts it, the waters of the Orontes (in Syria) flowed into the Tiber, they carried a burden of Oriental folk into the West, and these people brought with them their own rites.

Mithraic worshipers had first come to Rome as prisoners of war captured by Lucullus and Pompey in the wars with Mithradates and the Cilician pirates. These slaves of course had little influence and were too poor to build chapels for themselves. Their coming affected Roman cults but little at first. It must be remembered, however, that even if they forgot their rites temporarily, their children, who rose to better conditions, provided a receptive soil for the seeds of the mystical cults that were later imported. Then Augustus, Tiberius, Corbulo, Vespasian, and Trajan brought new hordes of captives and when the descendants of these rose in the social scale they carried their religions to respectability with themselves. Their churches sprang up everywhere, supported frequently by wealthy Oriental traders who established branch offices at Rome and at the Italian seaport towns. Finally the soldiers who were being constantly recruited in the East, beginning with the levies of Pompey, Brutus and Cassius, brought with them their own cults. These soldiers not only served in all the Western provinces, especially during the fifty years after Vespasian's army reforms, but they

were ultimately discharged as Roman citizens and settled in various parts of the empire as well as at Rome. Excavations have revealed more than sixty centers of Mithraic worship at Rome alone and seven in the small seaport town of Ostia, and there is hardly a large city anywhere in the empire or any important military camp in Britain, Gaul, Spain or on the Danube line where dedicatory inscriptions to Mithras are not found.

This religion was of the usual Oriental type though somewhat cleaner of dross than most of them. It had grown out of Zoroastrianism by the aid of Chaldean mysticism and astrology. Mithras was the light-god who helped men in their struggle to escape the fiend of darkness, Ahriman, and to reach Ahura Mazda, the power of light. The worshipers were members of congregations who aided each other in times of difficulty, and they worshiped regularly in their underground chapels with prayer and an elaborate ritual. These congregations possessed all the fascination of secret societies, conferring seven degrees of initiation which involved fasting, ablutions, and the memorizing of secret chants and watchwords which were designed to aid the souls of the initiates after death past the evil demons to the highest stars of heaven. The aid of Mithras was thought to be personal and ever present, the rites provided relief from bodily taint, the promise of eternal happiness was certain, and here and there at least the devotees also prayed for moral purification.

It is not surprising that the Orientals who had known this faith clung to it persistently. It is certain also that it obtained many new converts in the West, though it is not so certain that men of real Occidental stock accepted it to any extent. When later we find senators bringing offerings to Mithras we may generally conclude that they had descended from Oriental ancestors who had long before gained citizenship and risen to wealth and dignity through a successful business career; and the emperors who paid

respect to Mithras did so usually because they considered it wise for political reasons to show a formal sympathy with cults that were accepted by a large part of the people and of the army. It has often been said that Mithraism was once a strong rival of Christianity and might conceivably have become the religion of Europe. This is not quite correct. Its vast extension westward is in general an evidence simply of the wide extension of Orientals in the West. When Oriental cohorts ceased to serve on the western frontier the cult died out in the western camps. It survived longest at Rome because Rome was so thoroughly flooded with men of Oriental blood.

Mithraism was perhaps the most successful of the mystery religions but there were many others carried through Roman territory in the same way. The ancient religion of Isis, which was inspired by the belief that Isis had restored Osiris to life and therefore could give immortality to all devotees, thrived wherever Alexandrian slaves and merchants went. The processions of Isis in which the story of the resurrection of Osiris was portrayed were so impressive, the use of hypnotism and of all the arts of spiritualistic mediums so cunning that not a few Occidentals were caught. This religion like that of Mithras offered an escape from the sense of guilt, communion with deity, sympathetic fellowship, and immortality, and it spread beyond the colonies of Egyptians particularly among the poor and ignorant.

The worship of Magna Mater also took on new life during the Empire. The cult that had first been brought to Rome in the second Punic War for patriotic reasons had as we have remarked been locked in on the Palatine as soon as the Senate discovered what an amazing thing they had imported. But in the Empire when Rome had thousands of citizens from the Anatolian plateau, the home of the religion, Magna Mater had to be let out; and now the devotees that had recently come from the East added

to the Palatine cult many crude practices that had never been seen at Rome before. The most remarkable of these was the *taurobolium* (the slaying of the bull) and the cleansing of sin in its blood. The ablution was actually performed. The bull was killed above a cavern where the convert stood so that its blood gushed down over the penitent sinner. At some places this ablution was supposed to afford purification for twenty years, at others the convert was said to be *renatus in aeternum*—reborn for everlasting life.

Other deities of the same kind brought in by slaves, recruits, and sailors from their native countries, were the Dea Syria (Artagatis) of Northern Syria, Ma-Bellona of Cappadocia, the Baal of Heliopolis (Baalbek), identified by his worshipers with Jupiter, and therefore called Jupiter Optimus Maximus Heliopolitanus, the Baal of Beyrut, and a score of others. Finally it must not be forgotten that Jewish synagogues were numerous. Pompey had taken many captives in his campaign in 64 B. C. and others had been brought from time to time from other captured cities of the East where Jewish settlements were found. There were 4000 freedmen of this race sent from Rome to Sardinia to do guard duty by Claudius. Moreover the capture of Jerusalem brought a hundred thousand Jews to Rome to be sold and many others came to the metropolis of their own free will to trade after their government was destroyed, for it must be observed that Rome, though she destroyed the Jewish state, never attempted to destroy the religion.

Such then were the religions which were most popular at Rome in the days of Marcus Aurelius. That their influx is concomitant with a thorough-going change in the spirit of Rome is not surprising. The peoples bringing these cults were absolutely incapable by temperament of understanding the calm and rational attitude of Caesar and Cicero towards the problems of life, government, and phi-

losophy. To them democratic independence was incomprehensible, and a state cult in which the individual had no personal contact with the deity seemed ludicrous. A patriotism which assumed that the civil institutions of the state were worth fighting for made no appeal to them. Glory and honor attained in the service of the state were to them quite futile. They had rather been brought up to humble obedience, to self-suppression, to a life of hardship from which a personal god gave his devotees some relief during their lifetime and more after death. Their code was to endure what had to be, to help each other as much as possible, to serve God in every way that the rules required. Rome became more and more saturated with such opinions and no class could quite escape them. The generous giving of gifts, the increasing manumission of slaves and the grant of legal privileges to them, the decreased stress upon military glory, the remission of taxes to provincials, and the relaxation of discipline in the army, are in part a recognition of the spirit of a non-Roman population. And to the same source we must credit the emergence of the medieval mysticism and superstition, the relaxing of rigid thought, the ready yielding to faith and intuitions, the suppression of reason, and the helpless acceptance of destiny that began to make itself felt in the writings of this period. Even the Occidentals—though there are not many left at Rome—breathe in the miasma. Thought is out of fashion, and so is vigorous endeavor and investigation; impressive ceremony, oracular rant, and emotionalism hold sway. The medieval attitude towards life and the darkening of the intellectual light are not far off.

Christianity also was now making rapid progress all through the West. In a sense this was an Oriental religion also, but any attempt to classify it with them would only obscure its essential points. This is not the place to describe or estimate its value, but it is necessary to consider from the point of view of a rationalistic Roman what it had

to appeal to him, and what induced him to accept a religion so utterly at variance with his mode of thought. It did not reach Romans in the form in which Jesus presented it. Probably Romans in their pride of position in the days of Tiberius would not have felt the need of a doctrine that taught the fatherhood of a loving God, personal communion with Him, the rightness of forgiving one's enemies, meekness, and non-resistance. They were hardly ready for that. The doctrine was first brought, however, not to Romans but to Jewish slaves and freedmen of the West, and it laid stress upon doctrines that interested Jews rather than Romans. For Paul preached that Jesus was their Messiah, that he had died to atone for their sins, that he had risen from the grave to rule forever. These doctrines were presented with scriptural evidence drawn from their prophets, and the written testimony of personal followers of Jesus; and since there were Jewish groups everywhere that accepted the proofs offered, a nucleus of worshipers soon formed in all the large cities of the Empire. Then since both the Jewish and the Christian religions demanded proselyting and the acceptance of the one religion as the only condition of salvation—no other Oriental religion did that—a strong compulsion was supplied that spread the doctrines among other slaves and freedmen.

From the point of view of other Oriental religions this new faith as preached by Paul had all that any of them offered, and much besides. It offered a personal communion with the deity, a cleansing from all sin, an assurance of immortality. It recognized sacrifice, which in this case had been performed for all, it offered devotees communion in worship with their fellows, and the ritual was clean and simple, for a symbolic baptism in water and participation in the eucharist sufficed. Thus a poor Syrian or Armenian slave may have reasoned to himself as he worked by the side of some zealous Christian enthusiast who pleaded and argued with him. Doubtless he was also told that Mithras

was a mythical being of whom there was no record, whereas the Messiah had been foretold in old prophecies that were accessible and the records of his miraculous life could be bought for a few sesterces. But what may have appealed most was the remarkable effect of the religion on those who adopted it, the kindness and generosity, the truthfulness and purity of life, that contrasted so favorably with the behavior of devotees of other cults. Here was a religion that appealed to the deep-lying springs of altruism. It was hard to resist for those Orientals who had no reason to question the respectability of the source and who were already accustomed to the phrases and the mystical ideas of the East, and at this time these were more than a majority at Rome.

But among the native Romans who still associated Christianity with a despised province and with un-Roman forms of thought, it made but little progress in the first century. It entered senatorial households gradually, partly by way of the Christian nurses who had the children of such families in their care all day long, partly through the rise of lowly families into high position, partly through the fact that Oriental teachers who adopted it began to sever it from Judaism entirely and to put it into terms of transcendental Greek philosophy which seemed quite respectable in senatorial circles. Thus it came about that such men as Domitian's cousin, Clemens, and the senator Acilius had, as it seems, accepted Christianity before the end of the first century.

We have remarked above that the persecution of the Christians by Nero was an accident due to Nero's whimsical tyranny, but that it bore evil consequences in producing the decree that Christians were dangerous to the state. The principle accordingly seems to have been adopted by Domitian that the confession of being a Christian was enough to cause the imposition of the death penalty, and at that time also the emperor's statue was used as a con-

venient method of proving the charge. Perhaps Domitian, who insisted so fanatically upon respect for his godhead, based his decree of persecution partly on the Christians' refusal to worship him. If so, he seems to be the only emperor before Commodus who persecuted for purely religious reasons. Later emperors seem to have applied police force to suppress a sect which the records proved to be inimical to the state. Any general effort to suppress Christianity we do not find thereafter till the time of Marcus Aurelius, though provincial governors were at liberty to act on the Roman court decrees of Nero's day if they wished. In one of his most interesting letters to Trajan, Pliny asks how he should treat this sect which had very many adherents in Bithynia. His letter shows that persecutions had been instituted, especially by merchants who dealt in sacrificial victims and had lost money by the spread of Christianity. Trajan answers that the old decree must be observed if genuine proof is brought, but that the governor should not seek them out nor pay any attention to anonymous charges and that he should accept a reliable denial. When we recall that a false charge made a prosecutor liable to conviction for *calumnia* we realize that this rescript must practically have stopped persecution, for it was soon made generally known by Pliny's publication of it. Persecution of a more extensive kind was, however, encouraged by Marcus Aurelius who himself went so far in exemplifying the Christian virtues. What induced his action we do not know. Perhaps in his extensive recruiting he found the pacific sect recalcitrant, and he was thus convinced that the name actually covered treasonable conspiracy. At any rate he was ready to do what he considered his duty to the state, be it ever so distasteful. By his day, however, the church was well organized and it had many able defenders, especially among Greeks and Orientals, who took the occasion provided by the emperor to call attention to the high worth of the Christian doc-

trines. Hence the church gained tenfold by the losses caused by the persecution.

The condition of the empire. The period of the "good emperors" and especially of the Antonines was, except for the plague, one of apparent prosperity, good government and general satisfaction. Aristides speaking for the Greeks says, though with some exaggeration, that within the empire strife had disappeared and cities now vied with one another only in their splendor and their pleasures, that they were all crowded with porticoes, gymnasia, temples, and schools; that travellers might go from one end of the empire to the other in safety even through deserts and mountains. "The whole world is a paradise." Even the Christian apologists, who criticized the popular antagonism toward their sect, were free to praise the benefactions of the emperors in maintaining universal peace and safety. Bryce¹ has pointed out that in many parts of Europe the Roman roads built at this time continued even in the eighteenth century to be the chief avenues of travel, and that Southern Europe seems to have enjoyed better order under Hadrian and the Antonines than was enjoyed again until nearly our own time. Cities were in a flourishing condition in all parts of the empire. We are told that the province of Asia had 500 prosperous cities which more than rivalled the splendor of Ionia before the Persian conquest. Egypt is credited with forty large cities. Even the *agri decumates* beyond the Rhine would seem from excavations to have had some 160 thriving communities. More than 120 towns were organized in Dacia beyond the Danube. In Africa, where Marius on his nine days' march from Lares to Capsa had found nothing but sands and serpents, and where to-day the road leads through parched deserts, large cities had sprung up everywhere: Thysdrus must have had 40,000 inhabitants, Thelepte 50,000, Sufetula 25,000 and Cillium 12,000. Such were the miracles of

¹ "The Roman and the British Empires," 1914, p. 20 ff.

peace, good government and careful methods of agriculture. Roman citizenship was now enjoyed by almost all the people of Spain, a large portion of Gaul, many cities of the Danube provinces, in Greece and in the East.

The taxes were reasonable. While the state drew revenue from state-owned mines and rented crown-lands, from Egyptian factories and a monopoly on salt, from moderate port dues, usually of from two to five per cent *ad valorem*, a four per cent on the sale of slaves, five per cent on the price of manumitted slaves and a general sales tax of one per cent, the ordinary provincial had to pay only the equivalent of about ten per cent on the value of his annual produce. What farmer in America to-day would not quickly compound his federal, state, and county taxes for a tithe of his crop? The provincial tax also was now being collected honestly. Recent emperors had been very careful in appointing honest procurators, and treated no criminal more severely than the man who attempted to rob provincials. In return for peace and absolute security the price was small. The Roman empire seems to have justified itself completely in the eyes of friends and enemies alike. It is not surprising that peoples beyond the Caspian sea sent envoys to Rome begging the emperor to take them under his beneficent protection.

A closer examination of municipal life in Italy and abroad gives the same general impression, but it will also reveal some of the symptoms of lurking disease. Rome had of course always made much of local autonomy; that in fact had been one of the chief factors in her early success. Even the changes in the city government of the metropolis had little effect on the form of other cities. Though the assemblies at Rome had long ago been suppressed they were still functioning in the other cities. In many Greek cities popular assemblies were actually still passing the city ordinances. In Italy the semi-aristocratic form of municipal government survived as it had even in the late Republic

when Rome for a time became a pure democracy. The usual form in Italy provided that the populace elect the annual board of four magistrates (*quattuorviri*), including two executives with judicial power (*duumviri jure dicundo*) and two administrative magistrates (*duumviri aedilicia potestate*) who looked after streets, police, etc. The *curia*, consisting usually of a hundred members (*decuriones*) was the city council which passed local ordinances. This body was made up of all men who had held the aforesaid annual magistracies, and if the number did not suffice, the higher magistrates of every *quinquennium* (called *quinquennales* during that year) filled up the body from among the most respectable citizens. The city governments required no taxation, for two reasons. In the first place every city seems at its foundation to have set aside a portion of its lands as city property, the rental of which was intended to bear the running expenses. Secondly, the running expenses were light. It was still possible in the municipalities to depend upon the deeply ingrained republican feeling that a gentleman's business was public service, and that the greatest rewards of life came from public esteem. Hence there was no thought of paying salaries to the *quattuorviri* or to the *decuriones*. In fact numerous candidates for these honorable offices not only offered themselves, but the wealthy invited popularity, and consequent reelection, by liberal gifts of public buildings. At Pompeii, for instance, we find that the two theaters, a bath, and several of the temples, had been given to the city by such men. In return for gifts, the *decuriones* would of course inscribe a laudatory tablet or erect a statue to the benefactor. In this way most cities of Italy had their magistrates without salaries, even when Hadrian was paying large salaries for all his civil service officials at Rome; and they also received gratuitously their theaters, temples, baths, and frequently even public schools and charitable

foundations, at times with endowment to pay for their upkeep.

The system worked with laudable success, though we may suspect that one reason why Trajan and later emperors appointed *juridici* to intervene in the local governments of Italian cities was that unfit men were sometimes elected because of their benefactions. Yet who shall say that the populace would have elected better men had the modern salary-system existed and ward-bosses in search of salaries contended for the offices? A more serious criticism of the system we shall meet presently. We shall find that these wealthy men, usually large plantation owners, suffered financial losses when the civil wars came on, and when for various reasons the productivity of their lands gave out. Then there were fewer good candidates ready to serve for honor and to face the expectation of giving gifts to the city. We shall also see that such men preferred to enter the civil service at Rome where salaries were paid. Then the municipalities suffered for want of good magistrates, and the government had to compel men to carry the burden of office. There were already signs in some cities that such a condition was near at hand. Within a century the situation became distressing.

Economics. The general economic situation of the empire was not nearly as healthy as it may have seemed to the casual observer. The cities everywhere were accumulating many beautiful show places given by the wealthier citizens, but there is reason to think that the quarters where the poor lived were deteriorating markedly. Wealth was too unevenly distributed; and the portion reduced to poverty was inordinately large. Sicily as we have seen had worn herself out in cereal culture before the day of Augustus and had not yet recovered. Africa, which under the scientific methods of the Roman immigrants sprang into prominence as the granary of Rome, had too thin a soil to endure intensive culture very long. When the top soil gave out

there was only sand beneath, and Africa had already begun to raise signals of distress. Egypt was now coming into her turn as a corn-province, and Egypt could stand the strain fairly well since the Nile waters fertilized the soil every year, but Egypt had a large population of Hamitic state-serfs. The province was a great economic resource, but that was all. Her people could never become the dependable citizens that Rome needed. The Eastern provinces were on the whole economically self-sufficing and a little more than that. In fact Romans still owned large tracts of land there—not very fertile—from which they drew some annual income. Asiatics and Syrians made considerable wealth from commerce—they were still the most successful traders on the Mediterranean. They also directed some of the caravan trade with India, Arabia, and the Chinese. This produced much wealth. And some of them had factories, especially in various grades of fine cloth, in glass-ware and jewelry, in ointments and in furniture. We hear of some very wealthy nabobs in the East who gave luxurious buildings to their native towns. But apart from this, the thrifty people of the parched country kept up home industries in a wholesome fashion. The women were apt at embroidery, at tapestry-weaving, and at rug-making and the proceeds supplied the pantry, for these goods brought high prices in the western cities. The East, therefore, though the lands were poor and were largely held by absentee landlords, was prospering, perhaps more than ever before. And yet the East proved to be an expensive part of the empire. The populace could never be relied upon for support in any crisis. It never supplied its fair quota of troops for the frontier, since it lacked fighting quality. Even its own borders had usually to be defended by Gauls, Germans, and Dacians in times of invasion. Its trade and manufactured articles drew heavily on the currency of Rome, and competed at such a low cost as to discourage western industry and trade; and finally its people were tem-

peramentally and religiously so different from the Romans that when brought to the West they weakened rather than strengthened Rome.

In the eastern provinces of Europe there was much mountainous country where the barbaric shepherd folk lived their old lives (as they do in Albania and Dalmatia to-day) without much regard for who was overlord. In the Danube valley and in Dacia, to be sure, cities were springing up and accepting the civilization of Italy. But the folk movements were soon to come on when these were to have little time for anything but defending themselves. Meanwhile these cities lived of course upon the agriculture of the region.

In Gaul the southern part was thoroughly Romanized. The land was still productive and home industries, especially in pottery, were competing more than successfully with those of Italy. In central Gaul—Lugdunensis—citizenship had been conferred upon several towns, but the Celts generally preferred to dwell on their farms, and their local governments were still usually tribal rather than municipal. Under such conditions thorough-going Romanization was slow. Gaul was, however, a bulwark of strength in every way to Rome. Her cohorts were among the most dependable in Rome's armies, her citizens law-abiding though still clannish, and the resources of her rich lands generous enough to supply Rome with a large tribute and still keep her own people in prosperity. But for Gallic men and resources the story of Rome after 200 A.D. would have been much abbreviated.

We come then to Italy where we found in Augustus' day a wide distribution of small lots of land to soldiers, a temporary improvement of cereal culture at the time when little foreign grain was imported, and a rather vigorous industry at least in the region of Campania and in the north. During the Empire Italy generally shows regression along all economic lines. As the East secured peace, and the

Spaniards and Gauls were Romanized these provinces developed industries of their own and rather competed with than aided those of Italy. And as Africa and Egypt developed more and more into grain-raising countries the exhausted Italian lands found it more difficult to market grain profitably. There was a tendency, therefore, to fall back again upon grazing and vine culture more than in the days of Augustus. Internal changes are also noticeable. As there had been no new distribution of allotments for two hundred years, there was nothing to prevent the operation of the economic tendency—always so noticeable at Rome—of the small farmer giving up the struggle before the great landlords. To be sure many small farmers still persisted, but the drift was decidedly back to the *latifundia*, and those generous and much lauded municipal officials whose names are so much in evidence on the bases of statues at this time were mostly rich landlords. We must also keep in mind the fact that cruel emperors like Nero had proscribed many senators and rich knights and had turned their lands into imperial estates. There were vast estates of this kind all over Italy.

Another change now noticeable is that large estates are more and more leased to renters (*coloni*) rather than worked by slaves. Not that the slaves were necessarily dismissed. They were often turned directly into renters of small plots, often set free for the purpose, though not necessarily so. At any rate the landlord would rid himself of the cares of personal supervision by cutting up his estate into small lots, distributing some of them to his slaves and freedmen and some to citizen tenants, receiving from them a fixed annual rental in kind. What hurried on the tenantry system was doubtless the constant rise in the price of slaves, due to a growing scarcity after peace was generally established through the world. This system did not improve the economic conditions of Italy. The old Romans had been skilful farmers and had taken great pains

to keep their farms in condition by rotating crops, by using manure, leguminous plants and clover, and by occasional grazing. Tenants are notoriously careless about the condition of the land. They neither have the money to put into the land nor the concern for its future worth. When we find that at the end of the second century there were many abandoned farms in Italy we may be sure that this was due not only to the awful plague that raged during the last ten years of Aurelius' reign but also to the bad farming methods practised under the widespread tenantry system, both on the imperial estates and on private farms. Italy, then, was not by any means in a healthy economic condition, despite the apparent accumulation of handsome buildings in most of her cities. We shall see that in the next century her tenants gradually fell into serfdom.

In concluding this brief survey, we may ask whether the Roman empire had actually justified its imposition of a world-wide rule. The pampered rabble of Rome, if asked the question, would readily have answered in the affirmative; probably Spain, Gaul, and the Orient would have agreed. If we had only the results apparent in the days of Marcus Aurelius, we might be skeptical. At any rate the Empire had committed a sin which it is difficult to forgive in that it had leveled the whole world to a futile uniformity. There was general peace and in many places prosperity. Most men could live in a higher degree of physical comfort than ever before. Slavery was fast going out, the poor were cared for, commerce brought the necessities of life quickly where crops failed, cities and tribes in the empire did not attack each other, crime was repressed. But these good things were too largely imposed from without, and the spiritual force of the people seems somehow to have died. Let but the restraining power be loosened for a season, and we shall see what the civilization was worth.

Moreover all this material prosperity was accomplishing

nothing of value. There were enough families of wealth living easy care-free lives. But, as in so many of our western republics, they were living with a misplaced pride on the reckless exploitation of the natural resources which their children would need, but would find wasted when the critical moment came. It pleased their vanity when they could walk through the towns and see handsome buildings inscribed in large letters with their names, but those very buildings were soon to crash in a ruin which the builders did nothing to stem. The prosperous men were wasters of nature's resources; they created nothing. Not one penetrating discovery in any science, not one principle of art, not one lasting book, not one constructive idea in government came for the benefit of later generations from all those successful men of the magnificent second century.

It was a great misfortune also that the union of all nations in one had destroyed wholesome international competition. How stimulating in ideas to the Greeks and Romans had been the rivalry of their city-states! What theories of state Plato had built on the juxtaposition of Athenian democracy and Spartan aristocracy! How it stimulated art when great sculptors and architects were bid for by vying cities! How eager the Romans were in the days of Scipio not to be put to shame by Hellenic cities! One feels the stimulus of a challenging Greece everywhere in Vergil and Cicero and Lucretius. Scipio Nasica had been shrewd enough to see that even the government needed the spur of rivalry and regretted nothing so much as the fall of Carthage and Corinth. "Now you will have none to fear and," he added scornfully, "none before whom you need stand in shame." It is a question whether world peace had not been bought at too high a price.

Rome had also leveled down the spiritual force in the all-inclusive empire. It is possible that her greatest mistake was an erroneous liberalism based partly on self-interest, partly on sentimentality. The easy gift of citizen-

ship to hordes of slaves who could never comprehend the Roman institutions that had made the state great, and who were temperamentally unfit for the succession of duties into which they came, and the constant inclusion of foreign territory within the empire, were not always marks of true liberalism. Too often this seeming humanitarianism was spurred on by the desire to have more land to exploit or to cheapen labor, regardless of the consequences to the state. But it was also in some measure an expression of an old-time republican liberalism, and the attraction of the most useless element to Rome by the lavish gifts of grain and games was due in some measure to disheveled sentimentality. Rome, if any nation, needed to discover some formula whereby a state would not through mistaken humanitarianism betray the strong-fibered stock to the exploitation of the morally, mentally, and physically unfit. We have seen above, that, according to the best evidence available, Rome and Italy were in Hadrian's day peopled by men and women that had but a trace of Roman blood. Perhaps that alone is enough to account for the complete change in the spirit of Rome. The Empire then seemed a success to most observers, but the Empire had let the fiber of the great tree decay at the core, and the storm was near at hand which only a sound tree could withstand.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE AGE OF THE SEVERI

Commodus, 180-193 A.D. It may fairly be taken as a commentary on autocracy that while Rome had had five excellent emperors in succession introduced to power by adoption, tyranny returned with the first incumbent born and bred in the palace. Our accounts of L. Aurelius Commodus given by two of the worst historians of Rome, Cassius Dio and Lampridius, are so confused and superficial that it is difficult to obtain any plausible explanation of his character. He was but nineteen at the death of Marcus Aurelius, and as Marcus had been exceedingly conscientious in choosing diligent officials to perform all the offices of state the young man had perhaps not been tried out in any responsible position under his father's supervision. At any rate it is clear that he had had leisure to acquire too keen a taste for horseracing and for gladiatorial shows.

The reign began badly. Commodus, against the advice of his father's generals, withdrew his garrisons from beyond the Danube, made peace on easy terms, and hurried home to enjoy himself. He grew impatient of the counsels given him by the strong men whom his father had gathered into high positions of state, and dismissed one after the other, resorting presently to charges of treason against those who were unwilling to yield. This led to a conspiracy against his life among some of the senators, a plot in which even his sister shared. She was married to one of Marcus Aurelius' most trustworthy advisers, Pompeianus, and as the deed of killing was allotted to Pompeianus' son, it is not at all unlikely that the father had been selected to be the new emperor. The would-be slayer on

drawing his sword for the deed paused long enough to shout, "The Senate sends you this." The delay was fatal. He was seized and was of course put to death, and his betraying words brought death to many of the senators. From that time Commodus acted like a man completely insane, and it is likely that the act had unbalanced his mind. It is not only that his cruelty overleaped all bounds, that almost all the men who had held positions of trust were murdered and their offices given to freedmen like Cleander and Eclectus, but his daily behavior becomes inexplicable. He would assume the garb of Hercules and walk up and down striking men with his club, or he would have his pate shaven and insist that he was a priest of Isis. He bought racing horses which he himself drove at the races, or he entered the arena fully armed and took the part of a gladiator. His own freedmen finally discovered that their lives also were in danger, and Marcia, his concubine, was induced to poison him. When the poison seemed not to prove effective a gladiator was brought in to strangle him.

Pertinax and Didius Julianus, 193 A.D. This deed only forestalled other plots, for the responsible men still at the head of Rome's armies had already been casting about for a better man. Pertinax, Septimius Severus, and Pescennius Niger were three of the generals who were being advocated for the position, and the armies had naturally come to think, as during Nero's abuse of power, that the sword would have to decide the issue.

The imperial freedmen who had slain Commodus, knowing that their lives were at stake, quickly sought out Pertinax and struck a bargain with him. He at once took charge of the praetorian cohort, and was then accepted by the Senate. The state was heavily in debt. Pertinax had no funds with which to give the lavish donatives usual on such occasions, and the cohorts soon began to grumble. The new ruler was also less popular with the armies than several other generals. So the intrigues in the armies con-

tinued and there was continued talk of rebellions. In March, when Pertinax had been in power less than three months, the praetorian guard broke into the palace and killed him. Then it is said they invited bids for their support, and sold the throne to a foolish senator, Didius Julianus, for a promise of lavish gifts. This was an insult which the army could not endure. L. Septimius Severus, the governor of Upper Pannonia, who had the army that was nearest Rome, called upon his army to march with him to Rome. In six weeks he was at the capital; the Senate deposed Julianus and elected Septimius Severus in his place. The new emperor discharged the praetorian guard and chose Illyrians from his own trusted army in their place.

Septimius Severus, 193-211 A.D. The new emperor was of Carthaginian blood, and the Punic language was the tongue of his childhood. He was a man of little learning, superstitious and gullible, and possessed, as the Romans said, the cruel and treacherous temperament of Hannibal. But it was unjust to the great Barcid to compare the two. Septimius, however, made the most of the memories of his race, of which he was very proud. He even rebuilt the tomb of Hannibal in Bithynia. He was not a great general, but he sufficed for the task at hand. Coarse and imperious, he knew how to control the barbaric troops that made up Rome's armies of that day, and he even gained their good-will by his mixture of firmness and scorn for courtly manners. He married a woman not unlike himself, a Syrian by the name of Martha, a daughter of the priestly house that was once called royal in the temple-state of Emesa above Damascus. It was an ancestor of hers, by the name of Sampsigeramus, that Pompey had once to the amusement of Rome foolishly boasted of conquering. Septimius had apparently met her when, campaigning in Syria, he had visited the Eastern temples in search of fortune-telling oracles. As wife of a Roman general she assumed the name of Julia Domna.

Septimius had reached the throne without difficulty, but he knew his position would be challenged by men who despised his lineage. In fact Pescennius Niger in Syria had already been acclaimed emperor by his soldiers, and there was reason to think that Clodius Albinus, the legatus of Britain, would also seek the position. Septimius shrewdly offered to adopt the latter and give him the title of Caesar, a promise which had the intended effect, though the emperor, having two sons of his own, could hardly have intended to observe it. Now he set out on his long journey to settle scores with Niger, invested Byzantium, and proceeded with a part of his army to take Cyzicus and the "Cilician gates," the chief strongholds of his rival. Niger was defeated at Issus and soon after put to death. Septimius reestablished the province of upper Mesopotamia, giving Nisibis the privileges of a colony. On his return he stormed Byzantium which was still resisting, and foolishly razed its walls. It is difficult to understand what military insight an emperor could have had who deliberately destroyed one of the essential strongholds of the frontier. The Eastern campaign had consumed three years.

Meanwhile Clodius Albinus had declared himself Augustus and had concentrated the forces of Britain and Gaul near Lyons in order to support his claim. Septimius marched his army directly from the East over the Danube road to Gaul. The contest was largely between the army of the Danube and the army of the Rhine. The former, hardened by three years of warfare, won the desperate battle. An immense number of soldiers perished. Septimius let his barbarians take their pay in looting Lyons. The splendid old colony was a complete wreck when they had finished. He was not much more considerate of Rome when in 197 he returned to destroy those who had shown any sympathy with his rivals. Four years before he had taken the oath never to put any senator to death. Now twenty-nine were executed on the charge of treason. He

confiscated their estates or rather he made them a part of his 'private property.'

He returned immediately to the East, since the Parthians had attempted to recover Nisibis. Like Trajan he marched down the Euphrates and took Ctesiphon. It is likely that this defeat was the death blow to the Arsacid kingdom which had troubled Rome for three centuries. Unfortunately for Rome, another dynasty, the Sassanid, arose to combine the Parthian and Persian tribes and continue the contest. It was on this campaign that Septimius recognized the oasis city of Palmyra as a "colony" and honored its noble family, the Odaenathi, with citizenship. Palmyra was rapidly growing to great wealth through its position on the Eastern caravan route.

Septimius Severus knew little of Roman history and cared less. As a non-Roman he had no fondness for the Roman aristocracy and he disliked the favoritism that had usually been shown to Italy. One part of the empire seemed to him worth quite as much as any other. Italians had hitherto served in the praetorian guard on the theory that they alone could be trusted to protect the capital. Septimius replaced the old guard with soldiers picked out of the army, especially his own loyal Danube troops. Henceforth this powerful corps consisted mostly of Illyrian and Dacian mountaineers. He also placed an army legion on the Alban mount, stationing regular troops in Italy for the first time. The Senate received no consideration from him, and he regularly filled its number from his favorites in the army and in his personal staff. Henceforth it may be assumed that the majority in the Senate consists of Africans, Syrians, and Illyrians. He was naturally very liberal with the provincial cities of Asia and Africa, which had hitherto received less recognition than those of the Western provinces. Alexandria, a conglomerate of semi-Greeks, Egyptians and Jews, now received autonomy, and all its peoples were given an equal share in its government. Many eastern

cities like Palmyra, Damascus, Tyre, and Laodicea were accorded citizenship and dignified with the privileges of honorary colonies.

Septimius seems to have adopted the old Ptolemaic policy of permitting soldiers to marry and have their homes outside of the barracks. This was in some measure accountable for the fact that in succeeding reigns the troops got out of hand more and more. His persecution of senators also affected economic conditions adversely. The large *latifundia* which he confiscated he set apart as a "private estate" of the emperor, which greatly increased the extent of the imperial lands and gave the emperor vast financial resources. The old public treasury (*aerarium*), under the control of the Senate, had now but an insignificant place in the finances of the empire.

For one act at least Rome could be grateful. Ignorant of law, though he insisted upon being considered the head of the judicial system, Septimius elevated Papinian, a very learned and keen jurist, into the highest office at his disposal, the prefecture of the praetorian cohort. As we have seen, this position had come to carry with it the chief seat at the imperial privy council. Papinian in his law studies had drunk deep in the great legal authorities of the Republic. He had the assimilative powers and clear intellect that made it possible for him to comprehend the tendencies of Roman law and to put his decisions into very brief and effective form, and he had the sincere sympathy for the provincials (he seems to have been a Syrian) that made it possible for him to adapt the old principles to the new needs of the empire at large. The civil code in its final form owed very much to Papinian and his two pupils, Ulpian and Paulus.

Septimius destined his two sons by Julia Domna to be his successors. Bassianus, later named Aurelius, now generally known by the nickname Caracalla, and Geta, soon slain by his brother. On the well-known Arch of Severus

which still stands in the Roman forum in front of the old Senate-house the names of the father and the elder son appear with all the titles that they bore in the year 202. The name of Geta had also been inscribed at first but was erased at the command of Caracalla and the space filled in with harmless verbiage. The inscription now reads as follows:

Imp. Caes. Lucio Septimio M. fil. Severo Pio Pertinaci Aug. patri patriae, Parthico Arabico et Parthico Adiabenico, pontific. maximo, tribunic. potest. XI, imp. XI, cos. III, procos., et imp. Caes. M. Aurelio L. fil. Antonino Aug. Pio Felici, tribunic. potest. VI, cos. procos., (p.p. optimis fortissimisque principibus) ob rem publicam restitutam imperiumque populi Romani propagatum insignibus virtutibus eorum domi forisque, S. P. Q. R.

The chief function of the Senate, it appears, had now come to be the voting of honorary monuments with such fulsome inscriptions to hated emperors. It will be noticed that Septimius was eager to get the suggestion of a respectable pedigree into his name. It was for that reason that he adopted the cognomen Pertinax, that he called himself M.fil., as though he were a son of Marcus Aurelius, and that he changed the name of his son, Bassianus, a Syrian priestly title, to that of Rome's most honored emperor.

"*Caracalla*," (*M. Aurelius Antoninus*), 211-217 A.D. Septimius died at Eboracum (York) in England in 211, while stemming a dangerous raid of Caledonians and superintending the rebuilding of the old wall. His sons were with him at the time, and he commended both of them to the army, though he knew that there was deadly hatred between the brothers, and that, since officials in the state were already dividing their support between them, a civil war was more than likely. Julia did her best to bring about harmony, but to no purpose. Caracalla, with a tiger's conscience, had his young brother cut down in his mother's arms. He proceeded to hunt down all those whom he suspected of having preferred Geta, and Dio, who lived

through that reign of terror, vouches for the fact that 20,000 men were murdered.

It was in this same year of unsurpassed cruelty (212) that Caracalla took the step, which Severus had doubtless planned, of giving by the *Constitutio Antoniniana* citizenship to all free-born people throughout the vast empire. Had this remarkable gift to the provincials been made by any but the most brutal of all emperors, we might know how to gauge the state of general culture by it. But Caracalla certainly did not take the step after careful consideration of whether the people were ready for it, nor did he do anything toward making it a success. Indeed, he murdered in a fit of anger his one far-seeing jurist, Papinian, in the very year when he most needed his aid. It was doubtless as the son of a Punic father and of a Syrian mother that he ordered all provincials to become Romans. It was his method of telling the Romans that he was as good as they. But, as Dio noted, the treasury benefitted not a little from the act, for it imposed upon all the world the inheritance tax (which he raised from 5 per cent to 10 per cent). This tax had originally been placed by Augustus upon citizens only, for unless they owned provincial tithe-land, they had been practically tax-exempt. To impose this tax upon the provincials, who already were subject to the tithe, was to make Roman citizenship a burden.


The most important consequence of the new *Constitutio* was that it spread the application of Roman law. Roman governors, who held court for Roman citizens, henceforth had jurisdiction over nearly all inhabitants of the empire, and the native courts of the cities must have quite generally disappeared. It therefore became necessary for all lawyers throughout this realm to study Roman law; and it was to meet this new need for legal equipment that Papinian's pupils, Ulpian, Paulus, and Modestinus, the last great jurists, wrote their excellent commentaries on all phases of Rome's old law.

Caracalla also tried to revise the coinage, but only succeeded in adding new confusion. Commodus had debased the silver coins to the point where they were at least one-half alloy. The trick had, of course, been discovered and the value of the coins dropped accordingly. Septimius had done nothing to improve the situation. Indeed, it was impossible to bring the coins back to their old-time weights, since the silver mines were exhausted, and silver was constantly going out of the empire to pay for Chinese, Indian, and Arabian ware. Caracalla at first attempted to reestablish old ratios between gold and silver by issuing a new silver coin, the "Antoninianus," in the place of the debased *denarius*. It weighed about 50 per cent more than the *denarius*, but it also was immediately debased with alloy, so that it is difficult to see what he accomplished except temporarily to deceive the recipients. As it was, Rome now had two standard coins of uncertain content and varying value. Had the *denarius* been reduced honestly to meet the corresponding rise in the price of silver, and had the ratio been announced and kept stable, business need not have suffered. It was the deception on the part of the government that confused the world of trade, and finally drove out gold as well, since foreign trade, refusing to accept the deceptive silver coins, demanded gold in return for goods.

In 213 Caracalla had to go to the North to stem German attacks which were now coming on with ever greater frequency. We know little about this war except that the emperor succeeded in driving the invading Alamanni back from Raetia, and that the cowed Senate immediately gave him the cognomen Germanicus Maximus. In the next year he went to the East, where he paraded as a second Alexander the Great, supporting his boast by refashioning the legions into Macedonian phalanxes. While having his army trained for a projected expedition to the far East he visited Egypt. There he avenged himself on the

Alexandrians in the most beastly fashion for their scorn of him. Thousands of youths were invited out to the parade grounds, surrounded by his soldiers, and massacred. He began his Eastern expedition by inviting the king of Armenia to a conference and having him treacherously arrested. But his end was not far off. Macrinus, his praetorian prefect, having discovered that he also was doomed, acted first and had one of his soldiers strike the emperor down. Macrinus, a Moorish soldier, who was not even a member of the Senate, was elected emperor by the army. Caracalla had mis-ruled the empire for six years.

Macrinus had no children of former emperors to fear since Caracalla had destroyed all possible rivals, but knowing that Julia Maesa, the sister of Julia Domna, was an ambitious and domineering woman, he ordered her to depart from Rome. She went home to Emesa, where she was most able to create mischief; for there she had two daughters and by them two grandsons whom she proceeded to groom for the throne at Rome. The family tree appears thus:



No one but Julia Maesa could have invented any claim to the Roman throne for either of these Syrian lads. Elagabalus (Heliogabalus), the older, was only sixteen years of age, and was now engaged in filling his inherited office as highpriest of the Sun God of Emesa, whose image was a

shapeless meteoric stone, and whose cult was as wildly orgiastic as Arab imagination could make it. But Maesa longed to get back to the palace, and she had great wealth, procured in the days when her sister was empress. This she and Elagabalus used to bribe the Roman legion, more than half Syrian, which was stationed outside the city of Emesa. To establish an apparent claim to the throne Soaemias was induced to make the modest admission that Caracalla was the boy's father. Macrinus meanwhile was proving his unfitness for the throne which he had seized; for in his expedition against the Parthians he suffered defeat and disgusted his army by purchasing peace at great cost. He had not been emperor more than a year when Maesa induced the Roman legion at Emesa to revolt and declare in favor of Elagabalus. In the battle, which took place near Antioch, Maesa herself led the charge. The disgusted troops of Macrinus offered no great resistance when their leader proved a coward and ran. Thus the Syrian highpriest captured the throne of the Roman empire from the Moorish centurion.

Elagabalus, 218-22 A.D. The reign of the next four years was a variety show with an empire as stage. Any clown from a circus could have bettered the part of the chief actor. While the emperor assumed the name of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus in support of the shameful claim of his mother, he continued to be known by the name of the fetish he had worshiped, and which he now brought to Rome. For the black stone of Emesa he erected a temple on the Palatine; it became the supreme deity of the Empire and the emperor continued to be its priest. Knowing nothing about the affairs of state and distrustful of his own judgment, he took his grandmother with him as his adviser to the sessions of the Senate. His favorites became ministers of state. The highest praefectures of the city were filled by an actor, an acrobat, a charioteer, and a barber. There is no profit in rehearsing the tale of the

preposterous festivals, the Oriental orgies in honor of the new god, the marriage of the black stone to the Palladium of Rome, and the emperor's own marriage to a vestal virgin. Even Rome and the barbarous praetorian guard were finally nauseated, and Maesa, to save her position, had to induce the emperor to adopt his cousin Alexander—then a boy of twelve—so that in case of a general revolt she might still have a descendant in power. Elagabalus, soon suspecting that Alexander was intended to supplant him, tried to have him murdered. This hastened the revolt. The guards stormed the palace, putting the fanatic to death with his mother, and raised the boy Alexander to the throne (222 A.D.).

Alexander Severus (222-235 A.D.) was then but little over thirteen. The Senate, therefore, appointed a commission of sixteen of their number to act with Maesa as a kind of regency. For a few years there was some semblance of order. The great lawyer Ulpian was placed in charge of the guard and in that capacity became the first minister of state. In this position, which he held for five years, his influence could only have been beneficial. The guard, however, disliked him for his strictness and eventually put him to death.

It may be to him that Rome owed a new experiment in economic and social reform, the purpose of which was to set the clogged wheels of industry going by employing labor and industrial guilds directly in the service of the state. The evils that were to be remedied were innumerable. Commerce on the high seas and on the roads was threatened because of pirates and brigands. The lawless element was increasing not only because the state failed to provide police, but also because the disruption of society put an end to the usual mode of gaining a livelihood. Civil wars, tyranny, uncertainty of life and of private property, and the collapse of the currency stopped the outlay of money in building and in trade. In other words, industrial and social anarchy of

a kind that we have recently seen in Russia was rapidly coming on. And the remedy that was tried seems—though on this point we have inadequate information—to have been not wholly unlike that tried in Russia. Instead of stabilizing the currency and reëstablishing law and order, for which the state had neither the gold nor the men, it was thought best to organize the trades by governmental edict, and compel each guild to do a definite amount of work gratis for the community. The germ of this idea lay in certain experiments of the Emperor Claudius, of Trajan, and of Septimius Severus, for these emperors had, by offering insurance and immunities, tried to induce shippers, grain and oil merchants, shipbuilders, and even bakers to take over regular service in Rome's bureau of food supply. Now the state applied this idea to several trades and crafts and *ordered* every man engaged in the craft to join his appropriate guild, and ordered the guilds to produce their regular commodities under the supervision of state officials. It is unfortunate that we do not know the details of the organization or the success of it. We only learn that all the guilds of the *annona* were attached to the state service directly, that all kinds of guilds of a private character—of builders, carpenters, lumbermen—as well as of such petty tradesmen as shoemakers, potters, grocers and innkeepers were to some extent involved. Within a hundred years this state paternalism had progressed to the point where all laboring men were practically serfs.

During the reign of Alexander the municipal governments also passed through a marked change which bore serious consequences during the following century. Since commerce and trade threatened to stop, land owners found their profits diminishing and taxes dropped accordingly. The state, in crying need for funds, ordered the *curiales* (the members of the city councils) of the municipalities to assume responsibility for the taxes of their respective districts. In fulfilling these demands the *curiales* often had to make up

the tax deficits out of their own pockets. The office became a grievous burden instead of an honor. The time came when men refused election, and then the state imposed the office on those deemed wealthy. Eventually the difficulty of finding *curiales* was so great that the state in some cases imposed the burden upon criminals!

The situation on the land was also precarious. The emperor's *res privata*, inherited from the confiscations of Nero, Domitian, Septimius Severus and Caracalla, was immense. The state had thousands upon thousands of tenants upon whom some emperor, probably Alexander, imposed the regulation that they could not surrender their contracts or go into any other occupation. Tenants must remain on their lands and produce for the benefit of the public. The obvious step, when the children of such *coloni* tried to escape compulsion, was to make this occupation also hereditary, and then the tenants of the state became serfs in a real sense. But the final change in this step was not taken for another century. Of Alexander's colonial regulations we only know that he made grants of lands to soldiers of the frontier on the basis of hereditary service in the army. In other words, the children of these soldier-*coloni* were also to be soldier-*coloni*. However, there was as yet no penalty attached to refusal to serve on the part of the children except the forfeiture of the land.

The reign of Alexander Severus also marks a great change in the East which was destined to have serious consequences upon Rome's history. The Arsacid house of the Parthians, so powerful in Hadrian's day, had for some time been losing its power. In 226 Ardashir (Artaxerxes) of the house of the Sassanids of Persia, who claimed descent from the ancient Persian kings of kings, threw off the Parthian yoke, proclaimed himself king of all the ancient Persian realm, and announced himself the restorer of the true Zoroastrian religion. To Rome he announced that he was lord of all the realm as far as the Aegean, and he

overran Armenia and Cappadocia before the Roman army had time to act. In 231 Alexander set out with his mother to meet his new foe, summoning the Danube legions to his aid. He advanced with three armies in 232, himself leading the central one. Ardashir met the southern army first. The battle resulted in the complete annihilation of the Roman force, but Ardashir had himself suffered such losses that he hesitated to move against the other two divisions. However, he did not need to do so, for Alexander, hearing of the fate of his southern division, retreated and called back the northern army as well. The latter suffered severely on its retreat from disease and lack of food. Alexander, despite his great losses, claimed a victory and returned home to celebrate a gorgeous triumph. The Sassanid kingdom might at that time have been checked. As it was, Alexander had merely shown the Persians how feeble Rome was. The neglect of the opportunity cost Rome dear.

Alexander had no sooner reached home than he was called North. The barbarians were breaking through along the whole line. On the Danube frontier the returning troops soon restored order. But Alexander made no progress on the Rhine until he bought peace with gold. This act disgusted his soldiers, and when they heard of the arrival of Maximinus "the Thracian," the Illyrian commander, who was called in to help, they hailed him as emperor and put the faint-hearted Syrian to death. He had held the throne, with the aid of his mother and grandmother, for thirteen years. Septimius Severus, his children, and his Syrian relatives, had ruled Rome for forty-two years and left it wholly unfit to check the enemies now rushing in.

CHAPTER XXIX

FIFTY YEARS OF ANARCHY

It would profit little to rehearse the story that late gossipy chroniclers have told of the brigands who murdered each other for the throne during the next fifty years. Their names are not worth remembering; and we are not informed about the general conditions of the empire, a matter of far more interest. Throughout the period Rome is not even the capital of the empire in any real sense. The armies are the potential centers of the empire, and the government is the general who for a season can get his particular army of barbarians to acclaim him emperor and in return for gold or loyalty whip every other army that dares support a rival. Needless to say the armies were meanwhile beating themselves to pieces.

Maximinus (235 A.D.) at least restored the northern frontier and kept it safe for three years. But he was hated and dreaded by all. Gordian, the proconsul of Africa was, therefore, recognized by the Senate, and his son was designated to be his successor, but the African army killed them both. Then the Senate recognized Pupienus, once general of the Rhine army, and Balbinus, an ex-consul. Maximinus was killed by his own troops while marching down to suppress these interlopers; and they in turn were slain by the praetorian guard. The guard then chose Gordian III, a boy of fourteen, for the giant's task of stemming the dread Goths who, as well as the Persians, now appeared on the scene. A Syrian general succeeded in stopping the Goths; Gordian marched east against the Persians. His general here was *Philip*, the son of an Arab sheik, who

put his emperor to death (244) and reigned in his stead. Four years later the Arab emperor led Rome in a magnificent celebration of her one-thousandth anniversary, when the heralds proclaimed the return of the Golden Age. The very next year Decius, the Illyrian, revolted, put the Arabian to death, and took his place.

Now the Goths came down in hordes. They had long been moving southward from their Baltic homes. It seems indeed that it was pressure exerted by their movements that had thrown the frontier tribes into nervous commotion in the days of Marcus Aurelius. Meanwhile they had rested in lower Russia, where they had adopted some of the Iranian customs from the Sarmatian tribes which they absorbed. The eastern portions of the tribe (the Ostrogoths) now broke over the Danube, devastating much of Thrace and Macedonia. It is said, for instance, that when they took Philippopolis they put its 100,000 inhabitants to the sword. Decius tried battle with them twice, only to be defeated. In the second battle he was slain (251). *Trebonianus*, the Gaul, who was governor of Moesia, succeeded to the throne, and bought peace from the Goths by a pledge of a yearly tribute. Meanwhile the dread pestilence swept over the empire again, and it raged unchecked for fifteen years.

In 253 *Aemilius*, a Moorish general, defeated and slew the Gaul to claim his throne, but he in turn was slain by his own troops.

Then *Valerianus*, a general of Thracian descent, claimed the crown and called his son *Gallienus* to share his power with him. Their eventful joint-rule began in 253 when enemies were breaking into the empire at every point. That they lost more than half the empire was perhaps not their fault, for they received shattered and undisciplined armies from their predecessors, and the plague had weakened the morale of the remnant they had. Valerian left his son to care for the West while he marched to the

East where Shapur (or Sapor), now king of kings, was advancing to the Aegean. Valerian arrived to find Antioch, the capital of Syria, in the enemy's hands. He forced Shapur to retreat, but was eventually defeated and taken prisoner (258 A.D.). All of Asia seemed now definitely lost, for Gallienus, already suffering similar defeats in the West, could not come to the rescue. Meanwhile the Ostrogoths seized all the ships on the Black Sea, invaded Bithynia and Pontus, plundering and burning the great cities of Nicomedia and Nicaea. There were no armies to send to the rescue, for Gallienus was hopelessly beaten back in the West. The Franks—we now hear of them for the first time—crossed the Rhine far to the North, and marched through Gaul and deep into Spain. The Gallic commander engaged them successfully once, but was compelled to let them stay for the present. All he could do was to fortify the Rhine to prevent new hosts from following. The Alamanni meanwhile took possession of the *agri decumates*, which were never again recovered, and advanced down the Rhone and into Italy. These at least Gallienus defeated near Milan (259).

While Gallienus was busy suppressing revolts in the Danube army, Postumus, the governor of Gaul, also rebelled, setting himself up as emperor, not of Rome, however, but of an *Imperium Galliarum* (259). Gallienus hastened back to recover the West, but was defeated. Postumus organized a full-fledged government on the Roman model, with senate, consuls, and all the useless apparatus. Though on his coins he recognized the Celtic Hercules as supreme deity, it is not to be supposed that his government was in any way an expression of Celtic nationalism. Such sentiments had long since ceased to be a vital force. Postumus had in fact only carved out a kingdom for himself which he thought could be held together without unreasonable effort, and he received the support of the natives because he was able to check barbarian invasions more

successfully than the emperor. It can hardly be denied that his rule over Gaul and Spain during ten years of terrible invasions was beneficial to the empire, for he held the West together against a better day.

The East was ultimately saved for the empire by a similar act of treason. After the defeat and capture of Valerian, Shapur had proceeded to take city after city in Syria and Cilicia. Then it was that Odaenathus of Palmyra, the oasis city which Septimius had prospered, gathered the scattered fragments of the Roman armies together, built up a strong force and pounced upon the Persian army as it was peacefully marching homewards. Odaenathus was then recognized as Rome's "commander of the East," to which title he presently added those of "King of Palmyra" and "Imperator." Since Gallienus could not possibly assert Rome's position in the East, he acquiesced in the usurpation. And when Odaenathus was killed in 266, his wife, the far-famed queen Zenobia, raised her son Vaballathus to the throne and presently sent her generals to sweep the province of Egypt into her great empire. All this was, of course, dark news for Rome, but it proved later to have been a blessing in disguise, since the Euphrates boundary was for the time being protected by a power which was able and willing to guard the social and economic interests of the region.

Gallienus had apparently lost more than half the empire and he could not even protect the Danube front which was still left to him. In his closing years the Goths again used the sea route, this time coming out boldly into the Mediterranean. They took Ephesus in 263, and even laid siege to Athens in 267. The Athenians, however, led by the historian Dexippus, were able to protect themselves. The Herulian chief who led the expedition was bought off from raiding Thrace by a high position in Rome's service, including the Roman consulship. Gallienus in fact advanced very far in the dangerous policy of buying the services of

the chieftains he could not subdue. Perhaps it was the only way he had of building up the army again, weakened as it was by many defeats and by the plague. At any rate, he invested heavily in buying barbarian cavalry forces, which now began to predominate in the army and which his successor used with excellent effect. Of his internal policy there is but little known, except that he vigorously promoted autocracy at the expense of the Senate. Henceforth, senators were not chosen to lead armies or govern provinces; in fact, several of the preceding emperors had chosen whom they would, but had at least recognized the old custom by according senatorial rank as a preliminary step to the command. Now even this farce was dispensed with. Noble rank was henceforth recognized not by the name "senator," but by the title "*protector divini lateris*," "protector of His Divine Person."

Gallienus met his death, as had so many other emperors, through a mutiny in the army, which seemed weary of his futile campaigns. He was killed in 268 and Claudius, an Illyrian officer, was elevated to his place by the Danube army, the only army now in Rome's service.

Claudius began well with an extremely difficult task. He met the Alamanni who were again pouring into Italy over the Brenner Pass, defeated them and drove them back home. The Goths were again roaming over Macedonia with a horde estimated by a panegyric writer at about 300,000. Claudius whipped them thoroughly at Nish in Servia, slew 50,000, it is said, and took a great many captives whom he planted as half-free colonists in the provinces. He well deserved the name Gothicus which the Senate and later history gave him, for it is not at all unlikely that, but for the victory at Nish, the Gothic conquests of Italy might have come a century too soon. It was while Claudius was thus occupied that the daring queen of Palmyra threw off the Roman yoke completely—Claudius had refused to recognize her state as independent—declared her son Emperor

of the East, and took possession of Egypt. Before Claudius had time to answer this challenge as he desired he died, a victim of the plague. He was the only one of the twenty-six emperors of this period of anarchy who escaped a violent death.

Aurelian, the son of an Illyrian peasant (270-75), was chosen by the army, which for once did well. The new emperor, unable to go to the east, at once recognized most of Zenobia's claims on an agreement that she and Vabalathus in return recognize the sovereignty of the Roman emperor. Then he took in hand the boundary question, defeated the Juthungi, who had descended to Italy by the Brenner Pass, and the next year met the Vandals with equal success in Pannonia. While he was thus occupied the Juthungi secured the aid of the Alamanni and invaded Italy again. This time Aurelian was completely overwhelmed in a surprise attack by night. The defeat threw the state into a turmoil. Several rivals at once claimed the throne. Zenobia declared the complete independence of the East, and riots of the mint workers at Rome threw the city into confusion. Meanwhile the Germans plundered the rich cities of the Po valley and moved southward along the coast toward Rome. Aurelian was, however, equal to the occasion. He hurried to Rome and called upon all men of Italy to come to the rescue of their threatened homes. With this hastily raised army, chiefly of recruits, he beat back the barbarians at the river Metaurus, followed them up and annihilated them on the Ticinus River. Then he returned to Rome, called out all the guilds of the city and set them at the task of building that amazing brick wall about the city which still inspires the visitor with admiration. The riot of the freedmen employed in the mint was typical of conditions then prevailing. It had broken out when Aurelian, learning that the mint workers were robbing the treasury by issuing coins below standard, had closed the mint. The freedmen called upon their friends, took up

arms and fortified themselves for the purpose of holding the treasury. It was only by the use of a strong force that the emperor could dislodge them. Thousands are said to have been slain in the riot.

Having saved Rome and secured the boundary he went to the East to bring Zenobia to terms. Egypt had already been restored to Rome by the efforts of its prefect. Aurelian met Zenobia's forces first near Antioch, out-maneuvered them and compelled them to retreat to Emesa. There he won a signal but costly victory. He must now invest Palmyra, protected by seventy miles of desert and a strong wall. One marvels how such large armies were so successfully moved in those days through the waterless wastes of Syria. After a long siege Zenobia tried to escape but was captured. The city then surrendered and Aurelian proved himself somewhat above the barbarian crew from which he had sprung by saving the city¹ as he saved the queen.

It was on this occasion also that Aurelian demonstrated his understanding of Roman traditions by undertaking to settle a dispute between two claimants to the bishop's chair at Antioch, each charging the other with heresy. The emperor, though no friend of Christianity, adopted the principle that the one who could prove that he was acceptable to the bishop at Rome should be recognized.

Aurelian was by no means inclined to be friendly to Christianity. On his return from the East he had erected a magnificent temple to Mithras, the sun god, and Mithraic worshipers were particularly hostile to the new religion. This dedication was probably more than a gesture of friendliness to the eastern soldiers of his army, for on his coins he stamped the legend *Sol, Dominus Imperi Romani*, which seems to imply that he meant to make Mithraism the official religion of the Empire. The secret of his adoption of this Oriental religion seems to be an inherited devotion to the cult, for his biographer tells us that his mother was

¹ Palmyra revolted later and Aurelian then returned and destroyed it.

a priestess of the temple of the sun in his native village. The tale is plausible, for, as we have seen, Trajan had settled many Orientals in Dacia. This religion would naturally make a strong appeal to an emperor like Aurelian who favored absolutism, since it preached the doctrine of the East that the ruler was the god's incarnation. It was, therefore, consistent with the tenets of this faith that he first insisted on being addressed as "Deus et Dominus." Such a claim must eventually have brought him into serious conflict with Christianity had he lived.

Before Aurelian celebrated his triumph he determined to win back the *Imperium Galliarum* also. The task was not difficult since Postumus had died, and his successors had proved incapable of holding the "Empire" together. It required only one battle, not very hotly contested, since the general opposing him had already agreed to desert his post. Now Aurelian could return to Rome and claim to have restored the empire. The coins struck on the occasion of his triumph (274) bear the legend "*Restitutor Orbis.*" Zenobia was shown in the procession as a captive, but otherwise she was treated with the respect she deserved and allowed to spend the rest of her days as she liked in the beautiful city of Tibur.

In Aurelian's internal policies we find little to match the imagination he showed in military affairs. He was logical enough in centralizing the government in his own hands: the Senate was even deprived of the petty sign of participation in the government that was implied in their stamping *S(enatus) C(onsulto)* on the copper *asses*. But this act was perhaps more a consequence of his temper than of his reasoning. There was logic also in his abandonment of Dacia. Trajan's colonists were probably glad enough to leave their constantly devastated lands for others which the emperor allotted them south of the Danube.

What needed drastic remedies were the state budget and the currency. The standard coin, the denarius, had in the

days of Augustus been worth in average modern metal values about 16 cents. Nero had debased it to about 12 cents in value. The century that followed had brought it to about 8 cents. Caracalla's denarius was seldom worth 5 cents, and as we have seen he had issued a new and larger coin, the Antoninianus, with which he was able to practise new tricks of deception. Then came the desperate period of revolutions which Aurelian did something to stop. This had played havoc with the denarius. Each new tyrant had promised lavish donations to the army in return for his position, and then finding the treasury empty and taxes on the decrease had resorted to the expedient of paying the promised amount in coins of about half the existing value. The result was that the denarius was now a thin plate of copper merely washed with silver, and in exchange for gold its value was less than half a cent. One can imagine what was the condition of finances, especially of credits and trust funds. For instance the original sixteen dollars worth of denarii payable annually to the poor children in Italian cities under the great trust fund of Nerva and Trajan were now worth about forty cents. One could not support a child very long on such a trifle. This will illustrate what had happened to credits. Aurelian did nothing of value to remedy the evil. He merely multiplied the taxes by eight on the plea that since the denarius was now worth only one-eighth of what it had been twenty years before, the government, in order to run, must have eight times as many denarii. His calculation was correct, but since it was the government that had profited by the cheapening of the coin year by year and every cheapening had destroyed that much of the accumulated private capital, the government should at least have cut down its expenses and assured business of a somewhat sounder standard. The taxes on the new basis were confiscatory, and the people were in despair. It is from this time on that we hear of orders from the government that the municipal senates must make

up the deficit of taxes levied on deserted farms, and also of general orders that land owners in the provinces must take up deserted farms that adjoin theirs (*epibole*) and produce enough to pay the taxes on them. Unfortunately Aurelian did not cut down imperial expenses. Laboring under the old vicious theory that the people of the capital must be kept from rioting at all costs (a theory that several European capitals adopted during the Great War), he spent more lavishly than ever on the *annona*. And having such trade-guilds as the bakers and butchers organized under state control, he had the distribution made not in the form of wheat, but in that of two-pound loaves of bread, slices of pork, together with salt and oil.

Aurelian was murdered in 275 by his private secretary, a freedman whom he had offended, and another period of short-term rulers ensued for a while. Since his soldiers were devoted to him, they honored him by asking the Senate to choose a worthy successor. The Senate naturally selected an elderly and respectable senator who promised to restore their dignities to some extent, but this man, *Claudius Tacitus*, was also put to death shortly. The Syrian army then claimed the position for *Probus*, a sturdy Illyrian soldier, who succeeded in keeping the boundaries intact for several years, till he too was murdered (282) by his officers. Carus, another Illyrian, was elected by his army. On his early death he left his position to his two sons, but the army found (284) a more congenial man in *Diocletian*, the prefect of the guard, who accepted the honor and beat the armies of the two heirs of Carus into submission. Diocletian's reign marks a new epoch in Rome's declining career.

CHAPTER XXX

AUTOCRACY, DIOCLETIAN, AND CONSTANTINE

Diocletian (285-304 A.D.) brings us to the extreme antipodes of everything that the early Republic had been. The state had been founded on farsighted liberalism, it ended in despotism, elaborately systematized espionage, and unabating suppression and persecution. The new emperor was born among Illyrians, like so many of those elevated by the Danube army, which consisted of course largely of Illyrian and Dalmatian mountaineers. He was, however, the son not of an Illyrian but of an ex-slave, and since his cognomen was Diokles it is probable that his father was of Oriental stock. This may account for his choice of the Orient as his portion when he divided the realm, and for his selection of the Oriental type of despotism for his model of government. He has been praised by historians for his constructive ability and his capacity to break loose from tradition and devise new forms of government. But that a man of his origin and upbringing should sever himself from Rome's past is not strange. It was not his past; and he probably knew little about Roman traditions. And as for originality, he need only have applied to the situation he found some of the ideas that he could have gathered from the history of any Oriental despot in order to create the utterly un-Roman government that he imposed upon a suffering world. Nevertheless we cannot deny him efficiency and the good intention of creating an enduring government. That much the training in Rome's army had given him.

He found on coming to power that all the frontiers were again being overrun and he accordingly chose his friend

Maximianus as co-ruler and fellow-Augustus and sent him to the Rhine-frontier. Maximian did his work well on the Rhine, while Diocletian cleared the Danube line and drove the Persians back of the Euphrates. After ruling for eight years he decided to secure the succession by the selection of two Caesars, an idea taken from the practices of the second century. He adopted Galerius as Caesar while his fellow-Augustus adopted Constantius, and though Diocletian through personal prestige remained the lord of the Empire, the administrative districts were evenly allotted among the four co-rulers. Diocletian, residing at Nicomedia, took personal charge of Asia, Thrace and Egypt; Maximian, usually residing at Milan, took Italy, Africa and Spain; Galerius, the Danube line and the Balkans, and Constantius, Gaul and Britain. It was agreed that all four should sign all edicts and "laws," and that the Augusti should retire after twenty years, when the Caesars should become Augusti and adopt two Caesars in their place. Had such a scheme been established by Octavian before ugly traditions had permeated the army and the court it might possibly have worked. With the history of the last half century of army revolts before him, however, he could hardly have hoped that this system would long be respected. Diocletian's own preëminence was indicated by dress and ceremonies that would have pleased any sultan. He assumed the crown—three hundred years after Julius Caesar had been compelled to refuse it—purple silken robes, jewelled and gilded, and as a god he compelled all men to prostrate themselves before him, as was the old custom in Persia. Not even the members of his Privy Council could sit in his presence: they must stand. Accordingly the body was henceforth called the *Consistorium*.

A very intricate administrative division of the Empire was adopted in which the civil functions were generally separated from the military. But much overlapping of duties was permitted, probably because Diocletian was sus-

picious by nature and encouraged officials to spy on each other and report delinquencies to him. In the first place each of the four emperors had a prefect in charge of civil affairs. The four prefectures were again divided into *dioceses* under the care of *vicarii*, of whom there were twelve. These *dioceses* were again sub-divided into over a hundred provinces—smaller now than the old provinces. For the position of provincial governors *equites* were generally employed and given the title of presidents (*praesides*), though a few provinces received proconsuls or *correctores*. All these officials had trains of subordinates and the imperial bureaus at the capital under the charge of an august *magister officiorum* kept minute account of all that the governing officials did. In fact the imperial secret service was one of the busiest departments. The chief assistant of every governor was a *princeps* sent from the home office, whose duty was to spy and report. Besides, there was an army of *agentes in rebus* who were supposed to look after public roads. In point of fact they were spies who reported on everything they observed in their journeys. Lactantius apparently did not greatly exaggerate when he said that half of the population of the empire was in the civil service.

Corresponding to this administrative machinery was an equally intricate military one. The Augusti and Caesars were of course at the head of their armies, but under them were *duces* in charge of corps, and *comites* (whence "duke" and "count"), etc. Diocletian finding that the army had grown immobile under the system that had permitted soldiers to marry and settle on land, now mobilized almost a half of it, and kept it training in camps for immediate duty anywhere. But he increased the army heavily by doing so, bringing it up, as has been estimated, to about 400,000 men. The expense was more than the state could endure.

Diocletian did something also to correct the confusion

in the monetary system. But he tried so many experiments in different standards that it is now difficult to equate his coins. The basis of his fourth attempt at reform seems to be fairly sound. He let the old, almost worthless, denarius remain as it was, a silver-washed copper coin. It now passed as worth less than half a cent, and that in fact appears to have been approximately its intrinsic value. A real silver denarius, like that of the early Empire, was also issued, though not in great quantities. Perhaps silver was not plentiful enough for a heavy coinage of them. It was valued at fifty of the copper ones and was surely worth that. The gold aureus, a coin long issued, was enlarged to about $1/50$ or $1/60$ of a pound and was therefore worth over four dollars. That too was honest coinage. The ratios of the metals seem to have been about as in the Republic. Gold: silver—about 15:1; silver: copper—about 120:1. Because of the difficulty of procuring enough gold and silver for circulation he issued bags of copper *Antoniniani*, called *folles*. The bags held about 312 pounds of these petty coins, and the bags, weighed and sealed at the mint, passed for about one-eighth of a pound of gold, or nearly forty dollars.

Though this system accepted once and for all the depreciated values of the past fifty years, and therefore destroyed the hope of restoring formerly established credits and trust funds, it seems to have been as respectable as could be expected. Government notes based on a gold reserve would hardly have been possible at that time, since the autocrats had been so treacherous for a long period that the government's promise to pay would not have been accepted. And one may also add that before paper was discovered and printing was invented it would have been difficult to manufacture absolutely uniform notes proof against counterfeiting. Unfortunately as soon as Diocletian's coinage secured respect, he himself tampered with it again, and lowered the weight of the copper as well as of the old coins. The

temptation to profit from a control of the mint has always proved well-nigh irresistible to autocrats.

The quality of Diocletian's economic ideas is best revealed by his remarkable edict issued in 301, by which he attempted to fix the maximum price on all articles of trade throughout at least the eastern part of his realm. No complete copy of "Diocletian's Edict" has survived, but broken fragments have been found in several cities, and from these we learn the essentials of his methods. It was not unusual to regulate markets in that day. In fact, even during the Republic market prices were often fixed in time of wars and famines, just as they have recently been controlled in Europe and to some extent in America. The denarius had in Diocletian's lifetime fallen to one-tenth of its value, which of course meant that the price index in terms of the denarius had risen correspondingly. There must have been great pressure on the government to bring down the high cost of living. One can therefore not criticize the desire to attempt a remedy. But what was extremely unwise was to assume that the very same prices could hold permanently in all cities alike throughout a vast portion of the empire, and that the retail price must be the same as the wholesale price. The attempt of course failed, although the emperor decreed that the penalty for disobedience should be death. A contemporary writer records that business men closed shop, that many articles of commerce disappeared and that food riots at once resulted. Naturally.

The scraps of this edict are, however, interesting in giving some insight into the economics of the time, though one cannot feel full confidence in Diocletian's ability to judge what was a normal price. The prices of a few standard articles follow: wheat was to be sold everywhere at 75 cents a bushel; rye at 45; dry beans, 45; ham, 12 cents a pound; beef, 5; lamb, 7; butter, 10; cheese, 7; eggs, 5 cents a dozen; workman's boots, 52 cents a pair; soldier's cloaks, \$17.40 each; undergarments, \$5.40. A

pound of pure gold is valued at 50,000 denarii, one item which enables us to estimate prices under the edict, and to comprehend the items of his coinage systems. Diocletian, who apparently thought that laboring men were "profiteering" as much as the merchants and farmers, also set a maximum wage. These wages are here given in addition to "keep" for a day's work of probably twelve hours.

Unskilled workmen.....	10.8	cents	per	day
Bricklayers	21.6	"	"	"
Carpenters, masons, black-				
smiths	21.6	"	"	"
Painters	32.4	"	"	"

These lists show that there had been some important changes in Rome's economic system during the century of anarchy. The metals are somewhat higher in value, that is to say, scarcer; and yet, somewhat to our surprise, gold, silver, and copper bear nearly the same ratio to each other as before. This means that there was still a goodly quantity of silver and gold in the realm. Wheat stands at about the same ratio to gold as before, while meats are cheaper, and clothes and other articles requiring labor are more expensive. Laborers' wages are also higher and are generally being paid on the plan of "custom-work." These things imply that slaves are fewer, that factories have largely gone out of business, and that much land is being used for grazing. Indeed the whole industrial system had largely broken down, partly because capitalistic investments had been wiped out by the rapid debasement of money, partly because the pirating and brigandage that had sprung up had cut off the trade routes. "International" trade ceased to a great extent, and men fell back upon "domestic" and "town" economy. And this circumscribed economy had to be carried on by means of bartering, partly because the unstable currency could not be


trusted, and partly because the poor, thrown out of money-making industries, had nothing but natural products and the labor of their hands with which to pay for necessities. In other words, the world had to a remarkable degree returned to a primitive industrial stage.

This change in economic conditions seriously affected public finances and the collection of taxes, and Diocletian met these difficulties in the same short-sighted spirit that Aurelian and Severus had done before him. He knew only the method of autocratic compulsion. He introduced the direct land-tax in Italy which had long been in vogue in the provinces, and discontinued the inheritance tax, because the former brought in a larger and steadier revenue. Then, finding that landowners had insufficient currency with which to pay, he made the tax payable in "kind." This necessitated having state granaries and national stock yards and a horde of officials to care for them. Italy was fast growing into a huge state enterprise like Egypt. The emperor of course owned as *res privata* vast tracts in Italy, and finding that his *coloni* were in many places giving up the struggle with a land constantly deteriorating under tenant-culture, he took the autocratic short-cut of simply compelling the tenants to remain on their lands for life. When the same aversion to remaining under the stress of heavy taxes appeared among the *coloni* of private owners he used the same methods there in order to secure the tax. He not only applied to Italy Aurelian's rule that the municipal *curia* was responsible for the taxes of deserted lands in its district, and that landowners must take up and work waste tracts lying near theirs, but he also ordered the tenants on private lands to remain on their lots, an order which Constantine a few years later applied to the heirs of such tenants as well. In this way tenants on lands, both public and private, became bound to the soil, and it was not long before they lost many of their civil rights and became serfs. Many of the poorer landowners indeed accepted

the same condition from choice, for when they fell heavily into debt they could escape complete disaster only by "commending" themselves to richer landlords who would pay their debts and in return take them over as *coloni* for life. We also hear of landlords who, through friendship with high officials or by bribery, were able to escape many of the state exactions, and by profiteering from the misfortune of others accumulated vast estates and many *coloni*. The reverse of the picture of the growth of serfdom accordingly shows the rise of powerful and influential landlords, who entered the train of imperial noblemen. Diocletian's era of autocratic financing was, therefore, a period when the institution of serfdom made marked progress throughout the empire.

With the same persistent application of paternalism Diocletian went far towards transforming craftsmen and tradesmen into a hereditary caste. For when the industrial system broke up because of faulty state finances and lack of protection, and members of the guilds seemed on the point of migrating to other occupations, Diocletian ordered them to remain in their trade so that the public might continue to have their needs supplied. It was his idea that production could be fostered by edict. The result of this policy was of course that the children of the guildmen had also to be ordered to remain in their parents' professions; in other words, crafts became hereditary as did tenant-farming. Communism could not have been more exacting in binding the individual to the state. Such were the economic and social ideas of this son of an Oriental slave who for twenty years sat as Sultan on Rome's throne.

One of the last acts of Diocletian before his retirement was to attempt to suppress Christianity completely (303). He undertook the persecution with his usual vigor. All Christians were at first removed from civil positions and deprived of citizenship, their property was confiscated, and acts of worship were forbidden. Those who infringed the



order were to be put to death. Many influential men and women suffered martyrdom, for Galerius continued to enforce the edict for eight years after Diocletian's retirement. However, the new sect was now so numerous and the persecution awakened so much pity that in 311 Galerius was compelled to withdraw the order. It had overshot the mark and Christianity had won its last serious fight.

In 304 Diocletian celebrated the twentieth anniversary of his accession at Rome, the first time apparently that he entered the city after he became emperor. Then he retired from power as he had promised, and his colleague with him. The two Caesars rose to the position of Augusti and adopted two new Caesars. But the plan did not work for long. When Constantius died in 306 his army acclaimed his son, Constantine, and Maxentius the son of Maximian similarly secured the support of Italy. Diocletian could not bring about a compromise and retired to Salona (Spalato) in his beloved Dalmatia where he had built a magnificent palace, and there he lived for about ten more years.

Constantine (306-337 *A. D.*) was recognized by his troops in 306 as co-ruler in the west. His origins were not unlike those of Diocletian. His father seems to have been an Illyrian; his mother was a pretty freedwoman by the name of Helena—therefore doubtless Oriental—who had kept an inn at Nish; and the future emperor was born out of wedlock. His claims to the throne were not officially recognized by the Augusti for several years, but he was not disturbed. When Galerius died in 311 Constantine decided to force recognition, intending, it appears, ultimately to unite all four parts of the empire under himself. In 312 he led his army into Italy, defeated Maxentius' army at Turin, and marched upon Rome. Maxentius met him at the Mulvian bridge with a strong force. Constantine, who had for a long time been favorably inclined toward Christianity, having refused to carry out Galerius' orders

of persecution in Gaul, adopted the sign of the cross for his standards. The battle was desperate but Constantine won, and Maxentius was drowned in the Tiber. The battle became of course one of the famous battles of history, and Raphael has adorned one wall of the great hall of the Vatican with an imaginary representation of it. It would hardly be correct to say that Constantine was as yet an avowed Christian—he was not baptized till on his death-bed twenty-four years later—but there is no reason to doubt the report of the historians that he thought he saw a sign of the cross in the clouds before the battle and on it the words *hoc vince*. At any rate he soon issued orders that the Christian cult should have the same recognition in the state as any other cult. In 325 he called together and presided at the council of Nicæa, at which the bishops voted after protracted debate to accept the Athanasian rather than the Arian creed, and soon after this Constantine is said to have decreed the pagan cults illegal. After the defeat of Maxentius at least he was generally regarded as a Christian.

His reign was not in every respect fortunate. There was a strain of cruelty and uncontrollable temper in him which led to vicious acts. He slew a son on suspicions that seem to have been unfounded, regretted the act, and, apparently blaming his wife as the cause of his mistake, had her put to death. He wasted much blood in beating down his co-ruler Licinius who held the eastern provinces. The reasons for the attack are not clear, but his behavior seems on a par with that of so many other of the Illyrian emperors who preceded him. By the defeat of Licinius in 324 he became sole ruler of the whole empire.

Constantine's reign is famous not only for the legal recognition of Christianity as a permissible religion but also for the building of Constantinople and the transfer of the capital to that place. It is not clear what his motives for this act were. Doubtless he realized that the danger points

for the present were the Danube and Euphrates lines. From a military point of view the move may be pronounced wise; but the results were unwholesome in that it gave the empire an Oriental rather than an Occidental tone. Had the capital remained at Rome it is likely that the later emperors would have exerted themselves to save the West rather than the East, and a Latin civilization based upon the sound stock of Gaul might have sprung up many centuries earlier than it did. As it was, Constantinople, permeated with Asiatic-Greek culture in the form of Byzantinism, survived with a language that failed to establish connections in the new world. But Constantine could hardly have seen how portentous his act would prove to be.

The immediate effect came in the form of increased taxes imposed on peoples already overburdened, for Constantine spent lavish sums on the buildings and decorations of his new capital. He was not the first, indeed, to impose irregular contributions in money besides the regular tax in kind, but he was the first to regularize this *indictio*, as it was called, and to make the assessment a very heavy part of the whole tax. The time had come when Roman citizens began to consider the possibility of escaping beyond the borders into barbarous country in order to make life tolerable.

With the moving of the capital to the East, the imposition of absolutism, and the acceptance of Christianity, we have reached a period where little that is recognizably "Roman" meets our view. The Roman people had long since disappeared in the mixture of races. The languages spoken on the streets of Rome and of Constantinople had become legion. When Latin was heard it was a formless, styleless, and turgid jargon that resembled the speech of Cicero no more than the English of the Bowery resembles that of Addison. Little was being written except in defense of a new religion, and that chiefly in Asiatic Greek. Few read the old authors, the books in the libraries moldered

away and were being dumped upon the scrap heap. Art disappeared. When Constantine raised an arch in the Forum at Rome to celebrate his victories he could find no artists to decorate it. His builders stole the panels from the arches that were erected two centuries before, and what they added of their own by way of ornamentation is unspeakably crude. The old spirit of independence has disappeared, the world is full of varlets who submit to despotic exactions or run away. Before their emperor they fall on their knees and scrape their noses on the ground. The frontiers are still practically intact but Rome is dead and the corpse is not worth burying.

The government still had a few missions to perform before it went under, and fortunately it survived long enough and only long enough for that. Rome had produced some things that deserved to survive, but in the latter day much that deserved to perish. The government needed to hold the barbarians back till they, or at least a few of them, could gain respect for that which deserved preservation. Rome possessed both Greek and Latin books that might prove of inestimable value if they could be saved until the barbarians were prepared to comprehend them. That some small part of them was saved we owe to the fact that the frontiers still held for a while. The barbarians also had time to learn to respect Roman law before it was too late, and Rome's law became a civilizing influence even before her literature. Finally Rome had now adopted and absorbed a religion that had sprung from the deepest roots of spiritual idealism. Rome held the barbarians back long enough to teach them the elements of this religion and give to them the book that could teach the rest when the elements had made the rest comprehensible. These are a few of the things that even the corrupt tyranny of Diocletian and his kind preserved for a newer and less corrupt race. And then the end came.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE CAUSES OF ROME'S DECLINE

Ever since the "decline and fall" of Rome, the only "world-empire" that European history has known, men have tried to explain the disaster. Statesmen have sought the answer in Rome's political structure, moralists in the behavior of her people, economists in "soil exhaustion," in the failure of the currency system, and the like. We must admit that a definite and adequate answer will never be attainable: the political, psychological, and economic sciences to which we go for data are at best descriptive. They can tell us how men and states have behaved, but they cannot lay down invariable laws of cause and effect in any field where the human mind operates. In the few paragraphs that follow we can only state probabilities that occur to those who have carefully observed the behavior of states and nations. And we need hardly refer to the final crash in the fifth century when the barbarians broke over all the frontiers and took possession of the empire, for Roman culture had ceased to be a vital force long before that date.

Political causes of the decline were serious and were inherent even in the behavior of the old Republic. The republican statesmen, like those of practically all modern states, too often let themselves be enticed beyond the point of prudence by the acquisitive instinct. Few had the courage of Cato and Scipio Nasica to point out the dangers of expansion. This is not saying that Rome was wilfully aggressive. Rather, like England and America, Rome fought out her wars, however they arose, with a dogged persistence till she won, and then, following natural human

instincts, she usually incorporated what lay at her disposal, not always estimating the far off consequence of her acts upon future generations. Rome grew far too rapidly, and far beyond her power to assimilate. The first evil consequence was that she had to hold her subjects with standing armies which soon dominated the government and which finally had to be so large that they sapped her strength. If Rome had been given the wisdom—which no government seems as yet to have acquired—of refusing proffered gain, if, for instance, she had resisted the temptation of touching Asia, she might have slowly built up a sound western state with easily protected frontiers, and have assimilated and educated its people without the use of dangerously large standing armies.

Closely connected with the political question is the "racial" one. We know as yet so little about race and racial inheritance that extreme caution is necessary in attempting to estimate this factor. Furthermore ease of communication has now so thoroughly mixed peoples of different parts of Europe that "pure races" hardly exist from which to draw safe illustrations. Yet biological study, advancing upon the work of Mendel, seems to have gone so far as to show that the historical theories of the 19th century, based upon Buckle's doctrine of environmental influences, were unsafe, and that in the future history must take into more generous account the mental and physical inheritance of the individuals that constitute a nation. The emphasis on racial inheritance is the more important in ancient history because the European folk groups of 3000 years ago were generally more homogeneous than those of to-day, for the reason that the migrating Indo-European hordes were landseekers who dispelled and scattered rather than assimilated the non-landholding savages which they found. This seems in general true of the early Latin, Celtic, and Germanic migrants.

Race-mixture may produce good results, but it has also

been established that in the mixture of two excellent stocks of widely differing qualities an unstable fusion often results which perpetuates the poorer qualities of both. Applying this consideration to Rome, if we find that the Latin stock advanced consistently along certain lines so long as it was fairly unmixed, and that it gradually declined from about the time that racial fusion was marked, we may fairly attribute this new trend in some measure to the process of the "melting-pot."

Even a hasty survey of the Republic is enough to show how the original peoples were wasted in wars and scattered in migration and colonization, and how their places were filled chiefly by Eastern slaves. As early as 130 B. C. Scipio Aemilianus reminded the voters of Rome, in words pardonably exaggerated, that he had led many of them as captives to Rome. The assimilation of the foreign element was so rapid that the son of Marcus Aurelius seems to be the last emperor of Rome who could claim untainted descent from Italian parentage. That calm temper of the old state-builders, their love for law and order, their persistence in liberal and equitable dealings, in patient and untiring effort, their deliberation in reaching decisions, their distrust of emotions and intuitions, their unswerving devotion to liberty, their loyalty to tradition and to the state are the things one expects to find so long as the old Roman families are the dominant element in the Republic. By contrast the people of the Empire seem subservient and listless, caloric and unsteady, soft of fiber, weak of will, mentally fatigued, wont to abandon the guidance of reason for a crepuscular mysticism. The change is so marked that it is impossible to speak of the "spirit of Rome" or the "culture of Rome," without defining whether the reference is to the Rome of 200 B. C. or of 200 A. D. History must take cognizance of this change, and in doing so it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the change is primarily due to the fact that the Romans partly gave way before and partly merged

their inheritance in a new brood which came largely from Asia Minor and Syria. According to this view the decline of Rome had begun in the last decades of the Republic.

There were also deficiencies of an economic nature which contributed to the decline; though the importance of this factor has probably been over-rated in recent years owing to a tendency to project the phenomena of modern industrial states into ancient societies. The exhaustion of resources by undue taxation had created some havoc in the East even during the late Republic. But during the first two centuries of the Empire taxation was fair, and the East recovered till it was more prosperous financially than it had ever been. Distressing taxes were again imposed only after Caracalla's day when they doubtless helped choke an Empire already expiring.

The same may be said of the general industrial breakdown. The provincial industries had actually benefitted much by the roads built and the sea routes safe-guarded by the imperial government up to the time of Alexander Severus. The chaos in industry that came during the army contests thereafter were consequences rather than causes of the general demoralization.

Deficiency in currency has frequently been blamed on the basis of a statement in Pliny that more gold flowed out of the realm annually than could be recovered in the exhausted mines. But the fact that even Diocletian could issue gold, silver, and copper at nearly the old ratios, and that Constantine could establish a fairly good gold and silver currency would seem to indicate that all these metals sufficed for the industry of that day. Perhaps there would not have been enough for a vigorous expansion of capitalistic business, but Oriental industry, which had also invaded the West, was never fond of capitalistic methods. It had always shown a tendency to cling to the individual shop. And such large-scale industry as Italy had seems to have suffered from the havoc of the wars during the third cen-

tury as much as from financial stringency. The greatest harm that resulted from an inadequate currency system came doubtless to invested capital and credits because of the rapid debasement of coins during the third century. Yet even this need not have been fatal, given a sound and industrious people. The Romans after all did not lose as much through debasement of their currency in 200 years as Germany lost in three years after the Great War. In fact it would be difficult to prove that an inadequacy of precious metals in a world-state need greatly hinder business if the deficiency makes itself felt gradually. Rome had from time to time used a gold-silver mixture called *electron*, and a silver-bronze alloy and might have done so again if gold and silver did not suffice in quantity. It was not so much the failure of gold, as the failure of a listless and deteriorating government adequately to manipulate the metals it possessed.

Distinguished economists have also attributed Rome's decline to lack of labor when cheap slaves ceased to come by way of warfare. In point of fact slavery began to be discouraged even before slaves ceased to come; and the raising of slave children would have been continued if it had been profitable, as it continued, for instance, in our South after importation of slaves was forbidden. In Cicero's day landowners had for economic reasons begun to farm estates through *coloni*, and they even found it profitable to free their slaves and use them rather as freedmen tenants. In the period of greatest financial stress, that is, all through the third and fourth centuries A. D., the state was not so much concerned in finding more laborers—captives were seldom enslaved though hundreds of thousands were taken—but rather in forcing idle guild members to remain in their guilds even when they had not enough work to occupy their time. Industry seems not to have declined for want of a laboring-class.

Other historians have been wont to attribute Rome's

decline to "exhaustion of the soil," and it is correct to consider this as one factor. That it was a serious item is, however, difficult to prove. The temporary exhaustion of the soil of Latium in the fourth and third centuries B. C. has been noticed above. But it has also been pointed out that the soil of the volcanic littoral of Italy recovers with relative speed under careful rotation of crops and grazing such as the farmers of the Republic practised. Sicily at first bore the burden of cereal culture while this readjustment was in process. When Sicily was overworked Italy was again able to take care of itself with the aid of the rich Po valley. Then, in the early Empire, the province of Africa produced much grain, until in the second century A. D. when its thin soil was exhausted by intensive culture under irrigation. By that time Egypt, which could not readily be wholly worn out so long as the Nile overflowed its banks, was turning to cereal culture, and Gaul was far from being exhausted.

There were, then, regions that had been worked till they had to be given a rest. Indeed there are several references in the Greek authors of the Empire to large and small districts which were nearly depopulated though they had once supported many people. Such districts can be found in all of our Eastern states to-day. They are usually places which once had a rich but thin soil over sand or some unproductive kind of rock, and which even scientific cultivation cannot bring back to profitable cultivation. Furthermore we must also consider that in Italy the *coloni* on the state lands of the empire were shiftless farmers who cared little whether the soil, not their own, was properly manured. They doubtless mistreated the soil in a way that Cato and his neighbors would not have endured. Nevertheless there are no sufficient proofs that the land of the empire was not meeting fair demands. The prices of wheat, barley, oats and vegetables, as given in Diocletian's edict, show clearly that the products of the soil are moderate in price

compared to many other commodities. In fact a study of modern agricultural conditions in Italy and France, in districts where for two thousand years agriculture has continued with almost the same methods that were used by the Romans, will show that it is incorrect to speak of permanent exhaustion of the soil. The Po valley with its very deep alluvium and the western half of Italy, for instance, have always quickly recovered from temporary exhaustion, and Roman commerce was in a condition to carry the surplus products of such places as well as of the rich fields of Gaul and Egypt to whatever point needed rest. At most one meets with temporary inconveniences, raising of prices in certain places, and here and there a temporary readjustment of crops. If Italy itself was not yielding what it might have done, this was partly due to the government's policy of overtaxing and of interfering with the colonate, partly to the fact that the new *coloni* were not as skilful or as conscientious in using manures, in planting legumes and clovers, and in judicious rotation of crops as the old farmers of Italy had been.

In a word, the economic factors to be considered in discussing the decline of the Roman empire, while numerous, do not seem to be the most vital ones. Most of them may be defined as symptoms of a general decay in the intelligence and vitality of the people then in possession of the government and its policies.

When we turn to moral and religious considerations, we are in the region of mists, and yet we have not the right to leave these influences out of account simply because we have no way of accurately estimating their importance. No notice need be taken of Nietzsche's assumption that the adoption of Christianity so softened the fiber of the people that it was rendered unfit to resist the barbarians. It is now clear that Rome was doomed long before the frontier line broke, and equally clear that after the state adopted Christianity, the Christians were fully as loyal in their ef-

forts to protect the realm from invasion as were the pagans. Indeed the Christians, through their belief in divine aid and their respect for duty, seem to have developed a vigor and determination that might if anything have revitalized the Empire had not leadership totally failed.

The failure of Rome's own religious faith many centuries before might with more reason be considered as an item of some importance. Not that the old animism contained any ethical principles that aided directly in keeping up the morale of the people. But the old religion had at least encouraged a healthy propagation of a sound stock by insisting upon parent-worship and consequently upon the importance for every family of having children who would continue the cult of the *parentalia*.

The accumulation of wealth through conquests and foreign investments also affected the morale adversely, but here again the social sciences have failed to provide the historian with any reliable gauge. All we can say is that the leisure classes of Rome which are pictured in the pages of Ovid were by every standard we know a deleterious force and that the possession of wealth seems to have released them from mental as well as physical exercise. They devoted themselves to the attainments of creature comforts only, becoming parasites upon society. Men and women alike, pampered from youth, untrained to exert effort or endure pain, shrank from meeting the normal obligations of the family, society and state. After the Punic wars it seemed to be generally true that families which had acquired great wealth gave out in a very few generations. There are various reasons for this, but the generalization is at least justified that, whatever may be true of other civilizations, at Rome in the late Republic and during the Empire striking economic success occasioned social corruption and endangered the survival of the stock of its possessors.

The Romans of the Empire seem to have suffered from

the lack of a stimulating philosophical atmosphere. The trend of thought was pessimistic, myopic, and unprogressive. Rome in fact when she reached the days of highest cultural possibilities fell on evil days so far as speculative thought was concerned. The conquests of the imagination, so stimulating in Plato's day, had ended abruptly and unexpectedly in general skepticism at about the time when the Romans were ready to speculate. It seemed that the world had been cheated by the lavish promises of philosophy. The sons of Roman senators dashed off to the philosophers of Athens and Rhodes to solve the riddle of the universe, and they came in time only to be told by Asiatic polymaths, who had assumed the philosophers' mantles, that metaphysics had been a mirage. There was nothing left but to get back to earth. Not to mention the doubting Academicians and the cynical skeptics, there were the Epicureans, basing hedonism on an incomplete science, and the Stoics, abandoning the search for truth for the satisfactions of a practical life. Education and philosophy were told to conform themselves to the needs of here and now, an attitude all too attractive to democratic society and guaranteed to put the intellect to sleep.

Finally the historian must put into the adverse scale the devastating consequences of slavery. The benefits which early civilizations drew from the institution by acquiring mental leisure for the few through the exploitation of the unfortunates were of course quickly offset by the evils inherent in the system. Economically, slavery retarded progress. Very cheap servile labor clogged industry by retaining in vogue an unprogressive household production and hindering the development of a capitalistic system, and by retarding the invention of labor-saving machinery. Socially, it destroyed the opportunities of citizens to make a fair living, and rise to positions where they might try out their capacity for larger service to society. A large class of futile "poor whites" is a direct consequence of slavery.

Furthermore by associating every kind of labor, not only physical but mental as well, with servility, the institution degraded all trades and crafts, and finally even the arts, till citizens of respectability found themselves deprived by caste-customs of all normal exercise. This was not only a great economic waste, but a calamity to the national morale. But doubtless its worst evil was the ethnological one, which we have discussed above under the race question. Slaves displaced the citizens of a race that had made Rome what it was. And however clever, however efficient they might be as individuals, they were Romans neither in tradition nor in temper, and they were all too apt to carry a slave's ideals of conduct into the performance of their new offices as citizens.

If from these many causes of Rome's decline we must select the more potent ones, we should be inclined to name first Rome's rapid and ill-considered expansion, the existence of slavery on a vast scale, and as an immediate consequence of these two, the thorough-going displacement of Romans by non-Romans.

CHAPTER XXXII

EPILOGUE

Constantine, dying in 337, left the Empire, according to Diocletian's scheme, to his three sons and a nephew. But after much bickering and many murders, and after the failure of Constans to make good in the West, Constantius alone survived (353). He called in his cousin Julian (the Apostate) to protect the West from the invading Franks and Alamanni. Julian had escaped the fatal court intrigues only by devoting himself to philosophy, as the mystical Neoplatonism of that day was called, and was hardly expected to meet the severe demands of his task, but he proved to be a shrewd general as well as a wise and considerate ruler. In 361 Constantius died on the eve of a civil war with Julian, and the latter found himself in charge of the whole realm.

His two years of sole rule were marked by a futile attempt to get rid of Christian influences and to reëstablish the pagan cults. He did not indeed persecute Christians, for their number was entirely too great for him to attempt extirpation. But he gave offices only to pagans, and he had all Christian teachers displaced by pagans. He also adopted the proselyting methods of the Christians, hoping by preaching, teaching, and argument to prove the pagan cults the more worthy. Unfortunately some of his provincial magistrates were less temperate than he, and many Christians suffered martyrdom in the provinces. He was killed in a skirmish in 363 while leading his army beyond the Tigris in a bold raid against the Persians.

After a few months under the inefficient Jovian, Valentinian (364-75), a soldier, was raised to power by the army.

He took the West as his portion with his court at Milan, and called his brother Valens (364-78) to shoulder the burden of governing the East. Their years were full of disasters, not to mention the constant quarrels between the two factions of the church which often led to bloodshed. Fortunately St. Ambrose, a follower of Athanasius, became bishop of Milan in 374. By the power of his personality, his eloquence and his persuasive pen, he did much to unite the distracted church. The strong bureaucratic machine built up by Diocletian also weakened the powers of the government, for the thieving and oppressive officials created much discontent throughout the empire, and were so thoroughly united that neither ruler dared interfere with them.

The most serious disasters, however, occurred on the frontiers. Between 366 and 370 Valentinian kept up a vigorous contest with the invading Alamanni which ended in his giving land to large numbers of them in Gaul and in accepting many others as soldiers in his legions. He died in 374 while fighting the Quadi on the Danube frontier. Meanwhile the armies of Valens were engaged in meeting a new terror. The nomad Huns, a savage Mongolian people, were rapidly surging westward, spreading terror among the Germans. Their pressure on the Armenian front had already called Valens to the East with all the forces he could gather. Then the main body of Huns had come on, crushing the Ostrogoths to the north of the Black Sea, advanced against the Visigoths who had long been settled in old Dacia as allies of Rome. Unfortunately these Goths had been weakened by religious dissension. A large part of them had been converted to Christianity (Arianism) by Bishop Ulfila, a semi-Goth who had inherited his religion from his mother, a Cappadocian captive. Some of the Christian Goths had been given lands in the provinces by the Romans when they had been persecuted by their king. Now that the Huns had defeated the portion living in Dacia, about 200,000 of these Goths,

led by a Christian chieftain, sent to Valens asking permission to come into the Empire. This he generously granted, but compelled them unwisely to give up their arms. Having come thus helplessly, they were abused by the Roman officials who refused to give them the provisions which Valens had promised. They naturally took to foraging for food, were attacked in turn, and open war resulted. Valens hurried home with his forces to drive them out, but was defeated and killed in a desperate battle before Adrianople. This fateful contest took place in 378. The flower of Rome's army was gone, the barbarians were marching at will through the Danube provinces, and the unconquered Huns were on the border.

The final disaster was held off for a while by Theodosius (379-395) who had been called to the Eastern command by Gratian, the young son of Valentinian, who now ruled in the West. Theodosius put Modar, a Goth, in charge of his armies, and called to his aid some corps of the Western army officered by a Frankish general. He was thus able in time to check the depredations of the Goths, to settle them in Dalmatia and to secure a corps of them led by Alaric to serve in his army. This act reveals a prudent and efficient ruler, and he deserved perhaps the cognomen of "the Great" which his contemporaries gave him. The name, however, was given him for his services to the church rather than to the state. Falling under the spell of St. Ambrose's eloquence, he was baptized and from that time zealously supported the orthodox creed against the Arians and took final measures also to suppress paganism. It was at his orders that the statues of the pagan gods were destroyed, the old temples given to the churches and the cult of the Vestal Virgins discontinued.

Dying in 395, he left the Empire to his two feeble sons, the East to Arcadius, the West to Honorius who chose Ravenna as his abode. Honorius was especially entrusted to the care of Stilicho, an efficient general of the Vandal

race, and he presently married the daughter of his barbarian guardian.

The two listless youths were generally at the mercy of their Teutonic generals who were quarreling for position while the barbarians were invading the provinces. Arcadius struggled vainly with the Eastern foes driven on by the Huns who were pushing through the Caucasus passes. Alaric, dissatisfied with the position his people were given by Theodosius in Dalmatia, invaded Italy, but was driven back by Stilicho in 402. But in 406 the Vandals and Suevi together with a group of Mongolian Alani, driven to desperation by the Huns, poured into Italy and Gaul. Stilicho had not the forces to check the tide. It was something that he could again clear Italy, but Gaul had to be sacrificed. The barbarians overran the southern half of the fair province with awful havoc and then advanced into Spain. They took possession of the best lands of the two provinces and settled there. The Roman legions of Britain, cut off from communication with the government, withdrew to the continent about the same time, never to return.

In 408 Stilicho, who had been accused of conniving at the invasion of his fellow countrymen, was suddenly put to death. Alaric knowing the helplessness of Honorius, invaded Italy once more with his Goths and marched upon the rich city of Rome (408) which had had security for 800 years. The city at first bought him off with a large ransom. In 409 he returned, however, and, declaring the throne vacant, pronounced his own nominee emperor. Growing bold at the demonstration of Rome's helplessness he returned in 410, stormed the city and sacked it, but for the sake of its churches he withheld the torch. Consternation spread through the realm. The power of Rome seemed at last completely broken, and one may feel the shudder of dismay that shocked the whole Empire by reading St. Augustine's "City of God" written as a kind of

"Consolation" to the Christians. Alaric marched southward, intent it seems on plundering Sicily and Africa, but he died in southern Italy.

Ataulf (Adolphus), Alaric's brother-in-law, succeeded to the command, and having learned to respect the evidences of civilization too much to continue such devastating raids, he led his horde to Gaul to find a permanent home. Driving down the Suevi and Vandals into the west and south of Spain he took possession in their stead, founding a Visigothic kingdom that extended from the Loire to Toledo and choosing Toulouse as his capital. After that the Roman emperors occasionally obtained a foothold in the Rhone valley, but the Visigothic kingdom in Gaul was not much circumscribed until Clovis the Frank put an end to it in 507.

What was left of the Western empire was now ruled by Valentinian III (423-55) under the regency of his mother, Galla Placidia, who had for four years been Ataulf's captive-wife. This reign too was turbulent with the mutinies and intrigues of ambitious generals, especially of Aëtius, the chief commander, and of Boniface, the barbarian saint and free-lance of Africa, who invited the Vandals from Spain into his province to support his cause. The Vandals came and took possession of country and cities with such devastating cruelty that their name became a synonym of the word Hun. Their leader, Gaiseric, founded a dynasty and forced recognition of his position as king in 435.

Meanwhile the Eastern emperor, Theodosius II, was suffering every disgrace at the hands of the Huns, who seem by this time to have established their rule as far as the Rhine and the Baltic over the Germanic tribes that had not escaped into the Empire. In 424 the Huns had raided the Danube provinces until the emperor promised them a yearly tribute of 350 pounds of gold. The tribute was doubled repeatedly when the lordly Attila came to power (about 445), and Theodosius did not dare resist. Then we hear

a strange tale of how Honoria, the sister of the Western Emperor sent the Mongol tyrant an offer of marriage, how Attila accepted it, and demanded that half of the Western Empire be given with her as dowry. This demand was of course refused, whereupon Attila with an army, reported to number half a million men, crossed the Rhine and marched into the center of Gaul, burning and slaying as only Huns could or would. The Visigoths were as thoroughly frightened as were the Romans. Their king Theodoric, therefore, united his forces with the Romans under Aëtius, relieved Orleans which was being besieged, drove the Huns back and offered battle not far from Châlons-sur-Marne (451). The allies suffered severely and Theodoric fell, but the Huns had also suffered, and Attila withdrew behind the Rhine. It is doubtful whether the nomads would ever have been content to settle down to a peaceful life in Gaul, for they preferred to live by plunder and forced tribute, but had they done so France would hardly have provided the abundant fruits of culture which the world has learned to admire. The "battle of Châlons" may with good reason be considered one of the decisive battles of the world.

Attila, however, had turned back only to invade Italy the next year. Here many cities fell into his power and suffered from his inexcusable sacking. It seemed that he would march on Rome and raze that city too, for Aëtius without foreign aid dared not risk the feeble Roman army against the Hunnish hordes. Then the Bishop of Rome, Leo the Great, came up to Attila's camp on Lake Garda and with all the authority he could assume solemnly warned the savage of the wrath of God that had befallen Alaric after his desecration of the holy city. Attila it seems cowered before the majestic saint who spoke with such assurance, and humbly led his hordes back to Hungary. We hear little more of this scourge. He died a year later and his people fell apart, soon absorbed by the natives of Cen-

tral and Eastern Europe. Attila became the theme of legends which entered into the fabric of Germany's oldest epics.

Rome had been spared from the worst possible fate only to fall three years later into the hands of men not much less savage, Gaiseric and his Vandal pirates. Gaiseric had been recognized by the emperors as king in Africa, but that had not prevented him from manning the ships he had found at Carthage and carrying on raids against the shores of the realm. In 455 hearing of Valentinian's death he sailed with a large force against Rome. Pope Leo tried to prevail upon the Teuton as he had upon the Hun to spare Rome but he was merely brushed aside. That the city was not burned may have been due to his prayers. But the plunderers left nothing of value that could be carried away. For two weeks they ravaged and carried down to Ostia all that their fleet could hold, even to the bronze roof of the Capitoline temple. Eudoxia, the widow of the emperor, was taken captive and married to Gaiseric's son and successor.

For the next twenty years there was peace on the frontier since the Huns, who had caused the confusion of peoples, were falling apart, and Ricimer, the Suabian general ("master of troops") of the Western Empire, freely took into service in the Roman army such Germans as desired a place in the empire. Ricimer in fact was practically ruler of the West, raising up one puppet emperor after the other to suit his whim. He seems to have had the courage to do all things but to proclaim himself emperor. He died in 472.

Four years after when two feeble rivals claimed the throne of Rome, the German troops of the army that had been hired by Ricimer—and most of them were Germans—mutinied and acclaimed one of their officers, Odovacar, king. The ancient writers looked upon this act as the end of the Roman empire of the West. In point of law it was

hardly that since the Empire had never been legally divided, and Odovacar, so far from demanding the imperial title, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Eastern Emperor. He claimed and received the title of *patricius* as the commander of the Western army, and of *rex* over his own people to whom he gave a third of the land. He was not even the first barbarian to rule Rome, since scarcely any of the emperors after Commodus had been of Roman stock. But he differed from these mainly in that he was raised to power by a barbarian horde which acted not in the capacity of Rome's army but as a group of invaders who took possession of Italy as their own.

In the West, Roman institutions had given way almost everywhere. In Britain the legions were long since withdrawn, in Gaul the Franks held the northern half, and were soon to win the East from the Burgundians and the South from the Visigoths; in Spain the Suevi inhabited the northeast, the Visigoths most of the rest. The Vandals held Africa, while in Italy Odovacar's Germans dwelt everywhere as haughty conquerors, soon to be reinforced by Theodoric's Ostrogoths.

Was Roman civilization at an end? The government still lived in the East, and, protected by the almost impregnable walls of Constantinople, was destined to survive for many centuries. Justinian (527-565) in fact assumes a lofty place in the story of civilization because of his success in producing a complete Codification of Roman laws. To be sure this is itself a confession that original constructive legislation had come to an end, and that the imperial jurists felt incapable of meeting the needs of the courts of law except by memorized formulae created in days of greater wisdom. Indeed the code with its scrap-book-like jumble of laws, edicts, and rescripts betrays a strange lack of organizing power. But for all that the emperor's purpose in having the code made reveals a true

Roman respect for law, and his work, however imperfect in arrangement, proved of inestimable value to posterity.

We must also mention to Justinian's credit the superb church of Santa Sophia with its daring fusion of Roman and Eastern principles of architecture. The Greek artists whom he so wisely selected and commissioned to build without stint created a temple that surpassed in beauty and in originality any structure ever erected at Rome, though it must be added that Roman structural inventions alone made the new conception possible.

But the Roman court of the East soon lost its Western character. By the seventh century Latin was no longer heard on the streets of Constantinople, Roman books were allowed to decay; not one Latin text has survived for us in that Empire, and even the great code by which the state was supposed to govern and administer had to give way to simplified epitomes composed in Greek.

Roman civilization seemed to be faring even worse in the West. The Goths, Burgundians, and Lombards cared even less for art and literature than did the decadent natives, and with the zeal of new converts the fiery preachers of the church warned in and out of season against the reading of pagan literature. Were it not for the box of precious rolls that Cassiodorus (480-575) rescued and brought to his monastery on the southern coast of Italy, and the codices which Celtic refugees carried along to Ireland when escaping from Teutonic raiders in Gaul, very few of our Latin authors would have survived. The sixth and seventh were centuries of well-nigh midnight darkness for pagan culture throughout the West. The Bible alone remained to carry on the tremendous task of re-education.

Presently we find monks carrying back copies of the Latin classics here and there over the pacified continent to serve as text books in writing and grammar. Then a few men of intelligence began to read them with comprehension.

The authors of *Beowulf* and the old French epics studied the *Aeneid* to learn how to compose epic tales. The earliest Gaelic literature shows the influence of classic rules of composition; even the sagas of Iceland betray a study of Livy and Sallust and Lucan. In the twelfth century the first university of a new world grew up at Bologna around a copy of Justinian's code. A little later we find Dante accepting the guidance of Vergil in writing his *Divine Comedy*, Pisano studying the reliefs of old Roman sarcophagi for the secrets of artistic sculpture, and Petrarch starting the search of monasteries for precious manuscripts. It was thus that the art of the modern world came to be. The barbarians of Europe, slowly assimilating through centuries the texts which remained, had now mastered them, and recognizing in them a kindred spirit of rationalism, they rejected the medieval obscurantism that had temporarily beclouded Europe, and set out along the path of culture indicated by the great masters of the ancient world.

✓ To-day the principles of Roman jurisprudence and government constitute the most vital element in the heritage of the ancient Romans. With the republication in Washington of the classics of international law we have again become aware that modern international law was based upon the precepts of the Roman Civil Code. Bryce has revealed to us how extensively the rules of that code have penetrated the whole civilized world, permeating the laws that govern nearly 800,000,000 people. Of its present vitality we were recently reminded when the Supreme Court of the United States decided a federal case between the states of Kansas and Colorado by reference to a line which Napoleon's code borrowed from the *Digest*. That our constitution is a peculiar combination of democratic and aristocratic principles in conjunction with strong executive power is largely due to the enthusiasm of eighteenth century essayists for the republican constitution of Rome. Our laws of inheritance, our acceptance of the legal parity

of men and women, our respect for property rights and for contracts are essentially Roman; and it is largely due to the precepts and examples of Republican Rome that modern governments have so persistently searched for a way to combine liberty and law, to follow after justice as against privilege, to accept the principles of equity as axiomatic, and to persist against every discouragement in extending the domain of a sane and intelligent democracy.

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The first historian of Rome was Fabius Pictor, who wrote a brief history in Greek about 200 B.C., that is, at least four centuries after the city was founded. From the appearance of his work till the fall of Rome there was a steady stream of histories produced, and enough of these have survived to provide a fairly satisfactory account. But opinions differ widely regarding the reliability of the stories provided by Livy, Dionysius, Diodorus, and Plutarch for the several centuries anterior to 200 B.C. The point of view adopted in the present volume is that the basic structure of important events narrated by later historians is fairly reliable for the period after 500 B.C. The Romans, respecters of law and legal forms to an unusual degree, preserved copies of their treaties, laws, and senatorial decrees, and also the high priests' brief record of events. The pontifical annals purported, to be sure, to record only deeds of religious significance, but since only men of political dignity became priests, their annals were apt to contain many items of political import.

The common assumption that most records were destroyed by the Gauls in 390 B.C. is far from probable. Archaeologists have found reason to believe that most of the temples escaped destruction and with them the records they contained. Apparently the Celts, as is often the case with primitive peoples, respected the holy places. At any rate, the treaties, which were kept on the Capitol, survived.

The earlier historians of Rome, like Fabius Pictor, were statesmen trained to acquire an accurate knowledge of laws and treaties. It is incorrect to ascribe to such men the loose historical methods that were followed by the rhetorical romancers who wrote for entertainment in Sulla's day. The care and knowledge they employed in affairs of state they doubtless used in their composition of history.

In using later historians who have filled in the Fabian skeleton with many picturesque legends, we may in general assume that the main structure of the chronology is reliable—allowing of course for a discrepancy of a few years for the early period—that the consular lists are on the whole safe, and that in large part the laws, treaties, *senatus consulta*, colonial dates, and dates of important wars

are acceptable. It must, however, be remembered that senatorial debates and bills proposed but not passed were not recorded, and that the pontifical records had not space for details regarding military movements. Hence when such things occur in the accounts of the period before 300 B.C. they must be considered as arising from mere oral tradition which it is safest to reject wholly. After such purgation the account afforded by our literary sources seems to be in reasonable accord with the latest conclusions of archaeology.

Archaeological researches in the remains of the early city have been very fruitful in recent years (published chiefly in the *Notizie degli Scavi*). They have done much to establish faith in the early traditions recorded by the later authors. The historians of twenty years ago who insisted upon reducing the chronology of the early Republic by a century or two have been proved to be in the wrong. By comparing the art objects, native and imported, found in the débris of early Rome with those of Greece and Etruria, which can generally be dated, we are now in the position to say, for instance, that Rome was a large city in the sixth century B.C., surrounded by a well-built stone wall, possessing many buildings that were decorated by excellent Greek and Etruscan artists, and in touch with an extensive Mediterranean commerce. We also know from archaeology that the Latin cities and colonies mentioned by early tradition as flourishing in the sixth century were in fact what the accounts of Livy and Dionysius picture them as being at that time. Indeed archaeology has generally vindicated tradition wherever the test can be applied.

From the time of the first Punic war we generally can establish a sound basis upon which to build. Polybius, who wrote between 150 and 130 B.C., provides an excellent account for the period between 264 and 146. Livy's work, through somewhat less reliable, is very much fuller. His history, in books 20-45, is very serviceable for the years between 218 and 167 B.C. and the brief epitomes of his last books, from book 46 to 150, are of some value for another century and a half. Plutarch's "Lives" vary in historical value. Those that deal with characters of the early Republic are based wholly upon the oral traditions recorded by romancing story-tellers of the Sullan age. The "Lives" of men of the post-Hannibalic period usually contain the fruits of indiscriminate reading of current histories, biographies, and of some valuable autobiographies now lost.

Plutarch did not pretend to be a critical historian; he selected his material wholly with a view to writing entertaining and moralizing stories. Nevertheless he reports what he finds, he does not invent.

Appian, another Greek author, though not a great historian, has preserved for us in his "Civil Wars" and his "Foreign Wars" a heavy conglomerate of stuff drawn from the numerous historians, good and bad, who wrote during the last two centuries of the Republic. We have not always the means whereby to sift his material. The account of Caesar's rule seems to be very reliable, for instance, while the portion which follows Caesar's death is demonstrably full of grave errors. The Greek Cassius Dio is valuable in preserving in his extensive "Roman History" much of Livy's lost history of the end of the Republic, but his work is also badly contaminated with useless rhetorical verbiage and with apologetic material drawn from political pamphlets written with a decided bias. Caesar's "Gallic War" is excellent, his "Civil War," written in self-defense, not quite so reliable. Sallust has provided useful material in the "Catiline" and in the "Jugurtha." Cicero's correspondence, of which we have about nine hundred letters, is invaluable, and his orations and essays furnish much useful material to the historian.

For the first century of the Empire we rely mainly upon Tacitus' "Annals" and "Histories," Suetonius' "Lives of the Caesars" (to and including Domitian), Velleius' brief history, Cassius Dio (fragmentary after 46 A.D.), Josephus, casual statements in Seneca, Pliny's letters, Juvenal, and Quintilian, besides a number of important inscriptions and a mass of coins. Tacitus was a keen critic of society and politics and wrote with compelling force, but his point of view is too insistently that of the senatorial nobility. Suetonius is valuable chiefly as an antiquarian who delved into the imperial archives, but he failed at times to submit his finds to thorough-going criticism. The inscriptions, of which more than 100,000 have been published in the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, provide a great mass of incidental but useful facts. The coins supply dates of importance, and frequently facts of value for economic history.

After the reign of Nerva, we must rely more and more upon the casual contributions of inscriptions. There exists, for instance, no consecutive account of the reigns of Nerva and Trajan. Fragments and paraphrased abstracts of Cassius Dio are of service here and there down to 180 A.D., then Herodian, who continued Dio's work,

offers us a hasty and rhetorical sketch as far as 238 A.D. The *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, composed in the fourth century, purports to continue Suetonius' "Lives of the Caesars" down to Numerian. The first few "Lives" of this collection, beginning with Hadrian, seem to rest on fairly good sources, but the account of the emperors of the third century is very careless work. Ammianus Marcellinus brings us back to solid ground but only for the brief period of 353-378, while Procopius and Jordanes give full accounts of the late wars with the Persian and Germanic invaders. The lacunae must be filled in by references in the voluminous works of the Christian apologists.

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